Turkey and the Transition to a Post-Assad Regime in Syria

The unexpected fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria marks a turning point in the region’s political landscape, challenging previous expectations that the Syrian uprising had concluded with Assad’s victory. His survival during the civil war was largely attributed to the military backing of Russia and Iran, but it created the perception that the opposition’s cause was lost. However, Turkey, as one of the primary backers of the Syrian opposition since the onset of the uprising in 2011, has emerged as a key player in the conflict’s aftermath. This unexpected outcome has made Turkey pivotal in determining Syria’s future, presenting both significant opportunities and formidable challenges. Central to these dynamics are Turkey’s intricate relationships with the country’s various armed factions. Of particular importance is Turkey’s relationship with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group that has consolidated its dominance among Syria’s armed actors. This relationship is likely to shape the trajectory of Syria’s post-Assad era and Turkey’s enduring role in the region.

While Turkish officials have consistently emphasized Turkey’s unwavering support for various Syrian opposition groups as a cornerstone of its success, the broader reality reveals that Turkey’s Syria policy has undergone significant transformations. These shifts can be broadly categorized into three distinct phases.

Three Phases of Turkey’s Syria Policy

In the first phase (2011-2016), Turkey was an active supporter of the uprising in Syria and its primary goal was the overthrow of the Assad regime. However, the protracted conflict and Assad’s entrenchment with the support of Russia and Iran forced Turkey to reassess its approach.

In the second phase (2016-2022), Turkey changed its objectives while maintaining its rhetorical support for regime change. By 2016, it became clear to Ankara that toppling Assad was becoming increasingly unlikely. As a result, Turkey’s focus shifted to two priorities: preventing new waves of Syrian refugees and, if possible, facilitating the return of some of them to Syria, and dismantling Kurdish political autonomy in the north of the country. Turkey’s four military operations in Syria during this period were all aimed at these two objectives, rather than at weakening or toppling the Assad regime.

When the Assad regime unexpectedly fell, Turkey achieved a goal it had long abandoned.

The third phase (from 2022 onwards) marked a notable shift, with Turkey explicitly abandoning the goal of regime change and initiating a process of normalization with Assad. This move was part of a broader policy of regional reconciliation aimed at repairing Turkey’s relations with former foes. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has even expressed a desire to restore friendly relations with Assad, resembling the close ties that preceded the Arab Spring uprisings. Despite these overtures, reconciliation efforts failed due to the constant incompatibility of demands on both sides. In the end, Turkey failed to make peace with Assad, just as it failed to topple him a decade ago. When Turkey gave the green light to the HTS attack on Aleppo on November 27, one of the main expectations was to pressure the Assad regime to come to the table rather than topple it.

When the Assad regime unexpectedly fell, Turkey achieved a goal it had long abandoned. However, this was a result of the declining power of Assad’s supporters rather than Ankara’s rising influence. Nevertheless, it raised Turkey’s profile as the new kingmaker in Syria and presented both opportunities and challenges because of its multifaceted relations with various militant groups in the country.

Turkey and Militant Groups in Syria

A state is often defined as a polity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a given territory. Syria’s current reality, however, is far removed from this ideal. The country’s fragmented landscape is dominated by four major armed groups: HTS, the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Southern Operations Room of rebel factions. This fragmentation remains the main challenge to a successful transition to a post-Assad Syria. For Turkey, these groups represent differing relationships: HTS is an informal ally, the SNA is a proxy, and the SDF, which Turkey sees as an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party, is a nemesis. Additionally, Turkey itself maintains approximately 10,000 soldiers actively deployed inside Syria.

Among the various armed groups, HTS currently holds the upper hand, and the relationship between HTS and Turkey is likely to play a pivotal role in shaping Syria’s future, as well as Turkey’s influence in the region. Indeed, Turkey benefits from being the only country with established ties to the organization. This was underscored by a symbolic event during a visit to Damascus by Ibrahim Kalin, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization. HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Joulani reportedly drove Kalin around town, a gesture that highlighted the close relationship. This event served as both a message to Turkey’s domestic audience and a signal to external actors about Ankara’s leverage over the group.

