A recent report by a pro-Israel think tank in Washington cautions against making any deal with Iran that does not provide for the total dismantlement of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program. The authors’ apparent concern that Trump might favor some kind of actual compromise with the Islamic Republic is not entirely far-fetched. This is because Donald Trump’s approach to the world is not animated by any overarching national security strategy, but rather flows from a constant need to project his power and ego. The trick for foreign leaders is to know how to stroke that ego. Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin, for one, understands that he may be able to manipulate Trump by playing to his narcissism. Putin’s recent commissioning of a portrait of Trump—which the White House Special Envoy Steve Witkoff claims that Putin asked him to personally deliver to the US president—paints a vivid example of such strategic flattering.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would never stoop to such antics. Still, the Ayatollah sees Trump’s desire to show the world that he has the smarts to negotiate could create an opening for Iran to extract American concessions on a new nuclear deal. By contrast, Washington hardliners seem to want Trump either to demand Iran’s capitulation or to prepare for a major Israeli or Israeli-American military assault on the Islamic Republic. Since the dangers of such an attack would be far greater than the risks the United States is now taking in bombing Houthi targets in Yemen, it is not obvious that the president will follow such advice.
Indeed, Trump’s volatility can unexpectedly open doors—or blow them up just as quickly. For example, Trump warned Hamas on March 7 that it will have “hell to pay” if it failed to release the remaining hostages, a statement that effectively gave Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu a green light to resume military operations in Gaza. But if Israel’s attacks on Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria expand in ways that invite a wider regional conflict, Trump might change his tone. Witkoff hinted as much during his recent interview with Tucker Carlson in which he argued that Trump favors diplomacy over war. Witkoff claimed that Trump wants to build “trust” with Iran, a position that will not sit well with Washington hawks, much less with Netanyahu.
Trump’s Election Sparks Hope and Confusion in Tehran
On the Iran-US front, the roots of what is now an increasingly dangerous situation go back to November 2024, when, following Trump’s election—and against the background of repeated warnings from the International Atomic Energy Agency about Tehran’s expanding enrichment program—his close ally Elon Musk reportedly met with Iran’s United Nations Ambassador Saeid Iravani. Commenting on the surprise encounter, a conservative Iranian website declared, “It appears that Trump has genuinely decided to adopt a different approach toward Iran, perhaps, as [Foreign Minister] Abbas Araghchi put it, moving from ‘maximum pressure’ to ‘maximum rationality.” This reference to Araghchi’s earlier statement that “maximum rationality” would “probably get a different result” seemed calculated to test Trump. Moreover, it opened space for reformists to argue for diplomacy. Thus on January 1, the reformist-oriented Jamaran News featured an interview with the reformist journalist Mohammad Ghoochani, who argued that “it is essential to hold direct talks with America,” adding that the foreign minister himself would lead any such initiative, thus associating the regime with this not uncontroversial proposal.
Iran is now in a far weaker economic and geostrategic position than at any time in decades.
Boding well for such talks, at least from Tehran’s perspective, was Trump’s decision, before returning to office, to block two of his first-term advisors who are prominent Iran hawks—former secretary of state Mike Pompeo and former US special representative for Iran Brian Hook—from any role in his new administration. Trump also ordered the removal of Secret Service security details for both men, who were reportedly under threat from the Iranian regime because of their implementation of Trump’s hardline Iran policies during his first administration.
Citing Trump’s own “Truth Social” attack, the Tehran Times even featured the president’s statement that “Brian Hook from the Wilson Center for Scholars…YOU’RE FIRED!” Reflecting a sense of cautious optimism about Trump’s second-term policy, the Islamic Republic News Agency speculated that the president’s actions “could be sending signals to Iran that he may be willing to engage with Tehran diplomatically,” while adding that it is “unclear whether the moves signal a shift in tactics, strategy, or attitude.”
Trump’s “Dear Ali” Letter to the Supreme Leader
To be sure, it is unclear exactly what—a personal grievance or Iran policy differences—led Trump to turn against Pompeo and Hook so bitterly. The fact that Trump’s new secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and his new national security advisor Mike Waltz, are well known Iran hardliners certainly complicates the picture. Now, Trump’s new national security team must manage Trump’s volatility while trying to achieve some minimal level of coherence in US Iran policy. But as the drama surrounding the personal letter that Trump reportedly wrote to Khamenei in early March 2025, it will not be easy to strike this balance. The precise contents of this missive, which was delivered by an emissary from the United Arab Emirates, are not publicly known. But Trump alluded to it during his March 7 Oval Office remarks, saying that “I would rather negotiate a peace deal…but we can make a deal that would be just as good as if you won militarily.” But he added, “Something is going to happen one way or another.” Two days later, in an interview with Fox Business News, Trump acknowledged, “I’ve written them a letter saying I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.”
Trump’s remarks may have repeated or echoed the language in his purported letter to Khamenei. The president’s assertion that the United States seeks a deal that would be “just as good as if” the United States “won militarily” seemed to telegraph a position that through either negotiations or military force, Trump will compel Iran to dismantle the entire infrastructure of its now-vast enrichment facilities.
The possibility that such a take-it-or-leave-it position constituted the core message in Trump’s letter surely reassured Israeli and American opponents of a genuine compromise deal with Iran. They know very well that no Iranian leader, including Khamenei, can agree to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program and survive politically or perhaps even physically. From Tehran’s vantage point, whatever the incentives offered by the United States, a “zero enrichment” position provides zero basis for a deal.
