Having emerged in 2017 from Yemen’s Southern Movement, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) is the preeminent political and military force in southern Yemen. Since its founding, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, who served as the governor of Aden Governorate from 2015 to 2017, has led the organization. The STC is officially part of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Yemen’s internationally recognized governing authority, of which al-Zubaidi is the vice chair. Established in 2022, the eight-member PLC was created to bring together various anti-Houthi factions under unified leadership. The STC, however, still champions a separatist agenda aimed at re-establishing an independent South Yemen, which existed from 1967 until unification with North Yemen in 1990. Despite significant support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the STC has struggled to gain recognition among key regional and international actors.
Against this backdrop, the STC has increasingly sought to secure more alliances with foreign actors, most notably by signaling openness to establishing formal ties with Israel and by pledging that a future southern state would join the Abraham Accords. In a September 2025 press interview on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, Zubaidi explained that before Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023, the STC had been “advancing towards joining the Abraham Accords.” As the southern separatist leader put it, the Abraham Accords are “essential for stability” if “Gaza and Palestine regain their rights.” Zubaidi also declared, “When we have our southern state, we will make our own decisions and I believe we will be part of these accords.”
While such overtures may appeal to Washington and Tel Aviv, especially during US efforts to expand the Abraham Accords, they risk alienating the STC from much of Yemeni society and the broader Arab public. In the wake of the two-year genocide in Gaza that has angered the whole region, the STC’s outreach to Israel could become a significant liability in its pursuit of independence—particularly considering how easily many of its domestic enemies and rivals could damage the separatist group’s legitimacy by portraying it as subservient to American-Israeli interests.
Early Engagement and the Strategic Foundations of STC-Israel Ties
The STC’s position on Israel is not a recent development. Soon after the UAE and Israel formalized relations in 2020, STC Vice President Hani Bin Braik publicly welcomed the Abraham Accords, signaling early alignment with Abu Dhabi’s Israeli normalization agenda. Early in the following year, Zubaidi hailed Israel’s diplomatic deals with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco as “an exemplary action” toward peace in the region. In 2020, the UAE and Israel moved ahead with their plans to establish a facility on Socotra, the strategically positioned Yemeni archipelago under the de facto control of the STC, which is largely understood to be the UAE’s surrogate, if not proxy, in southern Yemen. The Emirati-Israeli steps provoked anti-Israeli normalization protests on the island. In February 2021, Emirati aircraft transported dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers to Socotra. Nine months later, US Naval Forces Central Command conducted a maritime exercise in the Red Sea with Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel, marking the first publicly confirmed military collaboration among the Abraham Accords partners.
From Israel’s perspective, establishing a foothold in Socotra, facilitated through cooperation with the UAE and the STC, offers a valuable vantage point for monitoring Iran’s activities across the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the wider Indian Ocean. Following the eruption of Houthi-Israeli hostilities in November 2023, consolidating a presence in southern Yemen through the STC serves Tel Aviv’s strategic interest in countering Ansar Allah. In this context, Israeli activities in Socotra align with the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure 2.0’ campaign to contain Iran and its allied non-state actors across the Arab world, as well as advancing the UAE’s objective of deepening its security partnership with Washington. Although most Yemenis remain firmly opposed to any Israeli presence on their soil, the STC has emerged as Yemen’s most Israel-friendly actor. For the separatist group, engagement with Israel is a means to advance its broader goal of securing international legitimacy for a future independent South Yemen.
Domestic Legitimacy and the Political Costs of Israel Alignment
Engagement with Israel may boost the STC’s standing in Washington and bring tangible benefits ranging from intelligence support to diplomatic backing. Yet such ties carry substantial political risks at home. Across Yemen, including the southern provinces where the STC hopes to establish its state, solidarity with Palestine and hostility toward Israel remain deeply rooted and broadly shared among the population. Despite Yemen’s political fragmentation, the Palestinian cause endures as one of the few unifying national sentiments. Much as the Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah) have leveraged their anti-Israel stance to consolidate legitimacy, deeper engagement with Tel Aviv could erode the STC’s credibility and weaken its popular appeal within the very territories it seeks to govern as an independent South Yemen.
Despite Yemen’s political fragmentation, the Palestinian cause endures as one of the few unifying national sentiments.
The STC confronts a range of formidable domestic enemies and rivals—the Houthis, other factions in Yemen’s internationally recognized government (including the Islamist al-Islah Party), and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Each is poised to exploit the Israel-Palestine issue to discredit the separatist movement as it deepens engagement with Tel Aviv. Although growing public resentment over the STC’s ties with Israel could galvanize opposition in southern Yemen, the group has joined other Yemeni factions in repeatedly showing a readiness to suppress dissent. The STC leadership appears largely unresponsive to domestic criticism, signaling a determination to pursue its strategic objectives despite potential damage to its popular legitimacy.
Maritime Security, Regional Calculus, and the Houthi-Israel Conflict
Since the onset of Houthi maritime attacks in response to Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in November 2023, and the subsequent US-UK airstrikes on Ansar Allah targets beginning in January 2024, the STC has worked to cast itself as an important player in regional maritime security. Sensing an opportunity to bolster its international legitimacy, the group has sought to take advantage of Western anxieties over Houthi threats to freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most critical chokepoints, the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Its swift condemnation of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in late 2023 was a calculated effort to demonstrate alignment with Western powers concerned about Iran-backed threats to global trade routes.
