Turkey has played a pivotal role in Syria’s conflict, significantly shaping the trajectory of opposition groups, particularly Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Without Turkey’s involvement, HTS would have likely struggled to maintain its control in Idlib, let alone to challenge the Assad regime. While HTS gained valuable governance experience over the past seven years by administering Idlib, transforming Syria into a functioning state requires far more than knowledge of localized control. It demands a skilled workforce, advanced technical capabilities, a political structure capable of managing diversity, and above all substantial international financial aid and investment. Although Turkey’s support has been critical, achieving stability in a post-Assad Syria necessitates broader global cooperation.
Ankara and the interim HTS government in Damascus are both aware of these challenges. Consequently, they have actively sought to garner support from Gulf countries, Europe, and the United States. Turkey has taken care not to hinder HTS’s overtures toward improved relations with the Gulf and other Arab states, including Egypt and Jordan. However, different approaches between Turkey and Western actors regarding the future of Kurdish political and military structures in Syria are creating tensions and putting HTS in a difficult position.
Turkey’s Consistent Support for the Syrian Opposition
Although Turkey has been a steadfast supporter of the Syrian opposition during the civil war, its relationship with HTS is relatively recent. During the initial phase of the Syrian uprising, Turkey aligned with the United States and Saudi Arabia in seeking the removal of President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey viewed the uprising as part of a broader regional transformation that would make it the hegemonic force in the Middle East while for the other two countries, the primary objective was reducing Iranian influence.
Turkey viewed the [Syrian] uprising as part of a broader regional transformation that would make it the hegemonic force in the Middle East while for the other two countries, the primary objective was reducing Iranian influence.
Early in the civil war, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s optimistic rhetoric, such as his declaration in 2012 that he would soon pray at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, symbolized Turkey’s ambitious vision. However, critics have since pointed to the chaos in Syria and the influx of more than three million Syrian refugees into Turkey since 2011 as evidence of policy failure. Moreover, Turkey’s support for the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Syria and elsewhere in the region damaged its relations with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, which view these uprisings as an existential threat to their regimes.
Despite all the challenges, Turkey pursued a policy of supporting the Syrian opposition, including initially adopting an open-door policy for Syrians fleeing the violence. This allowed the relatively free movement of arms and personnel between the two countries, making Turkey a retreat for opposition fighters. Additionally, Turkey played a role in forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA), originally composed of defectors from the Syrian military. Over time, Turkey sought to transform the FSA into a more effective fighting force, notably through the Turkish-American “train and equip” initiative. However, these efforts failed, and the FSA remained weak and disorganized. As radical jihadist groups, like the so-called Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda, gained influence, the Syrian uprising devolved into a sectarian civil war, harming the opposition and further complicating Turkey’s objectives.
Over time, as the Syrian conflict evolved, so did the FSA. This force, which initially symbolized hope for a unified opposition, transformed into the Syrian National Army (SNA) around 2017. One of the four significant military forces in Syria today, the SNA has become a critical Turkish proxy, reflecting Ankara’s strategic investments in the region. Still, however, and despite substantial support from Turkey, including financial and logistical backing, the SNA struggles with persistent issues of discipline and cohesion, limiting its overall effectiveness on the battlefield.
The rise of jihadist groups, particularly the Islamic State, which gained prominence around 2014 during its territorial expansion in Iraq and Syria, created a rift between American and Turkish strategies for Syria. While Washington prioritized combating IS, Ankara remained focused on removing Assad.
Diverging Strategies with the United States
The rise of jihadist groups, particularly the Islamic State, which gained prominence around 2014 during its territorial expansion in Iraq and Syria, created a rift between American and Turkish strategies for Syria. While Washington prioritized combating IS, Ankara remained focused on removing Assad. Eventually, the United States decided to ally itself with the Kurdish militant organization the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the war against IS, a decision that has become one of the biggest problems in Turkish-American relations. Turkey considers the YPG an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party, which both Turkey and the United States deem a terrorist organization. This divergence led to mutual accusations of collaborating with terrorists. On the one hand, Turkey has faced accusations from some US officials, including President Trump’s nominee for Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and policy experts of harboring jihadists or being lenient toward their activities. On the other hand, Turkey has criticized the United States for its support of the YPG, accusing Washington of collaborating with one terrorist group to fight another. These disagreements have become a persistent source of tension in Turkish-American relations, with both sides accusing each other of undermining their respective security concerns.
