After waiting for a week following Israel’s June 13 attack on Iran, US President Donald Trump decided to involve the United States directly in the Israeli-Iranian war. On June 21, American strategic bombers and naval ships attacked three Iranian nuclear sites—at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—ending the United States’ pretense of diplomatic contact and negotiations with the Islamic Republic regarding its nuclear program. In addition to throwing the entire Arabian Gulf and Middle East regions into a chaotic and destructive spin that could spiral out of control, Trump’s intervention has caused rifts in his Republican Party and voter base, and drawn criticism, mainly among Democrats, for his failure to secure congressional authorization.
Generally speaking, the American attack on Iran came as a culmination of pressure from Israel and its many supporters in the United States and as a fulfillment of American strategists’ dogma of challenging other rising powers. Since he first assumed office in the late 1990s, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been obsessed with Iran’s nuclear program and its dismantlement. He has made the issue a central focus for his many governments since then and has taken it to the halls of power in the United States, European capitals, the United Nations, and elsewhere. His address to a joint session of Congress in 2015—in which he challenged former President Barack Obama’s efforts to sign a nuclear compromise with Iran—still stands as one of the most audacious attempts to prevent both a peaceful resolution for the Iranian nuclear program crisis and American neutrality in adjudicating it.
Arab Center Washington DC (ACW) asked its fellows and analysts to provide their perspectives on various aspects of President Trump’s decision to involve the United States in Israel’s war with Iran. Their responses are below.
Is the United States Seeking Regime Change in Iran?
Charles W. Dunne, Non-resident Senior Fellow
The US strike on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and two other key Iranian nuclear sites “was not, and has not been, about regime change,” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told reporters on June 22. Vice President J.D. Vance agreed, insisting on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that the United States is “at war with Iran’s nuclear program,” not Iran itself (a distinction with no apparent difference). Vance added, “Our view has been very clear that we don’t want a regime change.”
Trump had remained remarkably consistent that, despite his policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, he would not press for the replacement of theocratic rule. “We’re not looking for regime change. I want to make that clear. We’re looking for no nuclear weapons,” he said in 2019 at a joint press conference with Japan’s then-prime minister Shinzo Abe. Officially, Trump has not changed his tune since; he has not officially bought into Netanyahu’s thinly veiled calls for the overthrow of the Iranian regime, and reportedly vetoed an Israeli plan, put to him by Netanyahu, to assassinate Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
But Trump’s ambitions may be expanding along with American military involvement and his own triumphalism. On June 17, Trump openly threatened Khamenei’s life, and called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender.” He has repeatedly threatened broader and more violent attacks. Iran “must make peace,” he said at the White House on June 21. “If they do not, future attacks will be far greater…There will be either peace or there will be tragedy for Iran far greater than we have witnessed over the last eight days.” And on June 22, Trump posted on Truth Social, “If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn’t there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!” It seems that regime change may be on the table after all.
The coming days and weeks will tell. If hostilities end with a rapid diplomatic settlement, Trump’s potential interest in regime overthrow will probably fade. However, if the war turns into a protracted conflict with escalating US involvement and casualties, or if the president misreads his opportunities, Trump could be drawn inexorably toward the regime change option as the only way out. He will certainly find an enabler in Netanyahu, who wields considerable influence with the president. Dangerous waters are ahead.
What Is the Impact on the Axis of Resistance?
Imad K. Harb, Director of Research and Analysis
The American attack on Iran should be seen exclusively as an act of war against the Islamic Republic, and not as a direct assault on the military formations constituting the so-called Axis of Resistance that Iran leads in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen. Still, the Trump administration’s decision to side with Israel in the current conflagration weakens the link of the Islamic Republic with its allies and limits their ability to challenge Israel’s activities or the American role in the Middle East.
Lebanon’s Hezbollah has thus far refrained from joining the fight against Israel or the United States, having been weakened following some 14 months of confrontation with Israel. The group has condemned the Israeli and American attacks on the Islamic Republic, but it is hindered from military action by several factors. First, the Israeli Army continues its attacks against the party’s military positions and cadres, preventing Hezbollah from constituting a credible challenge to Israel or the United States. Second, Hezbollah has to worry about challenging the Lebanese state’s sovereignty over its territory and responsibility for deciding war and peace issues for the country. Third, the Lebanese Army has nearly succeeded in controlling southern Lebanon and will not allow the party to launch any attacks against Israel.
Practically the same holds for Palestinian Hamas. It has enough on its hands in resisting Israel’s genocide in Gaza to contemplate responding to the US attack on Iran. At any rate, Hamas was never seen as a full proxy doing Iran’s bidding. As for the Iran-friendly Shia militias in Iraq, they appear to have accepted to respect the Iraqi state’s sovereignty claim and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s effort not to antagonize American forces in the country.
