What Trump’s Aid Cuts Mean for the Middle East and North Africa

Although the Trump administration exempted Israel’s $3.3 billion and Egypt’s $1.3 billion in annual foreign military financing (FMF)—the majority of US assistance for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)¹—the region has not escaped the resultant tumult. Many US-financed security, humanitarian, development, climate, refugee, health, and democracy projects in MENA have been affected. As of this writing, the full regional picture is unclear. The administration has not released a final list of terminated activities, and the Elon Musk “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE)-led endeavor has been chaotic. But considering Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s March 10 announcement that he approved the cancellation of 5,200, or 83 percent, of US Agency for International Development (USAID) awards worldwide, the anticipated closure of USAID, and reports of the termination of 4,100 Department of State projects, it can be assumed that many MENA activities have been cut.

Home to geopolitical competition, oil and gas resources, armed conflicts and humanitarian crises, terrorist threats, and above all, to close US ally Israel, since 1946 MENA has received more US foreign assistance than any other region. In Fiscal Year 2023 (FY 23), Congress appropriated about $9 billion for the region.²

To be sure, US foreign assistance does not have a shining reputation in MENA. Some governments resent aid dependency and what they perceive as US interference in their domestic affairs. While some citizens support US aid, many are unaware of its impact, or are suspicious, associating it with deeply unpopular US foreign policy. Overall, it must be acknowledged that tens of billions in US aid investments have not created a secure, prosperous, or democratic region. But it is undeniable that some American aid has been valuable, indeed lifesaving, and that President Donald Trump’s cuts are unsettling governments and harming people in MENA.

What Has US Assistance to MENA Included?

Most US foreign aid projects have been managed from Washington and by embassies in the region, as well as by USAID, which has an official presence in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel (for the West Bank and Gaza), and Saudi Arabia (for Yemen). After having fired or placed on leave most of the USAID workforce, the Trump administration may close USAID missions, and perhaps even embassies, to downsize the diplomatic budget.

According to the US government’s foreign aid website, foreignassistance.gov, in FY 24 (which ended on September 30, 2024) the United States obligated (or formally committed) $12 billion from various appropriations years for some 1,000 activities in 16 MENA countries. This aid, however, is quite unevenly distributed. In recent years some 80 percent of annual bilateral funding has been for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, mostly for military aid. (Washington ended most non-military aid to Israel in 2007.)

Over the past decade or so, the rest of the funding has gone to lower-middle or middle income countries (such as Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia), conflict-affected areas (Lebanon, Syria, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen), multi country programs, Iran democracy promotion, and refugee and humanitarian aid. The wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council countries, along with Algeria, receive very minimal US aid, mainly for security cooperation.³

Security Aid

This assistance includes FMF for many of the region’s militaries as well as funding for the Multinational Peacekeeping Forces in Sinai; military education; counter-narcotics and criminal justice support; anti-terrorism training; and counter-proliferation, demining, and more. In FY 24, according to foreignassistance.gov, the US government had $7.7 billion in such obligations for activities in 14 MENA countries and the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

Economic and Development Support

This aid has funded fiscal stabilization, economic development, governance, education, environment, food security, countering violent extremism, democracy and civil society, Israeli-Palestinian peace-building, regional cooperation, anti-corruption, and more. Recipients have included Arab governments as well as NGOs and UN agencies. In FY 24, per foreignassistance.gov, the United States had $1.7 billion in obligations for 14 MENA countries and the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

Health Promotion

In FY 24, according to foreignassistance.gov, the United States had $270 million obligated for activities in 10 MENA countries and the West Bank and Gaza to improve child and maternal health, control infectious diseases, strengthen public health systems, and respond to health emergencies.

Humanitarian and Refugee/Migration Aid

In FY 24, per foreignassistance.gov, the US government had $2.3 billion in obligations for humanitarian aid in MENA–for food, medical care and health, shelter, sanitation/hygiene, livelihood support, and more–mainly for Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen. The US government also has provided billions of dollars for migrant and refugee aid in the region and for earthquake recovery in Morocco and Syria.

Democracy and Human Rights Programs

US financial support to promote democracy, human rights, and civil society in MENA has been administered by USAID, by the Department of State, and by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-independent organization funded mostly by Congress. According to foreignassistance.gov, in FY 24, USAID and State had $250 million in obligations for projects in 11 MENA countries and the West Bank and Gaza. NED’s website says that in FY 23 it made $33.8 million in grants for the region.