The STC’s growing alignment with Israel serves various strategic purposes, enabling it to project an image of discipline, pragmatism, and security-mindedness, in contrast to Ansar Allah’s militancy and its Iran-aligned ideology of resistance to America, Israel, and the conservative Gulf monarchies. By presenting itself as the Yemeni faction most capable of confronting the Houthis and safeguarding maritime corridors in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the STC seeks to persuade the United States and its allies that partnering with it would advance regional stability and global trade interests. Its messaging to Western capitals is carefully calibrated to portray the movement as a moderate, reliable actor capable of contributing to collective security while pursuing its separatist goals. Central to this narrative is the STC’s openness to cooperation with Israel, which is reinforced by reports of quiet intelligence coordination between the UAE and Israel, with the STC as a local partner, against Houthi threats, underscoring the image it strives to cultivate of a capable, secular, and pro-Western force aligned with the broader anti-Iran coalition.
Ultimately, the STC’s Red Sea posture reflects both strategic opportunism and awareness of shifting global priorities. By aligning itself rhetorically and operationally with Western security concerns, the group seeks not only material support but also legitimation as a responsible political and military actor within Yemen’s fractured landscape.
The UAE’s Leverage
Central to the STC’s outreach is Abu Dhabi, reflecting the UAE’s broader vision for the future of the Abraham Accords. Despite the Gaza genocide, the UAE has not only maintained relations with Israel but has even deepened bilateral ties across multiple sectors. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $3.2 billion, an 11 percent increase from the previous year. Defense cooperation is also expanding: Controp Precision Technologies, an Israeli defense firm, recently launched a subsidiary in Abu Dhabi 10 months after Israeli military supplier Thirdeye Systems sold a 30 percent stake to Abu Dhabi-based conglomerate EDGE. The UAE’s leadership frames its continued relations with Tel Aviv as responsible for changing “mindsets” in the Middle East, sustaining diplomatic agility amid a shifting multipolar order, and positioning Abu Dhabi as a credible bridge between Israel and Arab actors.
Despite the Gaza genocide, the UAE has deepened bilateral ties across multiple sectors.
Determined to position itself as a diplomatic trendsetter through the Abraham Accords, the UAE must navigate post-October 7 political realities, which have rendered Israeli normalization politically toxic across much of the Arab world. While Abu Dhabi seeks to expand normalization to more countries, it shares Washington’s frustration that progress has stalled despite Kazakhstan’s recent pledge to join the Accords. Within this context of Abu Dhabi seeing the Accords as a “catalyst for wider change in the Middle East,” the UAE likely views the STC’s engagement with Tel Aviv favorably, eyeing it as an opportunity to both secure US support for its ally in southern Yemen and extend Arab-Israeli normalization should an independent South Yemen emerge.
Beyond diplomatic and ideological considerations, the UAE pursues clear military objectives in the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea. Growing Israeli cooperation supports these goals. Emirati-Israeli coordination in these waters has been taking place for years, with the Crystal Ball initiative standing out as a key component. Launched in Tel Aviv in June 2023 by the UAE’s Minister of Cybersecurity, the initiative aims to “design, deploy, and enable regional intelligence enhancement,” leveraging support from Microsoft, Abu-Dhabi based cybersecurity firm CPX, and Israeli firm Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Through Crystal Ball, the UAE, with Israeli backing, has deployed intelligence platforms, logistical hubs, and advanced air bases across southern Yemen, including on islands such as Abd al-Kuri, Mayoun, Samhah, and Zuqar.
Looking ahead, Israeli support for UAE-backed groups in Yemen, including the STC and the National Resistance Forces (a coalition of anti-Ansar Allah forces loyal to the PLC which General Tariq Saleh leads), is likely to grow as Emirati-Israeli cooperation in and around the Bab al-Mandab becomes increasingly central to both countries’ maritime strategies in this strategically vital region. Israeli recognition of a UAE-backed and Israel-friendly independent South Yemen would naturally align with Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv’s intersecting interests.
The STC’s Strategic Dilemma
Since 2020, the STC has increasingly aligned with Israel, signaling support for UAE-supported Arab-Israeli normalization while seeking to expand foreign backing for its push for southern Yemeni independence. By courting Tel Aviv, the STC strategically appeals to US interests in broadening the Abraham Accords, projecting itself as a pragmatic, pro-Western actor capable of enhancing regional security. This alignment serves multiple purposes: bolstering external support, demonstrating military credibility, and advancing Abu Dhabi’s broader diplomatic agenda, even as political appetite for such normalization remains extremely limited across the Arab world.
Yet the STC’s pro-Israel stance carries substantial domestic and regional risks. Strong anti-Israel sentiment, Palestinian solidarity, and opposition from Yemeni political parties and armed factions challenge the group’s legitimacy, while involvement from Israel and the UAE has the potential to exacerbate tensions across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab al-Mandab. Additionally, with five of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s six members invested in maintaining Yemen’s fragile North-South unity, the STC’s secessionist ambitions illustrate the challenge of balancing foreign partnerships against regional and domestic sensitivities, illustrating both the opportunities and hazards of pursuing independence in a deeply fragmented state.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: x/AidrosAlzubidi
