The relationship between the United States and Egypt has seen many highs and lows over the decades. Under Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden, and now Trump again, Cairo has been through both. Bilateral ties have careened from Trump’s high praise of “my favorite dictator” directed at Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi at the G-7 summit in 2019, and back again to presidential candidate Joe Biden’s 2020 campaign promise of “no more blank checks” for Egypt. Today under Trump 2.0 it is a US shakedown over Suez Canal fees for American shipping.
Once solid, the US-Egyptian relationship may be wobbling a bit. These ups and downs are not unknown to other longtime US allies, such as Canada, Mexico, and NATO members, all of whom have been subject to wild swings in US foreign policy under Trump. But it is still disconcerting to Egypt, which since its 1979 peace treaty with Israel has been a premium ally of the United States, facilitating American war operations through the Suez Canal and military overflights, joining the American-led coalition to free Kuwait from Iraq’s 1990 invasion, brokering diplomatic deals, mediating between Israel and Hamas, and working closely with six US administrations on counterterrorism and other security issues.
Today, especially compared to the Gulf states, Egypt has sunk down the ladder of top regional allies and is more subject to the transactional, punitive politics that characterize Trump’s foreign policy. No major crisis has precipitated this descent, at least not yet. For al-Sisi, who may have expected some special treatment from Washington, it might be disorienting. For the bilateral relationship, it could be a major readjustment. For Trump, it is business as usual.
Anatomy of a Fall
Egypt is, or has been, a master at making US presidents see the country as an indispensable center of influence in the Middle East. This strategy has typically hinged upon Egypt’s military strength, underwritten by a $1.3 billion annual infusion of US assistance for the Armed Forces. Egypt has hosted multiple international meetings, including some attended by American presidents, to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Egypt’s large population, deep historic and cultural weight, its status as the pioneering Arab maker of peace with Israel, and its role as regional arbiter also have contributed to the country’s estimable reputation in Washington and its status as a crucial partner.
But much of this status has eroded over the last 25 years, from the last gasp of the Clinton administration’s Israel-Palestine peacemaking efforts to today’s regional wreckage of the Gaza war. The end of US combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reduced the need for expedited clearances from Egypt to transit its airspace, a perk that the US military required to rapidly access those theaters. Israel’s campaign to destroy Hamas in Gaza, and the ascendance of Qatar as a critical mediator among Israel, the United States, and Hamas, has degraded Cairo’s comparative advantage in the diplomatic field. A steep decline in international terrorism targeting Americans, and the virtual destruction of the so-called Islamic State (at least in countries important to the United States), has lessened the significance of the bilateral counterterrorism relationship. And—somewhat perversely—Washington’s reduced emphasis on international human rights and democracy under both Biden and Trump has diverted attention from Egypt, whose abuses once merited headlines in the US media. For Washington, Egypt today is more of a friendly dysfunctional dictatorship ripe for exploitation, and less the bulwark of regional stability that it was formerly perceived to be.
Today, US-Egypt relations face a wave of new challenges created by regional developments including Israel’s Gaza War, the Suez Canal, and Ethiopia’s dam on the River Nile.
Existential Fallout from Gaza
Israel’s war in Gaza has placed Egypt in an extremely uncomfortable position. Israel’s intent to expel the Palestinian population from Gaza to other countries has had Egypt on edge since October 2023. Cairo has criticized Israel’s takeover of the Philadelphi Corridor along the narrow strip separating Gaza from North Sinai as a violation of its Peace Treaty obligations and has reinforced border security measures in anticipation of Israeli moves to push large numbers of Gazans into Egypt and shut the gates behind them. Trump’s apparent openness to illegal population transfers has reinforced a sense of existential crisis for Cairo that inevitably pushes the country into conflict—or at least exacerbates tensions—with Washington.
Cairo seems simply to be waiting for what Israel and the United States will do next.
While the official US position on the future of Gaza is at this point unclear, the Trump administration is now apparently considering what is being billed as a benign real estate deal in which Palestinians would be paid to leave and enabled to return only after the Gaza Strip is rebuilt as a luxury resort. Neither Egypt nor Palestinians are buying this idea. Far more likely is a forced expulsion in which border barriers between Gaza and Egypt are suddenly removed—or are allowed to be breached by Israel—and Gaza’s entire population is herded into the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt fears an economic, political, and security catastrophe—not an unrealistic possibility for a country that remains financially strapped and that has been battling an Islamist insurgency in Sinai for more than a decade.
The Egyptian government has semi-officially floated alternative plansthat do not involve the relocation of Gazans, though none has yet gained traction. At this point, Cairo seems simply to be waiting for what Israel and the United States will do next—and dreading the possible outcomes.
Suez Shakedown
Egypt is also feeling the effects of a typical Trump strong-arm move, in this case an abrupt demand for free Suez Canal transits for US ships.
In April 2025, Trump posted on his Truth Social platform that “American ships, both military and commercial, should be allowed to travel, free of charge, through the Panama and Suez Canals!,” neglecting to clarify that the United States did not build Egypt’s canal. Trump seemed to envision a transaction based on the idea that Egypt should grant the United States a financial offset for providing security for the Red Sea and the Suez Canal by carrying out military operations against the Houthi militants in Yemen, who have been protesting Israel’s war in Gaza by attacking international shipping lanes.
