As the death toll in Gaza rises, many Palestinians there are faced with a decision: either try their luck under endless and indiscriminate Israeli bombardment, or surrender upwards of $5,000 per person in bribes to cross the border into Egypt. Israel’s war on Gaza, and the resulting closure or limited access of border crossing, has only worsened the 17-year blockade of the Strip, which has severely limited the in- and out-flow of both goods and people. The Egyptian government has developed a tough position on allowing Palestinian refugees to enter Egypt because of three worries: widespread and permanent Palestinian displacement that would facilitate Israel’s re-settlement in the Strip; Islamist militancy spreading in Sinai if Hamas or Islamic Jihad blend in with civilians and cross into Egypt; and a worsening economic crisis due to the impact of more refugees and migrants on the state’s already-stretched-thin basic services. On the other hand, Egypt has notably been open to medical evacuees, reportedly receiving nearly 45,000 injured Palestinians from Gaza for treatment as of February 2024. Yet for those not yet transported to Egypt for care, and for the not-yet-injured, this situation—in conjunction with the May 8 Israeli closure of the Rafah border crossing that links Egypt and Gaza—has not only exacerbated the suffering of Gaza Palestinians, but has also severely limited their options.
Private Egyptian firms such as Hala Consulting and Tourism Services have capitalized on this bottleneck by facilitating registration for border entry, as well as providing transportation directly to Cairo. By exploiting Palestinians from Gaza, and with assistance from some officials within Egypt’s security agencies, the Hala Tourism firm has been able to make $2 million a day transporting Palestinians out of the Strip, earning $118 million in revenue between March and May 2024 alone. Once in Egypt, Palestinians are faced with a lack of basic services and impossibly-short tourist visas lasting just 45 days that make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to support themselves, attend school, open bank accounts, receive healthcare, and live a dignified life. Egypt’s policies, compounded by corrupt officials and economic challenges, have not only failed to protect Palestinian refugees from Gaza but have actively contributed to their exploitation and suffering.
Since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Palestinians in Gaza have experienced unprecedented levels of warfare that have resulted in the deaths of more than 40,319 people (as of August 19), with some reports even estimating the total number of deaths reaching 186,000. Close to 2 million people, almost the entire population of the Gaza Strip, have been displaced by Israeli attacks that have also destroyed over 70,000 housing units. Palestinians in Gaza have very little access to clean water and sanitation services, which has led to an increase of infections of communicable diseases such as polio and skin and acute respiratory ailments. In addition, as of August 4, nearly 85 percent of school buildings in the Strip have been damaged or destroyed, leaving children without education for nearly a year. Prices of food and other goods have skyrocketed, and with problems of transporting goods and aid into Gaza, fresh produce and other products are almost impossible to find. According to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification report in December 2023, around 1.1 million Gazans are predicted to have experienced famine by July. With these chronic conditions, one might assume that the smartest decision would be to leave Gaza to search for a more secure and stable place to live, at least for the time being. The ever-tightening blockade on Gaza, however, has made such escape nearly impossible.
Capitalizing on Palestinians
While Israel is to blame for this level of restricted movement, Egypt’s policy on Gaza also has played a role in confining residents. Fears of Palestinian Islamist militant groups such as Hamas infiltrating the already destabilized Sinai region largely guides Egypt’s view on the matter. Moreover, concerns about the potential “liquidat[ion of] the Palestinian cause” through mass displacement have also led the Egyptian government to remain steadfast in its refusal to open its borders to the displaced. But since the Strip is surrounded on three sides by Israel and by the blockaded and thereby impassable Mediterranean Sea, escape through Egypt into the Sinai Peninsula is the only viable option. With the Egyptian government no longer accepting immigration applications, many desperate Palestinians have resorted to using border services such as the Hala Tourism firm to find a way out from under Israeli bombardment. As a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch has stated, “Egypt’s restrictions on the freedom of movement via Rafah, in place for many years, have allowed predatory business behavior by many actors imposing extortionist fees on people who want to travel.” Despite the fact that the Egyptian government does not officially condone this extortionist practice and has reportedly ordered Hala to stop its work on the border, there has been no change as Hala is still able to continue exploiting Palestinians.
