Overnight on June 21-22, American military aircraft launched strikes on three nuclear facilities inside Iran, most notably the fortified Fordow plant. To reach the underground facility, located inside a mountain near Qom, the United States employed bunker-busting bombs. Although the strikes marked Washington’s entrance into in a war initiated by Israel against Iran on June 13, President Donald Trump framed US involvement as limited, emphasizing his desire to avoid a broader conflict.
Iran insisted on a response, albeit a symbolic one. Unlike its reaction to the first Trump administration’s 2020 assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, in which Iran targeted the US Ain al-Asad Air Base in Iraq, this time Tehran opted for the first-ever strike on a US military base in the Gulf. It launched missiles toward al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the region’s most significant hub for American air operations and home to the forward headquarters of the US Central Command, which is responsible for all military operations in the Middle East. While the strike was largely symbolic—Qatar had been warned in advance—the attack demonstrated Iran’s willingness to escalate should a full-scale war with the United States erupt. This development heightened the Gulf states’ fears about potential damage to critical infrastructure and national economies in the event of regional escalation.
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states have adopted a public posture of neutrality, attempting to distance themselves from the conflict.
Considering these concerns, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states have adopted a public posture of neutrality, attempting to distance themselves from the conflict between the American-Israeli axis and Iran. This included reportedly denying the United States use of its military bases on their soil for strikes against Iran. By the end of the 12-day Israel-Iran conflagration, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors had largely succeeded in avoiding direct fallout. However, Iran’s symbolic attack on al-Udeid served as a stark reminder that a wider conflict could drag the Gulf states into the center of the storm. This possibility strengthened Riyadh’s commitment to a policy of strategic nonalignment and conflict avoidance, which is vital to protecting its economic diversification agenda.
Yet, the United States has hinted at renewed efforts to normalize relations between Israel and key Arab and Muslim countries—most notably Saudi Arabia. President Trump views expansion of the Abraham Accords as a central foreign policy goal, as his Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff has stated. Such a development poses a challenge to Saudi Arabia’s neutrality strategy. Normalization could undermine Riyadh’s position as a neutral actor and increase the likelihood of entanglement in future Israeli-Iranian escalations. At present, normalization does not appear to be on the horizon, as Riyadh insists on linking it to the creation of a Palestinian state.
Staying Out of the Conflict
Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy is deeply informed by its Vision 2030 development plan, which emphasizes economic diversification and the cultivation of new industries. These priorities have driven Riyadh to de-escalate tensions with regional neighbors and to avoid entanglement in conflicts that could damage its investment climate or disrupt economic reforms.
Since the onset of the war in Gaza, Saudi Arabia has expressed concern about regional spillover. In the weeks leading up to Israel’s June 2025 strike on Iran, Riyadh—joined by other Gulf capitals—reportedly sought to dissuade President Trump from initiating a military confrontation. In April 2025, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman traveled to Tehran to meet Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and deliver a message urging diplomatic engagement with Washington and reaching an agreement to avoid escalation.
Riyadh and other Gulf capitals sought to dissuade Trump from initiating a military confrontation with Iran.
The Gulf states also insisted that their airspace would not be used for any US military operations targeting Iran. The rationale was clear: involvement would not only expose vital infrastructure to Iranian retaliation, as occurred in the 2019 Abqaiq attacks in Saudi Arabia, but also deter foreign investment by reinforcing perceptions of regional instability.
When Israel attacked Iran on June 13, 2025, Saudi Arabia publicly condemned Israeli aggression. Saudi media adopted a relatively restrained tone toward Iran, and the government announced support for Iranian pilgrims still in the Kingdom, offering them continued care until they could return home. While a weakening of Iranian regional influence was not unwelcomed, as occurred in the past year with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s fall and Hezbollah’s setbacks, the kingdom remains uneasy about unchecked Israeli dominance in the region. Excessive pressure on Iran, cornering it into narrow options, could destabilize the Gulf and harm Saudi economic and security interests.
The kingdom did view the US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities with concern. Riyadh stopped short of condemning the American action but issued a balanced statement expressing alarm over the potential consequences. It harshly criticized Iran’s retaliatory strike on al-Udeid but refrained from escalation, interpreting the response as a calibrated signal rather than a provocation. Diplomatic channels between Riyadh and Tehran remained open; following the Israeli-Iranian ceasefire, Iran’s new chief of staff Abdolrahim Mousavi—appointed to replace Mohammad Bagheri who was killed in Israel’s June 13 initial attack—placed a call to Khalid bin Salman to discuss bilateral relations and military developments.
