In Syria under former President Hafez al-Assad, liberating Palestine at all costs was a regime slogan commensurate to freeing the Golan Heights of Israeli occupation. Still, Assad helped Lebanese right-wing Christian militias conquer the Palestinian Tal al-Zaatar refugee camp near Beirut in 1976, where they committed a massacre of some 1,600 people. Assad also helped to fracture the Palestinian Fatah Movement in 1983 and was a key party to the 1985-1988 War of Camps in Lebanon that weakened the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and turned Palestinian factions against one another. He controlled and shaped the Palestinian political and military structure in Syria, significantly affecting intra-Palestinian socio-political dynamics and the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Bashar al-Assad inherited his father’s policies. Under his rule, the Palestinian factions in Syria became part of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” He made an alliance with Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, who believed that the road to Jerusalem passed through Syrian cities, and who declared, “If Syria falls, Palestine will be lost too.” In the name of Palestine, Assad and his allies devastated Syria and killed both Syrians and Palestinians. Throughout the Syrian civil war, some Palestinian factions, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), suppressed Palestinian and Syrian protests against the Assad regime.
When Hay`at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) entered Damascus in December 2024 and toppled the Assad regime, its leaders quickly addressed the Palestinian factions. HTS’s first big decision was to dissolve the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and ask other factions to surrender their arms. Syria’s new de facto president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has since communicated that under his leadership, Syria will not serve as a base for launching attacks against neighbors and other nations and Syria will continue to adhere to its 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel. This has been his consistent position since taking control, despite the Israeli bombing of Syria’s military bases immediately after Bashar’s fall and the ongoing Israeli invasion of Syrian territories, including on the rural outskirts of Damascus.
Both Hafez and Bashar, and now the HTS, have had a direct impact on the shape of the Palestinian political structure in Syria and on Syrian policy toward the Israeli–Palestinian struggle. The traditional Palestinian political structure in Syria that the Assad dynasty built over five decades has now collapsed, and with the new Syrian leadership, the policy toward Israel and Palestine will necessarily change as well.
The Evolution of Palestinian Factions in Syria
Historically, Palestinian factions have held considerable military and political weight in Syria, influencing the broader Palestinian political scene over decades. Hafez al-Assad tried to control the Palestinian political movements by structuring his relationships with them through a security and intelligence office called the Palestine Branch. The mission of this branch was to spy on and monitor Palestinian factions and to control their hierarchy and leadership in order to guarantee their loyalty to the Syrian regime. Through the Palestine Branch, Syrian intelligence founded, split, and dissolved Palestinian factions in Syria and, for a while, in Lebanon.
After Black September in 1970—when the Jordanian Army crushed Palestinian armed activity in Jordan—the PLA brigades based there moved to Syria. Hafez al-Assad made them a semi-autonomous part of the Syrian Army, and Palestinian refugees were required to complete two and a half years of mandatory military service. Hafez al-Assad used the PLA and other Palestinian factions to fight the PLO in Lebanon. But the PLA played no significant role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict beyond its involvement in supporting the Syrian Army during the Lebanese Civil War; over time, its primary function was to collect bribes from Palestinian refugees to get out of their mandatory military service while juggling work or studies.
The Assad regimes (father and son) provided the PFLP-GC with multiple training facilities, including the well-known military training camp in Ein al-Saheb. With the permission of the PFLP-GC, the Ein al-Saheb military site trained hundreds of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters who were recruited from Palestinian refugee camps in Syria or smuggled into Syria from Gaza and the West Bank. Iran selected elite fighters from these trainees and instructed them in Iran on advanced warfare techniques. These fighters supported Hezbollah in the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon as well as in the current Israeli wars in Gaza and Lebanon.
Palestinian factions developed parallel organizations in Syria that provided social services to their communities.
Over the years, Palestinian factions developed parallel organizations in Syria that provided services such as education, public libraries, healthcare, and daycare to their communities. Such services also acted as a recruitment tool to attract more members, followers, and fighters, leading to competition among factions in service delivery. When Hamas moved to Syria in 1999 after the Israeli attempt to assassinate Khaled Meshaal in Jordan, Bashar al-Assad allowed the group to operate in the camps. Hamas was more organized and wealthier than the other Palestinian factions in Syria. While it did not actively compete with other factions, Hamas did establish an organizational structure that rivaled the PLO’s institutions, positioning itself as an alternative to the PLO. Hamas leveraged its wealth and its relationship with the Syrian regime to expand within the camps, to recruit, and to promote political Islam in Syrian and Palestinian communities alike.
In 2011, Khaled Meshaal, head of the Hamas political bureau in Damascus, chose to align with the Syrian uprising; he left Syria in 2012, despite disagreement over this decision within the organization’s leadership. Some Hamas leaders in Gaza opposed his departure because it weakened their connection and access to military bases across Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. In 2013, Hamas supported the establishment of a Palestinian pro-Syrian opposition armed group in Syria, Aknaf Beit al Maqdis, which was based in al-Yarmouk camp in Damascus. By doing so, Hamas entered into direct military confrontation with the Syrian regime and its allies. However, some Hamas leaders such as Yahya Sinwar in Gaza remained in the pro-Assad camp, mobilized the Hamas base against Mashaal, and campaigned within Hamas for a reconciliation with the Assad regime. Mashaal refused to reconcile, making it clear that Hamas now had two distinct factions and political positions.