Turkey’s Role in the Survival and Transformation of HTS

To date, Turkey has supported HTS in various ways that have been critical to the latter’s survival and evolution. Under the 2018 Sochi Agreement, Turkey was tasked with neutralizing extremist and jihadist elements in Idlib, specifically targeting HTS as a former al-Qaeda affiliate. But instead of dismantling the group, Turkey adopted a softer approach, allowing HTS to consolidate its power in the region and take responsibility for dismantling more radical groups within its ranks such as the salafist Hurras al-Din. Thus, HTS’s transformation from an al-Qaeda-style transnational jihadist organization to a militant Islamist group governing a proto-state, as it is often referred to these days, has therefore taken place on Turkey’s watch. As part of this transformation, HTS established the Syrian Salvation Government in 2017 as a civilian administrative body governing Idlib. This governance experience gave HTS a jump-start in the transition to the post-Assad era, the positive effects of which are already being seen with a relatively stable transition and transfer of power without disrupting the functioning of the Syrian state.

The relationship between HTS and Turkey is likely to play a pivotal role in shaping Syria’s future.

Moreover, HTS’s control of the Turkish border and taxes on trade with Turkey have been an important source of revenue for the Salvation Government in Idlib. The Turkish border also serves as the primary entry point for international humanitarian aid to the province. This economic integration has further strengthened HTS’s administrative capacity and solidified its role in the region.

Turkey’s intervention in 2020 marked a turning point in its relations with HTS. When Syrian regime forces backed by Russia and Iran launched an offensive to retake Idlib, Turkey intervened militarily to prevent the collapse of this opposition stronghold. This move was motivated by Turkey’s desire to prevent a new wave of refugees from Idlib toward the border. Turkey established military outposts along Idlib’s borders to deter future regime attacks, effectively turning the province into a Turkish protected area. Thus, as HTS’s survival in Idlib is largely dependent on Turkish protection, Ankara has firmly established itself as the dominant player in its relationship with HTS.

Implications for the Future

Turkey’s support for HTS has ensured the latter’s survival and facilitated its transformation into a quasi-state actor, solidifying Ankara’s influence in Syria’s future. However, Turkey’s relations with other armed groups, particularly the SNA and SDF, could complicate Syria’s transition in the post-Assad era.

While HTS maintains an informal alliance with Turkey, the SNA operates as Turkey’s direct proxy, relying on Ankara for funding and guidance. This distinction became evident after the events of November 27, when sections of the SNA joined HTS’s offensive on Aleppo. However, once Aleppo fell, the two groups diverged. HTS advanced toward Damascus, while SNA factions shifted eastward under Turkey’s direction to target the Kurdish-dominated SDF. This divergence reflects differing objectives and relationships with Turkey. In contrast to SNA, HTS has refrained from targeting the SDF because it wants to maintain a stable transition. Moreover, HTS will be more hesitant to target the SDF to avoid antagonizing the United States, and this difference in policies could create potential future conflicts.

Notably, the SDF leadership has also drawn a clear distinction between HTS and the SNA. While criticizing the SNA and Turkey’s interference as major obstacles, the SDF has hinted at a more conciliatory stance toward HTS and expressed its openness to negotiations. These dynamics, coupled with Turkey’s focus on suppressing Kurdish autonomy, could lead to friction between Turkey and HTS over conflicting priorities.

Although HTS currently relies on Turkey for protection, its history of conflicts with SNA factions suggests that it may increasingly resist the presence of another armed group in the region that operates under Turkey’s direct influence. This tension underscores the fragility of Turkey’s alliances in Syria.

Turkey’s Expectations in Syria

Turkey’s expectations from its evolving Syria policy can be summarized under one short-term goal— addressing domestic criticism—and three long-term objectives: leveraging economic opportunities, managing the refugee crisis, and resolving the Kurdish issue.

In the immediate term, President Erdoğan is attempting to rehabilitate his image at home, which has been heavily damaged by his widely criticized Syria policy. His administration frames Turkey’s role in the Syrian conflict as a success, claiming that Turkey has effectively “won” the Syrian civil war and that its policies have been vindicated. Pro-government media outlets and social media accounts are currently focused on attacking opposition figures for suggesting dialogue with Assad or meeting with him in the past. This narrative conveniently omits Erdoğan’s own unsuccessful attempts to secure a meeting with Assad over the past two years. By controlling this narrative, Erdoğan seeks to deflect criticism and solidify his position domestically.

