Despite the Israeli war on Gaza killing nearly 30,000 Palestinians, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has clung to the Abraham Accords, which it signed with Israel in 2020 along with Bahrain and Morocco. Maintaining relations and ensuring economic, geopolitical, and security ties between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi appears to be a higher priority for Emirati leaders than pressuring Israel to end the massacre of Palestinians in Gaza. The UAE is also concerned that if the Gaza conflict expands into a full regional war, its objective of building a commercial maritime “empire” along the Horn of Africa-Gulf of Aden-Red Sea littoral would be in jeopardy. Over the last two decades, the UAE has steadily expanded its control over ports, logistics hubs, and military bases in Yemen and East Africa and has supported armed groups that help it project political influence in those locations. DP World, a Dubai-based multinational logistics company, has been a “driving force” of this emerging empire. Cutting ties with Israel over Gaza, the UAE fears, could threaten its expansionist project.
Current Crisis in the Red Sea
Since November 2023, in opposition to Israel’s war on Gaza, Yemen’s Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) has been conducting missile and drone attacks against commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea. Ansar Allah claims that it only targets ships owned by Israelis or bound for Israeli ports, but in fact the group has struck many vessels with no connection to Israel.
The initial US response to the Houthi attacks was to announce Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) on December 18. OPG is a security initiative aimed at deterring the Houthis from waging maritime attacks through the presence of a naval coalition made up almost exclusively of western powers. In January, after OPG had failed to establish such deterrence, the United States and the United Kingdom—with nonoperational support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands—began launching military strikes against Ansar Allah targets in Yemen.
The UAE and other Gulf Cooperation Council states (save Bahrain) avoided formally joining OPG and supporting the US-UK military campaign against Ansar Allah.
The UAE and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (save Bahrain) avoided formally joining OPG and supporting the US-UK military campaign against Ansar Allah. It is ironic that not long ago when the UAE, as part of the Saudi-led coalition, was fighting the Houthis in Yemen, it would have welcomed direct western military intervention to degrade Ansar Allah’s capabilities. Today, the UAE is distancing itself from the US-UK strikes against the Houthis, which is understandable within the wider context of Abu Dhabi’s movement away from certain US-led approaches to Middle East security. For example, the UAE reportedly recently asked the United States not to use American military assets on Emirati soil to launch attacks against Iran-backed militias in the Middle East, apparently in order to avoid antagonizing the Islamic Republic.
Early in the Yemeni civil war, Emirati and Saudi officials generally believed that the Obama administration failed to appreciate fully the GCC’s concerns about the Houthi threat to their states, or the dangers of Iran-backed militias elsewhere in the region. During the Obama administration, Washington’s approach to the Iranian nuclear file, which resulted in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deal, also unsettled Abu Dhabi. This was in no small part because, in the view of GCC members, the United States negotiated the agreement without consulting them. Furthermore, the JCPOA’s failure to address non-nuclear issues such as Tehran’s support for certain non-state armed actors in the Arab world and Iran’s missile activity left Abu Dhabi lukewarm, at best, toward the deal.
During the Trump and Biden administrations, the UAE was disappointed with what Abu Dhabi viewed as inadequate US responses to Iran-backed attacks on Saudi Aramco in September 2019 and the Houthi missile and drone strikes against the Emirati capital in January 2022. Such grievances toward the United States’ perceived indifference to GCC security in the face of Iran-related threats help explain Abu Dhabi’s reluctance to back Washington’s current initiatives for Red Sea security.