Causing Harm and Disruption

Trump’s dismantling of the foreign aid sector has occurred, aid professionals say, in a slash-and-burn fashion, without the careful 90-day review claimed by the administration. A 368-page unconfirmed list of terminated USAID projects worldwide leaked to the media suggests the extent of the damage in MENA.

Vulnerable People

By far, the hardest hit are probably tens of millions of desperate people in MENA conflict zones for whom US humanitarian aid has been a lifeline. Since the 2011 Arab Uprisings, as Washington was arming regional actors to wage devastating wars, it was also pouring in aid funds to mitigate the civilian impact of those very conflicts. Even if the motivation for such aid was cynical, the help it provided was real. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), between 2010 and 2023, the US government funded some $28.3 billion for MENA humanitarian response. The Biden administration provided $1.2 billion for Gaza and the West Bank following the October 7, 2023 attacks, as well as significant humanitarian aid for Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

In war-ravaged Gaza, the United States has been the major funder of aid for health care, food, sanitation, field hospitals, shelter, and more. Although throughout this war Israeli obstruction, armed gangs in Gaza, and other factors have severely hindered aid access, much of what did enter was US financed and delivered by US government partners. Now, Trump’s funding freeze has worsened a disastrous situation, and undermined the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The agreement, for which the United States is a guarantor, required Israel to allow a surge of humanitarian aid into Gaza (mostly US-financed) during the first phase. The Associated Press reported in March 2025 that although the Trump administration in late January granted humanitarian waivers for some $340 million of USAID funding, money has not flowed to the organizations that are supposed to deliver it.

The hardest hit are tens of millions of desperate people in MENA conflict zones for whom US humanitarian aid has been a lifeline.

In Syria, emerging from 14 years of civil war, millions of civilians have depended upon US-funded emergency shelter, food, medical care; education; water and hygiene; and livelihood aid. US assistance has also financed housing, food, and medical care for millions of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. In Yemen, US-funded food aid, clean water, healthcare, shelter, and more has been a source of survival for millions since the civil war that began in 2014. In Lebanon, the Biden administration surged funding for food, shelter, health care, and other relief for civilians suffering from the Israel-Hezbollah war, the Syria crisis, and Lebanon’s own financial collapse.

Now, a lot of this aid looks to have been cancelled or is not flowing normally, despite Secretary Rubio’s promise to grant waivers to “life-saving humanitarian assistance.” The Trump wrecking ball likely will cause death, increase survivors’ suffering, intensify the economic strain on MENA governments, and sow the seeds of future instability. Even if the administration somehow decides to continue funding a small amount of MENA humanitarian aid, it will not be anywhere close to the level required: the region’s humanitarian crises were already severely underfunded. It is far from clear that private donors or other governments can, or will, do much to fill the gap. And that gap is large: the United States not only was the world’s largest humanitarian donor but USAID was considered the premier humanitarian agency.

Vulnerable Governments

Jordan is the MENA nation most affected by Trump’s assault on foreign aid. For decades, the kingdom has been highly dependent on US foreign assistance to fill fiscal gaps, to maintain stability, and to defend against terrorist threats and spillover from regional conflicts; in return, Jordan has often worked closely with Washington on US policy goals in MENA. According to CRS, US assistance represents more than 40 percent of the kingdom’s total yearly official aid. Since FY 18, the annual US aid package, second in MENA only to Israel’s, has exceeded $1.65 billion, providing military aid, direct budget support, economic development, health, and governance projects, with additional US funds helping to finance the kingdom’s hosting of Syrian and other refugees.

The sudden cancellation of dozens (perhaps hundreds) of US aid projects puts Jordan, already buffeted by significant economic and security challenges, in an extremely vulnerable spot. Among many other immediate effects, the cuts may cause the loss of some 35,000 jobs in the country. Trump’s abrupt shrinking of Jordan’s aid package is a break from decades of unusually strong bipartisan backing for the Hashemite Kingdom. The president’s threat to withhold aid if Jordan does not cooperate with his proposal to accept forcibly relocated Gazans only heightens the peril. King Abdullah II reportedly has urged other donors to step up, but there is no easy substitute for US aid and the regime support that it conveys.

