The December 8, 2024, collapse of the Assad regime necessitated a strategy for the new Syrian administration to garner the legal and constitutional cover to lead a transition from authoritarianism. Many ideas have surfaced, such as a call for a national dialogue conference with the participation of some 1,200 delegates. But the task of organizing such a conference during a fraught transitional period prompted the new authorities to postpone it, pending better circumstances.
Instead, the new Syrian administration chose between two other transition options. The first was to implement the provisions of the 2012 constitution codified under former President Bashar al-Assad, which states that in the event of a presidential vacancy, the vice president shall serve as interim president for 90 days until elections are held. (In this case, the deposed President Bashar al-Assad’s vice president, Faisal Mekdad, would be appointed.) Making a former regime figure the interim president was a non-starter for the Syrian people, especially for the revolutionary forces. Nor was it ever suggested as an option by the international community, which seemed to welcome the new resident of the presidential palace and the head of Hay`at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmed al-Sharaa.
The second option, which was selected, was to move forward with the concept of revolutionary legitimacy, a temporary and exceptional concept that expires with the end of the revolutionary stage or transitional period. Unlike the concept of legitimacy defined by the German sociologist Max Weber—who found three bases for it, rational-legal, charismatic, and traditional—current legitimacy in Syria emanates from an extraordinary and exceptional degree of popular unity that was sought from the beginning of the post-Assad transition. The question was how to build institutions of revolutionary legitimacy during the current stage in Syria. The answer came in the January 29 announcement of a transitional ruling council, similar to what was created in some Arab countries that experienced revolutions since 2011, such as Libya and Sudan. Al-Sharaa was chosen as president of the council—effectively, becoming Syria’s transitional president.
Discussion about the transitional period was limited to how to build this ruling council in order to achieve the essence of UN Resolution 2254, which calls for a “transitional governing body” that guarantees the representation of all Syrian political, social, sectarian and ethnic forces. The Sharaa-led council also calls for al-Sharaa to establish an interim legislative body that will issue an interim constitutional declaration and laws for the transitional period, grant confidence to the transitional government, develop economic infrastructure, and form an independent commission to organize elections and an independent body for transitional justice.
There is no question that the HTS-led military command of Operation Deterrence of Aggression that toppled Bashar al-Assad possesses the necessary revolutionary legitimacy to lead the transition period. The January 29 declaration signaled the transfer of revolutionary legitimacy from the HTS, the group that liberated Syria, to a transitional council.
The declaration included other revolutionary decisions such as the dissolution of the People’s Assembly (the Assad regime’s parliament), the disbanding of the army in order to rebuild a new Syrian army along national lines, the dissolution of all of Assad’s security agencies and militias, and the formation of a new security institution dedicated to the preservation of citizen (rather than regime) security. The declaration also disbanded the Arab Socialist Baath Party and the parties of the National Progressive Front and banned their reconstitution under any other name. Furthermore, it abolished the 2012 constitution and all emergency decrees. While the media rollout of these moves was not successful because it should have been more public and transparent, the declaration did achieve the desired purpose—to establish a more detailed transitional roadmap.
In all transitional periods, it is important to move quickly from revolutionary legitimacy to representative legitimacy, which Syria’s new authorities did by announcing a temporary legislative body. Although the naming of al-Sharaa as interim president did not come until almost two months after the fall of the Assad regime, it is necessary to point out the context in which the transition is unfolding and explain the huge challenges that face Syria today.
The political system that ruled Syria for more than 60 years was one of the most closed and totalitarian in the Arab world—and globally. It established sectarian institutions that governed through the military and security services. It lacked a bureaucratic apparatus or the concepts of the rule of law and accountability. Clientelist relations prevailed in all aspects of state governance and the economy. The Assads ruled according to their own interests and the interests of their sect and region.
The fierce, nearly 14-year-long civil war turned Syrians into detainees, hungry people, and refugees, causing the disappearance of the middle class that often leads the process of change in a political transition. Moreover, Syria is under international sanctions that are the most severe after those imposed on Russia and Iran. Such conditions are unlikely to produce a Jeffersonian democracy in Syria—they are likely to produce more war and security breakdowns. This is why the appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa as interim president is a welcome development. He is a patriotic person who needs a great deal of cooperation to arrive at the dream of building Syria as a civil and democratic state for all its citizens and that can regain its position and role in the civilized world.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Twitter/Syrian Transitional Government
