Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, Syria’s new administration announced on January 29, 2025, the appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa as president of the transitional period. The same announcement also abolished the existing (1973) constitution and dissolved armed factions and security services, the People’s Assembly (parliament), and the Arab Socialist Baath Party. On March 2, Sharaa announced the formation of a committee of seven legal experts to draft a constitutional declaration, to serve as Syria’s temporary constitution for the duration of the transition period. On March 12 these experts submitted the document to President Sharaa, who signed it the following day.
In a March 13 press conference, the committee explained that it based its preparation of the Constitutional Declaration on the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference held in February 2025, as well as on two founding documents: the 1950 Constitution and Sharaa’s January 29 Victory Speech.
The preamble of the Constitutional Declaration states:
Based on the ancient and authentic values that characterize Syrian society, with its diversity and cultural heritage, and on the established national and humanitarian principles, and keen to establish the foundations of sound constitutional governance inspired by the spirit of previous Syrian constitutions, especially the 1950 Constitution—the Constitution of Independence—and in implementation of the provisions of the Declaration of Victory of the Syrian Revolution issued on January 29, 2025, which constitutes a solid foundation for this declaration.
Article 52 stipulates that the transition period shall last five calendar years, ending “after the adoption of a permanent constitution for the country and the organization of elections in accordance with it.” Five years is a long wait for elections, especially compared to the transitions in the other 2011 Arab Spring countries.
“Constitutionalism” in Pre-Revolution Syria
Although the Assad regime theoretically was both a party-based and a civilian regime, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution granted the Baath Party significant authority and prestige. The party led the state and society and its regional command chose the president. In reality, the system of government paid no heed to constitutions, depending instead on governance by the military and intelligence services, which replaced the civilian government apparatus in many aspects of political and social life.
The Assad regime’s form of government was also centered on the president’s family—that is, the group closest to the president. The constitution did not provide any real basis for governance, instead presenting a pale image of some aspects of governance, such as the Baath Party’s role as the leader of state and society. The importance of the constitution waned during the rule of Hafez al-Assad and the tenure of his son Bashar.
Prior to Baathist rule, the Syrian political arena had witnessed serious episodes of violent disputes regarding the constitution’s clauses pertaining to the religion of the state, the religion of the president, and the source of legislation. Such disputes ended with the onset of Baath rule. By the end of the 1970s, violent oppression based on the power of the security services and the strength of the Baath Party replaced whatever there was of vitality in constitutional discussions.
Even party loyalty and support diminished, however, as the security forces came to control political matters in Syria. As evidence of the shrinking role of the constitution to the point of disappearance during the era of Hafez al-Assad, we can recall the role of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Although the Court initially had an important ceremonial role in the folklore of the Assad regime, this did not help it at the end of the elder Assad’s life, as it no longer had any real presence by the late 1990s and remained for several years without a source of funding for its basic monthly expenditures.
Sharaa’s Absolute Presidentialism
Sharaa’s Constitutional Declaration adopts an absolute presidential system, which has elicited significant criticism from Syrians. Missing from the document is the principle of separation of powers, even though in practical terms, this cannot be implemented during the transitional phase, which is based on appointment of and by the president. Article 24 states, “The President of the Republic shall form a higher committee to select members of the People’s Assembly.” It also states that “the President of the Republic shall appoint one-third of the members of the People’s Assembly to ensure fair representation and competence.” This wording poses a challenge to the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. At the same time, the declaration does not specify the number of members of the next People’s Assembly.
Regarding the judiciary, Article 43 states that it is “independent, and no authority over judges shall be subject to any authority other than the law.” The Constitutional Declaration, however, does not address the mechanism for forming the Supreme Judicial Council, stating only that the body “shall ensure the proper functioning of the judiciary and respect for its independence.” This has raised concerns that the president will become the head of the Council, as in the 2012 Constitution, in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
The Constitutional Declaration states in Article 47 that “the existing Supreme Constitutional Court shall be dissolved and a new Supreme Constitutional Court shall be established,” to consist of “seven members, appointed by the President of the Republic, who have integrity, competence, and experience.” In other words, the president forms the Supreme Constitutional Court, with no role for the People’s Assembly, thus granting him absolute power over the legislative branch.
Transitional Justice and Concerns about Freedoms
Notably, the Constitutional Declaration provides for an authority for transitional justice. Article 49 states, “A transitional justice body shall be established, relying on effective, consultative, victim-centered mechanisms to determine accountability, the right to the truth, and justice for victims and survivors, in addition to honoring martyrs.” It also says that “the state criminalizes the glorification of the former Assad regime and its symbols. Denying, praising, justifying, or downplaying its crimes are crimes punishable by law.” This provision, however, may affect freedom of opinion and expression, as it fails to define the so-called symbols of Assad or his crimes.
Most important, the Constitutional Declaration never mentions the word “democracy.” Nor does it mention anything about an electoral commission, meaning that after five years, Syrians may not be able to organize and elect a legislative body in preparation for the political system they are seeking to achieve.
Lack of Transparency, and a Need for Inclusive Negotiations
In general, a major flaw in the Constitutional Declaration is that an unelected seven-member committee wrote it without transparency. To be sure, it is impossible to satisfy Syrians emerging from the revolution who may desire different political systems. Therefore, it would have been better for this declaration to have been issued by the appointed People’s Assembly, as this would have given the document greater credibility and legitimacy. Such an approach would have been better for Syria at the present time, in light of the growing regional tensions and the weakness of national institutions. Indeed, the central government in Damascus needs to be strengthened during this transitional phase.
At the same time, negotiations must commence involving all Syrian parties with a stake in the transition. These negotiations necessarily will focus on the framework of the transition process, but they should also include negotiations on a permanent constitution. These negotiations must be inclusive of all religious and ethnic minorities to ensure the success of this crucial phase in Syria.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Twitter/Syrian Presidency
