The Failure of the Jeddah and IGAD Mediation Efforts for Sudan 

The war in Sudan, which broke out on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has entered its second year.¹ Since the beginning of the war, many mediation initiatives have attempted to end the fighting and reach a peaceful agreement between the two parties.² The latest of these is a US-led ceasefire round of talks starting on August 14 in Switzerland. Despite the multiplicity of these efforts, the question remains: Why has none of them over the course of sixteen months made a real breakthrough toward ending the war, building peace, and restoring stability and life to the millions of Sudanese facing death, displacement, and the specter of famine?
This paper highlights two initiatives: the Jeddah Platform mediation, which began in May 2023, under Saudi-American bilateral sponsorship, and expanded in its second round to include new facilitators, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation, which began in June 2023, with the support of the African Union. These two initiatives were characterized by the fact that they were officially announced through statements from the mediators and the two parties to the conflict, and actually included direct and indirect negotiations. They continued despite interruptions and sought to achieve success in the form of declarations and temporary ceasefire agreements.
The Jeddah Platform and IGAD efforts had a greater chance of continuing, unlike other initiatives and despite the multiplicity of mediations. For example, the Sudan Neighboring Countries Summit, hosted by Egypt a few months after the outbreak of the conflict, did not continue or produce any documents or action regarding the conflict, despite the continuation of its ministerial mechanism meetings.³ As for the Manama talks, they were characterized by secrecy, and were not announced by the mediators or the two parties, despite leaks to the media.⁴ The latest endeavor, the Turkish-Libyan mediation initiative, did not see negotiations, but the Libyan government separately invited the army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” without planning to organize a direct meeting between them.⁵

The Nature of Ongoing Mediations

Mediation in the context of war can be defined procedurally as “a conflict management process, in which the disputants seek assistance from an individual, a group of individuals, a state, or an organization to settle their dispute or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking legal mechanisms.”⁶ Based on this definition, the ongoing conflict in Sudan has witnessed several types of mediation, most notably those in which multiple mediators “offered” to mediate. Individuals such as South Sudan President Salva Kiir Mayardit have proposed mediating between the army commander and that of the RSF.
In addition, multi-track mediation has emerged, which is an approach that brings together “various peacebuilding initiatives underway at different levels in society, with the aim of enhancing the positive impact of the linkages between the initiatives, while preventing or mitigating the negative impact.”⁷ This pattern was used in the second round of the Jeddah Platform negotiations, especially after the two African organizations (the African Union and IGAD) were incorporated into the group of facilitators. This style can also be seen in the existing IGAD mediation, especially as it is built on the roadmap proposed by the African Union to settle the Sudanese conflict, and which resulted in the formation of an expanded mechanism that included actors from different levels within this process.⁸
In the midst of this multiplicity of mediations and platforms, and the inclusion of some of them (like Jeddah and IGAD) on a multi-track dimension, the prospect of ending the war in Sudan faces many challenges. Some of these challenges are related to the type and nature of the mediation itself, such as coordination and neutrality, while others are related to the two parties to the conflict and the negotiation process, such as political will and the degree of conviction in the feasibility of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, in light of the facts on the ground and the actual and estimated military power of each party against the other.

