In response to President Donald Trump’s February 4 proposal to take over the Gaza Strip, displacing its indigenous Palestinians and transforming it into “the Riviera of the Middle East,” Arab leaders held on March 4 an extraordinary summit meeting in Cairo to discuss and endorse a rival Egyptian plan for the enclave’s reconstruction. The Egyptian plan proposes to rebuild Gaza in phases without displacing the Palestinians. The plan would invite the Palestinian Authority to return to the Strip to govern it instead of Hamas which had ruled the territory since 2007 and to ensure security by training Palestinian police officers and requesting international peacekeeping forces sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Hamas has already relinquished its claim to governing Gaza so long as the Palestinians continue to be in charge but has refused any talk of its own disarmament.
Arab leaders unanimously approved the proposed Egyptian plan, but Israel and the Trump administration have rejected it. Israel long ago refused to contemplate any role for Hamas or the Palestinian Authority in the territory. Israel’s foreign ministry accused the Arab summiteers of “remaining rooted in outdated perspectives,” repeating that Trump’s plan was the way to go for the Palestinians. The United States, for its part, tried to convince the Palestinians and the Arab world that it cares for the enclave’s indigenous population by reminding everyone that Gaza is uninhabitable, failing to acknowledge that Israel’s war on the Strip is the very cause of the destruction.
Arab Center Washington DC (ACW) asked its analysts and fellows to provide brief commentaries to shed needed light on the summit and the wider geopolitical environment surrounding the Egyptian proposal for Gaza. Their perspectives are below.
The PA Failed in the West Bank
Yara M. Asi, Non-resident Fellow; Assistant Professor, University of Central Florida
In early December 2024, the Palestinian Authority (PA) launched raids on the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank. To many observers, the motives were obvious—to demonstrate to Israel and the incoming Trump administration that the PA could assert control and, potentially, serve as a governing authority in the aftermath of a ceasefire in Gaza. The way the PA proves this, of course, is not by providing adequate services to the Palestinians whom it supposedly governs or by tirelessly pushing for justice and accountability for its people. Nor does it show its capability by managing an economic crisis that has left tens of thousands of Palestinians jobless or receiving half of their salaries, or by offering protection against the daily attacks by Israeli settlers and military forces. Instead, it is to show force, especially against Palestinians active in—or suspected to be active in—resistance groups or simply those who criticized the PA itself. Indeed, several Palestinians, including bystanders, were harmed or killed in these raids. Is this the same style of PA governance that the Arab nations are working to bring to Gaza?
At a time when the Palestinian people are facing unprecedented existential threats across historic Palestine, there is perhaps no entity less positioned to legitimately represent—and fight for—the Palestinian people than the PA. Since its inception in the 1990s, the PA has steadily lost support among the Palestinian people, especially as it has continued to engage in corrupt practices and to maintain the presidency of Mahmoud Abbas, who was elected in 2005 and has not permitted elections since. Public polling has consistently demonstrated there is little support for the PA to maintain its authority in the West Bank, let alone to expand its remit to the Gaza Strip.
What Is at Stake for Egypt and Jordan?
Heba Gowayed, Non-resident Fellow; Professor of Sociology, CUNY Hunter College
The Arab Summit comes after months of domestic and international criticism of the leadership of Egypt and Jordan, as well as of other Arab states, for their continued normalization of relations with Israel amid the genocide of Palestinians. The extraordinary event was convened weeks after US President Donald Trump described Gaza as a “demolition zone” and suggested that Palestinians would be glad to have “clean new land” in Egypt or Jordan after “decades and decades of death.” His comments, made just before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington DC, were followed by Trump’s social media posting of a disturbing AI-made video of the so-called Gaza Riviera that visualizes a seaside Trump resort on Palestinian land.
The expressed commitment of Jordan’s and Egypt’s leaders to collaborate with Palestinians on a $53 billion project toward self-determination and the rebuilding of Gaza is a departure from months of inaction. Protesters in both countries have called on their governments to intervene to stop the genocide and to break the Israeli blockade. Protesters in Egypt have demanded the opening of the Rafah crossing for humanitarian aid and accused their government of collaborating with Israel in the blockade.
