Prior to the Hamas attack on October 7, Turkey was in the process of political reconciliation with Israel. Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey in 2022 in the first high-level visit by an Israeli official since 2008, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met face-to-face at the United Nations in New York in September 2023. So, when the Hamas-Israel war first broke out on October 7, Turkey’s tone was quite measured. Erdoğan was careful not to damage his relations with Israel, which could also potentially jeopardize his reconciliation with the Middle East region and the West. More importantly, he wanted to mediate in the conflict, hoping that his recent reconciliation with Israel and good relations with Hamas would place him in an ideal position, as happened with his earlier role in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, it soon became clear that he could not play a similar role, mostly due to Israel’s reluctance, which led him to change his tone and start voicing his criticism of Israel.
But despite the harshness of his criticism, Erdoğan did not initially take any concrete measures against Israel—like cutting diplomatic relations—but only retaliated against its withdrawal of its ambassador from Ankara. He also expressed his readiness to continue reconciliation with post-Netanyahu Israel, which Erdoğan apparently hoped would be realized soon. Moreover, unlike in previous crises, Erdoğan was careful not to criticize any Arab country for not being sufficiently supportive of the Palestinians, implying that he intends to preserve the reconciliation process that he initiated several years ago and which, in addition to Israel, involves Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.
Erdoğan also refrained from cutting economic ties with Israel, despite growing public pressure to do so. In fact, the preservation of economic ties was not unexpected for Erdoğan, since during the decade of Turkish-Israeli tensions, trade was never affected by the almost constant political crisis in bilateral relations. On the contrary, trade increased from around $3.5 billion in 2010 to over $9 billion in 2022 and has always been seen as the last bastion of bilateral relations. It is worth noting that this bilateral trade has largely favored Turkey, which ran a trade surplus of around $5 billion in 2022.
Rising Public Demand Causes Change
Until recently, Erdoğan’s political duels and verbal sparring with Israel and its leaders was more or less the norm. But in the post-October 7 period, he began to face increasing public pressure and criticism regarding trade with Israel. This shift was due to several factors. First, the intensity and long duration of Israel’s war on Gaza and the high human toll that is incomparable to any other Israeli war against Palestinians and Arabs in the past, led to much greater public sensitivity and pressure. Second, media reports about some Erdoğan supporters being involved economically with Israel further drew public attention to the discrepancy between his actions and his rhetoric. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the emergence of new conservative parties campaigning against Erdoğan’s supposed inconsistency also drew public attention to the issue.
Erdoğan began to face increasing criticism regarding trade with Israel after October 7.
The turning point for Erdoğan, who resisted calls for an economic embargo on Israel for months, was the March 31 local elections in which he suffered the biggest defeat of his political life. The rise of the New Welfare Party (YRP), which campaigned intensively on this issue and became the third most popular party, set off alarm bells for Erdoğan.
Assuming that his policy toward Israel was one of the reasons for his defeat, Erdoğan finally began to take a tougher position on the conflict. On April 10, just ten days after the local elections, Turkey imposed trade restrictions on 54 products exported to Israel. However, the realization that the banned items had never been a significant part of bilateral trade led to continued and even increased public criticism, prompting Erdoğan on May 3 to eventually cut off all trade between Turkey and Israel. Erdoğan also met with Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh on April 20, drawing significant criticism from western circles. Finally, on August 5, Turkey submitted its official request to join South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.
Persistent Public Criticism
Despite these measures, there is a feeling in some sectors of Turkish public opinion that Turkey is not doing enough. It is also possible that those demanding tougher measures are potential supporters of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which makes it very difficult for him to ignore such demands. In a way, years of propaganda claiming that his two decades of leadership have made Turkey powerful enough to practically design the Middle East as it wishes is now working against him.
The opposition continues to challenge the Erdoğan regime on two issues. The first is the ongoing supply of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey, which is vital for Israel’s energy security. The second is the issue of the Kürecik radar base in the eastern Turkish province of Malatya. It provides instant data to NATO countries. Opposition parties argue that Israel also uses the intelligence gathered by the base and demand that Erdoğan shut it down. But on both issues, Turkey has little influence and therefore cannot take any significant action.