Iran, of course, is now in a far weaker economic and geostrategic position than at any time in decades. Its economy is in free fall, and its “Axis of Resistance” strategy has been dealt a near fatal blow as a result of Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. With the White House’s tightening the noose through its air assault on Iran’s allies in Yemen—a campaign that Trump has stated will “annihilate” the “Houthi barbarians”—Khamenei’s room for maneuver has narrowed. And yet he and Foreign Minister Araghchi have made it clear that they will not accept US ultimatums. As Khamenei recently put it, “Some bully governments insist on negotiations” but “their negotiations are not aimed at solving issues, but to…impose their own expectations.” If he is correct, the United States and Iran may be on a path to a military confrontation.
A Trump-Netanyahu Partnership Without Limits?
Netanyahu would probably welcome such a war. And yet it is worth noting that only some six weeks ago the Israeli press was full of reports speculating that, in the words of one Haaretz writer, Netanyahu might “go head to head with Trump on striking Iran.” But Trump’s February 4 remark that two million Palestinians would have to leave Gaza presented the Israeli prime minister with an unexpected gift. While leaders around the world tried to make sense of Trump’s shocking statement, Netanyahu praised his “revolutionary, creative approach” arguing that it opened up “many possibilities.” One such possibility is Israel’s renewed assault on Gaza, which Trump seemed to endorse when he declared that Hamas would have “hell to pay” if it did not immediately release all hostages. It is also extremely likely that Netanyahu construed Trump’s Iran remarks as signaling support for an eventual military assault on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities.
But such an attack would not be easy. There is domestic upheaval in Israel about the renewed assault in Gaza and its impact on freeing the Israeli hostages. The unprecedented chasm that has opened in Israeli society over the last two weeks was underscored by the statement issued by President Isaac Herzog. Wading into the political fray in a way that no Israeli president has ever dared, Herzog denounced what he called a “series of unilateral actions,” thus effectively denouncing the government. He then said that “thousands of citizens whom I meet every week…are…crying out to prevent the widening of rifts and divisions. They wish for unity…and for conducting a full… and independent investigation into the horrific disaster. It is unthinkable to ignore these voices and not search for agreement.”
Israeli leaders have much to gain from echoing Trump’s deep-state discourse
Made against the background of the controversy over Netanyahu’s March 20 decision to fire the head of Israel’s security service Ronen Bar—and compounded by the likelihood that he will also dismiss the attorney general, who declared that his firing of Bar would be illegal—Herzog’s statement points to a crisis that could send Israel careening into a kind of civil war. Undeterred, Netanyahu intimated that Herzog is part of a “left-wing deep state.” This language was certainly intentional: Israeli leaders—and especially the prime minister—have much to gain from echoing Trump’s deep-state discourse and thus suggesting that he and Netanyahu are on the same page.
Netanyahu Cannot Trust His Mercurial Twin
But Netanyahu must tread carefully. For the divisions tearing Israel apart will grow as Netanyahu expands the war on Gaza and continues military attacks on Lebanon and Syria. If these actions lead to the killing of the Israeli hostages or open the door to a military confrontation on three fronts, the specter of regional mayhem rather than peace-making will be bad for Trump who cannot tolerate looking like a “loser.”
Indeed, Trump’s envoy Witkoff used his hour-long interview with Carlson to help his boss out. Netanyahu’s resumption of war in Gaza, he argued, runs counter to Israeli public opinion that favors the return of the hostages over the renewal of fighting. Moreover, he stated that Hamas is “not as ideologically extreme as they’re often portrayed,” that if the group demilitarizes, it could have a political role in a post-war settlement, and—most strikingly—that real compromise-based negotiations with Hamas and Iran are vital to the “peace” that Witkoff said the president seeks. Indeed, Witkoff seemed to walk back Trump’s own words when he asserted that the letter to Khamenei was not a threat, that Trump wants a deal that incudes “verification,” and that the military option is not “a very good alternative.”
What Is Trump Saying and When Is He Saying It?
Witkoff’s interview provoked a storm in the Israeli press, and rightly so: he is a Trump loyalist whose apparent rational pragmatism contrasts with the volatility of his boss. His role as a trusted envoy is to serve as a kind of shock absorber who channels Trump’s utterings into something resembling actual policy. After all, if Trump launches another verbal blast that has leaders in Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Washington scurrying to make sense of his latest outburst, Witkoff may step in again with damage control. If Witkoff can temper Trump’s musings without antagonizing his mercurial boss, he could help him stand back from the brink. But such efforts ultimately hinge on whether Trump can muster the ability to articulate and sustain support for a working compromise with Iran. Perhaps pushing back against such a possibility, on March 23 National Security Advisor Mike Waltz declared that nothing less than “full dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program would be acceptable, thus seemingly putting him at odds with Witkoff.
The battle to spin or manipulate Trump’s verbal turns continues not only in Washington, but also in Tehran. There, sources close to the Iranian government have noted that the president’s letter “is not exactly clear, (but) is not an ultimatum.” If, as has also been reported, the letter gives Khamenei two months to respond, we might have a better sense in June about whether a nuclear deal is possible. But depending on his mood or inclination on any given day, Trump could lash out at anyone who he deems responsible for failing to make him look good, smart, and powerful. Both Waltz and Witkoff should proceed with caution.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/danielo
