In late September 2025, nearly two years after the start of Israel’s war on Gaza, President Donald Trump unveiled a highly touted 20-point “peace plan” that presents a long-term framework for reconstruction and governance linked to a sustained ceasefire in the Strip, the release of Israeli and Palestinian hostages and detainees, and the demilitarization of Hamas. The plan’s first phase is haltingly taking shape: Israel and Hamas have reached a truce despite continued Israeli violations, Israeli forces have withdrawn from limited parts of Gaza, and the release of hostages and Palestinian prisoners is underway. Humanitarian aid is entering Gaza, albeit in very limited quantities, and internally displaced Gazans are beginning to return to destroyed and damaged homes. Hamas, however, has publicly rejected key next parts of Trump’s plan, in particular its insistence on the group’s disarmament, which Hamas has said will not happen until a sovereign Palestinian state is established. Nor has Israel agreed to the rest of Trump’s 20 points. Indeed, any initial optimism is fading as it looks uncertain that the convergence of a ceasefire, prisoner exchange, and international involvement will coalesce into a path toward stabilization and recovery in Gaza and the rest of the occupied territories.
Beyond Palestine, a potential end to the war in Gaza could have implications for Lebanon. The complete cessation of fighting could diminish Hezbollah’s rationale for keeping its own weapons—although in addition to its claim of solidarity with Hamas’s battle against “the Zionist state,” Hezbollah had its own internal reasons, related to Lebanon, to be in active conflagration with Israel. Hezbollah had nevertheless politically and psychologically intertwined Gaza and Lebanon in its “unity of fronts” narrative that was reinforced—albeit inadvertently—by Israel’s widening military operations across the region, including strikes in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and even Qatar. Hezbollah invoked this logic to justify its post-October 7 operations across the Blue Line, which was followed by Israel’s destructive invasion of Lebanon in late 2024—a campaign that devastated large parts of the south and displaced tens of thousands of Lebanese.
As long as Israel strikes Lebanon at will, calls for Hezbollah to disarm will ring hollow.
Today, a diminished Hezbollah continues to resist disarmament—long mandated by UN Security Council resolutions and now championed by both the Trump administration and Beirut’s transitional government—but its ability to sustain the argument is eroding. If a lasting ceasefire takes hold in Gaza, it will be far harder for Hezbollah to claim that supporting Palestine requires Lebanon to remain in perpetual confrontation with Israel. At the same time, Lebanon’s security debate cannot ignore the asymmetry that continues to define the conflict. Israel’s repeated overflights, targeted strikes, and declarations of a right to “pre-emptive action” have perpetuated a sense among many Lebanese—particularly within the Shia community—that unilateral disarmament could expose the country to renewed aggression. As long as Israel acts as if it is entitled to act militarily across its borders at will, calls for Hezbollah to disarm without broader security guarantees will ring hollow.
For Lebanon, therefore, the critical question is not whether the Gaza deal is perfect, but whether it establishes a credible and permanent end to hostilities in the Strip, a framework for governance and security that assures Israel’s withdrawal from the enclave, and a regional environment that reduces rather than relocates the risk of war and Israeli aggression. Such conditions just might remove the daily casus belli that Israel uses to keep its northern theater “hot” and to justify its ongoing militarization along the border. In that scenario, Beirut would find it politically easier to advance a domestically sensitive disarmament agenda, reassuring Hezbollah’s own constituency that the process strengthens rather than weakens Lebanon’s defense posture.
Disarming Hezbollah
The long-established basis for Hezbollah’s disarmament is anchored in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. It required an end to hostilities, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory, the removal of all armed personnel and weapons south of the Litani River other than those of the Lebanese government and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the disarmament of all armed groups, and the extension of the authority of the Lebanese government across its entire territory. UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) previously demanded the disarmament of all militias following the 1989 Taif Accords that led to the end of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war. But disarmament in areas of the country south of the Litani has been stalled for nearly two decades.