From 2007 to October 2023, the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry operated the Rafah crossing on the Gaza side while the Egyptian security forces supervised the Egypt side. Each authority has its own process for allowing border crossings. Yet even before the current war, the border would experience sporadic closures. The approval process for an application would take months, even longer during the summer, and sometimes those who waited those long months to secure a permit were still turned away at the border for unexplained reasons. The inefficiency and unpredictability of such a process, along with the long wait times, led to tourism firms like Hala to start operating on the border. Such businesses have offered a “VIP service” that would provide a permit within 48 hours as well as transportation services directly to Cairo for a fee of around $1,200.
The Rafah crossing has turned into a black market and a place for mafias to operate.
Given the expense of this service, not very many Gaza residents could afford it. Since the onset of the war on Gaza, however, the procedures, costs, and popularity of such services drastically changed. As of January 11, 2024, around 200 Palestinians and Egyptians have been crossing into Egypt daily using Hala’s services. Since Hamas ended its formal application process, there has been an even greater demand for Hala’s “VIP” service. Because the company has developed a monopoly over border crossings, prices have substantially increased, especially for the few travel agents or fixers who operate independently and under the radar. Last November, a local fixer stated that the prices for crossing into Egypt are climbing every day, sometimes even reaching $10,000 per person. “Those who pay more cross,” he said. “The Rafah crossing has turned into a black market and a place for mafias to operate.”
Border Security Shortcomings
The question on many people’s minds is how exactly is Hala allowed to extort Palestinians in this way. How can a private company bypass border security in Egypt? The answer lies in the border security system itself. Egyptian writer and Sinai expert Mohannad Sabry has argued that the “corruption happening on the ground” is why the borders have not been opened. Egypt’s economy has been on a downward spiral for years, which has only been exacerbated by cuts in Suez Canal revenue as a result of Houthi attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea. With persistently high inflation rates, jumping from 13.9 to 33.9 points between 2022 and 2023, many Egyptian officials struggling financially may be more willing to accept bribes in exchange for allowing Hala to operate. Back in January and March, then Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry and State Information Service Head Dia Rashwan both emphatically denied that any bribery or other corrupt behavior was taking place. Nonetheless, corruption is much easier to both practice and hide if a private firm has the support of the government, specifically the military that controls the Sinai.
Hala is owned by Ibrahim al-Organi, a business tycoon and Sinai tribal leader with close ties to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the Egyptian Armed Forces. Organi “is a front for the state and military-owned businesses and their policies in Egypt,” argues Sabry. He adds that Organi’s business activity is “part of a larger, opaque economic system controlled by the Egyptian military,” called a “black box,” the details of which remain secret to the public. Neither civilians nor independent organizations are allowed to supervise or access information about companies with ties to the military, allowing businesses like Hala and people like Organi protection from outside observation. Additionally, businesses that work with the army are often awarded jobs through direct orders and can start on work even before going through required “feasibility studies.” Because of Organi’s connections, Hala and other Organi-owned firms are protected by the state and allowed to operate quite freely, despite the government’s best efforts to prove otherwise.
Palestinians’ Experiences in Egypt
After successfully crossing into Egypt with Hala, the select few fortunate Palestinians’ struggles only begin. A country overwhelmed by nearly a million of both registered and unregistered refugees from regions across the globe, based on United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, Egypt has struggled to not only successfully improve its refugee policy, but also to provide basic services. As of June 2024, official figures put the number of Palestinians from Gaza entering Egypt since October 7 at 115,000—up from 75,000 residing in Egypt before the war—although the actual number may be even higher. Due to the nature of the war on Gaza, however, a large number of those who have crossed over have overstayed their six-week tourist visas and are now residing in Egypt illegally. Since Egypt does not want to see another mass displacement of Palestinians reminiscent of the 1948 Nakba—a long-established policy—the government expects Gaza Palestinians to return home after the tourist visas end rather than provide them residence permits. Bearing in mind the fact that the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA) does not operate in Egypt, as well as the fact that the country does not recognize the UNHCR’s mandate for Palestinians, there are not many protections for displaced Palestinians specifically. Living in limbo without residence permits, families are unable to send their children to school, are ineligible for healthcare, unable to open bank accounts or start businesses, and live in constant fear of being fined, deported, or arrested once their illegal status is discovered. While the Palestinian Authority (PA) Embassy in Egypt has been working to secure temporary residence permits for Gazans, the process has been complicated by a decline in PA funding, staff, and the sheer complexity of the situation. This has led many Gazans to rely on savings, loans, charity, or hard-to-get jobs for which they would be paid off the books. While charitable support is obviously helpful, as one NGO worker in Egypt put it, “These families don’t want charity, they just want the chance to live a dignified life.”
