Taking advantage of the world’s attention to the Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hezbollah conflicts, the so-called Islamic State (IS) is trying to reconstitute itself in Syria and Iraq. US military commanders warn that the number of its attacks is set to double this year from 2023, a sign of the terrorist group’s increased capabilities. Ethnic conflicts between Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, the main group fighting the IS in Syria) and Arab tribesmen, poor economic conditions, and Syrian and Turkish government support for anti-SDF elements have contributed to this recent resurgence. The thousands of un-repatriated foreign IS fighters and their families in SDF prisons, as well as recent IS attacks in Oman and Iran, should shake the international community’s complacency about the terrorist group.
Losing Territory but Not Its Brand
At the height of its power in 2014, the IS occupied one third of Syria and Iraq. It made the Syrian city of Raqqa the capital of its so-called caliphate, and took control of Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq. During the course of its military campaign it captured substantial stockpiles of US military hardware that the Iraqi army had abandoned, and stole upwards of $1 billion from Iraqi banks, funds that helped to finance the group, along with smuggling operations, extortion rackets, and the collection of taxes. Many Sunni Muslims in Syria and Iraq, having been targeted by the central governments of both countries, initially welcomed IS. But they soon chafed under its draconian version of Islam, which included atrocities against many mainstream Sunni Muslims who refused to adhere to its rules and severe persecution of minorities.
A large international coalition led by the United States and including many regional states and local partners, eventually shrunk IS’s territory and led to the fall of Raqqa and Mosul in 2017. The last territory under IS’s control, the Syrian town of Baghouz, fell in 2019. To be sure, the territorial defeat of IS was a major victory for the coalition, but the group never went away. Although thousands of its fighters were killed in the campaign to eradicate it, several thousand fighters escaped the dragnet and either blended in with some local communities or took refuge in the desert. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) believes that there are about 2,500 IS fighters still at large in Syria and Iraq today, although the actual number may be higher. IS has also maintained a sophisticated online presence that has kept its brand alive and may account for the recruitment of “lone wolves” who, inspired by videos and messages, have carried out terrorist attacks in the region and around the world.
Scope of the Attacks
According to CENTCOM figures, IS conducted 153 attacks in Syria and Iraq in the first five months of this year. Charles Lister, a well-informed scholar of the organization, believes the number of attacks is actually much higher because the group no longer claims all of the attacks it undertakes. CENTCOM has long worked closely with the Kurdish-led SDF, Iraqi government forces, and Iraqi Kurdish militia forces to fight IS. The majority of such anti-IS operations this year have been carried out in Iraq (137 missions), which resulted in the deaths of 30 militants and the detention of 74 other fighters. In Syria, CENTCOM, in partnership with the SDF, conducted 59 missions, resulting in the deaths of 14 IS militants and the detention of 92 others. In addition, CENTCOM says it will continue to “remove key [IS] leaders from the battlefield” and target those who seek to “conduct external operations outside of Iraq and Syria” as well as those seeking to break fellow members out of prisons.
American military officers on the ground see not only an increase in activities by IS but also its capabilities.
American military officers on the ground see not only an increase in activities by IS but also its capabilities. One officer said to the Wall Street Journal, “What we’re seeing is the movement of men, weapons and equipment.” They are also witnessing attempts to free jailed IS fighters, which happened twice this year, and several attempts in recent years, including a major attempt at a prison break in Hasakah in northeastern Syria in early 2022 that resulted in scores of deaths. According to CENTCOM, as of June 2024, there are more than 9,000 IS fighters held in SDF prisons. In addition, prison camps housing the women and children of IS fighters have become recruiting grounds for the organization. At the large al-Hol prison camp in Syria, US soldiers found children’s coloring books with IS flags as a backdrop and drawings of AK-47 guns and explosive vests. IS militants are attempting to brainwash these youngsters and, once they achieve fighting age, to smuggle them out of the prison camps and train them militarily.
Human rights groups have strongly criticized the poor conditions in these camps and the use of torture against some detainees. A major problem is that the prisoners are made up of numerous nationalities, and most of their home countries do not want them back out of fear of retaliation by the IS if they are jailed there. The United States has been calling for the detainees’ repatriation, but results so far have been mixed at best.
The Islamic State is also building up its logistics, supply chain, and production facilities. Since the beginning of 2024 it has produced and deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs), staged complex assaults and raids, and put up checkpoints on highways. In addition, it has deployed fighters who operate in the open for prolonged periods, suggesting a willingness to lose personnel in battle because recruitment is not a problem. The group has also extorted money from local businesses. Most of this activity has been in Syria because vast areas of its desert, where many IS cells are located, are not governed. Meanwhile, the Assad regime remains opposed to the Kurdish-led political entity in Syria called the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which is protected by the SDF.
Why Now?
The Islamic State has been adept at taking advantage of opportunities such as the Syrian civil war and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s assault on Iraqi Sunnis in 2013-2014. Since October 7, IS undoubtedly saw a chance to step up its attacks. Moreover, with scores of pro-Iran militia attacks against US troops in Syria and Iraq since October 2023 (the latest of which was on August 9, after a hiatus), the US focus on troop protection and retaliation has reduced its freedom of maneuver against the Islamic State.
