Over the last 18 months, Iran quadrupled its stock of 60 percent enriched uranium. Yet however “successful,” this effort was fraught with danger for the Islamic Republic itself. Having produced some 900 pounds of 60 percent enriched uranium by May 2025, the incentive increased for Tehran to hold on to its stockpile rather than use it as leverage to trade for a negotiated deal with the United States. Thus, Iran may have turned a tactical advantage into something of a strategic burden. Indeed, Israel’s June 13 assault on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and military and scientific leadership suggests that Tehran has miscalculated.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) June 12 declaration that Iran has failed to provide “full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations constitute non-compliance with its obligations” underscored the perils of an accelerated enrichment program. But in terms of the timing of the Israeli assault, what counted first and foremost was the abiding conviction of Israeli leaders and the wider populace that Iran was well on its way to posing an existential threat to Israel.
And yet if Tehran’s own actions fed this grim perception, in undertaking a multi-pronged assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities and on the core leaders of its security sector and nuclear science community, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is literally and figuratively playing with fire. It is unlikely that the attack will permanently damage, much less destroy, Iran’s nuclear facilities. On the contrary, having surprised and humiliated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his hardline allies, Israel’s assault could convince Iranian leaders that they have no other option but to expel IAEA inspectors and exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, they might also conclude that Iran must adopt North Korea’s strategy of pursing nuclear weapons as the first line of regime survival. Foreclosing all prospects of diplomacy, this policy could invite a nuclear arms race in the region.
Israel Aiming for Regime Change?
Israel’s leaders and top security officials were surely well aware of the risks that could come with an attack that was unlikely to totally destroy Iran’s nuclear project. And yet while they concluded that Israel had no choice but to run this risk, it is also possible—as one veteran Iran analyst has noted—that their goal was not to destroy or disable Iran’s nuclear facilities. Rather, Netanyahu and his allies are seeking to destabilize the regime or even set the stage for a popular uprising.
There is good if mostly circumstantial support for this deduction: Israel has avoided targeting Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, a wise choice given the grave risk of nuclear contamination in Iran and the surrounding region. Additionally, Israel does not have the “bunker busting” munitions required to destroy Iran’s deepest nuclear facilities in Natanz and especially Fordow. Absent a commando raid on Fordow, which would be a huge gamble, Israel’s assault will leave a badly wounded Iran with its most advanced enrichment facilities intact and thus, experts argue, capable of rebuilding its nuclear program.
Indeed, unable to deliver a fatal blow, Israel has focused on “decapitating” the leaders of Iran’s security and nuclear energy establishments. Netanyahu’s claim during his June 13 broadcast that “this is your chance to stand up” against “an evil regime” strongly suggests that Israel’s leaders hope that the assault will prompt a popular rebellion and/or internal move against Khamenei and his allies.
The Dangers of Escalation Will Increase in the Coming Weeks
If regime change was a possible objective, Israel’s leaders may be disappointed. Rather than spur a rebellion, in the short or even longer term the assault could unite the population. Moreover, if Israel’s assassination of Iran’s top military officials underscores just how unprepared Tehran was, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s very survival now depends on taking immediate steps to shore up the regime. Apart from appointing new military leaders—such as General Ahmad Vahidi as head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Cords—Khamenei must now wrestle with how to respond to an assault that apart from its military costs, has resulted as of June 15 in at least 224 civilian deaths and almost 1,300 injuries, many of them in the capital Tehran. Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and northern Israel suggest that Khamenei has chosen to raise the stakes by targeting Israel’s civilian population.
This is a risky yet not surprising gamble. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has declared that “if Khamenei continues to fire missiles at the Israeli home front, Tehran will burn.” His warning that “the Iranian dictator is taking the citizens of Iran into hostages and creating a reality in which they, and especially the residents of Tehran, will pay a heavy price” is ominous. Echoing the rationale that Israel has used to justify its massive assault on civilian and economic targets in Gaza, the defense minister’s threat underscores the prospect for rapid escalation. Indeed, Israel’s assault on major energy facilities in southern Tehran suggests that without some major international effort to secure a ceasefire, Israel and Iran could move to a nearly existential battle.
Trump’s Magical Bombast Is No Substitute for a US Strategy
Aware of the perils of escalation, Israel’s leaders may be betting that the White House, and President Donald Trump in particular, will use US military and security assets to help Israel deflect Iranian missile and drone attacks. They may also be hoping that having damaged Iran’s nuclear facilities, the US will be in a position to secure the kind of deal it failed to get before, one based on “zero enrichment.”
But while the White House is not shedding any tears for Iran, US interests will not be served by a widening regional conflict. In this sense, Trump—who has been Netanyahu’s chief enabler—may very well have to take steps that the Israeli prime minister will find hard to swallow. Netanyahu’s warning that Israel will sustain its assault for “as long as necessary” may be smart tactics, but it only highlights the tricky task that Trump must soon face, namely, how to bring about a ceasefire.
The chances that the US president will be up to this task are not encouraging. Indeed, Trump’s warning on the very day following Israel’s assault that “Iran must make a deal…before it’s too late”—and even more so, his weird June 15 assertion that “Israel and Iran will make a deal” and “have peace soon” provide—offers no reassurance that he has any idea how to stop the fighting, much less forge a coherent US strategy. With Israeli military leaders warning that the conflict is reaching the “point of no return,” Trump’s predilection for magical thinking is likely to deeply worry US Gulf Arab leaders, not to mention Washington’s western allies.
Can Arab and European Leaders Work Trump?
Led by Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab leaders have assailed Israel’s assault. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan put it bluntly, expressing Riyadh’s “strong condemnation and denunciation of the heinous Israeli attacks against the brotherly Islamic Republic of Iran.” This is not the statement of an Arab official seeking to have it both ways by condemning Israel while hoping that its military campaign succeeds. Given Israel’s destruction of Gaza and its ongoing bid to push Palestinians out of both Gaza and the West Bank, an escalating Iran-Israeli war that might end with Iran retaining some of its nuclear program could encourage Gulf Arab leaders to reassess the very idea of normalization with Israel. It would be ironic if Israel’s assault leaves it more isolated from the region than ever, and thus dependent on a US president whose May 2025 trip to the Middle East amply demonstrated his desire to make US-Gulf Arab relations a mainstay of US policy.
As for European leaders—every one of whom is still reeling from the Trump administration’s ambivalent if not hostile attitude toward their countries and his erratic approach to Russia—they will now have to find some way to reach a consensus with Trump on how to respond to the widening Israeli-Iran war. The June 15-17 G-7 meeting in Alberta, Canada—which US and European leaders assumed would focus on difficult issues such as tariffs and Russia’s war in Ukraine—has been dominated by events in the Middle East.
That many European leaders probably suspect that the White House’s previous indirect talks with Iran were merely a smokescreen for Israel’s assault will not help matters. Still, it is very likely that they will not only press for Trump’s support for a ceasefire: they will also encourage the White House to rethink its previous insistence that the only basis for an agreement with Iran is zero enrichment of uranium and the complete dismantling of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program. Since part of that program will probably survive Israel’s assault, and since Iran’s leaders will endeavor to rebuild Tehran’s battered nuclear project, it is anybody’s guess if Trump and his advisers can see their way to envisioning a diplomatic strategy that will pull the region back from the brink.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Moshe Einhorn