A Policy Shift, from Sending Weapons to Sending Prayers
Over the years, Mashaal and his followers maintained close ties with HTS and other Syrian armed groups through the Hamas office and base that he established in Turkey. Hamas provided the Syrian rebels with training, fighters, weapons, and equipment that was delivered across the Lebanon and Turkey borders. After October 7, 2023, when Israel’s retaliation against Gaza intensified, HTS and its Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib permitted Hamas members to enter Idlib from Turkey and raise funds for Gaza. This led local residents to express their support, including naming a town square in Idlib City “Gaza Square.”
Although the continued presence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Damascus helped connect Tehran, Beirut, Gaza, and the West Bank, Israel’s war on Gaza has significantly weakened both Hamas and Islamic Jihad. With the collapse of the Assad regime, these factions have lost their military and political support system. As a result, the Axis of Resistance has been weakened, and the Palestinian political system in Syria has been all but erased. For the first time in five decades, Palestinians are free from Syrian intelligence intervention from the Palestine Branch.
As HTS has taken control in Syria, it has taken decisive action against the Palestinian factions. It has closed and confiscated the offices, weapons, and military camps of PFLP-GC, al-Sa’iqa, and Fateh al Intifada. HTS has allowed the offices of Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Fatah, and Hamas to stay open. Still, all factions have to operate within the permissible limits established by the new authorities in Damascus.
HTS has allowed the offices of Palestinians factions to stay open.
While these new policies toward Palestinians and their factions in Syria have been evolving quickly, the new Syrian administration cannot ignore the widespread anger toward Israel for its wars on Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, and now its military aggression in Syria. As a result, the transitional government is still allowing public expressions of support for Gaza. This appears to be the extent of the support the new Syrian administration is willing to offer Palestinians.
Moreover, it remains to be seen if the new Syrian leadership would seriously consider a Trump administration proposal, if attempted, to resettle Gazans in Syria if it comes with a US offer to lift sanctions and contribute to the reconstruction and stabilization of the country. In its current vulnerable position under a new administration, the United States and Israel may think of Syria as a weaker party than Egypt and Jordan. But it is doubtful that HTS and Sharaa would agree to resettling displaced Palestinians. Besides, Gazans are not willing to leave the Strip. At any rate, it is important to emphasize that moving Palestinians from Gaza to Syria would be yet another injustice that will neither contribute to sustainable and lasting peace in the Middle East nor provide security for Israel.
HTS has not yet established a complete policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But it has dismantled the traditional Palestinian political structure developed over many decades under the Assad regimes, with the goals of reducing the presence of these groups in Syria and transforming them into community-based organizations. The Palestinian leaders who agreed to this have remained in Syria, adjusting their roles and restructuring their presence accordingly. Those who have opposed it have left Syria for Lebanon, where some Palestinian factions still have assets and resources, although limited.
Risks and Recommendations
Living in refugee camps in Syria among Palestinian political factions (whether leftist, secular, or Islamist) has influenced the political identity of Palestinians there. The perpetual statelessness of Palestinians intensified the need for many to belong to a political group or faction. With the collapse of these factions in the country, there will be a political vacuum for Palestinian refugees in Syria.
Today, because the new Syrian state is so fragile, former political parties and actors loyal to the ex-regime may be able to regroup, reemerge, and pose a serious security threat. These players could return in new forms with radical ideas and ideologies that align with remnants of extremist groups such as the so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda.
This vacuum could also be filled by Iranian support, especially since Iran has historically funded many Palestinian factions. The likelihood of Iran reestablishing an underground presence through support to the Palestinian factions in Syria will increase with Israeli continued incursions into Syrian territory.
Turkey is another player that has established a strong relationship with Hamas and provided it with a haven from which to operate. Turkish influence in Syria could pressure the new government to amend its position toward the Palestinian factions if Turkish-Israeli interests in Syria come into conflict and escalate.
Today, Israeli forces are about 24 kilometers away from Damascus and just ten kilometers away from Khan Eshieh Camp for Palestinian refugees. Due to Israel’s ongoing atrocities in Gaza and invasions of refugee camps across the West Bank, Palestinian anger is high, and there is a real risk of the situation in Syria escalating quickly.
What is happening in Syria is historic, including for Palestinians, who should seize the opportunity to rebuild themselves under a unified and reformed PLO. The collapse of the Syrian regime is an opportunity to overcome the barriers and divisions that the Assad regime perpetuated over five decades in order to prevent Palestinian unity.
It is also crucial for the PLO to restructure the relationship between Palestinians and the new Syrian government to ensure that Palestinian refugees in Syria can live freely and enjoy equal socio-economic rights with Syrians. This will enable them to rebuild their homes, to live with dignity, and to contribute to rebuilding Syria. The PLO and the Syrian government must collaborate to prevent the destabilizing impact of new militias or the regrouping of existing ones under the guise of representing Palestinian interests or the slogan of liberating Palestine.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Elaf Al Photography
