Despite its extensive economic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt appears to be hitching its wagon to Saudi Arabia in the kingdom’s dispute with Abu Dhabi over Yemen and other regional issues. Egypt shares Saudi Arabia’s perception that the UAE is attempting to undermine territorial integrity and sovereignty in Yemen, in Sudan, and elsewhere. From Cairo’s perspective, the UAE’s approach risks fostering instability in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, which can disrupt international shipping through the Suez Canal. Egypt depends upon canal transit fees for vital foreign exchange. Some reports suggest that Egypt is also uncomfortable with the UAE’s close relationship with Israel and with some of its other regional stances.
Protecting an Important Lifeline
In Yemen, Egypt provided Saudi Arabia only minimal military support for the Riyadh-led coalition of Arab states organized in 2015 to defeat the Houthi rebels (also known as Ansar Allah) who had taken over Sanaa. Cairo wanted to avoid a repeat of its unhappy experience in Yemen in the 1960s, when it became bogged down in that decade’s civil war. Yet Egypt shared Saudi desires to beat back the Houthi offensive. Egypt did not want the Yemeni conflict to disrupt international shipping from the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait at the mouth of the Red Sea that connects to the Suez Canal. Nor did Egypt want to see Iran’s military assistance to the Houthis allow Tehran to develop a foothold in Yemen.
Yemen’s current civil war has lasted much longer than Saudi Arabia anticipated, and the kingdom eventually realized that its military intervention against the Houthis had bogged down and began to seek a political solution to the conflict. Egypt also wanted the Yemeni conflict to end. The UAE’s support for the separatist Southern Transitional Council forces and its attempt to control several ports in southern Yemen worked against Egypt’s goals of a diplomatic resolution and the preservation of a unified Yemeni state. The UAE’s wish to control the sea lanes in this area raised concerns for Egypt about instability in those vital waters.
Instability in Yemen worries Cairo for economic and geostrategic reasons. The month after Israel launched its war on Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis started to attack Red Sea shipping to show their solidarity with the Palestinians. Although the Houthis claimed that they were only targeting vessels that were Israeli-owned or were headed to the Israeli port of Eilat, the group hit other ships as well. The attacks prompted several major international carriers to reroute their cargo ships from the Red Sea and the Suez Canal route to the longer, more expensive route around Southern Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Egypt reported that in 2024, the state lost some $7 billion in revenue due to ships’ rerouting from the Suez Canal, a drop from the $9.4 billion from canal tolls that Egypt earned in 2022-23.
Since the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the Houthis have ended their shipping attacks, and Cairo has begun to recoup some of its losses by enticing shipping companies to return to the Suez Canal route, even offering them financial incentives to do so. For logistical reasons, rerouting will take some time. The last thing Cairo wants in the meantime is for violence and instability to return to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
On the Same Page with Riyadh on Sudan
Egypt and Saudi Arabia are not only on the same page in Yemen. In the civil war in Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have sided with the government headed by Sudanese Armed Forces chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) and the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Islamists cooperate with al-Burhan’s coalition. Although Egypt’s regime strongly opposes Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, Cairo considers a potential breakup of the Sudanese state to be a more ominous threat. Egypt has had a long relationship with the regular Sudanese military and wants to keep those relations friendly. It also needs the Sudanese government on its side in its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which has begun to adversely affect the flow of Nile water that is crucial to meet Egypt’s needs.
While Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s support for one side in the Sudanese civil war has prolonged the country’s agony, in recent months they seem to have changed heart. In November 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) visited Washington at the same time as news broke of fresh atrocities committed by RSF units in al-Fasher in the Darfur region. Perhaps with Egyptian support, MBS called for an end to the Sudan crisis and asked President Donald Trump to help. The UAE—which has long denied any involvement with the RSF—has seemed uninterested in a negotiated solution.
