Israel’s approval of a US-brokered ceasefire with Hezbollah set the stage for an end to fourteen months of fighting between the two parties, ushering in the potential for a new phase in Lebanon’s governance without proxy Iranian influence. In turn, Hezbollah’s agreeing to a cessation of hostilities underscored the setback it incurred along with its backer Iran whose regional strategy may very well have been dealt a deadly blow.
In principle, the ceasefire deal is not dramatically different from its 2006 version after the end of the Israel-Hezbollah war of that year. It calls for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to the border area, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from South Lebanon within 60 days. The agreement stipulates that Hezbollah retreats to areas beyond the Litani River, some 28 kilometers to the north of the Lebanon-Israel border. A 60-day truce will act as a transition phase, enabling the beginning of negotiations on demarcating the Lebanese-Israeli land border to resolve longstanding territorial disputes.
Under the deal, the militant group will move further away from Israel but will not disappear. Déjà vu? Perhaps. Questions indeed remain as to the Lebanese government’s ability to guarantee that Hezbollah will disarm or whether the army, one of the few functioning state institutions trusted by all, is capable of taking on an expanded role in shaping national security and becoming the country’s sole defense guarantor. What is certain, though, is that the inclusion this time of a US-chaired monitoring and enforcement mechanism for violations, with a focus on dismantling Hezbollah militarily and ensuring it cannot rearm, may help ensure success in the context of a changed strategic domestic and regional landscape.
Questions indeed remain as to the Lebanese government’s ability to guarantee that Hezbollah will disarm.
However, what may be less certain is how the future of Lebanon unfolds and whether sectarian tensions—the specter of which were revived with the mass displacement caused by Israel’s offensive—spiral into a civil war. Lebanon may be undergoing the most dangerous episode of its tumultuous history with the serious weakening, in the span of weeks, of a movement whose deepening involvement and influence in the country’s governance had transformed it into the primary representative of the Shia sect in Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s Capitulation?
The Israeli assault on Hezbollah, which coincided with deepening divisions within Lebanon regarding the party’s involvement in supporting Gaza, has exposed Lebanon to the tangible possibility of irreversible collapse. Hezbollah and its cache of weapons had long been a bone of contention internally—leading to growing anger among some segments of the population over the group’s decision to start a “war of support” for Hamas with Israel. Those who were vocal in their opposition to Lebanon being dragged into another war are now calling for the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and accountability for its political repression to silence critics and political opponents.
On September 28, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, who cultivated an almost inviolable aura, was killed by Israel, while the party’s invincibility was shattered, casting further doubt on its future. Israel continued to conduct intense bombing campaigns meant to downgrade the groups’ arsenal but also targeted civilian organizations linked to Hezbollah, aiming to make life unbearable in the three main Shia strongholds: southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. While it is hard to fully and assuredly ascertain Hezbollah’s losses in the war, Israel estimates that it has lost 80% of its arsenal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, having openly declared that he was seeking to take down Iran’s “axis of resistance” and repeatedly asserted the need to free Lebanon of Hezbollah and Iran. He also made it his objective to weaken Hezbollah not just as a Lebanese force but as a regional power, by targeting its financial network, al-Qardh al Hasan, as well as its media arms. He called on the Lebanese to wrest back control of their country from Hezbollah. Yet hardly anyone came to Hezbollah’s rescue, neither Iran nor its axis allies.
Political Shiism in Lebanon, which consolidated itself in the 1980s with the advent of Hezbollah, may now be fracturing. The Shia community has lost footing with the death of Nasrallah, who projected and symbolized its strength. After a bruising war, Hezbollah’s rank and file are caught between anger and grief, wrestling with a sense of weakness and memories of disenfranchisement and marginalization. These could heighten sectarianism tensions that were awakened when Hezbollah decided to join in the defense of Gaza.
While the war against Hezbollah damaged it significantly, it has not entirely eradicated it.
This also brings into question the future role of Hezbollah as the preeminent Shia party in Lebanon. While the war against Hezbollah and its popular base in the southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley, and the south damaged it significantly, it has not entirely eradicated it. The party’s structure is said to remain intact, as is the network it nurtured and sustained of economic and social services as well as influential personalities, including members of parliament, ministers, and religious and political leaders. Israel’s assault against Hezbollah strongholds and its displacement of around 1.3 million predominantly Shia civilians who fled their homes in the south and elsewhere has also disturbed the country’s delicate geographic composition; only 20 percent found shelter in government facilities, such as schools and community centers, while others have sought to rent houses and apartments or remain with relatives across the country. The displaced are now trying to return to their homes and properties but many are finding that they no longer exist after Israel’s punishing assault. Resettlement and rehabilitation will thus be a heavy burden, but the arguably inescapable conclusion is that Hezbollah’s Shia base has been devastated and this will inevitably reflect on the party’s ability to regain its dominant position among them and in Lebanese society at large.
