Israel’s August 18, 2026, airstrike on the Abu al-Dhuhour airbase, about 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, marked a new escalation in Turkish-Israeli competition over Syria. Israel later claimed that Syria had been preparing to alter what Israel regarded as the existing security status quo by allowing Turkey to deploy radar and air-defense systems operated by Turkish military personnel at the base. US Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack disputed that account, called the attack an unnecessary escalation, and warned that neither Washington nor Ankara had been notified of the strike and that Turkish forces could reasonably have prepared a military response. He also raised the possibility that Israel had sought to provoke Turkey for political gain ahead of Israeli elections. On September 23, 2026, Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa condemned Israel’s repeated strikes and incursions at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, rejecting its attempts to impose a new reality on the ground, and calling for Israeli forces to withdraw to the lines they held on December 8, 2024.
The Israeli Abu al-Dhuhour strike occurred just one week before the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced their dissolution and full integration into Syrian state institutions. Together, the two developments reveal both the extent and the limits of Turkey’s influence over Syria’s emerging order. The end of the SDF as an autonomous military and administrative actor brings Syria substantially closer to Ankara’s preferred model of a centralized state capable of absorbing nonstate armed groups. It also reflects a growing Turkish-US convergence over the reconstruction of state authority in Syria. Yet the attack on Abu al-Dhuhour demonstrated that Israel is determined to prevent the same centralized state from acquiring the military capabilities—and particularly the control of its own airspace—that meaningful sovereignty would require.
Syria has therefore become the main arena for a strategic rivalry between Turkey and Israel. This competition is no longer merely rhetorical, as Turkish-Israeli hostility often was during the decade after 2010. But nor does it necessarily point toward an Israel-Iran-style confrontation. Turkey remains a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member embedded in the US-led security system, and for now, US mediation and military deconfliction can contain their rivalry. Whether they will continue to do so depends not only on Turkish and Israeli strategic calculations, but also on Washington’s willingness and ability to restrain an increasingly aggressive Israel that has demonstrated a willingness to escalate even when doing so damages its longer-term interests.
The Dissolution of the SDF
The formal dissolution of the SDF marks the culmination of a process that had been unfolding for months. Ankara had long opposed the continued existence of an autonomous political and military structure led by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which it regards as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). By the time SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced the organization’s dissolution on August 25, much of its territorial authority had already been transferred and the integration of its military and civilian institutions was well underway. The announcement nevertheless formalized a significant Turkish gain, even though implementation remains incomplete. The eventual outcome is close to what Turkey sought: the SDF and its affiliated autonomous administration have ceased to exist as independent institutions, while border crossings, oil and gas fields, prisons, and other public facilities have been transferred to the central government. The agreement also provides for the removal from Syria of non-Syrian personnel linked to the PKK.
For the Kurds, the settlement is a major retreat from the autonomous institutions constructed during the civil war.
Washington’s shift helped make this outcome possible. The United States did not initially seek the SDF’s dissolution, having built and supported it as its principal local partner against the so-called Islamic State (IS). But once the al-Sharaa government established itself as a viable center of authority, Washington increasingly came to view Damascus, rather than an autonomous SDF, as its preferred partner for stabilizing Syria.
For the Kurds, the settlement is a major retreat from the autonomous institutions constructed during the civil war. The SDF leadership’s decision to postpone meaningful concessions after Assad’s fall also weakened its eventual bargain. By the time government forces advanced into the northeast and Arab tribal components defected, the SDF no longer possessed the leverage it had enjoyed earlier. An earlier settlement might have produced somewhat better terms, although the declining US commitment meant that no agreement was likely to preserve anything close to the former autonomous administration.