One of Turkey’s key long-term goals is securing economic benefits from Syria’s reconstruction.

One of Turkey’s key long-term goals is securing economic benefits from Syria’s reconstruction, which is estimated to cost between $250 and $400 billion, or even up to $1 trillion, depending on the source. The rebuilding of war-torn Syria represents a lucrative opportunity, and Erdoğan is determined to position Turkey as a central player in this effort. With its geographical proximity, technical expertise, and political influence over the emerging Syrian government, Turkish construction companies stand to benefit significantly from the reconstruction boom.

This expectation was reflected in the Turkish stock market, where construction companies and construction-related industries—cement, steel, and concrete—saw immediate gains following Assad’s departure. Many of these companies are cronies of Erdoğan’s administration and have thrived during the Justice and Development Party era by securing lucrative government contracts. However, due to Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis, the availability of such contracts has dwindled, leaving these companies in need of new opportunities. Rebuilding Syria could provide a much-needed lifeline, helping Erdoğan sustain the clientelist networks that underpin his political power.

Another critical goal for Turkey is to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to Syria. While there is a dominant narrative, supported by the pro-government media, that the overthrow of the Assad regime will open the door to this process, and while there is considerable public support for this goal, it is fraught with challenges. Without meaningful stabilization in Syria, rebuilding infrastructure and establishing a functioning economy, the return of refugees is unlikely to succeed quickly. Moreover, many Syrian refugees have been living in Turkey for nearly a decade and have built their lives there, making a rapid return difficult.

Despite these hurdles, the perception that Syria is now “liberated” could lead to increased public pressure for refugees to leave. This may exacerbate the already existing tensions between Turkish host communities and Syrian refugees, potentially sparking further social unrest. Ankara will need to devise a clear timeline and launch an effective public relations campaign to manage expectations and minimize conflict.

Kurdish Autonomy

Finally, developments are giving Ankara new incentives to eliminate Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Currently, Turkey’s SNA proxies have already pushed the SDF east of the Euphrates, but going beyond that will require American approval. At the moment, Washington seems intent on keeping the SDF east of the Euphrates, as the organization continues to monitor Islamic State prisoners and detention camps for their families. The SDF leadership has already raised this trump card and stated that they are under pressure to keep these prisons and camps under control. Moreover, the SDF continues to control the Iraq-Syria border, which is essential to preventing the re-emergence of Iranian influence in Lebanon and Syria. Israel, which is busy expanding its occupation zone in Syria and dismantling Syria’s military infrastructure, can be expected to lobby Washington in favor of the SDF, which means that Ankara and Tel Aviv will once again face off.

But Turkey’s hostility is not the SDF’s only problem. The SDF and its civilian government arm, The Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, emerged as a pragmatic alternative for local Arab tribes and militias to align with the Kurdish Peoples Protection Units (YPG), particularly in opposition to the Assad regime’s dominance. Although Arabs outnumber Kurds in SDF-controlled areas in terms of both population and fighters, the YPG remains the dominant force. Faced with a choice between the Assad regime in Damascus and an alliance with the Kurds in the SDF, the Arab tribes opted for the latter. However, with Assad gone, these Arab communities are likely to be more inclined to cooperate with Damascus under HTS rule than to be part of a Kurdish-dominated political framework. Ankara therefore expects the SDF project to collapse, or at least shrink significantly due to internal tensions in the post-Assad era.

Overall, Turkey’s intervention in Syria and its approach to the post-Assad era reflects a complex interplay of short and long-term objectives shaped by domestic political needs, economic ambitions and national security concerns. While Ankara has positioned itself as a key influencer, its strategy faces significant challenges, including managing relations with armed groups, addressing Kurdish autonomy, and facilitating the return of Syrian refugees.

Turkey’s ability to overcome these challenges will be critical in a post-Assad context. The fragility of alliances with groups such as HTS, the role attributed to the SDF by the United States in regional stability, and the unpredictable dynamics between the SNA and HTS could strengthen Ankara’s position or weaken its influence. Moreover, balancing its relations with other powers such as the United States and Israel will test Turkey’s diplomatic agility. The coming years will test Turkey’s ability to navigate these challenges and solidify its role as a stabilizing force in the region, or risk losing its newfound influence to competing regional and international actors.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors. 

Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Zafer Kurt