
In January 2019, this author posed the question, “can one make peace with the Houthis of Yemen?” In the six years since, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, have grown in power and regional influence, including through their interdiction of Red Sea shipping and firing of missiles at Israel in support of the Palestinians of Gaza. More than a decade after their takeover of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, the question of war and peace with the group persists. The following is an assessment of the military and diplomatic dimensions of the problem.
The dilemma faced by Yemen’s Aden-based internationally recognized government—represented in a presidential leadership council headed by Rashad al-Alimi—and the Houthis’ regional and international adversaries has never been a purely academic one. Both force and diplomacy have been tried and failed. On the one hand, military offensives stalled after the government of President Ali Abdallah Saleh waged war against the group from 2004 to 2010. Then an eight-year air assault (2015-2023) under Saudi and Emirati leadership did not defeat the Houthis. Nor did a land war by local forces across various front lines in Yemen, bombardment by the Biden and Trump administrations, or Israeli air strikes.
On the other hand, diplomatic efforts have achieved limited successes that ended in a non-aggression pact between Saudi Arabia and Iran with implications for Yemen and a United Nations-supported agreement in principle on a peaceful transition. More recently, the Trump administration, after weeks of intensive bombardment of Houthi military targets that caused significant civilian damage, reached a non-aggression deal with Ansar Allah, but it failed to end Houthi hostilities with Israel or end Yemen’s internal conflict.
Who Are the Houthis?
Despite 20 years of conflict with local, regional, and international dimensions, the Houthis remain a mystery to many observers. The term Houthi refers to a clan from the northern-most regions of Yemen that follows Shia Islam’s Zaydi sect, which draws its name from Zaid Ben Ali, an 8th century imam believed to be a descendent of the Prophet Mohammed and fifth in a line of revered imams. The Houthis, primarily based in north Yemen, first organized politically in the 1990s as a peaceful, religiously oriented opposition to the unification of North and South Yemen under President Saleh and took the name “the Believing Youth” (al-Shabab al-Mu’minoun). The Houthis’ coexistence with the Sanaa regime ended in 2004 when the group, energized by opposition to the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, formed a broader armed coalition of Zaydis and took the name Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) and the slogan “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.” After fighting the central government for six years with the goal of gaining more autonomy in their home region, the Houthis emerged in 2010 as the dominant force in northern Yemen and the strongest opposition force in the country.
The Houthis emerged in 2010 as the dominant force in northern Yemen and the strongest opposition force in the country.
As Ansar Allah, the Houthis participated in the national dialogue held after President Saleh’s 2012 abdication as a result of Yemen’s 2011 Arab Spring uprising. But they were unhappy with the share of power allotted to them under Saleh’s successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, and rebelled, taking over Sanaa in September 2014. In 2015, they consolidated their power over the northern half of Yemen and marched south, reaching the southern city of Aden and threatening to spread their control over the whole country. In March 2015, a US-backed, Saudi-led Arab coalition, fearing Iran’s influence over the strategic entrance to the Red Sea, began an air campaign against the Houthis and organized local ground forces to push Ansar Allah back. Eventually, after its military campaign stalled, the Saudi-led coalition ended their direct military assault, without much change to the Houthis’ front lines since 2015. The goals of the Houthis, who are part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance and consider themselves their country’s divinely ordained rulers, are to counter Israeli and Western influence in the region and to rule over all of Yemen.
The Houthis as Rulers
After taking over Sanaa, the Houthis imposed their control over the government ministries, formed committees to supervise the work of the state bureaucracy, and cracked down on dissent. The Houthis currently rule over between 70 and 80 percent of the Yemeni population. They maintain a robust military presence across multiple front lines where southern armies and forces of the internationally recognized government have tried to block further advances.
Domestic and international watchdog organizations have accused the Houthis of grave violations of human rights, including denial of freedom of speech and association, arbitrary arrest, and forced disappearance. However, documentation, such as Human Rights Watch’s 2024 World Report, indicates that both sides in the conflict, the Houthis and the internationally recognized government, have committed serious rights violations. But the Houthis’ arrests of local and international staff of international organizations, embassies, and civil society organizations, highlight the group’s widespread abuses of power, including enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and forced public confessions to intimidate Yemenis working with international organizations and to stifle dissent. UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg, dedicated to finding peace in Yemen, with others, issued an appeal for the release of all detainees on humanitarian grounds. In his March 2025 report to the UN Security Council, Grundberg voiced concern that the arbitrary detentions, coupled with the Houthis’ continued attacks on Red Sea shipping, would have a negative impact on the peace process that had shown promise in 2023.
