Many crises have afflicted Lebanon, from the banking crisis of 2019 to the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, and from the persistent presidential vacuum to the renewed internecine fighting in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp that has resulted in several deaths, the dislocation of the majority of the camp’s inhabitants, and heavy physical damage. These crises have been accompanied by a collapse in standards of living and by amplified racist rhetoric against refugees, especially against Syrians because of their large numbers. Syrian refugees are being exposed to a campaign of incitement by political forces accusing them of being responsible for the current collapse in Lebanon. The Syrian regime, meanwhile, refuses to allow their return and uses them as leverage to obtain financial assistance from the Arab states and to start early recovery programs from the United Nations without achieving any progress toward a political solution to the Syrian dilemma.
Political Incitement and Its Impact on Syrian Refugees
The campaign of incitement against Syrian refugees in Lebanon has increased, and has even come from influential politicians, including former President Michel Aoun and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati. The campaign primarily aims to pressure international organizations and donor countries to increase their levels of assistance to the Lebanese state. At the 77th United Nations General Assembly meetings in 2022, Mikati said that Lebanon cannot continue to bear the burden of the refugees and the best solution would be their safe and dignified repatriation to Syria in the context of a road map that includes help to the Lebanese state.2
Lebanon is host to the largest number of refugees per capita in the world (one out of every eight refugees),3 and there are 1.5 million Syria refugees in the country, 950,000 of whom are registered with the United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).4 This has had a huge impact on social and economic conditions in the country.
Since the beginning of the Syrian influx to Lebanon in early 2011, Lebanese authorities have refused to establish an agency to administer their affairs and organize their presence, residency, and distribution. In 2014, the government issued an official document outlining its position, leaving responsibility for the refugees to the United Nations and international and local nongovernmental organizations.5 Erected on the basis of a delicate sectarian balance, Lebanon rejects any form of local integration or permanent settlement of refugees. The document also restricted the entry of Syrians who had been able to enter without any restrictions prior to 2014. Since then, there have been arrest campaigns, raids, and summary expulsions of Syrians illegally in the country.6 The Syrian Network for Human Rights registered the forced repatriation of some 874 individuals between April and June 2023.7 Lebanese authorities also limited work available to Syrians to the agriculture, sanitation, and construction sectors.8
Ninety percent of Syrians in Lebanon live below the poverty level.9 There are some 3,100 private camps in Lebanon that suffer from desperate conditions, especially in winter. They are subject to expulsion, harassment, and arson.10 Eighty-three percent of refugees lack legal residency status, and it is difficult for many of them to obtain it because of the complicated nature of the process, especially if an individual has entered the country illegally.11 International legal organizations believe that Lebanese laws are designed to make refugees’ lives more difficult so that they return to Syria voluntarily, which is considered a violation of the rights of vulnerable and marginalized people. Lebanon’s General Security Service forces illegal refugees to leave, or hands them over to Syrian authorities. Those apprehended are barred from reentering Lebanon for one year after the first violation, five years after the second, and ten years after the third.12
With hopes diminishing for a quick political solution that would guarantee personal and economic security for Syrians, more of them are leaving Syria illegally, especially the youth, via Lebanese shores to Europe. This form of migration is full of danger; according to figures from the International Organization for Migration, some 4,000 died while attempting to cross to Europe from the MENA region between 2017 and 2022.13
International Law and the Role of International Organizations
According to international law, Lebanon is obligated to admit refugees and political asylum seekers and protect them. However, Lebanese legislators and government officials state that their country never signed the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.14 They also ignore the fact that according to customary international law, all countries are committed to the principle of not forcibly repatriating endangered refugees to their home countries. Many international treaties and agreements related to refugees and political asylum seekers apply to Lebanon, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.15 Article 14 of the convention stipulates that, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the United Nations’ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment states that, “No State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”16
Article 22, Paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that, “States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties.”17 The same applies to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,18 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,19 and others.
