The Middle East has undergone a profound upheaval following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, and the impact of the ongoing conflagration between Israel and Iran is likely to affect stability in the region for a long time to come. But the Hamas attack and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s downfall have reshaped the regional order in ways that have compelled Turkey to recalibrate its foreign policy. After years of regional isolation following its failed bid for hegemony during the Arab Spring, Turkey has strategically realigned itself with Gulf Cooperation Council countries-led reconciliation efforts, emerging as a key supporting actor in a new regional architecture that prioritizes diplomatic and economic solutions over military confrontations, such as that Israel is currently pursuing. This recalibration represents a pragmatic acknowledgment of Turkey’s financial limitations while it capitalizes on its unique leverage in post-Assad Syria to secure a meaningful role in shaping the region’s trajectory.
Turkey’s Post-Arab Spring Isolation and the Failed Hegemon Strategy
Turkey’s current regional positioning can only be understood against the backdrop of its ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish itself as a regional hegemon during the Arab Spring of the early 2010s. Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Justice and Development Party government under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan envisioned a Middle East where parties ideologically aligned to Turkey would take power, naturally elevating its regional leadership. Initially relying on soft power and political alliances, Turkey’s approach shifted toward a more assertive and militarized posture as the Arab Spring’s momentum faltered and political outcomes turned unfavorable. By the early 2020s, the Islamist movements Turkey supported, particularly those tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, had lost political ground, leaving the country increasingly isolated. This isolation was particularly evident in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Ankara’s aggressive tactics alienated potential allies and led to its exclusion from regional platforms such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum. Qatar remained its sole steadfast partner, as well as the Tripoli-based Libyan government of Abdul-Hamid Dbeibah, while other regional actors engaged in new forms of cooperation that explicitly sidelined Turkey.
The 2021 Reconciliation Pivot and Strategic Recalibration
Recognizing that its regional isolation was unsustainable, Turkey began a fundamental shift in its regional strategy around 2021. This transition coincided with broader regional reconciliation trends, including the 2020 signings of the Abraham Accords, the 2021 Al-Ula Declaration that ended the Qatar blockade, and various Iran-Saudi diplomatic initiatives. Turkey’s reconciliation efforts represented a pragmatic acknowledgment that its previous confrontational approach had failed to serve its national interests and that it lacked the financial and geopolitical means to sustain an assertive regional posture indefinitely.
The country’s ongoing economic crisis forced Ankara’s hand and made the Gulf the center of its reconciliation policy.
The reconciliation process began with Turkey’s attempts to mend relationships with former adversaries, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even Syria. Turkey’s motivations for this strategic pivot were multifaceted but primarily driven by economic necessity. The country’s ongoing economic crisis, characterized by runaway inflation, chronic current account deficits, the devaluation of the lira, and the depletion of foreign currency reserves, forced Turkey’s hand and made the Gulf the center of this reconciliation policy.
In this context, President Erdoğan’s 2023 Gulf tour following his re-election, which included visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, marked a significant milestone in this diplomatic reset. These visits resulted in the signing of substantial economic agreements, with Turkey announcing framework agreements for bilateral investment with the UAE exceeding $50 billion.
The New Regional Equation: Post-October 7 and Post-Assad Dynamics
Building on these diplomatic openings, Turkey’s reconciliation efforts yielded partial success, enabling it to reintegrate into regional diplomacy. However, the Hamas-led attacks on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza, along with the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, introduced a new set of dynamics that began to reshape the emerging regional order once again.
Three core dynamics now define the evolving Middle Eastern order:
1. Gulf Ascendancy and Pragmatism
The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have emerged as the dominant regional actors. This Gulf ascendancy reflects both its states’ economic resources and their improved relationship with the United States under the administration of President Donald Trump, who prioritizes transactional relationships. The Gulf vision emphasizes a conflict-free region where trade and diplomacy take precedence over military confrontation. This marks a departure from Gulf countries’ past opposition to American-Iranian engagement; Riyadh now supports diplomatic normalization with Tehran, reflecting a more pragmatic orientation. The Gulf’s ideal regional order is post-conflict, commercially integrated, and mostly western-aligned.
2. Israel as the Principal Spoiler
Israel has become the most disruptive force in the region. Paradoxically, it was once envisioned as a key part of the emerging regional framework. Through the Abraham Accords, Israel began integrating into the broader Middle East, normalizing ties with several Arab states. Turkey, despite initial objections in 2020, did not oppose this trajectory in its post-2021 recalibration and even pursued its own bilateral reconciliation with Israel. The final piece of this normalization puzzle was expected to be Saudi Arabia’s inclusion—an outcome that seemed increasingly plausible by mid-2023.