Disarmament of non-governmental forces was again mandated by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Subsequent US-devised proposals have involved a staged process. Phase 1 of the June 2025 plan proposed by US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack involves militia disarmament by year’s end, an immediate stop to Israeli airstrikes and overflights, a surge deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, and a monitored, time-bound process for removing Hezbollah’s heavy weapons capable of reaching Israel’s interior.
Consistent with Barrack’s proposal, in August 2025 the Lebanese cabinet tasked the LAF with devising a plan to bring all weapons under state authority and accepted its plan the following month. The LAF commander has highlighted the army’s expanded deployments south of the Litani, which the UN has documented since late 2024. Yet Hezbollah has rejected outright disarmament even while signaling, at times, a willingness to re-calibrate its presence and rules of engagement south of the Litani, contingent on Israeli actions and on reaching a political consensus on national defense in Lebanon. Recent reports point to an end of 2025 target for core milestones paired with Israeli pullbacks and curbs on overflights, if Beirut moves forward on enforcement. The Lebanese government then plans to expand disarmament north to the Awali River.
Gaza Settlement vs. Hezbollah’s Disarmament
The connection between Hezbollah’s political and strategic vision and Gaza has been evident since October 7, 2023. Hezbollah framed its engagement on the northern front of Israel as part of a “unity of fronts,” portraying its strikes against Israel as acts of solidarity with the population of Gaza and resistance to what it called Israel’s “collective punishment.” In the months that followed, it calibrated its military activity against Israel, carefully maintaining constant pressure while avoiding full-out war in coordination with developments on the Palestinian front. If Gaza now stabilizes under a credible ceasefire and a new governance and security arrangement emerges—an outcome that remains uncertain in light of Israel’s continued military posture—Hezbollah’s justification for retaining a heavily armed posture could be weakened.
The emerging US plan for Lebanon explicitly ties Israeli restraint and withdrawal steps to Lebanese commitments on disarmament, backed by international monitoring and clear deadlines. In theory, the Trump administration reasons that a sustainable Gaza outcome improves the likelihood that Israel will implement its side of the bargain in Lebanon—curbing overflights, halting ground incursions, and ending military operations that Hezbollah cites as a pretext for maintaining forward positions. Washington thus believes that Israel’s compliance with agreed de-escalation measures would not only demonstrate good faith but, in turn, make it easier for the Lebanese government to press for Hezbollah’s compliance with withdrawal and weapons restrictions in the south.
The US plan ties Israeli restraint and withdrawal to disarmament.
A genuine long-term Gaza settlement also could reduce the risk of a wider regional war by lowering Israel’s perceived need to carry out forward-deployed precision strikes in Lebanon, particularly south of the Litani. For years, Israel’s evolving doctrine of “forward defense” has blurred the line between deterrence and provocation—regularly targeting infrastructure it deems “dual-use” or preemptively striking across borders. The end of open hostilities in Gaza, made possible by an internationally verified ceasefire, undercuts this logic and potentially lessens the incentive for Israeli strikes in Lebanon. At the same time, Iran—Hezbollah’s principal patron—may still resist wholesale disarmament, seeking to preserve elements of its deterrence architecture across the region. But the Gaza conflict has already reshaped the regional “rules of engagement”—and a durable ceasefire may consolidate that shift, opening space for phased security arrangements in Lebanon that were politically impossible before.
Hezbollah’s presence in South Lebanon (its units, launchers, and observation posts) is only one part of its military footprint. The larger challenges—long-range rockets, precision-guided munitions, drones, command infrastructure—are located north of the Litani and may not be addressed or contained for years to come. For Lebanon’s Shia community, which is Hezbollah’s base, disarmament is not just an ideological or strategic affair, but also a deeply socio-economic one. Over past decades, Hezbollah has built an extensive infrastructure of welfare, education, healthcare, reconstruction, and patronage networks that functions as a quasi-state within the state and sustains its grassroots support. This parallel system of services has filled the vacuum left by Lebanon’s weak institutions, making large segments of the Shia community dependent on the organization. Any credible path toward disarmament must therefore also address this ecosystem of social protection and economic survival. Without viable state alternatives, Hezbollah’s constituency will perceive demands for dismantling Hezbollah’s arsenal as attempts to eliminate its means of sustenance and protection.