At the same time, as the absurdity of the forced co-existence of Hezbollah as a parallel state-like structure has unraveled in the most tragic of forms, there can be no return to the status quo ante—but this goal need not to be presented in a combative and antagonistic manner in the next phase. Indeed, while Israel’s military approach may have provided some opportunities, it could pose serious challenges to Lebanon’s medium and long-term stability. After all, Hezbollah is itself a product of such a military process: it was created under Iran’s patronage post-1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and established itself in 1985 in Beirut’s southern suburbs, having found its place within the Shia community as an anti-imperialist force pledging allegiance to the Supreme Leader in Iran and whose prime goal was to resist the Israeli threat, which later served as a justification for keeping its weapons.
Today, this resistance mentality risks being revitalized, and any new manifestation of Hezbollah may not just be targeted at Israel but at perceived enemies within Lebanon. Hezbollah may also be more militant, more anti-western, more clandestine, and more paranoid. It will thus be necessary in the next phase of Lebanese politics to avoid humiliating confrontations with Hezbollah’s new leadership while focusing instead on reversing the deliberate sclerosis of the previous phase in which the party protected and enabled a kleptocratic political class that led to Lebanon’s current economic and social calamity.
A Ceasefire That Helps the Lebanese State
In theory, the surprise November 26 ceasefire could sow the seeds for long-term stability in Lebanon and the region and ensure the country’s survival as a nation. UNSC Resolution 1701, on which the agreement is based, is widely recognized to have ended the 2006 conflict and brought about a semblance of stability to the border area between Lebanon and Israel. And while it established a buffer controlled by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the Lebanese Army and served as an effective conflict management tool for many years, Resolution 1701 also required the disarmament of Hezbollah, which never took place. The key now to addressing the Lebanese situation is to implement the 1989 Taif, Saudi Arabia Agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war. Taif called for the disbanding of militias in Lebanon and for exclusive state control of weapons in the country. Its accurate implementation would end Hezbollah as a military formation and assure the success of Resolution 1701.
The key now to addressing the Lebanese situation is to implement the 1989 Taif Agreement.
Rather than just degrade Hezbollah’s capacities once and for all and fully disarm Hezbollah, Israel has opted to boost security arrangements along the border and agreed to the formation of a US-led monitoring committee. Being satisfied that it scored what it considers to be a strategic victory, Israel allowed American diplomatic action to unfold and arrive at a ceasefire, although it continues to violate it. At the same time, most Lebanese support replacing Hezbollah’s military strength with that of the Lebanese army in the south as the sole defender of the country’s sovereignty. But this needs to be negotiated locally leading to a redefined defense strategy that ensures the prominence of the Lebanese state and its security services.
Meanwhile, Lebanon has been without a president and run by a caretaker government for more than two years, in addition to being ravaged by an economic crisis that has pushed millions into poverty and left the state unable to deal with the current emergency. Electing a president at this juncture would help consolidate the state, address the destruction that decimated Hezbollah-controlled areas, and usher the country toward a reality of sectarian inclusivity that assures the Shia that they belong to the Lebanese nation and are not proxy fighters in Iran’s regional battle.
Lebanon: Between Division and Unity
Today, the mass displacement caused by the Israel-Hezbollah war has been particularly devastating, but despite some triumphalism that has prevailed in the media, sectarian solidarity and unity have persisted at the grassroots, preventing the potential fracturing of Lebanese society. But in shifting domestic political dynamics and the balance of power, the conflict and its aftermath have brought to light the ineptitude of the Lebanese state and called attention to the need for a functioning government and political system capable of ushering the country through this next phase, inspiring the confidence of international partners, and attracting foreign assistance. Here, the weakening of Hezbollah provides what may be considered a short-lived opportunity to recover a potentially viable national formula, one not initially based on defeat and grievance but instead on unity and solidarity through rebuilding, reforming, and invigorating all state institutions within the Taif framework that intended the disbandment of all militias.
Today, Hezbollah assesses its setback, its notable field resistance of the Israeli invasion of the south, and the ceasefire agreement and is probably planning for a reemergence, even while its detractors dismiss the idea. This is why—and going back to the lessons learnt from Iraq and the de-Baathification effort—a path should be cleared to demobilize Hezbollah fighters, retire its fighting force, and inventory and dispose of its arsenal. This would be a way of reinforcing stability and permanently neutralizing the party militarily. At the same time, Lebanon’s army, the only still operational national institution, should be significantly bolstered and deployed to play a vital role in securing the south and maintaining stability. On the other hand, postwar relief and reconstruction efforts should be started to address the physical devastation and economic losses—that the World Bank has estimated at $8.5 billion—in tandem with the structural reforms needed to stabilize and rehabilitate the economy.
Finally, an influence effort needs to be made to counteract the growing tendency today—whether organic or induced—to mobilize against Hezbollah’s social environment through abject sectarian discourse. This may be reinforced by the verbal and behavioral abuse practiced by many Hezbollah supporters who are frustrated and over-compensating. Still, the resulting expanding sectarian divide is detrimental to stability and the prospects of Lebanon’s survival as a unified nation. Instead, concerted apolitical messaging that the time is one of unity and solidarity should be promoted.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Mohammad Kassir