Background of Turkey-HTS Relations
The relationship between Turkey and HTS has evolved through various phases, shaped by the interplay of pragmatic security concerns and geopolitical ambitions. Ankara’s direct engagement with HTS began after the group emerged as the dominant power in Idlib. Turkey’s primary objective has been to stabilize the region and prevent a humanitarian crisis, which would likely result in a new wave of refugees. Through the 2018 Sochi Agreement with Russia, Turkey assumed a mediating role, implicitly coordinating with HTS to enforce ceasefires and manage security in Idlib.
Over time, Turkey’s role expanded to more direct involvement, making Ankara a critical player in HTS’s trajectory and the broader dynamics of northwestern Syria. This deepening engagement became evident in 2020 when Turkey intervened militarily to prevent the collapse of HTS during a Syrian regime and Russian offensive in Idlib. By doing so, Turkey safeguarded HTS’s survival, and the indirect coordination gradually became more explicit. Turkey also gave HTS control over border trade, enabling the organization to survive economically.
Over time, Turkey’s role expanded to more direct involvement, making Ankara a critical player in HTS’s trajectory and the broader dynamics of northwestern Syria. This deepening engagement became evident in 2020 when Turkey intervened militarily to prevent the collapse of HTS during a Syrian regime and Russian offensive in Idlib.
Despite these developments, Turkey continued to officially designate HTS as a terrorist organization, a position that drew significant criticism. Detractors argued that Ankara’s cooperation with HTS legitimized the group’s rule in Idlib. In response, Turkish officials defended their actions as a pragmatic necessity to prevent further radicalization of HTS and to maintain stability along Turkey’s southern border.
Turkey also played a significant role in influencing HTS’s evolution. Over time, HTS rebranded itself, cutting its ties with al-Qaeda and shedding its jihadist image in favor of emphasizing local governance. While these shifts aligned with Turkey’s broader strategic goals, Ankara’s influence was pivotal. Although this relationship was more discreet in earlier years, it has become increasingly open. For instance, Hakan Fidan, now Turkey’s foreign minister and previously the chief of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), recently revealed that Turkey and HTS had excellent cooperation in intelligence sharing.
As a result of this collaboration, strong personal and professional ties have developed between Turkey and the HTS leadership. For example, Syria’s new foreign minister, HTS’s Asaad al-Shaibani, studied in Turkey and was pursuing a doctoral degree at a private Istanbul university when the Assad regime began to collapse. Thus, Turkey’s influence over HTS stems not only from its material support but also from a long-standing practice of cooperation and personal relationships.
While HTS has not become a proxy force akin to the Syrian National Army, it has evolved into a junior partner that coordinates closely with Turkey. This relationship was evident in late November 2024 when HTS launched the offensive against the Assad regime. The operation, reportedly undertaken with Turkey’s approval, unexpectedly led to the rapid collapse of Assad’s forces. Following this, Turkey employed back channel diplomacy to dissuade external actors such as Russia and Iran from intervening. Turkey’s longstanding ties, its green light for the operation, and subsequent diplomatic support underline its pivotal role in HTS’s recent successes. These developments further solidify Turkey’s position as the most influential actor in Syria today.
Shifting Regional Policies and the Syrian Outcome
The collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024 marked a significant moment for Turkey, which celebrated with great enthusiasm tempered by a degree of cautiousness. While Ankara sees this as a long-awaited success, it is also a long overdue achievement. A decade earlier, such a development would have aligned seamlessly with Ankara’s ambitions to leverage the Arab uprisings for regional dominance and reshape the Middle East in line with its strategic preferences. However, by 2024, Turkey had shifted away from its regime-change agenda, focusing instead on fostering stability and rebuilding relations with status quo regimes. Over the last three years, Turkey has mended ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. The fall of Assad, while welcomed, does not fully align with Turkey’s revised goals of reconciliation and regional stability. Consequently, Ankara has approached this success judiciously, seeking to ensure that its actions in Syria did not jeopardize its broader diplomatic efforts.