United Nations agencies began in 2014 to implement a plan to respond to the Syrian migrant and refugee crisis, as well as that of host local communities.20 But mismanagement and Lebanese banks’ exploitation aborted the plan. One relief official and two diplomats from donor nations asserted that “between a third and half of all direct UN cash aid in Lebanon had been swallowed up by banks since the outset of the crisis in 2019.”21
UNHCR issued a statement on July 22, 2022 that called on all parties to refrain from inciting feelings of hatred in the media and on social media platforms. It also explained the level of assistance given to the Lebanese people and municipalities to allow them to provide essential services and relieving pressure off public resources.22 Lebanon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants rejected the statement, saying it “deepens differences and exacerbates the crisis,” and calling for information sharing and augmenting early recovery in Syria to allow for a gradual, safe, and dignified repatriation of refugees.23
Human Rights Watch repeatedly emphasizes in its reports that Syria is not safe for a return of refugees. On July 6, 2022, HRW condemned then Lebanese Minister of the Displaced Issam Sharafeddine’s plan to deport 15,000 refugees a month to Syria.24 Legal entities concerned with Syria documented that a number of refugees who were repatriated between 2017 and 2021 from Lebanon and Jordan were exposed to systematic torture, arrest, forced disappearance, and even murder, conditions that should result in halting any return to Syria.25 HRW asserted that Sharafeddine’s proposal to deport those objecting to repatriation to other countries or to force them to “commit to not harming the Syrian state” comes from a false assumption and will not protect refugees from torture and the violation of their rights.”26
Amnesty International also demanded that Lebanon stop deporting Syrians and accused Lebanese security services of violating their rights through extrajudicial and unjustified arrest, as well as torture and other poor treatment.27 UNHCR also stated that for the eighth year in a row, Syrian refugees are the most in need of resettlement. Some 754,000 Syrian refugees around the world are in need of immediate resettlement.28
The European Parliament also issued on July 11, 2023, a resolution to halt forced deportations from Lebanon, putting responsibility for current tensions on the shoulders of the political class and armed factions there.29 Following that, Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib sent a letter to the head of the European Commission emphasizing “the need to start a comprehensive and constructive dialogue between Lebanon and the European Union about all pending issues, especially Syrian migration,” which, he said, “started to be a threat not only on the Lebanese social structure and economic stability, but also on the existence of Lebanon as a national entity.”30
Syrian Refugees’ Contributions to the Lebanese Economy
Since 2019, Lebanon has been experiencing a serious economic crisis that was exacerbated by COVID-19, which was accompanied by lockdowns that paralyzed the economy. The failure since then to enact necessary political and economic reforms has led to what the World Bank has called one of the three worst economic crises in the world since the nineteenth century. Forty-six percent of Lebanese families suffer from food insecurity, 88 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are economically destitute, and food prices are increasing daily with the collapse of the national currency.31
Contrary to incitement campaigns against them, Syrian refugees contribute effectively to Lebanon’s economic activity. Many of them work in professions undesired by Lebanese, especially in agriculture and service sectors. And because they work illegally for lack of employment permits, their wages are low, and they have no legal guarantees except verbal agreements with their employers.
Some union activists in Lebanon see that regulating the work of Syrians in the country would seriously boost the economy, especially in the agriculture and food industries. Lebanon has a very suitable climate for agricultural products and exports, which could provide long-term solutions to the country’s economic crisis. To be sure, many Lebanese employers prefer using Syrian labor because of low wages and the Syrians’ skills, including those in professions such as construction.
Consumption by Syrians and money transfers to them from their relatives enter the Lebanese economic cycle, and their relatively high number is a boon for local markets. For example, the communications sector has seen a three-fold expansion, which translates into more taxes for the state. Additionally, a large portion of Syrians’ consumption is paid for in foreign currencies; in-kind and cash donations account for 40 percent of consumption by Syrian refugees, 20 percent comes from personal savings, and the rest are remittances from the Syrian diaspora. In sum, Syrians contribute positively to the Lebanese economy through the inflow of hard currency to finance the current deficits in Lebanon and help stabilize the economy. This is why incitement against Syrians and work toward deporting them will not benefit the Lebanese economy; instead, these actions merely exacerbate the refugees’ misery and suffering.
Conclusion
Reforming the special regulations governing Syrian refugees in Lebanon—by abandoning the sponsorship system, forfeiting residency renewal fees, guaranteeing the registration of newborns, and ending Syrians’ arrest because of the expiration of their residency permits—would represent a crucial step toward securing a dignified life for them until their return to Syria. Such changes would not only protect the rights of refugees, but would also secure more stability for Lebanon.
And despite the miserable situation for Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the racial discrimination and incitement campaigns to which they are subjected, they see that Lebanon is a better choice for them at the present time than returning to Syria. Currently, Syria lacks essential services such as electricity and water; its medical infrastructure has collapsed, especially when it comes to services for cancer patients and long-term illnesses, and employment opportunities for youth are scarce. Compulsory military service is also a major concern that causes male refugees aged 18 to 42 not to return to Syria. So are political conditions and fear of arrest. Finally, the cost of living has become exorbitant, while average wages are only $20 a month for public sector workers and $40 for those in the private sector.
The only way to repatriate Syrian refugees to their country is to provide a secure and stable environment for their return. This will not happen without the Syrian regime accepting and implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and allowing for a democratic transition so that Syrians can rebuild their country and restore their regional and international role.
