Speaking to reporters on June 28, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made his most explicit appeal yet to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Setting a high bar for the future of relations, Erdoğan expressed optimism about rekindling a high level of understanding. On July 7, he said that Turkey would invite Assad for a visit, and on July 12, during a press conference at the NATO Summit in Washington, the Turkish leader made another appeal, stating that he asked his foreign minister to arrange for a meeting with Assad either in Turkey or in a third country. While Erdoğan’s repeated calls to Assad appeared desperate to some, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan claimed that Turkey’s outreach was not a sign of weakness and insisted that Turkey has no plans to abandon the Syrian opposition.
These recent moves were not Erdoğan’s first push for reconciliation with Syria. Since the fall of 2022, as part of Turkey’s broader regional reconciliation efforts with former rivals such as Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia, Turkey has been making moves to restore relations with the Syrian regime after more than a decade of enmity. Meetings between intelligence chiefs were followed by others between defense ministers and finally, foreign ministers. In the lead-up to Turkey’s crucial presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023, Erdoğan made several attempts at a bilateral meeting with Assad, with Russia mediating and pressuring the Syrian president. But these efforts seemed more about Erdoğan’s electoral calculations than a genuine desire to improve relations with Syria. During the campaign, Turkey’s opposition was proposing reconciliation with Syria as a solution to Turkey’s growing refugee problem, and Erdoğan wanted to take away one of his challengers’ main talking points by arranging a meeting with Assad.
This writer and others predicted that Assad would not concede to Erdoğan’s 2023 requests, even under Russian pressure. Indeed, the day after the elections, Ibrahim Kalin, at the time the spokesperson for the Turkish presidency, announced that there were no plans for a personal meeting between Erdoğan and Assad. This confirmed suspicions that Erdoğan’s primary motivation was electoral. Indeed, for more than a year following the 2023 elections, there were no developments in Turkey-Syria reconciliation or an Erdoğan-Assad meeting. Erdoğan’s recent attempts to restart the process have been influenced by both domestic and regional developments.
Domestic Drivers of the New Push
The most important driver is the wave of anti-Syrian immigrant sentiment in Turkey, which continues to rise amid the country’s continuing economic downturn. This wave reached its peak on June 30, when pogroms against Syrians erupted in the central Anatolian city of Kayseri, a ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) stronghold, after it was reported that a child had been assaulted by a Syrian. An angry mob attacked the homes and businesses of Syrians, and it took the police hours to calm the tension and the crowd. Similar mob attacks occurred the following day in other cities with large Syrian populations. A few days later, passport and address details of more than 3 million Syrians living in Turkey were leaked on a Telegram channel calling for violence against Syrians. All these incidents were just the latest manifestation of how the Syrian refugee issue has become a domestic flashpoint in Turkey. The fact that the angry crowd called for the president to step down during the unrest in Kayseri shows the explosive potential of this problem for Erdoğan’s political future.
Notably, Erdoğan’s junior partner since 2015, the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), is now pushing an anti-immigration agenda. In the past, the MHP mostly avoided the Syrian refugee issue, leaving smaller nationalist parties to champion anti-immigrant rhetoric. The MHP’s adoption of this discourse is significant, as it has a larger support base and can influence nationalist rhetoric in Turkey. This shift is linked to the power struggle within Turkey’s ruling alliance, which is now facing a rift. The AKP and the MHP are fighting for a share of the spoils of government in a struggle that has become increasingly difficult to contain. Moreover, real policy differences are emerging. After the AKP’s losses in the March 2024 local elections, Erdoğan has appeared willing to soften his anti-Western stance in order to secure better relations with the West and better economic exchanges. On the domestic front, he also aims to reduce polarization by making cosmetic overtures to Turkey’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). In contrast, the Nationalist Movement Party draws its strength from polarization and the constant rhetoric that the survival of the Turkish Republic is threatened by internal and external enemies. This “state of exception” rhetoric gives the MHP power disproportionate to its actual popular support.
During the 2023 presidential election campaign, Turkey’s opposition was proposing reconciliation with Syria as a solution to Turkey’s growing refugee problem.
Meanwhile, Erdoğan is using an investigation into a political murder in the MHP’s ranks to try to subjugate the party. The MHP is responding to Erdoğan by, among other things, raising the issue of Syrian refugees. It is likely that many of the participants in the recent Kayseri pogrom attempt were MHP supporters. Owing to its eight-year alliance with Erdoğan, the MHP has considerable influence over the security apparatus and the judiciary, and it has ties with various mafia groups and street gangs, allowing it to manipulate and inflame events such as what occurred in Kayseri. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli has also sounded alarm bells about the Kurdish political institutions governing northeast Syria, calling on Erdoğan to reconcile with Assad in order to destroy them.
In sum, the ongoing AKP-MHP power struggle is pushing Erdoğan to pursue Syria-Turkey reconciliation more urgently. But there is a vicious cycle here. The prospect of reconciliation is causing a backlash from Turkey-backed groups in Syria, including through violent anti-Turkish demonstrations in Turkish-controlled areas of northwest Syria. Videos of Turkish-backed Syrian militias targeting Turkish institutions in Turkish-occupied territory or burning Turkish flags further fuel anti-Syrian rhetoric in Turkey.
Regional Drivers
Regional factors are also at play. Israel’s war on Gaza and the conflict’s potential spillover into Lebanon and elsewhere in the region have created incentives for both Ankara and Damascus to resolve 13 years of intense hostility. Even if re-opening diplomatic channels cannot resolve all tensions, it can still lower the temperature at a heated time in the wider region. And, unlike previous failed reconciliation attempts in which only Russia tried to mediate between the two hostile countries, this time Iraq is also playing an active role, indicating that its close ally Iran, Assad’s main foreign backer, supports the prospect of reconciliation, or at least does not object to it.