The political weight of the Cairo summit is amplified by the fact that fears of the forced displacement of Palestinians cannot be dismissed as an absurd Trump musing. In February 2024, as Palestinians displaced from North Gaza by the Israeli siege were pushed into the Rafah border with Egypt, Egyptian authorities surreptitiously built a six-meter-high wall in the Sinai to close off an area of eight square miles. Observers understood it to be a barrier in the event that Israel’s bombing of Rafah forced Palestinians to move into Egypt in a mass exodus. After all, this was rumored to be Israel’s plan from the beginning of the Gaza war, as in 2023 a think tank close to Netanyahu published a blueprint for the “relocation and final settlement of the entire Gaza population.”
What Are the Options for Financing Gaza’s Reconstruction?
Imad K. Harb, Director of Research and Analysis
The United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank have put the cost of rebuilding Gaza at more than $50 billion. The Arab Summit has just proposed a phased reconstruction plan that would avoid displacing the Palestinians from Gaza but require financing from Arab and international donors. The primary funders would be the Gulf Arab states who, to different degrees, have previously helped the Palestinians financially. Other potential funders are Muslim countries that care about restoring Palestinian life and property and wealthy nations in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and others may not help because of statutory requirements as they are lending institutions not donors.
Given Trump’s rejection of the Egyptian plan proposed at the Arab summit, as well as its hostility to most US foreign aid, it is highly unlikely that his administration will rush to donate funds for Gaza’s rebuilding. The real estate mentality currently governing the American approach to Palestinian rights sees Gaza as merely a beachfront that is ripe for development into resorts and beautiful Rivieras. European countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany were as guilty as the United States in supporting Israel’s war on Gaza and are thus also unlikely to help with its reconstruction. Besides, Europe is currently in the throes of producing funding for Ukraine after the American abandonment. If Europe does help Gaza, its contribution would likely fail to make a meaningful dent in what is needed.
But whoever the funders may be and however much they can contribute, an essential question must be answered: if it comes to pass, will Gaza’s reconstruction escape the occasional Israeli war against the enclave, and thus the destruction of what is rebuilt, as happened in 2008-2009, 2014, and 2021? Absent an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and the destruction of Palestinian life, how can funders of reconstruction be convinced that their act of good will would be allowed to stand?
Arab Summit Hoodwinked by Trump
Khalil E. Jahshan, Executive Director
Observers at home and abroad were predictably startled by President Trump’s “shock and awe” announcement about taking over Gaza, although they could not ascertain at the time the seriousness of his horrifying proposal. Arab leaders, particularly those representing affected countries like Egypt and Jordan, rushed in a visible state of panic to explore their own alternative plans to block, or at the very least, to mitigate the Trump plan. From their perspective, the plan not only requires the illegal ethnic cleansing of the population of Gaza but also poses a national security threat to their countries at the demographic, economic, and political levels.
The rushed approval by the Arab world of the detailed 112-page Egyptian plan was made feasible and urgent by the widespread impression among participants, particularly those in direct communication with Washington, that the Trump administration is fully aware of their efforts and receptive to their suggestions as an alternative to the ethnic cleansing of Gaza proposed by Trump. This impression was further reinforced by the false assumption that the American president appeared to gradually soften his position on the depopulation of Gaza by stating that he was “not forcing” his Gaza proposal on anyone.
Arab hopes were quickly shattered just hours after the conclusion of the summit in Cairo. Despite weeks of intensive diplomacy, logistical research, and soul searching, the participants did not even get a chance to officially present their detailed plan to President Trump in Washington as they had intended. The Trump administration and the Netanyahu government quickly rejected the Arab Gaza reconstruction plan even before their experts took a close look at its contents. National Security Spokesman Brian Hughes declared that the Arab League reconstruction plan “does not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable and residents cannot humanely live in a territory covered in debris and unexploded ordnance.”