The idea of letting US vessels transit the canal without payment provoked outrage in Egypt. There is ample reason for their anger: the Suez Canal—which is Egyptian sovereign territory—is a major moneymaker for the government, with revenues amounting to approximately $234 million per year. Payments from American shipping, both military and civilian, contribute to these crucial hard-currency revenues. Allowing the United States to bypass payment would undermine Egypt’s sovereignty and set a dangerous precedent against its national interests.
The money is not the whole issue for Egypt, however. In 1956, Egypt found itself in a war with Britain, France, and Israel over control of the Suez Canal Zone, a last gasp of military activism by former colonial powers seeking to maintain regional dominance—and a glimpse of Arab-Israeli wars to come. Egypt survived that conflict with diplomatic support from the Eisenhower administration. But the scars of the intervention left a lasting impression. While Trump is threatening nothing like the action of the allied forces in 1956, these historical memories inflect Egypt’s current perception of great power relations, and certainly its relationship with the United States.
Trump Takes Egypt’s Side on Ethiopia, But…
Egypt’s longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has also attracted Trump’s attention—and not necessarily in a way that will work to Egypt’s advantage.
The two countries have been at odds for years over the allocation of Nile water. Egypt claims that Ethiopia unduly restricts the flow of the Nile to Egypt through the construction of the GERD, violating its riparian rights, and more important, its agricultural livelihood. Trump spilled fuel onto this fire during his first term in office when in 2020 he stated, “It’s a very dangerous situation because Egypt is not going to be able to live that way.” He came close to encouraging military action by adding, “I say it loud and clear – they’ll blow up that dam. And they have to do something.” Destroying the GERD is easier said than done, but Trump’s remarks—and Cairo’s own reported threats of war—set off a flurry of diplomatic recrimination and ill will between Egypt and Ethiopia.
In July 2025, Trump seemed once again to take Egypt’s side, accusing Ethiopia at a NATO meeting in Washington, DC, of “closing up water going to the Nile.” While he did not repeat his five-year-old comments on blowing up the GERD, the statement nevertheless inflamed tensions between Addis Ababa and Cairo, enraging Ethiopians and potentially signaling to the Egyptian government that it had US approval if it wished to take action.
Cairo, like other Arab capitals, is hedging its bets.
Trump’s stance may afford some satisfaction to Cairo, but it could lead to an unfortunate outcome. Washington does not appear to have staked out a constructive mediating role: Earlier mediation efforts in Trump’s first term fell flat, and Ethiopians were deeply upset at the time by what they considered the US president’s bias toward Egypt. Trump’s recent comments may encourage more dangerous confrontation.
If Egypt decides that the time is ripe to act against the GERD, it may find itself without US support, especially if any military operation bogs down or is seen to fail. Trump has frequently argued against US involvement in foreign conflicts, unless the United States can be assured of a quick win (or least the image of one on American television), as was the case in the US-Israeli strikes on Iran in June 2025. An Egypt-Ethiopia battle promises to be anything but a quick win. Trump’s recent comments add tension to a US-Egypt relationship that is already somewhat fraught.
Business As Usual
Regardless of such tensions, the US-Egypt military relationship continues unaffected. Trump’s slashing of US foreign aid has, so far, notably not included any change to the $1.3 billion in annual military aid to Egypt. The Department of State recently approved a $4.67 billion sale of surface-to-air missiles as part of this longstanding security relationship. The Bright Star exercise, a biennial military event that brings together US, Egyptian, and international allies, recently kicked off with a ceremony at an Egyptian military base. The Trump administration continues to tout the “shared goals of promoting peace and security in the Middle East” and “shared priorities for regional stability and prosperity.” This mutually congratulatory rhetoric has been a staple of US talking points on Egypt for decades.
Despite these continuities, Egypt has been considering its options. In April 2025, Egypt and China held their first-ever joint air exercises, “Eagles of Civilization 2025,” the intent of which was to “deepen substantive cooperation between the Chinese and Egyptian militaries.” Meanwhile, al-Sisi is strengthening relations with Moscow in economic, nuclear, and military fields. Cairo, like other Arab capitals, is hedging its bets.
Re-Polarizing the Globe?
Less than a year into the second Trump administration, it is too soon to tell where US-Egypt relations are heading. These bilateral ties have survived extraordinary past challenges. But Trump has, in effect and in practice, downgraded the bilateral relationship by taking it for granted. The US president may assume that a country apparently dependent on US military aid and diplomatic backing can be strong-armed into acquiescing to whatever policy positions Trump demands on any particular day. But such an assumption may not be valid. With serious differences on issues critical to Egypt, and to the future of the Middle East, Cairo has every reason for concern. The nature of the transactional relationships that Trump has forced upon allies and distant dictators alike has left many countries in the region wondering where they stand. Russia and China are attempting to take advantage of the instability in American politics and foreign relations in a bold attempt to reshape the world order to their advantage. Cairo has for decades entertained fantasies of bolstering its global position along these lines; al-Sisi’s careful buildup of military and commercial ties with Russia and China might offer a back door to the non-alignment that President Gamal Abdel Nasser championed in the 1950s and 1960s.
In the short term, humoring the US president has its advantages; in the long term, indulging Trump’s every whim could lead to disaster.
The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/esfera