The upcoming US presidential election and the possibility that Donald Trump might win is another driving motivating both Turkey and Syria to restart negotiations for a compromise and future restoration of ties. Trump is presumed to be less interested in maintaining the American presence in Syria than President Joe Biden has been, as Trump had initiated an abrupt withdrawal of American forces during his presidency. However, Trump halted the process in response to backlash from the political and national security establishment. If Trump returns to office, he might complete the withdrawal. This expectation has accelerated the latest initiatives in Turkey-Syria reconciliation because an American pullout may help Kurdish groups strengthen their control over the area.
The State of Bilateral Relations
The overall dynamics of Turkey-Syria relations and expectations surrounding the reconciliation process have remained largely unchanged since high-level meetings began two years ago. Turkey’s Syria policy continues to be driven by three main objectives: preventing the establishment of autonomous Kurdish political structures in northern Syria (such as the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria, or AANES); curbing new waves of Syrian migration into Turkey; and, if possible, repatriating some Syrians residing in Turkey to Syria. In exchange, Damascus wants Ankara to end its occupation of northwest Syria, withdraw the Turkish army from Syrian territory, and cease support for the armed rebellion against the regime.
Recently, Assad has shown some flexibility, rather than demanding an immediate withdrawal. With no upcoming elections in Turkey, Assad might be less wary of being used as a political tool by Erdoğan. Furthermore, reconciliation holds potential benefits for Syria, particularly in reversing its international isolation. Although the regime has made progress by being readmitted to the Arab League and establishing diplomatic relations with some Arab countries, it has achieved no significant improvement in its global standing. Reconciliation with Turkey, a NATO member and a crucial buffer between Syrian refugees and the European Union, could initiate a long-term process of easing relations with the West and eventually lead to the lifting or softening of the crippling Western economic sanctions on Syria.
Future of Reconciliation
Yet, real progress in bilateral relations and solutions to points of conflict seem unlikely, at least in the short term. First, it is unclear how reconciliation with the Assad regime would help Turkey solve its refugee problem. On the contrary, such a compromise could worsen the situation for Turkey. Under a deal with Damascus, the already limited number of returnees from Turkey to Turkish-occupied areas in Syria would nearly disappear, as the future of these areas without the Turkish presence would become untenable for them. Second and more importantly, a Turkish withdrawal from northern Syria, as a full reconciliation ultimately would require, could lead to a mass exodus from these areas toward Turkey. This mass exodus would include the thousands of Turkish-backed jihadist militia members currently residing in Idlib under de-facto Turkish protection, creating a further security problem for Turkey. These jihadist groups could turn against Turkey and conduct attacks on Turkish soil if Turkey abandons them to the Assad regime.
Erdoğan’s maneuvers appear more about distracting domestic public opinion with the appearance of a compromise solution than genuine compromise.
Thus, alleviating Turkey’s refugee problem binds Turkey to remain on Syrian soil and to avoid a full reconciliation with the Assad regime. This dilemma explains the paradoxes of Erdoğan claiming Turkey respects Syria’s territorial sovereignty while insisting on talks with Assad, and of Foreign Minister Fidan asserting that Turkey will not abandon the Syrian opposition. From the perspective of the refugee problem alone, Erdoğan’s maneuvers appear more about distracting domestic public opinion with the appearance of a compromise solution than genuine compromise.
This does not mean that Turkey’s calls are completely insincere, however. While reconciliation is a dead end when it comes to the refugee issue, it does create opportunities for both Ankara and Damascus in their relations with AANES. Coordinated action with the Syrian regime against AANES may be a more effective approach than unilateral moves by Turkey. Therefore, an anti-Kurdish agreement seems to be the most likely path for the future of Turkish-Syrian reconciliation. Such an agreement would be based on transactional cooperation only, and would not fully meet the expectations of either side. But it would still create opportunities for limited cooperation. For example, while it would be extremely difficult and burdensome for Turkey to fulfill Syria’s demand for a complete withdrawal, for the reasons explained above, Turkey could withdraw to a point where the Syrian regime would be in full control of northern Syria’s strategic M4 Highway that runs east-west parallel to the Turkish border and is essential for regional trade. In return, Ankara could expect a tougher stance from Damascus against AANES. A Syrian regime that cooperates with Turkey will have a stronger hand against AANES. In fact, even the prospect of a reconciliation between Turkey and Syria has strengthened the Assad regime against AANES and prompted the Syrian Kurds to seek ways to reach out to Damascus.
For these reasons, in the short term the reconciliation process will advance only along the lines of an anti-Kurdish arrangement. The level of US commitment to the Kurds in Syria will have a decisive influence. The credibility of the American protective umbrella is already being questioned and the Kurdish position is becoming increasingly precarious as voices within the United States in favor of withdrawal from northern Syria are rising. If Washington eventually decides to withdraw, Turkish-Syrian cooperation is more likely to yield concrete results. Such a scenario would be welcomed by Russia and Iran, which have long opposed the American military presence in the region. If Washington decides to keep its military forces and to stick to its commitment to protect AANES, Turkish-Syrian reconciliation is unlikely to produce tangible results. Both Ankara and Damascus will be looking to the American election on November 5 and Washington’s subsequent foreign policy moves before taking any bolder and clearer steps of their own.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: WAFA