IS has also taken advantage of increased ethnic strife between Arab tribes and Kurds of the SDF, some of which the Syrian regime has stoked and abetted. Such fighting broke out in 2023 because of Arab tribes’ anger over what they see as the SDF’s diversion of oil and gas revenues in their regions and its arrest of a tribal leader. In early August, pro-Syrian government militias made up of Arab tribesmen in the Deir al-Zor region attacked SDF positions on the eastern side of the Euphrates River. Reports indicate that there were exchanges of heavy artillery and mortar shells. The fighting was so intense that the SDF had to send in reinforcements from the northern part of the Deir al-Zor province, from the southern part of Hasakah province, and from the city of Raqqa to beat back the incursion. That Iran’s Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanon’s Hezbollah reportedly have aided these tribesmen, who are Sunnis, shows just how complicated and confusing the security picture is in eastern Syria. No doubt, IS sees these Arab-Kurdish clashes as being in its interest, as they take attention and resources away from the SDF’s campaign against it.
The SDF has also been weakened by numerous Turkish air strikes on its positions over the past year. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sees the SDF and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (YPD), as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a designated terrorist group that Turkey has fought for decades. Turkey wants the AANES to be defeated and abolished.
Negotiations Between Washington and Baghdad on Hold
Making matters even more complicated are negotiations between the American and Iraqi governments over the future of the 2,500 US troops in Iraq. These troops were brought into Iraq in 2014 to aid the anti-IS fight. Their combat mission, which ended in 2021, has changed to an advise-and-assist role, but they have become a political lightening rod as pro-Iran Shia militias and their political allies have pressured Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia` al-Sudani to end their role altogether. Washington was amenable to entering negotiations, which resumed in January, because it has been sensitive to Sudani’s predicament as he tries to maneuver between Washington and Tehran. Interestingly, while many Shia, especially those tied to the pro-Iran militias, want the US military to exit, most of Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds want the United States to stay as a balancer to Iran.
Although an Iraqi government delegation came to Washington in July to continue negotiations, an announcement of an end date for US troops was postponed in mid-August due to what was termed “recent developments,” probably meaning the threat of a wider war in the aftermath of Israel’s assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Reportedly, the talks in Washington almost reached a deal to withdraw most US troops by next September, leaving some in Iraq in an advisory capacity.
With IS seeking to reconstitute itself, a US military withdrawal from Iraq could jeopardize anti-IS operations.
US defense officials have been respectful of Iraqi sensibilities but are probably not upset by the suspension of the talks, in light of the resumption of pro-Iran militia attacks on US forces (an announced withdrawal might give the impression of the United States cutting and running) as well as IS’s efforts to rebound. Moreover, much of the logistical support for the 900 US troops in Syria comes from US military personnel in Iraq. With IS seeking to reconstitute itself, a US military withdrawal from Iraq could jeopardize American support for the SDF in its anti-IS operations.
IS Active Again Outside of Syria and Iraq
The Islamic State also has been successful in having branches outside of Syria and Iraq. The group “IS-Khorasan” has been active in staging attacks in Afghanistan and Iran and claimed responsibility for a major terrorist attack at a concert hall in Russia in March. Iran, as a Shia state, has especially been a target because IS considers the Shia apostates, and the Iraqi Shia militias with strong support from Iran’s IRGC, played an important role in protecting Baghdad in 2014 and in defeating IS territorially in Iraq several years later. In January of this year, IS-Khorasan claimed responsibility for two explosions near a cemetery in Kerman, Iran where IRGC Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani is buried. The same IS affiliate was also blamed by Iran for an attack at a Shia shrine in the city of Shiraz in August 2023. A year later, Iranian officials announced that they had arrested 14 IS members across several provinces in Iran. More surprisingly, a Shia mosque in Oman that served the Pakistani Shia community was targeted by three Omani brothers who had been radicalized and had pledged allegiance to the new IS leader, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi. Oman has a history of tolerance and an avoidance of sectarianism, and thus the incident shocked the country. More disturbingly, the three brothers, who were killed by Omani security forces, were part of the establishment—two worked for the government and the other for the central bank. They were not from the underclass, as is the case with the many IS recruits who face bleak economic prospects.
Recommendations for US Policy
There has been little discussion in the United States on the resurgence of IS in Syria and Iraq and the presence of US troops in both countries. With the US presidential election drawing near, the foreign policy focus has been chiefly on the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. Whoever wins the presidency, however, should keep attention on the IS threat—even if the winner is former President Donald Trump who wanted to withdraw all US troops from Syria in 2018-2019. As one US Special Forces military officer stated, “Attention has shifted elsewhere. But now is not the time to take our eyes off northeast Syria.” Without the 900 US troops in Syria, it is likely that IS will rebound even easier because the SDF would be in a much weaker position to confront it.
Moreover, if the United States does withdraw from northeastern Syria, there is a good chance that Turkey will invade to crush the Kurdish-led autonomous entity, which would play into IS’s hands. For its part, the SDF must seek reconciliation with the Arab tribes in the Deir al-Zor region and not be seen as overlords of Arab-majority areas or exploiting their economic resources. As for Iraq, although IS is not as strong as it is in Syria, a residual US force (smaller than what is in the country now) will likely be needed in the coming years to continue to improve the Iraqi military’s capabilities and to keep IS at bay in Iraq and Syria. In addition, the international community must do a better job in dealing with imprisoned IS fighters and their families and not postpone the issue. It should also do what it can to help rebuild the partially destroyed cities from the anti-IS campaign, as poor economic conditions feed into IS’s recruitment drive. The last thing the troubled Middle East region needs is a fully resurgent Islamic State once again controlling large segments of territory and people with its highly dangerous ideology and methods.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