Yemen’s Houthis appear to be the only “resistance” party that is primed and ready to respond to the US attack on Iran, although any such response is sure to invite severe American retaliation. In a show of solidarity with Iran, the Houthis have abrogated their May 2025 ceasefire agreement with the Trump administration and may soon renew their attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea. If Iran decides to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which some 20 percent of the global oil trade passes, a Houthi return to such attacks will add more calamity to the global economy since the group threatens another route for the commodity via the Red Sea.
Israel Got Its Main Wish, Now What?
Khalil E. Jahshan, Executive Director
In his victory lap held at the White House a few hours after the long-anticipated US airstrikes on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, the three key Iranian nuclear facilities, President Donald Trump boasted that “the strikes were a spectacular success.” He claimed further that “Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.” But the extent and effectiveness of the US strikes remain unknown until the stakeholders and specialized international agencies complete their own assessments of the American bombing raid that has raised more questions than it has answered conclusively. Indeed, it might take years for an objective assessment to emerge and prove the president’s claim that Tehran’s nuclear program has actually been decimated.
The only clear outcome so far is Benjamin Netanyahu’s emergence as the sole beneficiary of this controversial ordeal by solidifying his own political power in Israel and succeeding in dictating the pace and objectives of the war by dragging the United States into his obsessive decades-long fight with Iran. Consequently, the United States is left with the sole, undesirable responsibility of picking up the pieces for decades to come as it did in other ill-conceived and “endless” adventures including Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. This does not bode well for US credibility and the safety of its wide interests throughout the region.
By accepting the Israeli narrative and swallowing Netanyahu’s rationale for waging war on Iran hook, line, and sinker, President Trump has taken an enormous political risk that is likely to haunt his administration for the next three and a half years. Primarily, he will have to deal with Iran’s response to the US attack, whether Iran opts for retaliation or for the less likely option of capitulation, as Trump has demanded. Both options will present Washington with formidable challenges. Some Washington analysts predict that Trump will continue to follow Netanyahu’s leadership by espousing his notion of “regime change” in Tehran. The outcome of such a goal might be surprising to both Tel Aviv and Washington. As Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution warned the United States and Israel, “Be careful what you wish for. An Iran that is racked by violence and chaos is not going to be a better neighbor.”
Will the US Attack Change Anything for the Palestinians?
Tamara Kharroub, Deputy Executive Director and Senior Fellow
Palestinians have always been at the losing end of global affairs and geopolitical shifts. Palestinians in Gaza continue to endure Israel’s genocidal war of annihilation and mass starvation, while annexation, violence, and restrictions against Palestinians in the West Bank escalate. Isreal’s unprovoked attack on Iran and the ensuing US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites are likely to have severe consequences and intensify the already dire conditions for Palestinians.
First, the shifting global attention away from Palestine and toward US military involvement with Iran and the possible eruption of a global conflict may lead to reduced international visibility and bandwidth for advocacy for the Palestinian cause. As media cycles and diplomatic attention pivot to Iran, international pressure on Israel to end its genocide and occupation in Gaza and the West Bank is likely to shrink. (For example, the June 17-20, 2025, high-level international conference intended to recognize Palestine at the United Nations was postponed.) The focus on the humanitarian situation in Gaza will decline, which could deepen the crisis of mass starvation, lack of fuel and water, and the collapse of the healthcare system there.
Second, direct US military engagement against Iran is likely to embolden Israel to expand its attacks in Gaza and enact harsher repression and lockdowns in the West Bank under the cover of a broader regional war and Israeli security. The counter-Iran narrative affords Israel even greater impunity and time, escalating its ongoing bombardment, siege, and displacement campaign in Gaza (hundreds of Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since the start of Israel’s June 13 campaign against Iran, many while waiting for aid and seeking food), while intensifying settlement expansion and ethnic cleansing in the West Bank. For example, on June 22 Israel authorized the takeover of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem and Masafer Yatta.
Third, the US military confrontation with Iran will likely produce regional geopolitical shifts and international realignments, as countries in the region shift their priorities and further sideline the cause of Palestinian rights and self-determination. Whether it is Gulf states’ fears of Iranian retaliation on their soil or others affected by the exchange of fire over their skies, or fears of political and economic instability and environmental catastrophe, Arab states may prioritize relations with the United States and the protection of their strategic interests over solidarity with Palestine and diplomatic leverage for Palestinian rights.
Iran’s Reaction and What to Expect
Assal Rad, Non-resident Fellow
The American bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites raises questions about historical legacies, national security imperatives, regional dynamics, and international law. Iran’s nuclear ambitions predate the Islamic Republic, tracing back to Shah Reza Pahlavi’s era when nuclear development was pursued not just for technological advancement but also to assert sovereignty. This historical continuity shows that Iran’s nuclear program is not purely ideological but is driven by a broader national interest in safeguarding Iran’s autonomy and security.
