Sharing a 375-mile border with Syria, Iraq has high stakes in its neighbor’s successful transition following the December 2024 fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Today, Baghdad and Damascus are committed to fostering stronger ties, despite their political and ideological differences. This is a pragmatic approach that acknowledges the two countries’ shared transnational security threats, including a resurgence of the so-called Islamic State (IS). Nevertheless, interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s jihadist past, as well as Iran-related geopolitical tensions, are likely to complicate Iraqi-Syrian relations.
Reacting to Assad’s Fall and Adjusting to Syria’s New Realities
The Assad regime’s collapse unsettled Iraqi officials. Despite friction in bilateral relations during the tenure of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (2006-14)—stemming from his 2009 allegations that Syria had sheltered foreign terrorists responsible for carrying out deadly attacks in Iraq—Baghdad ultimately threw its lot in with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and backed Assad in the Syrian civil war that began in 2011. Iraq also joined al-Assad in fighting IS following its rise in Iraq and Syria a few years later when the jihadist group occupied vast territories across both countries. Based on a common cause with Damascus in fighting IS and on Iraq’s alignment with Iran, current Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani had reaffirmed Iraq’s support for Assad just a week before the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led rebel coalition toppled the Baathist regime in Damascus.
Just days before Assad’s fall, as well, the HTS-aligned Syrian Salvation Government had sought to deescalate tensions with al-Sudani’s government by issuing a statement to Baghdad emphasizing the deep historical ties between Syrians and Iraqis and urging Iraqi leaders not to perceive the rebel offensive on Damascus as a threat. Despite this outreach, Iraq maintained its view of Sharaa and all other rebels fighting the Assad regime as terrorists. Unfazed, al-Sharaa continued his diplomatic overtures, directly appealing to Iraq and especially its Shia militia factions under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), to refrain from interfering in Syria’s internal affairs. He dismissed Baghdad’s fears of the Syrian conflict spilling into Iraq as “baseless and unfounded.”
As the Baathist regime was teetering, some 200 pro-Assad Iraqi militants crossed into Syria to defend Assad’s rule. But the bulk of Iraq’s Shia armed factions did not do so, electing to stay on the Iraqi side of the border to protect Iraq from any destabilizing spillover from the events in Syria. This decision was likely based on an assessment that any attempt to shore up Assad’s government would be futile in light of the rebel’s rapid advance on Damascus. Iraq also perceived that Iran was either unwilling or incapable of providing the level of support necessary to mount an effective counteroffensive against HTS and its allies.
Senior Iraqi officials recalibrated their rhetoric to signal support for Syria’s transition and to lay the groundwork for stable ties.
Following HTS’s takeover of Damascus, however, Iraq’s leadership swiftly adapted to the reality of the “New Syria.” Senior Iraqi officials recalibrated their rhetoric to signal support for Syria’s transition and to lay the groundwork for stable ties, adopting a posture of cautious cordiality toward the new leadership. The repatriation of Syrian soldiers who had fled across the border into Iraq and the visit of Iraqi intelligence chief Hamid al-Shatri to Damascus less than three weeks after Assad’s fall illustrated Baghdad’s pragmatic engagement with Syria’s post-Baath regime authorities. Sustained diplomatic exchanges and measured overtures from al-Sharaa’s government have reinforced this approach, as the new Syrian regime has sought to reassure Iraq of its commitment to protect Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities and to maintain peaceful relations with neighboring states. These efforts have eased some anxieties in Baghdad about the new political order in Damascus, although the Iraqi government appears to remain apprehensive about how events in Syria might evolve, as well as about al-Sharaa’s al-Qaeda past. Additionally, having borne the heavy costs of defeating IS after its 2014 rise, many Iraqi actors fear the resurgence of extremist influence in al-Sharaa’s Syria. Such anxieties have only heightened in light of the June 22, 2025, church bombing in Damascus, for which Saraya Ansar al-Sunna (a murky IS-linked group) claimed responsibility.
Divisions in Iraq
The question of how to navigate the relationship with post-Assad Syria is a divisive one inside Iraq. Indeed, Iraq’s four main political actors each have distinct views.
