President Donald Trump plans to make Saudi Arabia the first country he will visit during his second term in office—after his visit to the Vatican to take part in the funeral of Pope Francis—just as he did in 2017. The upcoming visit, reportedly to take place in mid-May, reflects his very favorable view of the kingdom and his belief that he can persuade the Saudi leadership to boost investments in the US economy. Saudi leaders, for their part, are eager for their warm relationship with Trump to rekindle as they know he will not press them on human rights and other irritants that characterized former President Joe Biden’s initial policy toward their country.
Nonetheless, even under Trump, the United States and Saudi Arabia face several regional issues on which they may not see eye-to-eye, such as Syria, Iran, and Israel/Palestine. Concerning the last, although Trump likely will press Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the de-facto ruler of the kingdom, to join the so-called Abraham Accords (in which certain Arab states established formal diplomatic relations with Israel in late 2020), the US president seems to be lowering expectations on that issue. Trump seems aware that MBS has spoken about tying normalization with Israel to meaningful movement toward Palestinian statehood, something that Israel’s current government will not countenance under any circumstances.
Seeing the Saudis as Great Friends and Business Partners
Trump has characterized his May 2017 trip to the Saudi kingdom as a great success, not only because his speech in Riyadh before Saudi and other Arab heads of state was well received, but also because it led to closer US-Saudi ties, including subsequent visits to Washington by MBS and other high-ranking Saudi officials. During MBS’s visit to the White House in March 2018, Trump, in front of the cameras, displayed a large chart purportedly showing substantial new Saudi investments in US defense industries, to tell the American public that close ties to Riyadh were paying off— even though some of these investments were already in the pipeline during the Obama administration, before Trump took office.
For its part, the Saudi leadership appreciated Trump’s trying to protect Riyadh’s image over its poor human rights record, especially state agents’ gruesome October 2018 murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Trump went out of his way to obfuscate the conclusions of the US intelligence community, which said that it was highly likely that MBS was responsible for ordering the murder. Trump even said crudely to a prominent journalist, “I saved his ass,” referring to MBS. Just like during his first term, Trump is unlikely to bring up human rights during his upcoming visit to the kingdom, a stance that will undoubtedly please his Saudi hosts.
MBS was one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate Trump on his 2024 election.
As a likely reward for this protection and uncritical friendship, the Saudis have reciprocated by making investments in the United States as well as by helping Trump family businesses. In 2022, MBS overruled his investment advisors by placing $2 billion of the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund in the new investment firm of Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, despite the fact that Kushner had no experience in managing such a large investment. And in December 2024, the Trump organization announced it would build a new hotel resort in Jeddah in partnership with a Saudi firm, Dar Global. The project will cost about $530 million. In addition, the Trump organization reportedly will be involved in two projects in Riyadh that will feature the Trump name on buildings. Trump’s son Eric claimed that there was no conflict of interest because these projects do not deal with a foreign government, though it is not a stretch of the imagination to believe that MBS probably had a hand in giving at least tacit approval to them.
Mixing and encouraging business with government is a staple of the Trump organization. In 2024, a US House of Representatives report found that during Trump’s first term, in just two years, 20 foreign governments spent $7.8 million at Trump properties, with China and Saudi Arabia leading the list. Some prominent lawyers charged that Trump’s properties’ receiving such funds violated the “emolument” clause in the US Constitution, which states that “no person holding any office” shall, without the consent of Congress, “accept any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or head of state.” Trump was able to skirt this alleged violation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that one of Trump’s first major speeches after returning to the White House was at a Saudi investment summit in Miami, Florida on February 19 that included Yasir al-Rumayyan, head of the Saudi sovereign wealth fund. Trump told the assembled business leaders that “Saudi Arabia is a special place with special leaders.” Last November, MBS was one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate Trump on his election. During their phone call in January 2025 MBS reportedly pledged to invest $600 billion in the United States over four years. The next day, in a virtual address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Trump said that he would ask the Saudis to “round out” their pledge to $1 trillion, underscoring that “we’ve been very good to them.” Such a statement is indicative of Trump’s transactional foreign policy that the Saudis seem to understand well.
But Some Disappointments on the Economic Front
Saudi Arabia, however, may not accede to Trump’s request for the whopping $1 trillion. Indeed, in 2024, albeit when Trump was not in office, the kingdom lowered its US stock investments by $15 billion because of its need for cash. In April 2025, Saudi Arabia’s stock market suffered a heavy loss after Trump announced his tariffs, and speculation about a coming recession in the United States worked to lower world oil prices, adversely affecting Saudi revenue. Hence, it is likely that MBS and other Saudi officials will try to discourage Trump from implementing the tariffs after the 90-day pause that the US president announced on April 9, 2025. Despite disagreements about aspects of Trump’s economic policies, MBS is likely to honor the pledge of investing $600 billion in the United States to stay in Trump’s good graces. In remarks to reporters in early April, Trump emphasized that he is going back to Saudi Arabia “to create tremendous amounts of jobs” in the United States, alluding to Saudi investment promises.
Trump wants lower oil prices to dampen inflation, but Saudi Arabia wants relatively high oil prices to reduce its budget deficits
Oil prices are likely to remain a sticking point, however. Trump wants lower oil prices to dampen inflation, especially as tariffs are expected to increase prices for many consumer goods in the United States. By contrast, Saudi Arabia wants relatively high oil prices to generate more revenue to reduce its budget deficits and to help pay for some of its hugely ambitious mega-projects, especially NEOM, a futuristic city that the Saudi government is building in the country’s northwest region.