In more recent years, Iran has proved its willingness to negotiate with the United States and international actors, to limit its nuclear program for civilian purposes, and to abide by the terms of an agreement, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Donald Trump’s 2018 abrogation of that agreement and Israel’s unprovoked military aggression against Iran have exacerbated tensions, while likely changing the latter’s calculus on the legitimacy of a diplomatic path and, possibly, the nature of its nuclear program.
There are several possibilities that Iran might pursue but they have unpredictable outcomes and are fraught with risks. One is continued military retaliation against Israel while pursuing diplomatic negotiations with the United States. However, given the history of US betrayal, continued diplomacy may not be an option. Another choice would be withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accelerating the nuclear program, which may enhance Iran’s deterrence but will provoke international condemnation. A third option involves targeting critical economic infrastructure in the region, such as oil and gas shipping routes, or utilizing alliances to disrupt American and Israeli interests without escalating into full-scale warfare. A fourth could be diplomatic engagement with regional allies and international bodies to hold Israel and the United States accountable, although this approach may be ineffective given the duo’s disregard for international law and the failures of the international system to stop Israel’s genocide.
Ultimately, Iran is likely to combine military, economic, and diplomatic strategies, carefully balancing responses to protect its sovereignty and to challenge US-Israeli actions, while maintaining room for negotiation. Its future decisions will depend on the evolving geopolitical situation and the perceived durability of western commitments.
Americans Are Not Prepared for Prolonged War
Annelle Sheline, Non-resident Senior Fellow
The United States is not ready for prolonged war. Many Americans voted for President Trump because he pledged to avoid unnecessary wars. Trump won, in part, because Democratic voters did not show up for Vice President Kamala Harris the way that they had for Joe Biden in 2020; of the people who voted for Biden in 2020 but did not vote for Harris in 2024, 29 percent cited “ending Israel’s violence in Gaza” as the top issue affecting their vote, while “the economy” was the second highest cited, at 24 percent. It appears that many Democratic voters were tired of America enabling Israeli atrocities, while Trump claimed that he would be the dealmaker in chief.
Even Americans who were not primarily motivated by Trump’s anti-war stance on the campaign trail are wondering why the United States is suddenly attacking another country in the Middle East that posed no clear threat to American interests. A post on X.com from Rep. Marjorie Taylor Green (R-GA), a key Make America Great Again figure, conveyed this confusion: “Americans now fear…being dragged into another war by Netanyahu when we weren’t even thinking about any of this a week ago.” To be sure, Americans are tired of war in the Middle East, and many are tired of America’s unconditional support for Israel.
In contrast to the majority of Trump supporters voters who, at least days before the US attack, told pollsters that they opposed a US bombing of Iran, many Republicans in Congress are cheering on Trump’s military moves. Meanwhile, Democrats, who continued to applaud Biden’s disastrous support for Israel even as their voters soured on its genocidal war in Gaza, have couched their opposition in terms of the president’s failure to seek congressional authorization for military action against Iran.
Although Trump appears to believe that he can now push for peace, he has just vacated the anti-war lane that twice previously helped him win the presidency. Smart politicians from both parties will be positioning themselves to oppose war with Iran. Even smarter politicians will pledge to end America’s unconditional support for Israel.
The GCC Response to the American Attack
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Non-resident Senior Fellow
A direct American strike on Iran is the scenario that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have long sought to avoid, due to their hosting of US military bases and forces. There has long been concern in Gulf capitals that they could be targets for retaliation, either directly by Iran or indirectly by proxy groups or ‘gray zone’ activities. For this reason, Gulf leaders have signaled that they would not permit the United States to use any of the American military facilities on their territories for such an attack. Gulf officials will likely emphasize this stance to their counterparts in Tehran. In addition, there will be relief across the region that Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr was not among the targeted sites, as any damage there could have a catastrophic environmental impact on the GCC region if radiation seeps into the Gulf and contaminates water supplies used in desalination plants throughout the GCC.
As they assess the implications of the US strike and Iran’s range of responses, leaders in the Gulf will likely be at the forefront of regional diplomatic and de-escalation initiatives, seeking to pass messages and act as intermediaries between the United States and Iran. This was the case in January 2020, after the US killing of Iran’s Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, when Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman visited Washington to make the case for de-escalation in person to the (first) Trump administration. Now, Gulf leaders hope to leverage their influence in both Washington and Tehran. Sharply rising tanker freight rates and soaring insurance costs are already affecting shipping into and out of the Gulf. The heavy reliance on imported goods and seaborne supply chains may cause inflationary pressures, especially for those states that lack an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, regardless of whether Iran manages to disrupt maritime traffic or not.
The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: USAF