The first such actor, the Iraqi state led by Prime Minister al-Sudani, favors aligning Baghdad with Qatar and Saudi Arabia in supporting normalization with Syria. On April 17, 2025, under Qatari auspices, al-Sudani met al-Sharaa in Doha for the first time since Assad’s ouster. The landmark encounter underscored not only the new Syrian leadership’s efforts to reengage with regional actors, but also the Iraqi state’s quest to establish healthy ties with all its neighbors. Before the meeting, al-Sudani’s government signaled support for al-Sharaa by calling for a lifting of all western sanctions on Syria and an end to Israeli aggression against the country.
The second actor, Iran-aligned Shia factions including militias belonging to the Axis of Resistance, harbor deep mistrust toward al-Sharaa. Groups such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq associate al-Sharaa with the February 22, 2006, bombing of the revered al-Askari Shia shrine in Samarra, Iraq, a gruesome event that marked the beginning of Iraq’s descent into civil war and its own militias’ criminal record against fellow Iraqis. Many Shia actors believe that HTS bears troubling similarities to the Islamic State. Upset about Assad’s fall, these groups view al-Sharaa’s rise to power as the result of a foreign-engineered regime change plot orchestrated by the United States, Israel, and Turkey to shift the regional balance of power. According to this narrative, al-Sharaa appears to be a proxy of Washington, Tel Aviv, and Ankara.
Some Shia political figures, such as Yousef al-Kalabi, a member of parliament who belongs to the Shia Coordination Framework, have expressed strong opposition to the prospect of al-Sharaa visiting Iraq. Indeed, Iraq’s Council of Representatives, the Shia-dominated lower house of Parliament, sent a letter to the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Baghdad calling for an investigation into al-Sharaa’s involvement in al-Qaeda in Iraq during the 2000s and demanding his arrest were he to step foot onto Iraqi soil. For these Shia actors, questions of al-Sharaa’s accountability for events in Iraq remain unresolved. Al-Sharaa’s awareness of these sentiments likely influenced his decision not to attend the May 2025 Arab League Summit in Baghdad and instead to send his foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, to represent Damascus.
A third group, Iraq’s Sunni factions, mostly support normalizing Baghdad’s relationship with post-Baath Damascus. Their stance aligns with that of Gulf Cooperation Council capitals, who believe that this strategy will pull Iraq closer to Arab states and weaken Iran’s influence. Khamis al-Khanjar, the leader of the Sunni-aligned Sovereignty Alliance, is one of the Sunni politicians who has backed al-Sudani’s engagement with the new Syrian government, praising the Sudani-Sharaa meeting in Doha as a “significant step.”
It is not yet clear what role the issue of Iraq’s relations with post-Assad Syria will play in the upcoming elections.
Finally, while the Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan Regional Government generally support improved ties between Iraq and Syria, they believe that any normalization with Damascus should improve the conditions of Syria’s Kurdish population. Turkish-Iranian competition in Kurdish politics is an important factor in the diverging positions of the KDP and the PUK toward post-Assad Syria. On April 11, 2025, at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey, Nechirvan Barzani, second president of the Kurdistan Region, met with Sharaa, expressing “continued support” for the new Syrian leader, praising his “inclusive approach,” and reaffirming their “shared commitment” to combating the Islamic State. Barzani is the leader of the Turkey-friendly Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), whose relationship with Ankara is a factor. By contrast, Bafel Jalal Talabani, president of the Tehran-friendly Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), has urged a more cautious, wait-and-see stance toward post-Assad Syria. Speaking at the Baghdad International Dialogue in February 2025, Talabani emphasized that “western countries must be more cautious and provide more guarantees to care for Christians, Alawites, and Druze in Syria.” He added that the new Syrian constitution must be drafted with full recognition of the rights of these minorities and communities.