Opposition to Israeli-UAE Efforts in Somaliland
Another Saudi-Egyptian divergence with the UAE is over Somaliland: the two countries opposed Israel’s December 2025 recognition of the breakaway state, where the UAE has built a presence. From Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the Israelis have no business interfering in the internal affairs of a Muslim country, especially one that buttresses the strategic Gulf of Aden. The UAE has provided Somaliland with investments and military training while establishing its own military presence in the port of Berbera. This strategy seems to echo Abu Dhabi’s approach in southern Yemen. When Israel recognized Somaliland, it appeared as if the UAE and Israel were coordinating to make the breakaway state viable. The President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, severed all agreements with the UAE and said that he would enhance strategic cooperation on Red Sea security and deepen military cooperation with Riyadh and Cairo.
Seeing the UAE as an Outlier on Israel/Palestine
Egypt, the first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, has in recent years increased its economic cooperation with Tel Aviv through large natural gas deals. But Cairo has a cold political relationship with the Netanyahu government over Gaza and the broader Palestinian issue, even after the Gaza ceasefire. Israel has still not opened the Rafah crossing in the southern Gaza Strip, as per the ceasefire agreement of October 2025, thus continuing to hinder the flow of humanitarian supplies into the Gaza Strip, nor has it stopped its military attacks in Gaza, causing hundreds of casualties since the ceasefire began. Egypt likely sees the Netanyahu government as unwilling to allow a Palestinian technocratic administration to run Gaza under US tutelage, as Trump’s peace plan calls for. Saudi Arabia, despite past behind-the-scenes cooperation with Israel on issues such as Iran, also is concerned about the policies of the Netanyahu government toward the Palestinians. For this and other reasons Riyadh has not joined the so-called Abraham Accords, despite Trump’s entreaties.
By contrast, the UAE has established close relations with Israel. It appears to be the Arab state that has been the least critical of Israeli policies in Gaza and the West Bank since the Gaza war began. Although Emirati diplomats occasionally have criticized Israel at the United Nations, the widespread perception in the region is that the UAE has been too indulgent of Netanyahu and his far-right government and have developed a strategic alliance that has enabled Israel to bolster its position as the regional hegemon. While both Cairo and Riyadh are realistic about Israel’s power, they do not see the need for Abu Dhabi to cater to Israel’s designs.
An Important Meeting in Cairo…
For these and other reasons, relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been improving, as evidenced by Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Faisal bin Farhan’s January 5, 2026, visit to Cairo, where he met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. According to the Egyptian readout, the two countries hold “identical” positions on reaching peaceful solutions to the region’s crises, emphasizing that the solutions must “preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states” and specifically mentioning Somaliland, Sudan, and Yemen. Although the statement did not name the UAE, it is quite possible that Egypt and Saudi Arabia intended to convey criticism for Abu Dhabi’s support of rebel movements and breakaway states.
Cairo maintains important economic links to the UAE. Recent data have shown that trade between the two countries increased by 77 percent, to $4.8 billion, in the first half of 2025 and that remittances from Egyptians working in the UAE were $1.8 billion in Fiscal Year 2023/2024. Nevertheless, Egypt seems willing to risk Emirati ire by siding with Saudi Arabia in these regional disputes. Part of Egypt’s calculations may be that while UAE trade and investment in Egypt is substantial, its economic ties with Saudi Arabia are even more important. In 2024, trade between Egypt and Saudi Arabia reached almost $16 billion, representing a 29 percent increase over the previous year. In addition, Saudi investments in Egypt grew to some $35 billion in 2025. Egypt perhaps hopes that this amount will continue to increase as it becomes even closer to Saudi Arabia. Reports in September 2025 indicated that Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to form a joint naval force to protect the Red Sea, in order to avoid being tied to Western security actions in the area. Whether such a joint force will come to fruition is uncertain, but the announcement does signal growing ties between the two countries.
… and Another Important Meeting in Davos
On January 21, 2026, Trump and el-Sisi held a bilateral meeting at the World Economic Forum in Davos. El-Sisi said that he valued Trump’s offer to help mediate in Egypt’s dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD. El-Sisi may hope that MBS will weigh in alongside Trump on Egypt’s behalf, which would represent an added benefit of Cairo’s enhanced security cooperation with Riyadh. Although bolstering revenues from increased shipping on the Suez Canal is a priority for Cairo, ensuring that the GERD does not adversely affect water flows may be even more important considering Egypt’s growing population and water needs.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: FB/Egyptian Presidency