The opposition continues to challenge the Erdoğan regime on the ongoing supply of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey.
Azerbaijani oil is transported through a Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, from where it is shipped to Israel. Azerbaijan is the main trader, and Turkey is only a transit country. In recent years, Azerbaijan and Israel became strong allies, as both countries share an anti-Iranian position. Moreover, this transportation is secured by very strict international agreements that legally bind Turkey to maintain the flow of oil.
One legal opportunity for Turkey to circumvent these agreements could be to refer to the ICJ’s provisional measures, which require Israel to take precautions to prevent further harm to Palestinian civilians. Since Israel has so far ignored these measures, Turkey could argue that transporting the oil to Israel would constitute a violation of the ICJ’s provisional measures, thus freeing itself from the legally binding force of the international agreements it has signed regarding the operation of the BTC. However, Turkey is unlikely to follow this path for several reasons. First, despite Turkey’s tensions with Israel, Azerbaijan is a close ally and President Ilham Aliyev is close to Erdoğan. Second, the BTC is an important instrument of western geopolitics, as it is one of the few ways to undermine Russia’s energy dominance in the region. Therefore, anything that would undermine the BTC’s functionality would provoke serious political backlash from the United States and other European countries, which already continue to strongly support Israel. Third, such a move would significantly undermine the AKP government’s goal of turning the country into an energy transit hub. Given all of this, it seems unlikely that Turkey will push to take advantage of the legal opportunities that the ICJ’s interim measures could create.
Turkey has even less leverage over the Kürecik radar base. It is a NATO base and part of a dense network of alliance and western intelligence capabilities in the region. The information gathered at this base is instantly shared by NATO countries, so Turkey has no way of deciding what information to pass on. More importantly, since Israel is not part of NATO, the information is technically not shared with Israel. But many assume that the United States is sharing this information with its allies, along with any other intelligence that it gathers, which is not something in which Turkey can intervene.
The Context of Erdoğan’s Speech on Entering Israel
Erdoğan’s statement on July 28 regarding entering Israel to help the Palestinians took place with the backdrop of Turkey’s increasingly escalatory actions that are still not satisfactory to some segments of the population. The remarks were unusually strong and confrontational, even for Erdoğan’s escalating rhetoric. Several points about the speech are worth noting.
It is clear that this was not a pre-planned speech. Despite being a great orator, Erdoğan normally avoids giving spontaneous speeches and always reads from his notes via a prompter. Even when he gives interviews, his press aides make sure that the questions and answers are prepared in advance. On the rare occasions when Erdoğan speaks spontaneously, he often makes political gaffes. It is also not uncommon for him to lose his temper and make unintentional declarations, and his July 28 speech was a typical example. He was speaking at an internal party meeting and was visibly angry. But his anger was not directed only at Israel, but perhaps more so at the opposition YRP for demanding that Ankara take tougher steps on Israel. In fact, if one watches the entire speech, one will see that most of it was about domestic politics and the YRP rather than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A YRP parliamentarian apparently criticized Erdoğan for not inviting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to speak at the Turkish Grand National Assembly in retaliation for Netanyahu’s speech in front of the US Congress on July 24. Angered by this criticism, Erdoğan made several controversial statements.
Erdoğan implied that Turkey had intervened militarily not only in Libya but also in Karabakh, although Turkey’s official position has been that it had only provided military assistance to Azerbaijan against Armenia. There have been accusations that Turkey has transferred Syrian militias it controls in northern Syria to Azerbaijan, but the Turkish government has officially denied these accusations. On the other hand, there is indeed a strong Turkish military presence in Libya, which Turkey justifies by arguing that it is at the invitation of the UN-recognized government in Tripoli and therefore not a violation of Libyan sovereignty. Neither case applies to Gaza, which does not have a recognized and functioning state, or even a UN-recognized government.
Erdoğan may well have been trying to send a warning to Israel not to intervene in Lebanon.