Axis of Resistance
Despite Hamas’s years of preparations for a war of resistance in tunnels deep under Gaza, October 7 apparently came as a surprise to Ansar Allah and the other Axis of Resistance members. Ansar Allah was determined to use the new war on Gaza to advance its and the Axis’s causes and to show solidarity with Gaza—especially in the face of Arab regimes’ passivity against Israel’s aggression. On October 19, 2023, the Houthis launched missiles and drones at Israel, and carried out another such attack on October 31. On November 19, 2023, Ansar Allah began a military campaign against Red Sea maritime shipping by hijacking a commercial ship reportedly partially owned by an Israeli businessman and declared that it would attack all Israel-bound or Israel-tied shipping and other vessels in the waterway (though in fact, not all of the Houthis’ Red Sea maritime targets have an evident link to Israel).
Since October 2023, the group has carried out dozens of missile and drone attacks targeting Israel (most of which have been intercepted). Regardless of any direct or indirect impact of the Houthi military campaign on Israel’s economy, the Houthis’ assaults put Yemen on a regional war footing. The group’s maritime attacks have raised the cost of international insurance for commercial ships transiting through the Red Sea. The increased prices and danger of this route have caused many companies to re-route their ships around the Cape of Good Hope in Southern Africa to avoid Red Sea shipping lanes and the Suez Canal. Peace in Yemen became elusive again.
Diplomatic Initiatives
In December 2023, UN Envoy Grundberg announced that representatives of the Houthi movement and the internationally recognized government had agreed to “a set of measures to implement a nationwide ceasefire.” In meetings in Washington, Grundberg sounded optimistic about a UN-proposed roadmap for peace, which included payment of Yemen’s public sector salaries, a resumption of oil exports, the opening of roads in Taiz and other provinces, and an end to restrictions on air and sea ports in Houthi-controlled areas. This represented progress when compared to previous, more limited peace agreements, such as the Kuwait peace talks and the Stockholm Agreement (2018) that had resulted from direct meetings between the warring parties and had generated optimism that was unfortunately short-lived. The December 2023 agreement, too, fell apart, and in March 2025 Grundberg voiced concern that “the fear of a return to full-scale conflict in Yemen is palpable.”
The Houthis’ maritime attacks have raised the cost of international insurance for commercial ships transiting through the Red Sea.
Grundberg’s efforts followed those of earlier UN envoys Jamal Ben Omar, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, and Martin Griffiths. The Houthis were a party to all the peace talks and had agreed in principle to both interim and long-term suggestions made by the various peace envoys. The problem lay in the implementation, and in the regional and international conflicts that ensued.
Whither Peace?
Peace in Yemen will not be achieved solely by the goodwill and skill of Hans Grundberg or any of his successors. Rather, more important is the balance of power inside Yemen, the region, and internationally. The year 2024 witnessed the weakening if not near destruction of fellow Axis of Resistance members Hamas and Hezbollah and even of Ansar Allah. Iran, Ansar Allah’s most important backer, has also been weakened. Although Iran fired missiles at Israel twice over the past 15 months, its forces proved no match for the combined defensive capabilities of Israel and the United States. Iran has also been enticed into a non-aggression pact with its regional nemesis, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and into nuclear negotiations with the United States, both of which it does not wish to jeopardize. All this leaves the Houthis newly vulnerable.
Nevertheless, the internal Yemeni balance of power remains in the group’s favor—the combined armies of its Yemeni adversary forces are still no match in an all-out war with the Houthis. The Gulf Cooperation Countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have sheathed their swords for the time being in favor of peace talks, and have abandoned efforts to oust the Houthis from Sanaa by force. The United States under the Trump administration has ceased its bombardment of Houthi targets and opted for a non-aggression deal with Ansar Allah. The Trump administration also, so far, seeks to avoid a destructive war with Iran.
Without Gulf countries mobilizing against Ansar Allah or supporting a new military push by forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, regional and international conditions decrease the likelihood of all-out war with and around Yemen. At the same time, efforts to bring peace to Yemen are left in stall mode. But with prospects for both all-out war and peace in Yemen seemingly improbable, the Houthis remain a potent force and an essential player in whatever options or roadmaps that might be conceived for the future of the country.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.