Reducing apprehension among Hezbollah’s base that disarmament would leave Lebanon exposed to Israeli attacks requires not just credible security assurances—made more plausible by a stabilized Gaza front and visible reduction in Israeli military activity—but also the Lebanese state stepping into the spaces Hezbollah has long occupied to deliver social services to its constituents. This would involve investing in public infrastructure, expanding LAF presence as a stabilizing and protective force, and reestablishing a social contract with marginalized communities, so that Hezbollah’s weapons no longer represent protection but defiance.
What Should International Actors Do?
International stakeholders can leverage momentum in Gaza to help sustain the necessary political space and goodwill to achieve full disarmament in Lebanon. They could offer incentives linking real progress in Gaza, if and when it takes place, with diplomatic and financial support for Lebanon’s stabilization, while avoiding more rigid conditionality that would give spoilers an excuse to derail progress on either side. A parallel priority is to accelerate international support for the LAF’s southern sector by equipping units with additional technology and logistics support necessary for monitoring disarmament in real time, as well as Israel’s aggressive behavior. The UN-documented LAF troop surge south of the Litani in July 2025 provides a verified foundation upon which supporters could build.
Any progress must include visible early Israeli steps.
Any progress must include visible early Israeli steps such as airspace restraint, clear public reporting on overflights, and calibrated ground pullbacks. If Hezbollah’s forward posture recedes, Israel may reduce overflights and kinetic actions, restore civilian life in its north, and claim a strategic win. Such gestures are essential confidence-building measures that would demonstrate reciprocity and bolster Lebanese political consensus around securing Hezbollah’s disarmament. Visibility itself then becomes a form of deterrence, signaling to border communities that both sides are invested in stability.
Finally, an effective communications strategy will enable the Lebanese government to take ownership of the narrative, publicly outlining steps that are being implemented, how they are being verified, and what benefits are accruing to affected communities. Monthly dashboards on troop deployments, incident trends, and reconstruction progress could help maintain transparency and also build domestic confidence. By communicating directly and consistently, Beirut can shift the discourse from one of externally-imposed enforcement of disarmament to one that advances the national interest, showing that disarmament is not a foreign demand but a sovereign choice to restore stability and rebuild the Lebanese state.
The Future Is Partly in the Hands of the Lebanese State
If the Gaza war concludes with a credible stabilization package, Hezbollah’s disarmament track in Lebanon could open its most promising window since 2006. This window is real because the political, operational, and regional linkages that have kept Israel’s northern front “activated” would begin to diminish. This development will also require a degree of Israeli restraint and de-escalation that has so far proven difficult given Israel’s security calculus and the dynamics of its close partnership with the US. Besides, disarmament is not the automatic corollary of a Gaza ceasefire; it remains a function of the Lebanese state’s will and ability to take charge of the country’s future.
The real test of disarmament, therefore, lies not in UN resolutions or foreign guarantees, but in the capacity of the Lebanese state to enforce its own sovereignty. The immediate prize would be a safer south, free of armed groups, secured by the LAF, and underpinned by verifiable restrictions on heavy weapons and reciprocal Israeli restraint. Such an achievement would restore the credibility of the state as Lebanon’s sole security guarantor. But the task of dismantling Hezbollah’s arsenal north of the Litani, its social services infrastructure, and the political doctrine that sustains the group will demand political will and meaningful state reforms to serve all Lebanese citizens. Only an assertive state, confident in its institutions and backed by its citizens, can turn the principle of a monopoly on force from aspiration into reality.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Gabriele Pedrini