There are not many protections for displaced Palestinians in Egypt, who are living in limbo without residency permits.
What makes Egypt’s refugee policy unique is that it categorizes refugees and migrants as one in the same, leading the government to state that over nine million refugees reside in the country, nearly 8 million more than UNHCR has recorded. While the Egyptian government has recently worked with the UN International Organization on Migration to audit the numbers of migrants and refugees, there are many challenges in navigating this situation. Migrants and refugees’ general lack of important documentation for verification and registration has only added to these complications, leaving millions of people stuck in limbo with no way out. For Palestinians, especially those fleeing Gaza, the inability of Egypt’s refugee policy to note their remarkable circumstances has resulted in feelings of abandonment and entrapment. As one young Gaza father from Gaza noted, “Whenever you talk to people here in Egypt, they talk about loving Gazans. When it comes to bureaucracy, you are nothing, you are [an] alien.”
Recommendations
Egypt’s policy for Palestinian refugees has worsened the already immense suffering of those fleeing the war on Gaza. Corruption within the border security apparatus has allowed a private firm to monopolize border crossings and to allow only the wealthy, well connected, or crowd-funded to cross into safety. For those able to cross, they endure a new level of suffering, mired in minimal (or nonexistent) social services and refugee policies that fail to recognize their unique situation. In order to best support Palestinian refugees in Egypt, changes must be made.
First, the Egyptian government must ensure that the Hala firm ends its extortionist practices on the border to “ensure that people can travel through a rights-respecting, transparent system.” The Egyptian security authorities should take full control of the border and create an efficient, equitable system for all Palestinians fleeing Gaza, especially those with medical emergencies. Recent reports of talks between Egypt and the PA for future PA control of the Rafah border offer hope for a new border system, even if it is for a post-war Gaza. The Hala firm must also be investigated by an unbiased, international organization that can exert pressure on Egypt, hold perpetrators accountable, and ensure the safety and security of the investigators.
Second, it is important to note that Egypt’s fears of becoming inundated with refugees are valid. Forcing a country to take in more than it can handle is frankly unfair and unfeasible, both to the providers of the services and the recipients themselves. The international community, most probably western donor governments, can help with the increased pressure on Egypt’s already strained economy by developing and assisting the implementation of short-term plans to help relieve this mounting pressure by assisting in family reunification, medical evacuations, and providing grants specifically for basic service fulfillment. While Egypt received billions of dollars in financial aid from the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States in 2024 for the country’s economy, development, and migration governance, such provisions did not explicitly provide for the support or protection of Palestinian refugees in Egypt. Assistance focused in their needs is most needed, both to directly make an impact and to uphold accountability for where the money is going.
Third, to improve the livelihoods of displaced Palestinians from Gaza now residing in Egypt, the Egyptian government, specifically the Passports and Immigration Administration, can work alongside the PA Embassy in Cairo to speedily facilitate temporary residence permits for Palestinians, giving them up to six months rather than 45 days. Their extraordinary circumstances require further assistance, more than simply a quick-to-expire tourist visa. Charities in Egypt, such as Al Amal, Mersal Foundation, Network for Palestine, and Women for Palestine, have done exemplary work in support of Gaza’s refugees, but they should not be seen as a permanent solution.
Finally, one the most effective solutions would be for Egypt and its partners to pressure Israel and Hamas now more than ever to agree to a ceasefire deal and end this horrific conflict. This is the only way to slow, if not stop, refugee flows from Gaza. Ceasefire mediators should prioritize securing a permanent ceasefire deal. As a Gaza mother of six residing in Egypt said, Egyptians “need to do much, much more” for Palestinians fleeing Gaza. Given el-Sisi’s position that the Palestinian cause is the “mother of all causes,” all efforts should be dedicated to helping Palestinians survive and live with dignity, both at and away from home.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Flickr/Gigi Ibrahim