UAE Interests in the Horn of Africa and Yemen
Over the last two decades, the UAE has invested significantly in infrastructure, roads, and logistics in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. In taking advantage of natural resources and growing consumer markets in a region situated next to a major maritime route, the UAE’s foreign policy in this strategically prized location has been key to Abu Dhabi’s ability to project influence beyond the Gulf. The UAE believes that establishing a large presence in the Horn of Africa will allow it to benefit from maritime trade flows through the Bab al-Mandab waterway, a vital trade link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The UAE believes that establishing a large presence in the Horn of Africa will allow it to benefit from maritime trade flows through the Bab al-Mandab waterway, a vital trade link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Among the UAE’s important maritime-commercial investments in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa are various logistics platforms and wet and dry ports. These include Sokhna and Safaga in Egypt, Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland, both Somali-federated states, and Abu Amama in Sudan. To protect these economic interests, the UAE built an air and naval base in Assab, Eritrea, which it then dismantled in 2021 when Emirati participation in the Yemen war wound down.
The UAE’s foreign policy in the Horn of Africa has been controversial, particularly with respect to Somalia. Over the years, the government in Mogadishu has perceived Abu Dhabi as a threat to Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and independence. Although the UAE and Somalia signed a security agreement in early 2023 that improved bilateral ties, several factors have caused friction between them.
In 2018, Somalia’s parliament passed a resolution that banned DP World from operating in the country because it had previously signed a contract to develop an economic zone with the self-declared breakaway state of Somaliland. Mogadishu declared that contract invalid. One month later, the Somali government seized USD 9.6 million from a UAE plane at the international airport in Mogadishu, claiming that the funds would be used to disrupt Somalia’s internal security. Not until May 2022 did Mogadishu release the funds. The UAE’s relationship with Puntland, another autonomous region in northeastern Somalia that has been seeking secession from Mogadishu, also has made officials in Somalia’s central government alarmed about Abu Dhabi’s destabilizing role in the country.
Most recently, Somalia’s al-Shabab movement’s killing of four Emirati troops and one Bahraini officer at the General Gordon military base in Mogadishu on February 11 further illustrated antagonism toward the UAE in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa. Notably, this was not the first time for the Somalia-based jihadist militia to target Emiratis: In June 2015, al-Shabab attempted to kill Emirati diplomats in the Somali capital.
Abu Dhabi’s agendas in the Horn of Africa have also led to friction with Egypt and Sudan. Abu Dhabi and Cairo have had their disagreements over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute and Ethiopia’s Tigray War. In Sudan, the UAE has sided with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by warlord Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, against the Sudanese Army.
Not long after the Saudi-led coalition launched its war against the Houthis in March 2015, the UAE sent troops and vehicles to occupy Socotra, the Yemeni archipelago in the Arabian Sea, and established it as a quasi-military outpost at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden. In 2023, UAE reportedly imposed conditions on travel to the islands by requiring that visitors obtain visas from Abu Dhabi before arrival.
In southern Yemen, the Emiratis have made major investments with the aim of consolidating Abu Dhabi’s long-term influence there.
In southern Yemen, the Emiratis have made major investments with the aim of consolidating Abu Dhabi’s long-term influence there. The UAE has established a network of surrogates in southern Yemen, including the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a separatist group challenging Yemen’s internationally recognized government—the Shabwani Elite Forces in Shabwa Governorate, and the Hadrami Elite Forces. These militias serve to bolster the UAE’s leverage over Yemen’s maritime outposts in Aden, Hadramawt, Mayun, Socotra, Shabwa, and Taiz, all of which are important to the Emirati maritime empire. In particular, Abu Dhabi’s support for the STC has contributed to the UAE’s reputation as an economic power that hurts other Arab countries in order to advance its own interests, similar to its support for the RSF in Sudan.
UAE Interest in De-Escalation
Against the backdrop of Abu Dhabi’s decreasing confidence in Washington as the UAE’s ultimate security guarantor, the Gulf country’s decision to not support OPG and the US-led bombing campaign in Yemen is logical for at least three reasons.
First, Abu Dhabi recognizes Ansar Allah’s capacity to severely harm its national security and economy. The Houthis launched several missile and drone attacks against Abu Dhabi in January 2022, striking an extension of the Abu Dhabi International Airport undergoing construction and storage facilities belonging to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. The UAE’s ability to remain a major business and financial hub in the Middle East depends on the country’s reputation as an oasis of prosperity and stability in an otherwise tumultuous region. New Houthi attacks could cause expatriates and foreign investors to question how safe the UAE is for business and investment. With an economic model based on maintaining peace and security at home, Emirati officials are determined to avoid any actions that could prompt the Houthis to resume attacks against UAE targets.
