The foundations of President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign policy are now taking shape. He has nominated Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), as secretary of state, former Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as secretary of defense, former representative Tulsi Gabbard (I-HI) as director of national intelligence (DNI), Representative Mike Waltz (R-FL) as national security advisor, Representative Elise Stefanik (R-NY) as ambassador to the United Nations, and former Arkansas Republican governor Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel. These nominations, along with statements made by Trump and his designees during the campaign, point to a hawkish stance on Israel/Palestine, Iran, and China, consistent with a lurch to the right on domestic issues. Regarding superpower rivalries, Trump remains transactional—that is, he is willing to bargain and barter with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and even North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On Iran and the wider Middle East, Trump’s own biases and the ideological predilections of his cabinet choices so far preclude easy deals and foretell tough times ahead.
National Intelligence
Tulsi Gabbard has oscillated politically, from a Democratic representative from Hawaii (2013-2021), to Democratic presidential candidate in 2020, to an independent two years later, and finally to a Trump devotee after she joined the Republican Party in 2024. Nevertheless, her selection as the next director of national intelligence (DNI) is still surprising based on her professional background, which includes serving as a lieutenant colonel in the Army reserve, as a four-term congresswoman who never had an Intelligence Committee appointment, and as a contributor on Fox. Over the past decade, Gabbard has publicly disagreed with intelligence analysts who challenged Russian claims about bio-labs in Ukraine and who stated that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people. Her public disputes with the US intelligence community on issues on which she had no special information or expertise bode ill for her interaction with the professional analysts of the 18 different intelligence agencies that she would supervise as the DNI.
When combined with Trump’s own cavalier attitude toward using and sharing sensitive intelligence, Gabbard’s potential new role raises serious concerns about politicizing the conclusions of the intelligence community, which factor heavily into decision-making at the highest levels of government. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who is expected to play a non-official role in Trump’s Middle East policy, has demonstrated a similar disregard for the normally stringent rules of handling sensitive information. Kushner has been accused of sharing highly classified intelligence with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) about the latter’s domestic enemies, reportedly leading the Crown Prince to boast that Kushner was “in his pocket.” Aside from the security pitfalls of mishandling highly classified material as Trump has been accused of doing, the practice indicates a lack of commitment to fact-based policies on potentially critical issues in international affairs.
Department of Defense and National Security
As for Pete Hegseth, although he has served in the military, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, he has not risen to high ranks and is heavy on loyalty to Trump but light on experience and qualifications for the Secretary of Defense role. In saying that “Pete is tough, smart and a true believer in America First,” Trump emphasized generalities and toughness in the classical macho sense—literally, since the nominee is known for denigrating the combat role of women in the US military and was investigated for sexual assault in 2017 (ultimately he was not charged with a crime, but he did pay his accuser). His leadership skills have not been tested for such a high level, complex position. Perhaps most alarming is Hegseth’s alleged association with Christian nationalist ideology and denigration of the military’s diversity, equity, and inclusion programs as well as of Islam, including authoring a book called American Crusade in which he harshly criticized Muslims’ alleged high birth rates. He also enthused over the possible “miracle” of building of a third Jewish temple on the site of al-Aqsa Mosque.
Mike Waltz, Trump’s choice for National Security Advisor, is a four-time Bronze Star decorated Green Beret and more experienced in military and national security matters than Hegseth, but is also hardline on many foreign policy issues. “Hawkish on China and an ardent supporter of Israel” seems to be a common theme in the Trump national security team named so far.
Department of State
Marco Rubio, famous for his confrontations with Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential race, is highly rated by the American Conservative Union, is known as having hawkish views on China and Iran, and is part of the tilt to the right in the proposed Trump cabinet. Another ardent supporter of Israel, Rubio hailed Israel’s killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders, calling it “a service to humanity.” Although open to an agreement with Iran, he demands that its allies in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen be taken down. He co-sponsored a Senate resolution to condemn United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2334, which states that Israeli settlements in the West Bank violate international law.
Middle East Peace
Also telling for Trump’s Mideast policy is his pick of Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel. To be sure, Huckabee was quick to stress that he would be implementing the president’s policies and not making up his own. Nevertheless, one of the main reasons for choosing cabinet officials and ambassadors is to send a signal about what the president’s policies are likely to be. In the case of Huckabee’s designation, the Israeli right wing seems to have picked up on the message and welcomed it.
The incoming Trump administration also looks set to end the land-for-peace principle that, since the issuance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 at the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, past US presidents have put forth as the basis for peace plans, most notably the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.
President Biden, despite coming into office with the slogan of putting diplomacy first, did not present his own peace plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But in May 2024, Biden presented the outline of a three-phase plan for a Gaza truce, which included a six-week ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas of Gaza, followed by negotiations for a permanent peace. The Biden outline was just that: a general outline and not a detailed roadmap, and was quickly criticized as inadequate by both warring parties in Gaza.
After replacing Biden as the 2024 Democratic presidential candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris added that the goal of her peace plan would be the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Harris’s addition seemed timed to attract Arab and Muslim voters and to address the fear of her campaign of losing swing states to Trump because of the defection of these voters.