Over the last three years, Turkey has mended ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. The fall of Assad, while welcomed, does not fully align with Turkey’s revised goals of reconciliation and regional stability.
Turkey’s cautious approach reflects its intent to avoid undermining these reconciliations. President Erdoğan has refrained from high-profile gestures, such as visiting Damascus or fulfilling his earlier promise of praying at the Umayyad Mosque, that could alarm Arab regimes like Egypt and the UAE. While Erdoğan may eventually organize a symbolic “victory visit” to Damascus to capitalize on its domestic political benefits, his current restraint—despite the potential political gains—demonstrates an awareness of the regional risks such gestures could provoke. Additionally, Erdoğan personally met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi during the D-8 Summit on December 19, 2024. This meeting likely aimed to reassure Sisi of Turkey’s commitment to regional stability, addressing concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of political changes in Syria. Turkey is keenly aware that it is no longer 2011, and despite its success in Syria, it appears unwilling to revert to the failed policies of that period.
Similarly, HTS has also increasingly underlined its shift from revolutionary aspirations to focusing on internal governance. Under Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership, HTS has changed its focus from transnational jihadist objectives to Syria’s domestic issues, a transformation that began in Idlib and gained momentum as the group expanded toward Damascus. This rebranding was accompanied by symbolic changes, including al-Sharaa abandoning his guerrilla name “Abu Muhammad al-Joulani” and adopting new attire to signify the group’s departure from its jihadist roots. By presenting itself as a localized political entity rather than a revolutionary force, HTS has sought to gain acceptance from Arab states concerned with maintaining the status quo.
Engaging Arab States
Turkey and HTS share a consensus that the victory achieved in Syria will remain confined to the country, avoiding broader regional aspirations. In this context, although Turkey has emerged as the most significant supporter of the new administration in Syria, with initial official visits to Damascus carried out by Turkish officials like intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin and Foreign Minister Fidan, Syria’s outward engagements have focused on Arab states. The first official visits abroad from Syria were to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan. Similarly, al-Sharaa has made his most significant public statements through the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya satellite channel. These symbolic gestures aim to highlight Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, as key players in this process.
Al-Sharaa has made his most significant public statements through the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya satellite channel. These symbolic gestures aim to highlight Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, as key players in this process.
This approach does not seem to have caused any discomfort in Ankara. Several objectives drive this strategy of prioritizing Arab states: reassuring Arab countries, securing their support, avoiding an overemphasis on Turkey that might trigger Arab discomfort, and, ultimately, obtaining financial resources.
Despite Turkey’s pivotal role in supporting HTS’s survival, it cannot shoulder the burden of stabilizing Syria alone. In the short term, financial flows and humanitarian aid from Gulf countries are crucial. Qatar, aligned with Turkey, has taken a proactive stance, and Saudi Arabia’s support also has begun to materialize, marking its indispensable role in Syria’s reconstruction. Recent diplomatic moves, including renewed engagements with the Syrian administration, underscore Saudi Arabia’s commitment to this process. For instance, the meeting held in January 2025 in Riyadh on Syria’s political transition highlighted Saudi Arabia’s growing influence. During the meeting, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan emphasized the need to lift unilateral and international sanctions on Syria and to provide urgent humanitarian and economic support to facilitate the return of refugees and rebuild the state. These developments underline Saudi Arabia’s critical role in shaping Syria’s future and securing regional stability. However, convincing the UAE, traditionally more cautious regarding Islamist militants, is likely to take longer.
