An Unwinnable Battle of Narratives in Lebanon Regarding War with Israel

Hezbollah’s decision on war against Israel has attracted both support and objection from different political factions in Lebanon and helped lead to escalating sectarian tensions. By stating that it would battle Israel to support Hamas until a ceasefire is reached in Gaza, the Iran-backed party-cum-militia and most powerful national actor in Lebanon has drawn criticism from political rivals who accuse it of instigating war without sanction from the Lebanese state, which is a violation of the latter’s sovereignty and a dangerous threat to the country’s interests. To be sure, the question of whether Hezbollah’s actions are legitimate is vying with the view that they are an infringement on national sovereignty, with neither perspective emerging victorious over the other.

Considering the party’s powerful position in the country, this may ultimately mean that Hezbollah alone will decide the fate of Lebanon, which is already on the brink of collapse. Indeed, this would be another dreadful page in Lebanon’s troubled history, which will not only further polarize Lebanese society, but move the country toward irreversible and total breakdown, with serious repercussions for regional stability. Despite the risks, however, the Lebanese can use the opportunity to agree to engage in a national conversation involving all parties about the path forward, the nation’s future, and the kind of Lebanon its citizens desire.

Hezbollah’s Popularity and Stance

The question of Palestine—and Hezbollah’s relationship with it—draws mixed reactions in Lebanon because of social fissures and the Palestinian role in the 1975-1990 civil war. Since then, Hezbollah has claimed to be Lebanon’s protector against Israel and a fierce supporter of Palestinian liberation and statehood. When it helped to drive Israel out of south Lebanon in 2000 and then survived the 2006 war, the organization transformed itself from one championing the dispossessed Shia of Lebanon to a national movement, and thereafter the most powerful group in the country. It has a sizeable military arsenal, has infiltrated the state, and developed its extra-statal network of financial, welfare, and social services primarily geared toward its sectarian base. Today, in addition to its military operations against Israel, Hezbollah claims that it wants to liberate Israeli-occupied areas of southern Lebanon (such as the village of Ghajar, the Shebaa Farms, and Kfarshouba Hills), a claim many see as a guise to preserve its military arsenal.

While the level of domestic political support for Hezbollah in Lebanon—especially in case of war with Israel—is complex and multifaceted, Hezbollah does enjoy significant support among its base within the Shia community, but also among other segments who view it as unequivocally standing up to Israeli aggression. Since October 7, 2023, the resistance narrative that legitimizes Hezbollah has indeed had a boost, with several non-Shia groups and voices joining the fray. Still, a good portion of the Lebanese—mainly Christians but also most Druze and Sunnis—remain against it, and they are especially vocal against Lebanon becoming implicated in the Gaza war. They consider Hezbollah to be more of an Iranian proxy than a resistance movement, and accuse the party of having created a state within the state, of monopolizing decisions of war and peace in the country, and of stifling the formation of a strong state.

Hezbollah has rationalized its attacks against Israel by accusing the international community of doing nothing to defend Palestinians in Gaza.

Hezbollah justified its involvement in the Gaza war through seemingly principled positions, on the one hand in support of the Palestinians and on the other in defense of Lebanon. Not unlike Yemen’s Houthis or other Iran-allied militias in Iraq and Syria who since October 7 have stepped up attacks against American and Israeli targets, Hezbollah has projected self-assurance and signaled a readiness for war from the very start by indicating that the resistance is “ready for the battle.” The group has rationalized its attacks against Israel by adopting arguments accusing the international community of doing nothing to support Palestinians who are being slaughtered under siege by Israel. Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah has repeated in his speeches that there could be no negotiation or interruption of fighting until a ceasefire in Gaza is reached, stating that “A ceasefire in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen requires one thing: an end to the war in Gaza!” Similarly, Hezbollah MP Hussein al-Hajj Hassan called for “all free people around the world… to file a complaint against the enemy for committing war crimes and racist violations, and for all the crimes committed in Gaza.” The increasing daily death toll in Gaza has subsequently intensified supporters’ call for more forceful action by Hezbollah.

The “defending Lebanon” argument is premised on the idea that by showing strength, Israel is being discouraged from using Lebanon as a consolation prize for its failures in Gaza. As an example, Hezbollah Deputy Chief Naim Qassem declared in June that “any Israeli expansion of the war on Lebanon will be met with devastation, destruction and displacement in Israel.” Here, the rhetoric seeks to prevent Israel from restoring deterrence by using excessive force against Lebanon to compensate for not achieving its objectives in Gaza and to reassure the Israeli public.

While consistent with Hezbollah’s messaging and positioning, the two justifications of supporting Palestinians and defending Lebanon conceal a third, arguably more pertinent one, which is the unarticulated reality that the Gaza war is a threat to the current regional arrangements that benefit Iran and the axis of resistance. Iran certainly benefited from the Gaza conflict, which has not only forced a renewed anti-American and anti-Israeli discourse in the region but also exposed weaknesses in Israel’s military might. It is unclear how much Iran would gain from intensifying tensions which would almost certainly escalate into a regional war and weaken Hezbollah, its most important asset. In recent years, Hezbollah has become more than a proxy for Iran, playing a key role in bolstering the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, including his violent assault on his people, and training Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen. As a result, Hezbollah has been trying to balance its credibility as a major axis actor with avoiding escalation and war.