During his first term in office, Trump presided over the Kushner-brokered Abraham Accords, which started a normalization process between Israel and willing Gulf countries (the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) and later, Morocco and Sudan. The Accords essentially fully avoided the question of Palestine. A series of decisions in Trump’s first term foreshadow, during his second presidency, a potential Israeli annexation of the occupied West Bank. These decisions included his moving of the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, closure of the US consulate in Jerusalem that had served as a liaison to the Palestinian community, recognition of the illegal Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, and announcement that the United States no longer considered West Bank settlements illegal. Considering such decisions, Israelis likely expect that the Trump second administration will support whatever Israel proposes to do regarding the Palestinians, including but hardly limited to West Bank annexation.
Yemen
Yemen is another flashpoint for an impending policy shift in the Middle East. The Biden administration appointed during its first year in office a special envoy tasked with assisting the United Nations in finding a peaceful resolution to the Yemen conflict. Still, American and British forces have attacked Houthi installations since December 2023 in response to the group’s attacks on and disruption of Red Sea shipping. The United States is cognizant of the easing of relations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia and the UN Envoy’s continued insistence of UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg that peace in Yemen must be all-inclusive. The Biden administration has continued to recognize the humanitarian hardship in Yemen and to contribute significantly to international efforts to provide food and medical aid.
By contrast, there is no evidence that Trump accords much importance to Yemen. In 2019, then-president Trump vetoed a congressional resolution that would have stopped US support for the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s war against the Houthis. The humanitarian cost of the war, born overwhelmingly by the people of Yemen, was by then painfully obvious in terms of death, destruction, and the spread of disease and famine. Yet Trump enthusiastically supported the Saudi-led war against the Houthis during his presidency. He seemed mostly concerned with showing support for Saudi Arabia and opposition to Iranian support for the Houthis. Now, with the changed regional equation, a case could be made for a fresh US chapter on Yemen. Saudi Arabia has largely pulled out of the Yemen conflict, reaching a verbal (if not yet a written) agreement with Ansar Allah and is more concerned with a quiet border with Yemen rather than with toppling the Houthis from their control of Sanaa and the north. More important, the 2023 China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran signaled a less strident attitude by the kingdom toward its longtime regional foe. UN Envoy Grundberg has remained optimistic on the chances for peace based on the roadmap that he presented to Yemen’s warring factions. The Gaza war has complicated the chances for peace in Yemen, but any amelioration of regional tensions is bound to reflect positively on the prospects for Grundberg’s roadmap.
Lebanon
Trump’s newest son-in-law’s father, Massad Boulos, has stepped into the ring—at least in the media domain—as a potential Trump advisor on or envoy to Lebanon. Of Lebanese descent, Boulos speaks Arabic fluently, is poised and measured in his media appearances to date, and talks a big game about the potential for peace in Lebanon and in the Middle East more broadly under the new Trump presidency. Hints of a role that Boulos might play in the new administration aside, a photo showing him in Lebanon meeting with right-wing party leader Nadim Gemayel and representatives from his Kata’eb (Phalangist) Party, could, in light of other indications of a very Israel-friendly Trump administration, be interpreted as bridging between Lebanon’s right wing and Israel, rather than as a sign toward peace between Israel and Lebanon more broadly. Any Trump administration support for a regime-change policy in Lebanon as advocated by Israel’s right-wing ministers could unleash a bloody civil war in an already war-stricken country.
Syria, Iraq, and Iran
There is push and pull on the presence of US troops in Syria and Iraq, and much may depend on whether the coming Trump administration reaches a new deal with Iran. Under current conditions, US troops, though relatively few in number, play a critical role in monitoring the troop movements of Iran and its allies’ inside Syria. The desire to control the oil fields in Syria’s northeast and the need to monitor a resurgence of the so-called Islamic State in the center of the country may temper Trump’s unrealized desire to exit Syria altogether. A potential new understanding with Iran, perhaps with added incentives from Russia, may help grease a decision for such a pullout.
Such an understanding—despite hints of willingness to consider it from both the Islamic Republic’s new President Masoud Pezeshkian and Washington’s incoming administration—will be a tough nut to crack. During his first term in office, Trump put 12 new conditions to resume negotiations on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, from which Trump withdrew the United States in 2018. The conditions, potentially stripping Iran’s nuclear options to bare bones and heavily reducing its footprint in the Middle East, would be a hard sell for its hardliners, to say the least. Barring a new agreement, particularly on Iran’s support for allied militias in the region, Israel would cast a strong vote for maintaining the US military presence in Syria, Iraq, and other parts of the Middle East.
Conclusion
The contours of Trump’s foreign policy in his second administration are indeed beginning to take shape. Thus far, what is most evident is that the president-elect prefers loyalty to his person over experience and knowledge in critical aspects of national security, especially national intelligence and defense. What is also clear is that Trump’s foreign policy will emphasize a traditional conservative approach in dealing with such adversaries as China and Iran. In the Middle East, Trump’s administration is likely to deepen the permissive policy toward Israel followed by successive previous administrations, to the potential harm of long-term US national interests.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Flickr/Gage Skidmore; Shutterstock/Lev Radin
