On April 26, 2026, Tehran offered the United States a proposal to lift the US and Iranian blockades of the Strait of Hormuz but to postpone talks on the nuclear issue. Ten days later, after Tehran proposed a more elaborate version of this idea, Axios reported that President Donald Trump had responded with a one-page “memorandum of understanding,” declaring that if Tehran rejected its terms, the United States would resume bombing Iran. Negotiations seem to be at an impasse.
As his threat amply shows, Trump is the primary reason for this stalemate. So far, the US president has not only argued that he can compel Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” but also has claimed that “infighting and divisions” between ultra-hardliners and more pragmatic leaders have paralyzed the Iranian regime’s decision-making. Both assumptions are wrong. Iran’s leaders will not simply submit to Trump’s commands; the only way to reach a deal is through negotiations. Furthermore, Iran’s leaders are not squabbling over first principles, but rather over the very pragmatic question of which negotiating position is most likely to ensure regime survival. In short, Iran is not the main obstacle to diplomacy. It is Trump who must decide if he wants a prolonged stalemate, a resumption of hostilities, or genuine negotiations that produce a deal that he can present as some kind of victory.
The Consolidation of Hardline Power
Trump has offered oscillating explanations for why negotiations to end the war have not succeeded. He has insisted that the administration can deal with a man like Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, who led Iran’s negotiating team in the failed April 2026 talks with the United States in Islamabad, Pakistan, yet has also complained that there is no one to talk to because the regime is fractured. Indeed, Trump has used this as an excuse for avoiding the challenge of serious diplomacy. These regime divisions may be real, but in the maelstrom of the war with the United States the key issue is how to ensure the regime’s survival.
The rise of a group of ultra-hardliners in the Iranian regime is no doubt consequential.
The rise of a group of ultra-hardliners in the Iranian regime is no doubt consequential. Their ascendancy was highlighted by the appointment of two leading hardline security apparatchiks—Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi—to key positions. Zolghadr, previously an IRGC commander, was appointed as the chair of Iran’s Supreme Security Council on March 23, 2026, a week after its previous chairman, Ali Larijani, was assassinated by a US-Israeli strike. Larijani may have defended the IRGC’s ideological core interests, but he also had ties to reformists who favored talks with the United States. His replacement, Zolghadr, is a revolutionary firebrand who vastly extended the IRGC’s political reach. Vahidi is cut from the same cloth. Appointed on March 1, 2026, as IRGC chief, Vahidi is closely aligned with Zolghadr and was pushing to limit the influence of relative moderates like Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in the Islamabad talks.
Squabbling is a useful and necessary step to forge a consensus on this most vital question. On April 17, 2026, Araghchi declared that the Strait of Hormuz was “completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire,” a statement Trump echoed when he declared the Strait “completely open and ready for business and full passage.” (He later added that the US blockade of Iranian shipping remained in force.) The IRGC hit back via its media outlet Tasnim, which declared that Araghchi’s statement showed a “complete lack of tact in information dissemination.” A day later, Ghalibaf warned that Iran was not militarily stronger than the United States and said that “we made progress in the negotiations, but there are many gaps and some fundamental points remain,” implying that it was in Iran’s interest to pursue diplomacy. Aghast, one hardline member of parliament called for Araghchi’s impeachment.
Official sources quickly denied Israeli media reports saying that Ghalibaf had resigned and that Saeed Jalili, a veteran hardliner, would succeed him. A joint statement from President Masoud Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and the Supreme National Security Council declared that there were no radicals and moderates in Iran; “we are all Iranian and revolutionary.” Hardliners warned of the futility of talks with the United States, while the IRGC stated that it was taking charge of Iran’s blockade in the Strait of Hormuz—a defiant message to Iran’s pragmatists and to Trump.
Despite this display of hardline clout, on April 25, 2026, Araghchi met with Pakistan’s Field Marshall Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Islamabad. Araghchi then produced the aforementioned April 26 interim proposal, the details of which were not made public, but that reportedly called for the United States and Iran to lift their mutual blockade in the Strait of Hormuz while postponing talks on the nuclear issues to a late, unspecified date. His move was buttressed when 261 members of parliament issued a statement backing Ghalibaf and calling for unity. This move highlighted the need to reach a consensus on the fraught issue of US diplomacy. That said, any consensus would be delicate and could quickly dissolve if Trump again declares that he expects Iran’s capitulation.
Trump Needs a Reality Check
On April 30, 2026, Iran transmitted a more detailed proposal outlining a step-by-step approach that would start with a discussion of Hormuz, to be followed by a broader negotiating process. True to form, Trump stated that “at this moment, I’m not satisfied,” while adding that “it’s a very disjointed leadership,” which wants to “make a deal, but they’re all messed up.” This wording suggests that Trump believes that Iran’s leaders favor diplomacy but are incapable of reaching a unified position. He is thus once again blaming Iran’s leaders when the core obstacle is Trump. On May 6, 2026, the day after the administration submitted to Iran, via Pakistan, Trump’s one-page memorandum setting out the broad terms for a negotiated agreement, Trump stated that if Iran did not accept its terms, “the bombing starts.”
A policy meant to compel Iran’s capitulation has brought the Gulf and the wider Middle East to a perilous moment.
Whether or not Trump will follow through with his threat is unknown. What is clear, however, is that a policy meant to compel Iran’s capitulation has brought the Gulf and the wider Middle East to a perilous moment. Yet rather than reconsider the US strategy, Trump and his top officials continue to complain that ultra-hardliners in Iran are blocking a deal. For example, US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz insisted that Iran’s “leadership has been so devastated and so fractured,” but failed to note that the United States and Israel produced this fracturing by assassinating the very Iranian leaders who favored diplomacy.
Having created the crisis with Iran, Trump is scheduled to meet with Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14-15, 2026. The Chinese president, Trump claimed on April 15, would give him “a big, fat hug” for managing to reopen the Hormuz Strait—something that Trump obviously has not yet managed to do. But the chances for such a diplomatic breakthrough for Trump are slim. Before he arrives in Beijing, Trump must decide if he will return to war or will embrace the idea of a negotiated compromise with the Islamic Republic. The crisis is now at a pivotal moment, the outcome of which depends less on Iranian disunity than on the mercurial personality of one man.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