Other Arab governments, while less dependent than Jordan on US largesse, are also experiencing disruption. The following examples are drawn from the leaked list of terminated USAID awards.

In Egypt, projects to strengthen public schools ($24 million), end violence against women and girls ($25 million), and improve water and wastewater systems for climate resiliency ($24 million) reportedly are among the many cut.⁴  In Iraq, the Trump administration cancelled programs to stabilize Yazidi and Christian Iraqi communities liberated from so-called Islamic State (IS) control ($28 million) and to support returnees from the al-Hol camp in Syria where Iraqis displaced from IS were held ($5 million).⁵ In Lebanon, funding for small business development and job creation ($38 million) and for medical crisis response ($13 million) are among the numerous terminations.⁶ In Morocco, cancelled projects include those for countering violent extremism among youth ($5 million) and earthquake recovery ($8 million).⁷ Cuts in Tunisia include economic support for the most vulnerable children ($60 million) and wheat purchases for food security ($12 million).⁸

And, oddly for an administration that champions “peace” and Israeli-Arab normalization, the Trump team reportedly cancelled projects for Israeli-Palestinian “people-to-people” exchanges, Israeli-Arab scientific collaboration, and other such cooperation. The administration also reportedly has terminated tens of millions of dollars’ worth of climate change-mitigation and other environmental projects, a blow to a region that is especially exposed to the harms of global warming. Funding for many public health programs may also be gone.

Jordan has been highly dependent on US foreign assistance to defend against terrorist threats and spillover from regional conflicts.

As for security assistance for Arab governments, its status is not immediately clear. Initially, Trump suspended all security aid (except, as noted, Egypt and Israel FMF). The sudden halt must have given Arab regimes considerable pause since these are the foreign aid programs that they (and frankly, the US government) tend to value most. US security aid has given regimes access to coveted American weapons, equipment, and training and bolstered the military, police, and intelligence institutions on which authoritarian rulers depend to stay in power. The aid, in turn, gives the United States access and influence, as well as customers for American weapons. Reuters reported that in late February the Trump administration unfroze $5.3 billion in mostly security-related aid worldwide; it is not currently known how much of this was for MENA. But even if most security aid for Arab countries has been spared for now, it does not mean that the funds are flowing normally, as DOGE has interfered with US government payment systems, or that the Trump administration will not slash these funds next.

Vulnerable Activists

Dramatically scaling back and reshaping US democracy aid is a top goal of the administration. Illustrating the Trump/DOGE hostility to democracy promotion as the United States traditionally has pursued it, Musk shockingly called NED “evil.” And a senior Trump official recently described  US democracy promotion as “Regime Change” and as against the “national interest”—rhetoric that echoes authoritarian rulers’ attacks on democracy and civil society support.

The Trump administration appears to have terminated nearly all USAID and Department of State democracy funding in MENA. DOGE also cut off funding for NED, which was not officially part of Trump’s freeze, causing turmoil for hundreds of its MENA grantees. After NED challenged the move in court, the administration restored some of its funding. But NED remains in the crosshairs of Musk and of Trump’s allies, who have made it, like USAID, a top political target.

To be sure, Washington began to sour on MENA democracy aid during the Obama administration. In the aftermath of the failed Arab Uprisings, when initial US hopes for Arab democracy morphed into cynicism, the United States reduced regional democracy funding and shifted much of the remaining aid into more cautious activities to avoid antagonizing Arab regimes. Since then, however, USAID, State, and NED had continued to quietly provide support to the region’s small but courageous community of human rights defenders, independent civil society groups, journalists, anti-corruption crusaders, and democracy activists, including Iranian activists. This funding was relatively modest in scope but vital for its recipients, who face constant threats from hostile regimes. In recent years, it has been especially valuable as the European Union and other donors have scaled back their democracy funding.

Trump’s cutoff has left US-funded MENA democracy advocates financially reeling and even more vulnerable to harsh crackdowns. The demise of democracy aid marks the end of an era in which the United States, while overwhelmingly supporting (and funding) authoritarian rule and militarism in MENA, retained a very small policy margin to occasionally advocate for democracy and human rights. Under Trump, the US government appears to be fully turning its back on the region’s democracy and rights activists.

What Is Next?

