On April 14, 2025, a day after the Lebanese people were commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 1975-1990 civil war, the new prime minister, Nawaf Salam, was in Damascus, meeting Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Ironically, the two men’s discussions centered on familiar issues—border security, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and the Israeli challenge—that historically have troubled the relationship between the two countries and that contributed to Syria’s military intervention in the Lebanese civil war in 1976. In addition to avoiding new tensions over these longtime issues, relations between the two countries must overcome the complications borne from Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war (2011-2024) in support of Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime.
To be sure, the Middle East has undergone seismic shifts since 1975. Arguably, the region is completely different today than the one that existed when the Lebanese civil war broke out; Syria and Lebanon themselves have changed significantly, as well. In Syria, the 54-year rule of the Assad family has come to an end. A new regime rules today in Damascus with a completely different worldview. Lebanon, too, has seen sweeping changes, most notably Hezbollah’s recent defeat by Israel and the group’s subsequent retreat from Syria. Yet, despite these transformations, the ghosts of the past continue to haunt the relationship between the two countries, which need to do a great deal of soul-searching before they can turn the page on the past.
Syrian-Lebanese relations remain among the most complex in the Middle East. Many Syrians still regard Lebanon as part of “Greater Syria,” a historical and ideological concept that was shattered by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the region between the European colonial powers France and the United Kingdom. The concept of Greater Syria provided a rationale for the Baath regime in Damascus (1963-2024) to attempt to dominate the policies of its smaller neighbors—Jordan, Palestine, and particularly Lebanon. It was only under Bashar al-Assad that Syria reluctantly agreed to recognize Lebanon as a sovereign nation and to establish full diplomatic relations with it, in 2008. This came only three years after Syria was forced to end its nearly 30-year (1976-2005) military presence in the country following the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, a killing widely blamed on the Assad regime and its close ally Hezbollah (but for which the plotters have so far escaped accountability). That withdrawal marked the end of what many Lebanese had long viewed as an occupation.
Syria’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war shaped the conflict’s course and outcome, with Damascus eventually assuming the role of a kingmaker. Entering Lebanon as a peacekeeper under Hafez al-Assad, Syria claimed its goal was to prevent regional instability from spilling over its borders. However, Assad soon recognized Lebanon’s strategic value in helping Syria assert a leadership role in the Arab world when it managed Lebanon’s affairs during the civil war. Indeed, maintaining influence in Lebanon became a matter of survival for the regime in Damascus.
For almost three decades, Syria fought against all odds to keep its grip over Lebanon. Throughout the civil war, Hafez al-Assad masterfully played a game of shifting alliances—at first he supported Christian militias to block a leftist victory led by Druze leader Kamal Joumblatt, only to later switch sides to maintain a delicate balance of power. The strategy was clear: no single Lebanese faction could gain the upper hand without Syrian consent.
Despite suffering losses—especially during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon—Syria gradually emerged as the dominant external power by the mid-1980s. The Taif Agreement of 1989, brokered by Saudi Arabia, not only restructured Lebanon’s political system but also legitimized Syria’s military presence. A year later, Syria struck a deal with the United States: in return for joining the Gulf War coalition against the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, it was allowed to re-enter Beirut and dismantle General Michel Aoun’s anti-Assad government. General Aoun had been appointed prime minister in 1988 by former President Amin Gemayel and assumed executive powers in the presidential palace at Baabda. From that moment until 2005, Syrian influence permeated every aspect of Lebanese political life, undermining Lebanon’s sovereignty and stifling its democratic institutions.
Once Syria was forced to withdraw in 2005 following Harari’s assassination and international pressure, its regional leadership began to dwindle and Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power started to weaken. Iran and Hezbollah filled the power vacuum, and the Assad regime found itself increasingly dependent on Tehran and its Lebanese proxy for survival when the Party of God intervened militarily to help defend it against the Syrian opposition. Syria, once the puppeteer, became the puppet.
Today, 50 years after the outbreak of civil war, Lebanon and Syria are standing at a crossroads. The road ahead demands reconciliation, accountability, and a sincere effort to shed the shadows of the past. Both nations must commit to respecting each other’s sovereignty and affirm the right of their people to shape their own futures—free from interference, domination, and fear. Only then can they truly turn the page and begin a new chapter as sovereign, equal neighbors.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Archive image/National News Agency