The October 7 Hamas attacks and the subsequent Israeli response, however, disrupted this trajectory. It was not the attacks themselves but Israel’s overwhelming and prolonged military response, marked by widely publicized war crimes, that derailed the emerging consensus. Israel’s aggressive posture—seeking to prolong and regionalize the conflict—has destabilized the regional order and created a fundamental tension between the Gulf-promoted vision of stability and Israel’s preference for perpetual confrontation. This shift has been driven by a mix of strategic overconfidence and short-term political calculations, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reliance on permanent crisis to maintain power. Moreover, Israel’s military successes against Hezbollah and its role in facilitating the fall of the Assad regime have created a military intoxication that has further emboldened increasingly aggressive policies. This pattern was reinforced in June 2025, when Israel launched an expansive military campaign against Iran. The operation, which is ongoing, has further confirmed Israel’s role as a reckless destabilizer and is ratcheting up tensions in an already fragile regional architecture.
3. Turkey Aligning with the Gulf’s Vision
Turkey, constrained by financial pressures and recognizing its limited hard power reach, has largely endorsed the Gulf-led regional vision. It no longer seeks to unilaterally shape the region, but rather positions itself as a constructive partner to the Gulf. One major factor facilitating this re-alignment is the increasing economic orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Faced with persistent financial crises, Ankara has returned to a pragmatic, economy-first approach in its diplomacy—echoing patterns from its pre-Arab Spring era. This shift has brought Turkey’s interests closer to the Gulf states, whose regional agenda is likewise rooted in economic stability, investment, and de-escalation.
In addition to shared economic priorities, Turkey and the Gulf states converge in their growing unease with Israel’s destabilizing posture. While both Turkey and the Gulf initially responded to Israel’s war on Gaza with restraint, Riyadh and Ankara eventually adopted a more critical stance, driven by public pressure and by Israel’s continued escalation and well documented war crimes. Moreover, as explained below, Turkey and the Gulf share broad objectives in Syria and in their approach toward Iran.
Turkey’s Enhanced Leverage in Post-Assad Syria
The fall of the Assad regime has provided Turkey with perhaps its most significant strategic advantage in the new regional equation. Previously, Turkey had maintained its relevance in Syria by occupying portions of territory and by serving as a counterweight to both Assad and Kurdish-led forces in northern Syria. Yet it failed to achieve full normalization with Damascus. The emergence of a new, Sunni-led Syrian administration backed by Ankara has fundamentally changed Turkey’s posture. The new Syrian leadership, dependent on Turkish support for legitimacy, stability, and state-building, has given Turkey unprecedented influence over Syria’s political trajectory.
Turkey’s leverage in Syria is further enhanced by its alignment with the Gulf.
Turkey’s leverage in Syria is further enhanced by its alignment with the Gulf, particularly Saudi interests. Both powers share a vision for a stable, post-Assad Syria, one that marginalizes Iranian influence and consolidates Sunni power in Damascus. While Turkey can bring military and technical expertise, it lacks financial means. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, offers the financial resources but lacks the capacity for state-building and on-the-ground engagement. This natural division of labor and the convergence of interests has facilitated cooperation rather than competition, with interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa making his first official visit to Saudi Arabia while maintaining close coordination with Turkey.
Saudi Arabia has also taken the diplomatic lead, exemplified by its central role in facilitating President Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa, during which the American president announced the lifting of key sanctions on Syria. Turkey, by contrast, has accepted a more supportive role in the background of this process. This reflects not only Saudi Arabia’s financial indispensability, but also its greater ability to influence Washington—something Ankara, despite Erdoğan’s rapport with Trump, struggles to match.
Turkey’s role in Syria also serves broader regional strategic objectives, particularly regarding Iranian influence. The new Syrian government’s commitment to preventing Iranian arms transfers through Syrian territory and its opposition to Iran-backed non-state actors align with both Turkish and Gulf strategic interests. This has positioned Turkey as a key partner in efforts to contain Iranian regional influence.
Turkey-Iran: From Tactical Partnership to Regional Rivalry
Turkey’s relationship with Iran has long oscillated between limited cooperation and managed rivalry. Between 2016 and 2021, the two countries experienced an unusually close period of pragmatic entente, driven by mutual frustration with the United States and its allies. However, Turkey’s post-2021 pivot toward western-aligned regimes has exposed the natural areas of competition between the two regional powers. This shift has been most dramatically evident in Syria, where Turkey’s gains have come at Iran’s expense. The fall of Assad, Iran’s primary regional ally, represents a significant strategic loss for Tehran while providing Turkey with enhanced regional influence.