This Case Analysis was first published on September 27, 2023, by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
2 “Lebanon: His Excellency Mohammed Najib Azmi Mikati, President of the Council of Ministers,” United Nations, September 21, 2022, https://gadebate.un.org/en/77/lebanon.
3 “UNHCR: Global displacement hits another record, capping decade-long rising trend,” UNHCR, June 16, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-global-displacement-hits-another-record-capping-decade-long-rising-trend.
4 “Joint initiative to help hundreds of poor Syrians and Lebanese in northern Lebanon and Central Beqaa,” (in Arabic) United Nations, March 10, 2022, https://news.un.org/ar/story/2022/03/1096042.
5 “Government Meeting of October 23, 2014,” (in Arabic) Lebanese Republic: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, October 23, 2014, http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=6118.
6 “Lebanon: Armed Forces Summarily Deporting Syrians,” Human Rights Watch, July 5, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/05/lebanon-armed-forces-summarily-deporting-syrians.
7 “Petition to Lebanese authorities not to forcibly repatriate dissident officer Saleh Nimr al-Samar…,” (in Arabic) The Syrian Network for Human Rights, June 13, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/dak25jpp.
8 “Kazzi: Syrians are allowed to work in the fields designated for foreigners,” (in Arabic) An-Nashra, October 14, 2014, https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/799523/%7B%7Burl%7D%7D.
9 “Twelve years on, Syrian refugees face deepening debt and hunger,” UNHCR, March 15, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/news/twelve-years-syrian-refugees-face-deepening-debt-and-hunger.
10 “Fire at Syrian refugee camp in Lebanon’s Beqaa,” (in Arabic) Al Jazeera, August 12, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/yyzpe7m6.
11 “VASyr 2022: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” Relief Web, May 19, 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2022-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon.
12 “Deportation or Expulsion from Lebanon,” (in Arabic) The General Directorate of the Lebanese General Security Service, undated, https://www.general-security.gov.lb/ar/operations/details/147.
13 “Deaths on Migration Routes in MENA Highest since 2017: IOM Date Reveals,” Regional Office for Middle East and North Africa, June 13, 2023, https://mena.iom.int/news/deaths-migration-routes-mena-highest-2017-iom-2022-data-reveals.
14 “Despite the delegation head’s apology, Lebanon’s government continues to work toward repatriating Syrians,” (in Arabic) Shaam Network, July 18, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/2t2j9md3.
15 “International Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, December 10, 1948, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.
16 “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” United Nations, December 10, 1984, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&clang=_en.
17 “Convention on the Rights of the Child,” United Nations, November 20, 1989, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child.
18 “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” United Nations, December 21, 1965, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racial.
19 “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” United Nations, December 16, 1966, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights.
20 “Lebanon’s Plan to Respond to the Crisis, 2017-2020,” (in Arabic) United nations, undated, https://lebanon.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/LCRP%20AR.pdf.
21 Timour Azhari, “INSIGHT – Lebanese banks swallow at least $250m in U.N. aid,” Reuters, June 17, 2021, https://news.trust.org/item/20210617094247-a5d9z/.
22 “Protecting vulnerable Lebanese and Refugees alike is a Humanitarian imperative,” United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Lebanon, July 22, 2022, https://lebanon.un.org/en/191405-protecting-vulnerable-lebanese-and-refugees-alike-humanitarian-imperative-statement-ms-najat.
23 “Foreign Ministry: UNHCR’s irresponsiveness to Lebanon’s requests…” National News Agency, July 30, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/3ewnuh7a.
24 Lama Fakih, “Forced Return of Refugees by Lebanon Unsafe and Unlawful,” Human Rights Watch, July 6, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/06/forced-return-syrians-lebanon-unsafe-and-unlawful.
25 “Syria: Returning Refugees Face Serious Abuse,” Human Rights Watch, October 20, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/20/syria-returning-refugees-face-grave-abuse.
26 Fakih, op. cit.
27 “Lebanon: Authorities must halt unlawful deportations of Syrian refugees,” Amnesty International, April 24, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/lebanon-authorities-must-halt-unlawful-deportations-of-syrian-refugees/.
28 UNHCR expects a steep increase in resettlement needs,” United Nations, June 26, 3023, https://news.un.org/ar/story/2023/06/1121462.
29 “Joint Motion for a Resolution on the Situation in Lebanon,” European Parliament, July 11, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0323_EN.html.
30 “Bou Habib to Borell: The European Parliament’s resolution constitutes a threat to Lebanon’s existence,” Al-Mayadeen, July 19, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/2p93svkj.
31 “Weekly report of prices,” (in Arabic) Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade, multiple dates, https://tinyurl.com/45v5fzcz.