Eliciting Saudi Diplomacy but Confusion Over Iran
Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia will also be an opportunity for him to thank Saudi leaders in person for hosting US-Russia talks in the kingdom on the Ukraine war. This mediation role has boosted Riyadh’s prestige on the world stage and has made the United States even more indebted to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia has also apparently played an indirect role in helping to dampen tensions between the United States and Iran. Unlike a decade ago, Riyadh is not upset by the recent US-Iran nuclear talks that have reportedly made some progress, and even seems to have encouraged them. On April 17, Saudi Minister of Defense (and MBS’s brother) Khalid bin Salman traveled to Tehran where he held meetings with his Iranian counterpart, the Iranian president, and with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. That this visit took place around the time of the start of the US-Iran talks suggests that the Saudis wanted the Iranians to know they supported these talks.
Still, a successful outcome is not guaranteed. Trump has mixed his stated desire for negotiations with Iran with bellicose language threatening the country. Moreover, his advisors are split not only between those who want to concentrate on Iran’s nuclear file and those who want to broaden the talks to include other thorny issues such as Iran’s missile development, oil sales to China, and Iran’s aggressive and sometimes destabilizing policies in the region, but also between those who favor Israeli strikes on Iran and those who do not. Should Trump reverse course and move toward conflict, perhaps egged on by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or if Israel were to strike Iran as it recently wanted to do, the Saudis fear that Iran would likely retaliate against them suspecting that the kingdom had given the green light for military aircraft to cross their airspace on the way to bomb Iran. Saudi Arabia, therefore, will want Trump to keep pressuring Netanyahu to desist from attacking Iran.
Differences Over Syria
Another potential area of disagreement is over the new Syrian government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Trump administration is keeping the new regime at arms-length and has reportedly given it a list of demands it must meet before the United States eases economic sanctions. Some members of Trump’s foreign policy team distrust al-Sharaa for his past as leader of al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate, as well as his more recent leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a Jihadist organization. In a March 2025 meeting in Brussels, a Trump administration official reportedly handed the Syrian foreign minister a list of demands that included destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stocks, cooperation on counterterrorism, the exclusion of any foreign fighters from senior Syrian government roles, and the creation of a liaison group to help find missing American journalist Austin Tice. In April the US administration added a requirement that Syria ban all Palestinian militant groups from operating in the country.
The Saudis seem to want to give al-Sharaa the benefit of the doubt.
By contrast, the Saudis seem to want to give al-Sharaa the benefit of the doubt about his pledges to create a moderate and inclusive government, and received him in February 2025. In mid-April, it was reported that the Saudis agreed to pay Syria’s debts to the World Bank which amount to around $15 million. Normally, this would pave the way for Syria to get loans from commercial banks, but with US sanctions remaining in place, such banks and businesses are reluctant to make any deals, fearing US economic penalties. It is likely that MBS will press Trump to ease or remove US sanctions on Syria, especially given the dire economic conditions in the country, but it is not clear if Trump will oblige him. Some of Trump’s advisors, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have taken a hard line against Syria’s new regime and have highlighted the violence perpetrated against some of Syria’s minority groups by regime forces and pro-regime militants.
A Saudi-Israeli Bridge Too Far
Trump has not been shy about wanting Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, which the Biden administration also sought but failed to achieve. The Saudis, in exchange for establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel, have indicated that they wanted a US security guarantee for the kingdom, assistance in developing a civilian nuclear program, and acquisition of US military weapons with fewer or no strings attached. But the Israel-Hamas war has complicated this potential deal, with the Saudi government joining other Arab states in condemning Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians as well as Trump’s proposal to move Palestinians out of Gaza and turn the Strip into a luxury redevelopment. MBS has even accused the Israeli government of committing genocide in Gaza and has not deviated from the Arab League’s sharp criticisms of Israeli policies.
Although Trump, soon after he was sworn in on January 20, said he thought that Saudi Arabia would join the Accords “soon,” his subsequent comments about removing Palestinians from Gaza and US support for the ongoing Israeli attacks on the enclave have reinforced the kingdom’s position that it will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel until there is a credible pathway forward by Israel leading to a Palestinian state. Realizing that the right-wing Netanyahu government is unlikely to take such a path, Trump has since tried to backpedal from his earlier assertions. During his address to Congress in early March 2025, for example, Trump said that he expects the Abraham Accords to be expanded, though he did not mention Saudi Arabia, perhaps not wanting to raise expectations too high.
Nonetheless, Trump is still expected to make a pitch to MBS about the economic value of Saudi Arabia establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. As a sweetener, Trump even sent Secretary of Energy Chris Wright to the kingdom in mid-April, where he said that a Memorandum of Understanding would soon be signed between the United States and Saudi Arabia to advance cooperation across key areas of energy, including “civilian nuclear energy,” a key interest of the Saudis. But such an offer, and Trump’s warm embrace of the Saudi leadership, will not be enough. Trump will soon find out that the Palestinian issue remains a very sensitive one in the kingdom, and that MBS will not jeopardize his position there and in the broader Arab world by joining the accords at a time when Israel continues to kill Palestinian civilians in Gaza, even if a very friendly and protective US president urges him to do so.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Flickr/The White House
