
The Egyptian regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi looks upon the recent developments in Syria with a good deal of trepidation. That the Islamist rebel armed group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), rapidly took over the country last December has made officials in Cairo nervous that the new government in Damascus will encourage other Islamist groups, like Egypt’s banned Muslim Brotherhood, to mount a challenge to the Sisi regime’s authority after being suppressed for more than a decade. At the same time, Egypt has long coveted close relations with Syria and wants to prevent regional rivals, especially Turkey, from becoming the dominant player there. These countervailing interests will likely cause Sisi to move cautiously to develop ties with the new Syrian government while warning the HTS leaders to not use their recent victory to become a haven for opponents of the Egyptian government. The HTS-dominated government’s recent arrest of a leading Egyptian oppositionist, Ahmed al-Mansour, may signal that Damascus is sensitive to Egyptian concerns. Authorities in Cairo, however, will want to see more such efforts and a more inclusive government in place before contemplating a true warming of relations.
Syria as a Coveted Country Historically
Eminent American scholar of the Arab world Malcom Kerr wrote in his book The Arab Cold War that in the 1950s, “the center of contest in the Arab world was in Syria,” and in many respects this contestation for influence in that country has remained to this very day. Although Egypt joined other Arab League members in their suspension of Syria from this organization in late 2011 as atrocities against its civilian population by the Assad regime mounted, it was never an enthusiastic supporter of this ostracism, especially after the Egyptian military, led by then-defense minister Sisi, ousted the Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohamed Morsi, from the presidency in 2013. After this coup, which resulted in a violent crackdown on the Brotherhood by the Egyptian security agencies, Cairo quietly hoped that Bashar al-Assad’s regime would prevail in the Syrian civil war. It saw his fight against the Syrian opposition, which became increasingly Islamist in orientation, as similar to its own fight against the Brotherhood. The Sisi government, however, had to tread carefully on this issue because some of its Arab benefactors, namely Saudi Arabia, initially supported Syrian opposition elements, including armed factions.
Although Egypt joined other Arab League members in their suspension of Syria, it was never an enthusiastic supporter of this ostracism.
By 2022-2023, however, as Assad seemed to prevail in the civil war with the help of Russia and Iran and its proxies, the boycott of Syria in the Arab world began to weaken. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) took the lead in reaching out to the Assad regime, and Saudi Arabia followed suit. Syria was formally welcomed back into the Arab League and attended its summit meeting in Saudi Arabia in May 2023. Egypt was a prominent proponent of bringing Assad back to the Arab fold and it hosted Syria’s then-foreign minister Faisal Mekdad in Cairo a month earlier in what was seen as a very friendly visit. By that point in the Syrian civil war, the Assad regime controlled most of Syria except for the Idlib province in the northwest, which was largely in the hands of HTS, supported by Turkey, and the northeastern part of Syria under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The major cities of Aleppo, Hama, and Homs, in addition to the capital Damascus, had been under the Assad regime’s control for some time.
Shock and Concern Over Assad Regime’s Collapse
Egypt was shocked by the rapid advance of HTS in early December 2024, and had even declared support for Assad just three days before he fled Syria for Russia. Shortly after Assad’s fall from power, a seemingly nervous Sisi told a group of Egyptian journalists, “Two things I have not done: My hands are not stained with anyone’s blood, and I have not taken anyone’s money,” apparently trying to dispel any comparisons between him and Assad that some Egyptians were undoubtedly making. Sisi warned of “dormant cells” in Egypt trying to bring chaos to the country, a not-so-veiled reference to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which issued a statement congratulating the Syrian people for overthrowing the “treacherous [Assad] regime.” Following this statement, a number of social media posts allegedly attributed to the Brotherhood called for a “real revolution” in Egypt that would “uproot tyranny.” Sisi-supporting talk show hosts and television anchors in Cairo countered with messages of their own, with one even calling for the immediate execution of Brotherhood prisoners in Egypt who had received death sentences.
Shortly before Assad’s ouster, Sharaa appeared in a photo with an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mahmoud Fathi, whom the Sisi regime had sentenced to death in absentia for the killing of a public prosecutor. And an Egyptian national, Ahmed al-Mansour, who until very recently served in the ranks of HTS, posted videos on social media from Syria denigrating Sisi and created an account on X called the “January 25 Revolutionaries,” a reference to the movement that overthrew former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. In one of these posts, Mansour, in a direct challenge to Sisi, stated, “My problem with you is personal…Your price is one bullet, and Egypt’s problems will end.”
Reactions from the Egyptian Government
Considering the severe economic strain suffered by the Egyptian people, with high inflation (especially of food prices) and a significant depreciation of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar that has made imported goods more expensive, the Sisi government is likely worried that the Brotherhood or other Islamist groups might take advantage of the HTS victory in Syria to revitalize their fortunes by stoking public anger in Egypt. Cairo may be concerned that some Syrians now entering Egypt might be HTS or Brotherhood agents disguised as refugees with the aim of sowing dissent or even revolution in the country. Consequently, it has imposed strict entry restrictions on Syrian migrants, requiring them to undergo background checks by Egyptian consulates before entering Egypt (a very lengthy process), exempting only those with temporary residence permits. The general concern has been the Egyptian government’s worry about the entry of Syrians who have links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Egyptian security forces also reportedly arrested about 30 Syrians who celebrated the downfall of Assad, ostensibly to prevent the spread of such enthusiasm to Egyptian citizens.