The fall of Assad represents a significant strategic loss for Tehran while providing Turkey with enhanced regional influence.
Similar dynamics are unfolding in Iraq, where both powers vie for influence in Baghdad and in the Kurdish regions and typically support rival factions. Turkey and Iran also found themselves on the opposing camps in the South Caucasus where Turkey is strongly allied with Azerbaijan while Iran backs Armenia. Their rivalry increasingly resembles a zero-sum game: Turkey’s advances are Iran’s setbacks, and vice versa.
Despite this intensified competition, Turkey maintains important distinctions in its approach compared to Israel’s confrontational stance toward Iran. Turkey does not consider Iran as an existential threat and while it will work to occupy spaces vacated by weakened Iranian influence, it will never want this to turn into a military operation or regime change project against Iran. This nuanced posture explains why the Turkish-Iranian rivalry has not translated into a closer Turkish-Israeli alignment, despite their shared interest in curbing Iran. Similarly, Saudi Arabia—despite once regarding Iran as an existential threat—has opted for diplomatic engagement in recent years, bringing its approach closer to that of Turkey.
Conclusion: Turkey’s Pragmatic Regional Realignment
Overall, Turkey’s evolution from regional isolation to strategic realignment within a Gulf-led framework represents one of the most significant geopolitical shifts in the contemporary Middle East. This new regional framework—shaped largely by Gulf states and tacitly backed by the United States under a transactional Trump administration—emphasizes diplomatic and economic solutions over military confrontation (while the United States continues to allow and endorse Israel’s growing militarism). This framework represents a significant departure from the confrontational dynamics that characterized much of the 2010s, offering a path toward regional stability through economic integration and political accommodation. Turkey’s repositioning within this new regional order reflects both its pragmatic acknowledgment of its limitations and its skillful exploitation of new opportunities created by regional upheavals.
While not a central architect, Turkey plays a key supporting role in this new regional order. It aligns with this vision out of both necessity and opportunity. Lacking financial resources and global leverage, Ankara cannot unilaterally shape outcomes, but it can complement Gulf leadership through its regional networks, administrative capacity, and military power. Therefore, Turkey’s role within this framework is that of a crucial but secondary player. This position allows Turkey to maintain significant regional influence without overplaying its hand as it did in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
While Turkey’s role within the framework appears pragmatic and well calibrated, the emerging regional vision is not without contradictions. It is primarily a consensus among personalized authoritarian regimes, forged through elite-level bargains rather than popular mandates. As such, it lacks deep institutionalization and is inherently vulnerable to leadership transitions or domestic unrest. Moreover, its consolidation risks further entrenching authoritarian governance across the region. Finally, the framework’s dependence on US backing adds another layer of fragility, as continuity in American support remains uncertain.
The Syrian situation will serve as a crucial test case. If Turkey and Saudi Arabia can jointly support a stable, post-Assad political transition, it could signal the viability of this collaborative model. Syria thus functions as a microcosm of the broader framework—its success or failure likely to echo across other contested arenas. Success in Syria may also pave the way for deeper cooperation in Iraq and other areas where Turkish and Gulf interests converge.
The success of this framework, however, hinges on its ability to contain spoilers. While potential Iranian attempts to reassert influence could pose long-term challenges, the main spoiler of this order is Israel. Israel’s aggressive military posture, especially following October 7, threatens to unravel the regional convergence around stability and cooperation. Israel’s recent attacks on Iran have further strained regional stability, underscoring the urgency of restraining its escalatory behavior. In the short term, restraining Israeli actions is essential for preserving the fragile regional equilibrium, and only the United States—with the Gulf countries’ leverage in Washington—can realistically fulfill this role.
However, as the recent escalation against Iran has shown, Washington has so far refrained from playing this stabilizing role. This reluctance has emboldened Israel’s confrontational strategy. Moreover, Israel’s actions inevitably pressure Iran to respond, even if Tehran’s current capacity to retaliate is limited. This tit-for-tat dynamic risks spiraling into a broader conflict and further undermines regional confidence in the sustainability of the emerging order. Going forward, the United States must urgently assume a more active role in containing Israeli escalation if it wishes to preserve the very regional framework that it tacitly supports. In the longer term, however, the sustainability of the framework will depend on finding a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian question. Only by addressing the root causes of regional conflict can this new order achieve genuine and enduring stability.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