Western Interests
While Gulf humanitarian and financial aid is crucial for Syria in the short term, the new government’s long-term stability requires reintegration into the global economy and the lifting of sanctions. US sanctions on the Assad regime were instrumental in preventing the stabilization of Assad’s rule after the uprising. These measures severely damaged Syria’s war-torn economy, contributing to the state’s eventual collapse.
However, Europe and the United States approach Syria with differing priorities. For Europe, Syria is viewed primarily through the lens of migration. Following the Assad regime’s collapse, many European countries froze Syrian refugee applications, signaling their vested interest in stabilizing Damascus to prevent another wave of refugees. This perspective aligns Turkey and the European Union (EU) on a shared goal of ensuring stability in Syria. There is also optimism in Europe that some Syrians granted asylum might eventually return to a more secure and economically stable homeland. Germany and other EU countries have already indicated their willingness to soften sanctions as part of this broader strategy.
There is also optimism in Europe that some Syrians granted asylum might eventually return to a more secure and economically stable homeland. Germany and other EU countries have already indicated their willingness to soften sanctions as part of this broader strategy.
In contrast, the United States frames Syria as a geopolitical challenge. Its priorities include combating IS and curbing Iran’s influence, with the latter becoming less salient today. HTS recognizes these priorities and has strategically emphasized two commitments: preventing Iran’s resurgence in Syria and pledging that its actions will not threaten Israeli security. At the same time, the United States employs a dual strategy regarding sanctions. While extending the duration of existing sanctions, Washington has also introduced temporary relaxations, using the potential lifting of sanctions as leverage to influence HTS’s governance.
The Kurdish Question
Despite a general understanding among HTS, Turkey, Europe, and the United States to prioritize Syria’s stability, the Kurdish question remains a potential fault line. Turkey has consistently demanded the dismantling of the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in northeastern Syria. Unlike HTS, the Turkish-backed SNA has concentrated its military efforts against the Kurdish-led SDF. However, despite Turkey’s extensive support, the SNA has struggled to establish itself as an effective fighting force capable of defeating the SDF. Having initially retreated east of the Euphrates, the SDF now holds its ground and effectively counters SNA advances, even with Turkish drone support.
Aware of the risks, HTS has been reluctant to engage in direct military conflict with the SDF despite Turkish pressure. First, such a move would stretch its already limited resources. Second, it would jeopardize its relationship with Western actors. For its part, Turkey has issued ultimatums, warning that if the new government in Damascus does not dismantle the SDF, Turkey will take unilateral action.
Nevertheless, Turkey has refrained from acting decisively, seemingly awaiting clarity from the United States. Initial expectations in Ankara that President Donald Trump would withdraw US troops from Syria, allowing Turkey to target the SDF, have diminished. The power vacuum created by the weakening of Iran and its proxies may lead the United States to maintain its military presence in Syria and Iraq. While Trump’s statements have often been unpredictable, his administration’s broader policy, articulated by his new Secretary of State Marco Rubio, indicates a commitment to remaining in Syria and supporting the SDF. This raises further concerns in Turkey, as Ankara appears to be waiting for the Trump administration to clarify its policy on the Kurds before making any definitive moves.
While Trump’s statements have often been unpredictable, his administration’s broader policy, articulated by his new Secretary of State Marco Rubio, indicates a commitment to remaining in Syria and supporting the SDF.
Overall, in navigating the complexities of post-Assad Syria, Turkey and HTS face a multifaceted challenge of balancing regional and international expectations. Ultimately, the stabilization of Syria hinges on coordinated international efforts. While Turkey’s role remains indispensable, both Turkey and HTS must address the divergent interests of regional and global powers.
The Kurdish issue remains a critical obstacle, threatening to derail cooperative efforts and straining relations with Western countries. Despite this, Turkey and HTS have so far succeeded in reassuring regional actors, fostering diplomatic ties, and securing financial and humanitarian support from neighboring countries. However, until tensions surrounding Kurdish political and military structures in Syria are addressed, Turkey and HTS’s ability to effectively engage with Western powers will remain limited.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit:Twitter/Syrian Transitional Government