On the diplomatic front, Cairo has not been engaged in face-to-face meetings with Syria’s new leaders, unlike officials from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan, who received Syria’s new foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani in early January. The most Egypt has done so far is send a planeload of humanitarian aid to Syria in early January and have its foreign minister, Badr Abdelatty, hold a phone conversation with Shaibani. According to Cairo’s readout, Abdelatty called on his Syrian counterpart to pursue a “comprehensive political transition led by Syrians without external influence, safeguarding Syria’s unity, stability and Arab identity.”
Wary of Turkey’s New Role in Syria
Abdelatty’s message was largely aimed at Syria’s relations with Turkey, which supported HTS in Idlib province and wields significant influence with the organization’s leaders now ensconced in Damascus. Indeed, Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan both visited Damascus shortly after the HTS takeover to meet with Sharaa. Although Cairo and Ankara have had a recent rapprochement, Egyptian officials do not want to see Syria fall into Turkey’s orbit. Egypt still sees itself as a leader of the Arab world, despite its domestic problems and the rising influence of Saudi Arabia, and is wary of Turkey’s pursuit of a foreign policy that would increase its influence in the region. Hence, Abdelatty’s reference to the need to safeguard Syria’s Arab identity in addition to Egypt’s concerns about Turkey’s support for Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s support for the Brotherhood (allowing members of the group safe haven and, in the past, the ability to broadcast anti-regime messages to Egypt) was one of the main reasons why ties between Cairo and Ankara were so strained after Morsi’s ouster.
Although Cairo and Ankara have had a recent rapprochement, Egyptian officials do not want to see Syria fall into Turkey’s orbit.
In addition, Egypt and Turkey remain competitors in the Horn of Africa. According to Egyptian academic Hassan Nafaa, Turkey’s recent efforts to reconcile Somalia and Ethiopia have undermined Egypt’s efforts to counter Ethiopia’s policy of restricting water going to the Nile River from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Egypt has sought to cultivate relations with Somalia against Ethiopia over this issue, and thus the thaw in Somali-Ethiopian relations, led by Ankara, left Egypt feeling isolated. Such competition in this region has undoubtedly increased Cairo’s suspicions of Turkey’s new role in Syria.
But Cairo Does Not Want to Be Left Out of Syria
Although it is keeping the new Syrian regime at arms-length for now, Egypt likely does not want to be cut out of Syria’s future. It sees the Gulf Arab states trying to cultivate relations with the new Syrian leadership despite some misgivings among a few of them about the Islamist ideology of HTS. So far, HTS leaders are playing a smart game of talking about an inclusive Syrian government and downplaying HTS’s radical past. To be sure, this strategy is in part aimed at eliciting substantial funds from Gulf Arab states for the massive task of rebuilding Syria’s war-ravaged cities, which may cost upwards of $400 billion. But HTS leaders also know that with money comes political influence, and with political influence comes dependency, and thus they seek to broaden their support in the Arab world. Hence in mid-January, they decided to arrest Ahmed al-Mansour as a gesture of goodwill toward the Egyptian government, which may have secretly demanded this measure.
HTS leaders probably not only believe it is important to have a broad array of Arab countries supporting their government but also want such countries with good ties to Washington to encourage the United States to remove their group from the US foreign terrorist organization list, a designation that hinders HTS’s ability to access capital from international banks and pursue commercial transactions. For its part, Cairo may eventually believe that it has more to lose than to gain by remaining aloof in Syria. If the Gulf states do begin to pour reconstruction money into Syria, for example, Egypt may see an opportunity, as Egyptian construction companies could take part in this endeavor. And even though Egypt remains on good terms with Gulf Arab states, it also sees them as rivals for Arab leadership and will not want to concede the important country of Syria to them at its own expense.
Before any warming of relations occurs with HTS, however, Sisi is likely to press Syria’s new leaders to crack down on other Egyptian Islamists within the country, to halt their propaganda on social media, and to avoid becoming hosts to the Muslim Brotherhood. Cairo will also want the new Syrian government to keep its word about fostering an inclusive government, which means bringing in members of minority groups, with the hope that such elements will work as a hedge against HTS’s Islamist ideology.
Such policies will not be easy to pursue, especially if Cairo demands the extradition of its oppositionist citizens in Syria to Egypt for prosecution and imprisonment, a move that HTS leaders may very well resist. Nonetheless, Egypt has been playing inter-Arab politics for a long time and, after its initial shock and despair over Syria’s new Islamist reality, will probably get back in the game again.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Twitter/Syrian Transitional Government