Despite its supporters’ criticism over its restraint in its actions against Israel, Hezbollah’s pragmatism seems to have gained it allies who are not necessarily close to its ideology. For example, the party’s position has helped convince a Sunni military group, al-Fajr Brigades, the military wing of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya, to join the fight; a development that helped legitimize Hezbollah’s military presence in Sunni villages alongside the border with Israel and now marks the emergence of a potentially significant alliance between Shia and Sunni factions in Lebanon, however marginal they are. But some in Lebanon remain extremely unhappy with Hezbollah and have opposed it publicly. Both Lebanese Forces and Kataeb Party leaders Samir Geagea and Samy Gemayel, respectively, have accused Hezbollah of drawing Israeli attacks on Lebanese soil and pushing Lebanon into war.

The War of Narratives

The Lebanese public is split into three camps. On one end of the spectrum are those who are willing to suffer the damage that would be inflicted in an Israeli-Hezbollah war and on the other are those who are incontestably and vocally against it, especially at this time. But both of these camps are not in the majority. The third camp, which forms the majority, is attuned to a number of factors, including how Hezbollah fares in such a war and, more importantly, what promises the party makes about how to address the war’s damages. In 2006, Hezbollah cemented its relationship with the Shia community by providing immediate, generous compensation for damages incurred and were supportive of those families that lost breadwinners by providing them with stipends. Indeed, Hezbollah is said to have spent some $300 million on reconstruction and compensation. European and Arab countries also provided assistance at the time, although for countrywide, generally nonpartisan reconstruction efforts. This time around, Hezbollah’s resistance narrative has been elevated to include economic issues and to address the harm caused by Israeli attacks on the south. Party MP Hassan Fadlallah, for example, declared that Hezbollah had started surveying damage, paying compensation, and offering assistance to those affected by Israeli bombardment.

The elements in question here are the interests at stake and the narrative dominance regarding how the group is positioning itself in the face of war. In Hezbollah’s messaging, Israel is weak, demonized, and demoralized. Moreover, statements from Hezbollah representatives have repeatedly asserted that the party would not wage full-scale war unless the Israelis start it. And while there are those who are decrying being dragged into war, Nasrallah’s discourse has increasingly focused on Israel’s excesses and failures, specifically in Gaza. This is translating into a perception that Israel may attack Lebanon to compensate for its failure in the Strip. On the other hand, some extreme, albeit currently marginal (but growing) perspectives are emerging from Israel and calling for colonizing south Lebanon, thus bolstering Hezbollah’s assertions that Israel is not only attacking because it wants to defeat Hezbollah but because it wants the land. Such a narrative has allowed Hezbollah to effectively claim that it truly is the defender of the country.

Hezbollah has repeatedly asserted that it would not wage full-scale war unless the Israelis start it.

In response, sovereigntists within Lebanon who have been arguing that the presence of Hezbollah is dangerous are recycling arguments from the pre-October 7 period as if the war had not taken place. This is negatively affecting their credibility and limiting their efficacy. In recent speeches, opposition leaders have for example insisted that the key to the problem lies in Iran, which needs to be pressured to stop destabilizing the country. In this case, Samy Gemayel also held Hezbollah responsible for casualties and destruction so far, in addition to the economic downturn and the damage to tourism, plus everything that would happen should escalation take place. In a July 2024 press conference, a group of opposition parliamentarians similarly called for the end of extra-statal operations by Hezbollah and for the government to assume its responsibilities in monopolizing the defense of the country.

Still, however, the detractors of the sovereigntist camp are denouncing the latter’s ability to call out the party’s actions as violating state sovereignty without sufficiently criticizing Israel’s lack of accountability and denouncing its actions. As a result, even if the anti-Hezbollah crowd has credible arguments about the party and the desire to avoid conflict with Israel, it is not winning the war of narratives at a time when it needs to articulate a message that challenges Hezbollah’s omnipotence while remaining principled about Israel’s excesses in Gaza. To be sure, they need to update their playbook as they face up to Hezbollah’s sophisticated and effective arguments.

A National Dialogue Is Imperative

Hezbollah, which may be dragging Lebanon to an unwarranted war, is facing a tidal wave of hostility and resistance. Many of its opponents in Lebanon are smarting from its unilateral decision to battle Israel and are intent on demonstrating that not all of the country is behind the party. But these opponents are not winning the war of narratives because they are in a comparatively weak position vis-à-vis Hezbollah and might not be able to change the reality on the ground.

Lebanon thus finds itself at a moment of extreme risk, which also presents Lebanese officials and factions with the opportunity to initiate a genuine national conversation about a path out of the enduring aberration that is Hezbollah’s grip on the country and toward a comprehensive national defense strategy. As Hezbollah’s vast arsenal of weapons comes under scrutiny in Lebanon’s polarized political landscape, a national dialogue is imperative about the Lebanon its citizens want. This is arguably the best means of avoiding the dangers the country encounters today. Such a national conversation will also help diffuse any descent into communal violence in the period following a potential war between Hezbollah and Israel.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors. 

Featured image credit: Shutterstock/mohammad kassir