Adding to these complex dynamics is the upcoming parliamentary election in Iraq, scheduled for November 11, 2025. It is not yet clear what role the issue of Iraq’s relations with post-Assad Syria will play in shaping the vote’s outcome. A continuation of Israel-Iran hostilities could push Syria-related issues to the margins of the campaign. However, if the ceasefire holds between Israel and Iran, the question of Iraq’s role in Syria’s future could emerge as an important issue in Iraqi politics, with candidates presenting competing visions for Iraq’s Syria policy.
Iraqi National Interests in Syria’s Future
Baghdad’s challenge is to engage Damascus constructively while managing the wide spectrum of perspectives in Iraq on post-Baathist Syria. This balancing act will demand an Iraqi foreign policy that both reacts prudently to unfolding events in Syria and proactively seeks to shape outcomes that serve Iraq’s long-term interests. There are several issues of top importance for Iraq.
Perhaps Baghdad’s paramount concerns are counterterrorism and border security. The trauma inflicted by IS has left deep scars on Iraqi society, and the prospect of the group reemerging within Syria and using Syrian territory as a staging ground for attacks against Iraq is a truly unsettling prospect for the country’s leadership. Thus al-Sudani’s government recognizes that Iraq has critical interests in cooperating with Damascus on intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism and that without such collaboration, developments across the border risk exposing Iraq to renewed cycles of extremist violence. A desire to stem cross-border drug smuggling is a priority for both countries, which face challenges from transnational criminal networks. In recent years, Iraq has emerged as a key hub for global drug trafficking networks spanning Europe, Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Southwest Asia. Iraqi authorities have intercepted many shipments of Captagon, an amphetamine-like stimulant, along the border with Syria, which in effect became a narco-state under Bashar al-Assad’s rule.
Iraq’s energy sector is a second part of the picture. Iraqi and Syrian officials have discussed the potential rehabilitation of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline, which has been nonoperational since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The restoration of this pipeline, once a vital link connecting Iraq’s oil fields in Kirkuk to Syria’s Mediterranean coast, could significantly bolster Iraq’s export capacity to Syria—and European energy markets beyond.
>A third key issue is Iraq’s need for water. Iraq faces acute water security challenges caused by decades of conflict, poor management practices, and advancing desertification. Fostering stable and constructive relations with post-Assad Syria would help Iraq safeguard the reliability of its water supply from the Euphrates River. Due to the river’s critical role in sustaining Iraq’s agriculture, electricity generation, and drinking water needs, cooperative engagement with Damascus is essential. The recent signing of a water management agreement between Iraq and Turkey, guaranteeing Iraq an equitable share of water resources for a ten-year period, marks a significant step forward. A strengthened Iraqi relationship with Syria could pave the way for more meaningful progress toward sustainable resource management among all three riparian states. Cooperation between Iraq and Syria on water management and broader regional hydrological issues should also involve Turkey, as trilateral coordination is essential for governing water distribution from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Historically, the construction of large dams and irrigation systems in Turkey and Syria has been a major source of tension with Iraq.
A final priority is economic ties. The restoration of bilateral trade to pre-2011 levels stands to benefit the Iraqi economy. With most western sanctions on Syria now lifted, including those by the United States, opportunities are emerging for Iraq to deepen commercial ties with its neighbor. Sectors such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and textiles offer particular promise. The easing of sanctions also paves the way for the reopening of traditional trade corridors between Iraq and Syria, and across the broader Levant, fostering regional economic integration. In turn, renewed economic engagement between Iraq and Syria could contribute to Syria’s stabilization by facilitating economic growth there. Iraq has signaled its desire to play a role in Syria’s post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, estimated to cost between $250 and 400 billion.
Conclusion
Looking ahead, although the emergence of Syria’s new HTS-dominated government presents Iraq with numerous challenges, Baghdad stands to gain considerably from a stable and mutually respectful relationship with Damascus. The scope for constructive engagement—on counterterrorism, border and water security, energy integration, economic ties, and more—is broad. Should the two governments successfully navigate points of tension, particularly those related to Iran’s regional influence and Iran-Israel hostilities, a new chapter in bilateral relations would advance Iraq and Syria’s national interests—and benefit the broader region.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: SANA