Nevertheless, the outcome is not simply individual surrender. Some personnel from the YPG, the principal Kurdish component of the broader SDF coalition, have entered four Kurdish brigades in the national army stationed in Hasaka, Kobane, al-Malikiyah, and Qamishli, rather than being dispersed entirely among existing units. Damascus retains approval over their personnel and commanders, and the brigades comprise only a fraction of the SDF’s former forces. Heavy weapons are being transferred to the Ministry of Defense, non-Syrian PKK-linked cadres are excluded, and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) is expected to join the Interior Ministry collectively as a counterterrorism force, although the final arrangements remain unsettled. Collective entry at brigade level is therefore a limited Kurdish gain, but it does not preserve the YPG as an autonomous army.
The political settlement follows the same pattern of restricted incorporation. Mazloum Abdi has been appointed an adviser to the presidency, while senior YPG commander Sipan Hamo has become deputy defense minister for the eastern regions. Further appointments are expected for other Kurdish political figures. Such offices are not necessarily ceremonial, and they can give Kurdish leaders access to the central state and influence over policy implementation. But they do not replace the independent administrative and coercive capacity that the autonomous administration once possessed. Their effect is closer to elite incorporation into an authoritarian order dominated by Damascus than to meaningful power-sharing.
The cultural balance is similarly mixed but unequal. Kurdish has been recognized as a national language, but not an official language, and its entry into the state education system is an important departure from the denialist policies of earlier Syrian governments. Yet limited instruction cannot be compared with the Kurdish-language system that extended from primary school through university under the autonomous administration. The agreement provides recognition and restricted representation in exchange for the surrender of territorial autonomy and independent armed power.
There is a parallel with Turkey’s domestic Kurdish process, although the institutional circumstances differ. In both countries, the dissolution of an armed organization is accompanied by the incorporation of parts of the Kurdish movement into an authoritarian governing order. In Turkey, closer relations between the pro-Kurdish DEM Party and the governing alliance have developed alongside legislation concerning the PKK’s dissolution. In Syria, former YPG personnel and Kurdish political leaders have entered state institutions.
The SDF settlement marked a major step toward the centralized Syrian state that Turkey supports. Yet Damascus’s authority remains constrained by Israel’s opposition to a Turkish-backed Syrian military capable of restricting Israeli operations. Syria has consequently become a central arena of Turkish-Israeli strategic competition.
More than Rhetoric
Turkish-Israeli relations have long displayed a marked gap between rhetorical hostility and the actual level of confrontation. For more than a decade after the 2010 rupture, political rhetoric often suggested near-enmity, but disputes remained contained and bilateral trade even expanded substantially. This gap reflected the domestic political utility of confrontation for both governments.
The Abu al-Dhuhour strike partly followed that pattern. Coming ahead of Israeli elections, it bore the marks of the politically motivated confrontations long familiar in Turkish-Israeli relations. Yet it also revealed that Syria has brought a material conflict between the two countries that was largely absent from their earlier disputes.
For Ankara, a viable central government [in Syria] requires armed forces able to police the country and eventually defend its sovereignty.
Turkey wants a unified Syrian state capable of extending authority across its territory, containing autonomous armed actors, facilitating refugee returns, and serving as a stable political and economic partner. This approach has made Turkey one of the principal foreign allies of al-Sharaa’s government. Turkey is training Syrian military personnel and has agreed to provide equipment and logistical support. For Ankara, a viable central government requires armed forces able to police the country and eventually defend its sovereignty. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reaffirmed that alignment at the UN General Assembly in September, describing Syria under al-Sharaa as moving toward security and stability despite “internal and external provocations” and pledging continued Turkish support.
Israel favors a fundamentally different regional order. It has historically benefited from weak and fragmented neighboring states whose armed forces cannot challenge its military superiority or restrict its freedom of action. This does not mean that Israel requires Syria to remain in permanent civil war. A centralized government in Damascus may even be useful if it can impose security commitments on local actors. Israel would prefer a Syrian government strong enough to control its population and honor agreements, yet too militarily weak to control its own airspace or resist Israeli operations. Its continuing occupation in the south, its protection of Druze autonomy in al-Suwayda, and its destruction of Syrian military infrastructure show how it seeks to limit the authority and military capacity of the Damascus government, and with them Syria’s effective sovereignty.