Whether the Arab summit reconstruction plan is worthy or not is essentially a normative question. Its real value lies in the eye of the beholder. Its authors believe that it is a workable plan capable of maintaining the ceasefire in Gaza and initiating the early stages of the massive reconstruction needed in the devastated territory. More important, however, members of the Arab camp feel strongly that their plan, warts and all, will serve the region much better and longer than the alternative—the Trump plan that is destined to bring about further chaos, fighting, and misery to the region and beyond.
For this reason, Arab countries deemed as US allies are quite frustrated with their inability to get a fair hearing at the Trump White House and are not frankly moved by this sudden humane revival displayed by the current administration’s epiphany and fake concern for the quality of Palestinian human life in Gaza. The prevailing sentiment among Arab opinion makers today dwells on the fact that President Trump has hoodwinked US regional allies by sending them on a fool’s mission for several weeks without showing any intention to take seriously their plan regardless of its actual content.
Can the Palestinian Authority Return to Governing Gaza?
Yousef Munayyer, Head of the Palestine/Israel Program and Senior Fellow
The many obstacles in the way of a Fateh-dominated PA returning to control Gaza have only increased following the Israeli genocide and destruction of the Strip. Variables affecting the return of a Fateh-dominated PA to control Gaza have long been many, and have become more complicated. The most significant ones are Hamas’s willingness to cooperate, the PA’s willingness to take over Gaza, and the PA’s capabilities to govern.
Hamas’s position may be the only variable that has shifted in any appreciable way over the last 16 months, as it has indicated that it is willing to step away so long as Gaza remains under Palestinian control. This was not its position previously, even as Hamas had long wished to focus on its role as a resistance movement and not as a governing authority, but it seems more the case today. As for the PA’s willingness to govern Gaza, Ramallah has never been keen on it because of the problems associated with the mission. As it is, the PA barely governs the areas of the occupied West Bank where it allegedly has jurisdiction. After the genocide, the task of governing Gaza is littered with more challenges than ever and it is hard to imagine why the PA would be excited about the prospects.
Part of what makes the task so undesirable are the PA’s poor capabilities, particularly in Gaza. For many years after Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, the Fateh-led PA kept many loyalists and government workers in the Strip on its payroll. Eventually these payments slowed or stopped entirely, greatly diminishing the PA’s reach into Gaza. Moreover, the majority of Palestinians who were able to leave Gaza during the genocide were not associated with Hamas, meaning that many of those remaining support the group, not the PA. Subsequently, even if Hamas is now more willing to turn over control of Gaza to a different Palestinian faction, the PA is less enthused about taking over the territory than ever.
Is the Arab Summit’s Proposal Acceptable to the Trump Administration?
Annelle Sheline, Non-resident Fellow
Responding to the Arab plan for Gaza, the Trump White House stated that the proposal failed to address two key issues, one related to conditions in Gaza and the other concerning the ongoing presence of Hamas in the territory.
According to National Security Council Spokesman Brian Hughes, the Arab plan “does not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable and residents cannot humanely live in a territory covered in debris and unexploded ordnance.” Hughes failed to acknowledge that Israel created these horrific conditions in Gaza over 16 months of the most intense bombardment in modern history. He also failed to acknowledge that Israel is currently preventing all goods and aid from entering Gaza—the latest in a long list of Israeli war crimes, all of which are enabled and supported by the United States.
Regarding Hamas, Hughes stated that “President Trump has been clear that Hamas cannot continue to govern Gaza” and that “President Trump stands by his vision to rebuild Gaza free from Hamas.” Hughes did not address the question of how the United States would achieve this vision. After Trump asserted that the United States would “own” Gaza, even a few Senate Republicans expressed opposition to the possibility of deploying American troops there. Hughes added, “While the President stands by his bold vision for a post-war Gaza, he welcomes input from our Arab partners in the region.” Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff offered a more conciliatory tone, calling it a “good faith first step” with “a lot of compelling features.” Neither Hughes, nor Witkoff, nor other Trump administration officials have addressed the underlying motivation for Hamas or any organization that would take its place: resisting Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine and its ongoing violence against Palestinians.
The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Twitter/Royal Hashemite Court