In Washington

In the United States, Trump’s foreign aid assault is the subject of multiple lawsuits, with some early rulings reining in the administration and DOGE. But the most likely trajectory is that USAID will be closed, big cuts will come for the Department of State, NED will be under attack, and US foreign aid as the MENA region knew it for decades will be over. In the new hostile Washington climate, Musk, Trump, and US officials keep repeating, without evidence, that foreign aid is full of “waste, fraud, and abuse” and propagating other disinformation or falsehoods. And one key official reportedly hinted at the criminal prosecution of aid workers and questioned the very constitutionality of foreign aid.

A clearer picture of Trump’s plans will emerge in the coming weeks, as his administration prepares its FY 26 federal budget request to Congress. According to media reports, some Trump officials want to shift much foreign aid funding to the Development Finance Corporation. Other proposals would have the Department of State manage a greatly shrunken aid portfolio, with minimal or no democracy, development, or economic growth programs, and with a totally new set of implementing organizations. One top official reportedly suggested that the private sector and philanthropy should take over all development and humanitarian work.

Trump’s first term also offers clues of what he might do this time. Back then, he wanted to convert some FMF grants to loans and threatened to cut aid from governments that voted against the United States at the United Nations. Then, Congress, including key Republicans, firmly rejected Trump’s plans and kept foreign assistance flowing. Now, most Republican lawmakers have said little to nothing publicly about Trump’s decimation of foreign aid, or have cheered it on. Democrats, overwhelmed and divided, so far appear impotent.

In MENA

So far, likely to avoid provoking Trump’s wrath or to appear dependent on the United States, no Arab leader has publicly criticized the aid disruption. The situation, however, should prompt a regional reckoning on multiple levels.

For conflict areas, the crisis is a five-alarm fire. Trump’s actions have laid bare the endemic fragility of the humanitarian aid system and its overreliance on the United States. Looking forward, the MENA region needs to build its own humanitarian response system based on local funding and local expertise. Even more important, the region must develop its own conflict resolution and prevention systems to stop the wars and conflicts that keep causing such devastating humanitarian crises in the first place.

For Jordan, the reckoning is about how to survive without unlimited US support. This will be a huge challenge for the kingdom, where continuous US billions have enabled the regime to put off difficult reforms and to suppress public unrest. A past fiscal solution, large financial infusions from wealthy Gulf countries, is only a band-aid, and will have its own strings attached. Meanwhile, if Trump follows through with his threat to cut off Jordan if it does not accept displaced Gazans, King Abdullah will face a terrible dilemma: incur more punishment from the United States or accede and risk domestic upheaval.

For Arab governments less dependent on US foreign aid, the crisis is still worrying.

As for the Arab governments less dependent on US foreign aid, the crisis caused by Trump’s cuts may be more slow-building but is still worrying in a region marked by widespread socio-economic and political fragility. These governments must look for substitutes for the American funding and expertise that has helped them fill certain financial and socioeconomic gaps, provided elite patronage, and smoothed over various other rough edges–in short, helped them to keep the lid on. Ideally, these governments would forge new development strategies based on local priorities, funding, and sustainability. To replace American aid projects most important to governments, particularly in the security realm, aid-recipient MENA governments likely will turn to Europe, Russia, or China, or to Gulf sources. As a result, US influence will continue to erode. And MENA governments must prepare for Trump to wield what US foreign assistance remains as a blunt pressure tool against them. Moreover, Trump’s cuts will deepen the divide between the wealthy Gulf nations, and the aid-indebted countries in what is already among the world’s most unequal regions.

On the whole, Trump’s aid decimation should fully expose the fiction that the United States is MENA’s indispensable partner. The Arab world’s confidence in the United States has been declining for years. But, on top of Trump’s cruel and probably illegal plan for ethnically cleansing Gaza, the fact that practically overnight, the world’s superpower–without warning, regional consultation, or any apparent concern for human impact– froze and then slashed billions of dollars’ worth of aid will make MENA governments and citizens lose even more trust in the United States. President Trump may believe that American soft power and reliability are irrelevant because he can get his way simply through hard power and disruption. It is unlikely he is right. Meanwhile, MENA governments should prepare for how they will respond to an unpredictable United States with diminishing influence and resources to offer, and how they will cultivate other options. The people in MENA who relied upon US assistance will have to become even more resilient.

In short, the region needs to find its own solutions as the post-American era accelerates. For those in MENA who have long criticized US foreign assistance and close ties with the United States, now is the time to get to work on constructive alternatives.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.