The Resurgence of Normalization Talks?
The end of hostilities has not dispelled fears of future conflict between Israel and Iran, especially because the issue of Iran’s nuclear program is not resolved. While Saudi Arabia remains confident in the effectiveness of its neutral stance, a future round of hostilities—particularly one involving deeper US engagement—may not afford it the same insulation. Thus, Riyadh continues to prioritize the de-escalation agreement that it reached with Iran under Chinese auspices in 2023 and wants Washington to avoid further military entanglement in the region.
The Trump administration appears intent on capitalizing on Iran’s weakened regional posture by reshaping the Middle East in line with American and Israeli interests. Recent reports suggest that Washington is pursuing expanded Abraham Accords agreements, potentially involving Syria, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia.
Yet, for Riyadh, normalization with Israel in 2025 differs significantly from the context of two years ago. Prior to the start of the Israeli war on Gaza in October 2023, Saudi Arabia was engaged in normalization talks with the Biden administration. At the time, such an agreement appeared to offer tangible benefits: a defense pact, access to civilian nuclear technology, and advanced American weapons systems. However, the events of the past two years have altered the calculus. With the Gaza conflict ongoing, normalization—especially if it sidelines the Palestinian cause—is increasingly untenable.
Saudi Arabia has since advocated for a clear pathway to a two-state solution as a prerequisite for normalization. It even coordinated with France to convene an international conference in New York on the matter, though this initiative was postponed due to the Israeli-Iranian war. The push for a two-state framework runs counter to current Israeli preferences. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu still believes that he can secure a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia without a Palestinian state. The United States may push the Israeli government to declare its willingness to accept the two-state solution, contingent upon Palestinian Authority reforms, in order to make the normalization deal with Saudi Arabia possible. Today, there are Israeli reports claiming that Saudi Arabia would approve the resumption of normalization talks if the Palestinian Authority returns to govern Gaza following the end of the Gaza war and Hamas’s rule of the enclave.
Moreover, the strategic benefits of normalization are no longer as compelling. While a US defense agreement remains attractive for protecting Saudi territory, and while the kingdom is still interested in procuring American weapons, Riyadh’s recent experience suggests that neutrality and diplomacy may offer more reliable security. A defense pact alone would not shield Saudi Arabia from attack in the absence of a positive relationship with Iran. Despite US and western supplies of weapons, even Israel still suffered from Iranian missile attacks.
A defense pact with the US would not shield Saudi Arabia from attack in the absence of a positive relationship with Iran.
The civilian nuclear program, once under negotiation, also appears to be relegated to the back burner. The American insistence on prohibiting uranium enrichment in Iran suggests a broader regional stance, one that would likely preclude Saudi enrichment as well. Although there was speculation about progress on the nuclear issue ahead of Trump’s visit to the kingdom in May 2025, no announcement followed.
From Riyadh’s perspective, normalization in this situation without a robust economic and security partnership with Washington risks conceding to Israeli regional dominance, which is an uncomfortable prospect. For all these reasons, Saudi enthusiasm for normalization currently appears muted. President Trump had previously stated that Saudi Arabia should join the Abraham Accords in its own time, but it seems the dynamics for Trump may have shifted in the post-Israel-Iran war. On the other hand, if Syria—despite its history of conflict with Israel and its occupied territories—joins the normalization track, US pressure on Saudi Arabia may intensify.
Conclusion
Saudi Arabia views its neutral posture in the conflict between Israel and Iran—and by extension, between the United States and Iran—as the most effective strategy to safeguard its territory and Vision 2030 economic transformation. Normalization with Israel at this juncture could compromise that neutrality, undermining a policy that has proven effective and exposing the kingdom to heightened risk in any future conflict.
Despite the apparent success of this neutral approach, challenges remain. Chief among them is the risk of renewed conflict, possibly leading to drastic Iranian measures such as closing the Strait of Hormuz, an outcome with severe economic implications for oil-exporting Gulf states. In parallel, Saudi Arabia could face increasing pressure to join the Abraham Accords. Doing so would not only deviate from its current neutral stance but may also require abandoning the requirement of the Palestinian issue, a situation that would come with significant strategic and reputational costs.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: SPA