With an economic model based on maintaining peace and security at home, Emirati officials are determined to avoid any actions that could prompt the Houthis to resume attacks against UAE targets.
Second, the UAE, like Saudi Arabia, has vested interests in continuing détente with Iran. Managing tensions between Abu Dhabi and Tehran is a priority for the Emirati leadership. The 2019 acts of “sabotage” off the UAE’s east coast as well as the unprecedented drone attack against Saudi energy facilities demonstrated the potential of Iran or Iran-affiliated actors to inflict massive harm on GCC economies. For this reason, the UAE cautiously opened the door to dialogue with the Islamic Republic in 2019 and Abu Dhabi returned its ambassador to Tehran in 2022, resulting in a new era of détente in Emirati-Iranian relations. The UAE leadership does not want regional crises to derail this détente.
Third, although the UAE has shown no signs that it will withdraw from the Abraham Accords in response to Israel’s war on Gaza, Abu Dhabi must still be mindful of domestic and regional audiences. As many Arab citizens have expressed support for Houthi missile and drone strikes on allegedly Israel-destined ships off Yemen’s coast, the UAE recognizes that any support for Washington’s actions against Ansar Allah could risk making Abu Dhabi appear complicit in the US-backed Israeli war on Gaza. Although Emirati officials tightly govern a small and ultra-wealthy digitized police state, they cannot afford to be completely indifferent to local public opinion. As Palestinian suffering worsens amid Israel’s war on Gaza, the Abraham Accords will become an increasingly sensitive issue in the Gulf.
Bypassing the Red Sea via the Dubai-Haifa Corridor
Unveiled last year was the US-supported India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a transcontinental corridor intended to bolster transcontinental connectivity and accelerate economic integration between Asia and Europe through shipping lanes, energy infrastructure, high-speed cables, and railways. The United States and other western countries view IMEC, which depends on the use of UAE ports, logistics hubs, and roads, as a way to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
by making Asia-Europe trade less reliant on the Red Sea, the land corridor linking the UAE to Israel through Saudi Arabia and Jordan within the IMEC framework can shift the region’s economic map to benefit Israel.
The Haifa port is an important node within IMEC. As Israel deals with the Red Sea crisis, which has had a negative impact on the Israeli economy, IMEC could enable this port to become a key gateway to Europe via the Dubai-Haifa Corridor, which bypasses the Red Sea. Put simply, by making Asia-Europe trade less reliant on the Red Sea, the land corridor linking the UAE to Israel through Saudi Arabia and Jordan within the IMEC framework can shift the region’s economic map to benefit Israel. In December, Trucknet Enterprise, an Eilat-based Israeli transport company, signed an agreement with DP World and the UAE-based Puretrans FZCO aimed at facilitating the transport of cargo via Saudi Arabia and Jordan, connecting the UAE and Bahrain to Israel’s port of Haifa and Egypt—and from there to European countries. Ultimately, the handling and transit fees at Emirati ports and roads will increase the UAE’s revenue, which points to how the Emirati economy stands to benefit, in some respects, from Houthi attacks on global shipping off Yemen’s coast and, by extension, from Israel’s continuing war on Gaza.
In the final analysis, although the Red Sea security crisis may advance the UAE’s national interests vis-à-vis IMEC, instability in this body of water will remain a major source of concern for Abu Dhabi. Like other GCC states, the UAE does not welcome instability in the Red Sea that threatens its investments in Yemen and East African nations. Nonetheless, despite sharing Washington’s view that Houthi sabotage operations pose a grave threat to maritime trade, the UAE appears unwilling to cooperate militarily with the United States to counter the Houthi attacks. Until a ceasefire is reached in Gaza, Abu Dhabi’s position is not likely to change.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Twitter