The Struggle over Airspace
Abu al-Dhuhour brought the Turkish-Israeli dispute over the limits of Syrian sovereignty into sharper focus in the north. Israel can tolerate Turkish economic and political influence more easily than Turkish-supported military infrastructure that might eventually restrict Israeli access to Syrian airspace. The airbase had reportedly been inspected by a Turkish delegation shortly before the attack. Israel described the possible deployment of Turkish forces and radar systems there as a breach of what it considered the existing security status quo.
Barrack’s response to that claim was unusually critical of Israel for a US diplomat, but it also contained an implicit reassurance. He disputed the alleged deployment and called the strike unnecessary, without questioning Israel’s broader military operations in Syrian airspace.
The criticism from Barrack also left the underlying dispute unresolved. Turkey already has troops in Syria and close ties to the government in Damascus. What Israel appears determined to prevent is Turkish support for radar or air-defense systems that could restrict its aircraft. Israel’s ground operations remain concentrated in the south, but its aircraft can strike across the country. Its attacks on bases in Homs and Hama in 2025 were widely read as a warning against Turkish bases in central Syria. The strike on Abu al-Dhuhour, close to Turkey’s border, suggested that Israel would press the same objection in the north.
US Mediation and the Limits of Deconfliction
The most immediate risk is an Israeli strike on a Syrian facility where Turkish personnel are present, prompting a Turkish military response. To reduce the danger of such an encounter, Turkey and Israel began technical deconfliction talks in 2025, and after the Abu al-Dhuhour strike, Washington announced that it was working on a more robust communication mechanism involving Israel, Syria, and Turkey. Such arrangements reflect an interest in preventing miscalculation. Turkey’s position within the US-led security order also makes an Israel-Iran analogy misleading. Ankara is not an isolated power seeking to overturn the global system but a NATO member whose regional influence is exercised largely within a US-led order.
Yet structural incentives alone cannot guarantee restraint. Israel’s recent use of force has repeatedly produced immediate tactical gains at the expense of its broader strategic interests. Its September 2025 attack on Qatar, a state deeply embedded in the US security architecture, demonstrated that US partnership does not itself provide immunity from Israeli escalation. Such actions have not necessarily made Israel more secure. Their cumulative effect has damaged confidence in US-backed regional arrangements and weakened the prospect of an Israel-centered security architecture developing around the Abraham Accords.
Israeli military operations come at a cost to Syrian sovereignty, and the two countries’ conflicting aims will continue to test US efforts to contain the rivalry.
The same dynamic could operate in Syria. Neither Turkey nor Israel has a strategic interest in war, but domestic political incentives, confidence in US protection, and Israel’s willingness to accept high military risks may still produce strategically self-defeating escalation. A communication mechanism can reduce the danger of accidental confrontation, but it cannot prevent deliberate escalation. Washington must therefore do more than facilitate deconfliction.
The history of Turkish-Greek relations offers a useful comparison. Both countries are NATO members and firmly embedded in the US-led security order, yet this did not eliminate their strategic rivalry or the danger of military escalation. At moments of acute tension, stability depended in part on active diplomacy and Washington’s willingness to use its political and military influence with both sides. Turkey and Israel are likewise part of a US-centered security network, even though Israel is not a NATO member. This makes channels of communication relatively easy to establish. The harder task is for Washington to use its leverage when those channels fail to deter escalation. To prevent further escalations in Syria, Washington must oppose Israeli strikes that put Turkish personnel at risk or undermine the Syrian government the United States has itself supported, and it must use its considerable military and diplomatic leverage to restrain Israel from actions likely to provoke a Turkish response.
For now, Turkish predominance in the north and within Syrian state institutions coexists with Israel’s ability to impose military constraints from the south and the air. This uneasy coexistence gives Washington room to prevent a direct Turkish-Israeli confrontation. But Israeli military operations come at a cost to Syrian sovereignty, and the two countries’ conflicting aims will continue to test US efforts to contain the rivalry.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Kobi Gideon, GPO