Erdoğan may well have been trying to send a warning to Israel not to intervene in Lebanon, stating that Turkey would be ready to help Lebanon in the same way it helped Libya and Azerbaijan; i.e., by sending military equipment and advisers at the invitation of the Lebanese government. But this is very speculative and not supported by any other data or other reporting by pro-government writers and analysts. Despite the international attention they have generated, Turkey’s pro-government media has chosen to remain silent on Erdoğan’s remarks. Only one writer in the pro-government Daily Sabah addressed the issue, arguing that Erdoğan’s remarks did not imply military action, but should be understood as a reflection of his anger at Israel’s brutality and the world’s passivity in response. Moreover, if Erdoğan were to make such a subtle statement with indirect implications, he would certainly have been better prepared. Instead, his remarks were unprepared and, as the pro-government media columnist admitted, more a reflection of anger than a well-planned speech.
Finally, Erdoğan also revealed during his speech that Turkey had in fact invited Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, but that the latter had declined the invitation. By stating that he expected an apology from Abbas for declining the invitation, Erdoğan inadvertently revealed Turkey’s diminishing influence in the conflict. It is likely that his frustration with Abbas and the realization that Turkey has limited influence contributed to his anger.
In the Aftermath of the Haniyeh Assassination
Erdoğan’s inflammatory rhetoric was quickly tested by Israel’s killing of Ismail Haniyeh. Erdoğan had met Haniyeh on several occasions, most recently in April 2024, and had established a personal relationship with him. He is therefore clearly saddened and outraged by this assassination. Turkey declared a day of mourning and sent a high-level delegation to Haniyeh’s funeral.
Moreover, after the revelation that Abbas had previously declined the invitation and after Israel’s killing of Ismail Haniyeh, Turkey increased pressure on the Palestinian leader to accept the invitation and Abbas obliged on August 15. Abbas made a statement in the Turkish Parliament that he intends to visit Gaza and reaffirmed Gaza’s status as part of Palestine. This statement can also be read as a proposal for the post-war administration of Gaza and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority’s role in it. It is unclear at the moment whether Abbas’ remarks are a reflection of an agreement between rival Palestinian factions. By having Abbas, who did not attend Haniyeh’s funeral, speak in parliament and mourn Haniyeh’s murder, Turkey sought to retaliate against Netanyahu’s speech to Congress and demonstrate its influence in the conflict. Nonetheless, Turkey’s capacity to do more is limited.
Turkey’s Diminishing Influence
While Abbas’ speech to the Turkish parliament and his remarks on the Gaza visit in particular are important, this was not the first time Abbas addresses the Turkish parliament. He had done that in a very different context in 2007. He was accompanied by then Israeli President Shimon Peres. By hosting both Palestinian and Israeli leaders in parliament on the same day, Turkey demonstrated its diplomatic power. At the time, Turkey was an important mediator in the conflicts in the Middle East, spearheading peace talks between Israel and Syria, Israel and Palestine, and Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah.
A decade and a half later, Turkey has lost influence and is trying to rebuild relations with Syria and Israel while no longer acting as a mediator in any conflict. Turkey’s influence with Palestinian factions is also very limited. It is possible that Abbas was reluctant to speak in front of Parliament because of Fatah’s perception that Turkey is biased in favor of Hamas in the intra-Palestinian conflict. Still, despite Erdoğan’s strong support for Hamas, which he likens to Turkey’s own historical liberation movement, Turkey’s influence over the group is also very limited.
Moreover, as the Israeli war on Gaza escalated, the military wing of Hamas, with which Turkey had little to no contact, inevitably gained the upper hand within the organization. Haniyeh’s assassination and the election of Yahya Sinwar as the new leader of Hamas further accelerated this process, after which Turkey’s influence and role became even more minimal.
This is regrettable for Turkey, but also for the Palestinians, who have supported Turkey’s mediation efforts in the past and need them now more than ever.
To become an influential actor again, Turkey needs to return to the policies that made it the main mediator in the Middle East in the early 2000s. It should emphasize soft power, prioritize diplomacy, carefully maintain the ability to talk to every actor in the region, and avoid a roller-coaster foreign policy full of sudden and radical changes. But for this to work, Erdoğan needs to stop making foreign policy for domestic consumption. Considering his personal political style and the numerous pressures of office, this last point is far more difficult to achieve than any other measure.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Twitter/Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
