Over the past several decades, US National Security Strategies (NSS) have reflected a combination of goals and approaches that remained general enough to reflect continuity and to project strength, while leaving enough flexibility in the conduct of actual foreign policy. These general statements, albeit under varying titles, stressed great power competition such as the US rivalry with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, antipathy toward Iran during the Ronald Reagan years, and the Global War on Terror during the George W. Bush era. Under the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations, successive strategies reflected a sense of confidence in new beginnings and harkened back to the argument of President Jimmy Carter that human rights and democracy abroad are in the US national interest—and therefore part of the country’s global mission.
All administrations since Carter’s have stressed the importance of helping to bring peace to the Middle East, with a focus on fostering Palestinian–Israeli dialogue. The Camp David Accords coaxed Egypt and Israel into a peace agreement, with President Carter declaring the need for a Palestinian “homeland.” The Madrid and Oslo peace processes under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, respectively, broadened US peace-making efforts to include solving the Palestinian problem. President Clinton famously brought together Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat for a handshake on the White House lawn, touted in the 1994 NSS as inaugurating a durable peace in the region. Under the Biden administration, while full support was given daily to Israel’s war on Gaza, the need for a peace agreement via the two-state solution was stated as a strategic goal.
President Donald Trump’s 2025 NSS differs in style and content from all previous such documents. To begin with, the strategy reads more like a personal campaign speech than an objective listing of goals and the methods to achieve them. The style is extremely narcissistic, boldly stating in the opening that President Trump has “brought our nation—and the world—back from the brink of catastrophe and disaster.” The document is replete with phrases like “my administration” and “starting on my first day in office,” and conveys an inflated sense of accomplishments during Trump’s first nine months in the Oval Office. From claims that the president has “obliterated Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity” and “settled eight raging conflicts,” the very first page blows the trumpet of a bold new era—but lacks the evidence to prove these claims or to detail the challenges that remain to be faced.
Another glaring characteristic is the scathing critique of all previous administrations, starting with that of President Biden, whom Trump clearly considers to be his nemesis. The advent of the Trump administration is contrasted with “four years of weakness, extremism and deadly failures” and US strategies since the end of the Cold War are described as “fall[ing] short.”
A relatively short section on the Middle East declares that “the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over.” The stated rationale for this proposed pivot away from the Middle East is the reduced dependency of the United States on oil imports and the weakening of Iran and its regional allies by American and Israeli military strikes. Syria’s new leadership receives a pat on the back for being on its way to stabilizing the country, with the notable assistance of Israel, Turkey, Arab countries, and the United States.
Preventing an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East nonetheless remains a strategic goal for the United States, as does maintaining open navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab waterway at the entrance to the Red Sea—both long-term goals of previous US administrations that imply an enduring commitment of US power and presence. Additionally, the stated goal of expanding the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim countries implies a heavy and potentially risky American involvement, contrary to the assertion that perhaps attention on the region can now be diminished.
A notable difference with previous National Security Strategies is the absence of any interest in promoting democracy and human rights in the region and the outright debunking of that focus as expensive and offensive, particularly to Gulf monarchies. According to this year’s NSS, US concerns should focus instead on trade and investment in technology, including nuclear power, artificial intelligence, and defense. A promise of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other nations will be well received by the Gulf states. A glaring contradiction, however, is the ongoing attempt to direct the course of Palestinian affairs via the imposition of a new international mandate on Gaza and pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah and to normalize its relations with Israel (moves that inevitably would alter the balance of power inside the country and risk civil war).
In conclusion, the Trump NSS reflects some continuity with the past and some differences in emphasis—notably the notion that peace in the Middle East is now focused on the Abrahm Accords and not on Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. There is no mention of the two–state solution, and the word ‘Palestinian’ appears only once, in reference to an “Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” The document also contains some glaring contradictions. First, the stated goals in the Middle East require expanded, not reduced, US commitments. Second, the NSS prescribes a policy of non-intervention—but only in some parts of the region, such as the Gulf countries, but not others, such as Palestine.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: USN