The Jeddah Platform

The platform was launched in early May 2023 through bilateral mediation by Saudi Arabia and the United States, when on May 11, they called for protecting civilians during military operations and facilitating the entry of humanitarian aid.⁹ On May 20, after a number of short truces, a temporary, one-week ceasefire accord and humanitarian agreements were reached between the parties.¹⁰
The “Jeddah Declaration” focused on protecting civilians and securing the entry of humanitarian aid in times of war and included a set of commitments related to civilians, whether they were ordinary people, medical personnel, or humanitarian aid workers. These commitments came with conditions for both parties, the most important of which is that “the commitment to the declaration will not affect any legal, security, or political situation of the parties signing it, and will not be linked to engagement in any political process.”¹¹ This condition can be considered to have distanced the Jeddah Platform from the deep political complexities of the conflict, thus weakening the position of the mediators and enabling the warring parties to disregard the platform’s commitments, thus enhancing their room for maneuver in the negotiations.
The May 20 temporary ceasefire agreement did not differ much from the Jeddah Declaration, except for the fact that the temporary agreement stipulated the possibility of developing into a permanent ceasefire.¹² This round stumbled noticeably because of the failure to implement the platform’s original decisions regarding the protection of civilians and the transition to a long-term and permanent ceasefire. The failure was reflected in the collapse of most of the truces that were announced¹³ and in the continuation of the war and its humanitarian ramification that were reported by international organizations.¹⁴
The negotiating process in this round took place amid a military situation that favored the RSF in areas of the capital, Khartoum, and in Darfur, and at a time when the role of regional actors, such as the United Arab Emirates and Chad, was not clear. On the other hand, the army was still convinced of the feasibility of a military solution.¹⁵ In late October 2023, talks resumed in the Saudi city of Jeddah,¹⁶ between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese army, which issued a statement accepting the mediation invitation to resume negotiations and indeed sent a delegation.¹⁷ This coincided with a statement by the Deputy Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Shams al-Din al-Kabbashi, during a meeting with a group of officers, that “going to negotiate does not mean neglecting the battle of dignity.”¹⁸ This reflects the army’s position in trying to rhetorically balance the pressures of the internal forces supporting the military solution¹⁹ and the mediation pressures by external actors aiming to end the war. The RSF accepted the mediation invitation without neglecting to pass on its message that the army’s decision on the war is not independent of the Islamists, a refrain that has pervaded the RSF’s rhetoric since the outbreak of the conflict.²⁰ The two parties resumed negotiations in Jeddah willingly, but with the caveats of relying on the military option on the one hand, and skepticism about the will of the other party on the other.
Regarding the structure of the mediation and the negotiating process, the joint statement was issued by the facilitators on October 29, 2023, three days after the resumption of negotiations, and included the commitment of the second round to the original emphasis on humanitarian issues and the protection of civilians. The statement also explicitly stated that the talks “will not address issues of a political nature,”²¹ and identified three issues around which the talks will focus: facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, achieving a ceasefire and building confidence-building measures, and the possibility of reaching a permanent cessation of hostilities. The mediators tried to develop their tactics to ensure greater effectiveness within the agreed limits of negotiations and reviewed the structure and approach of bilateral mediation.
The most important review of the mediation structure in the Jeddah Platform was that, in its second round, it incorporated the African Union and IGAD within the group of facilitators, through a joint representative.²² Two factors impacted this step. First, the two organizations have experience in African conflicts as well as a history and role in contributing to resolving Sudan’s previous conflicts, such as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Second, the step helps in unifying the negotiating platforms that the African Union has proposed and adopted. In its roadmap, the African Union proposed to resolve the Sudanese crisis through the expanded mechanism. This roadmap is based on what was agreed in the Jeddah Declaration for the protection of civilians, which represents “a basis on which the expanded mechanism depends in order to ensure compliance with the terms of the ceasefire.”²³ Procedurally, this round adopted amendments, such as publishing the names of the two negotiating delegations,²⁴ a task neglected by the first round,²⁵ and adopting a single platform to make declarations in the name of the negotiating process. The two parties agreed that “the facilitators will be the sole official spokesman for the talks.”²⁶ This was to avoid unilateral statements that had a negative impact on the course of negotiations in the first round.²⁷
The second round of the Jeddah Platform negotiations collapsed after about a month. The two parties stated that the issues that led to its collapse centered on the failure to end military deployments in civilian areas, the issue of returning leaders of the former regime, and the entry points and airports approved for the passage of humanitarian aid.²⁸
It is safe to say that the scope, agenda, and issues of this round of the Jeddah talks did not go beyond the “protection of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid.” Hence, matters remained in the area of procedurally addressing the consequences of the war without radically addressing its causes. This is the same point at which negotiations broke off in the first round, despite the passage of seven months between the two rounds, during which several military and humanitarian developments took place.

The IGAD Mediation

The IGAD Initiative was launched at the 14th regular session meeting in Djibouti, on June 12, 2023, following the assessment of the high-level South Sudan-led delegation formed by the organization to resolve the conflict. The roadmap included four practical steps: Adding Ethiopia to the delegation, making it a quartet committee (Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Djibouti) led by the former. This committee was to facilitate a meeting between the commander of the Sudanese army and that of the Rapid Support Forces within 10 days, arrange for a safe humanitarian corridor within two weeks, and commence a comprehensive political process within three weeks.²⁹
The Quartet adopted the roadmap issued in June, and decided in its first meeting on July 10 a set of measures to be taken, the most important of which were to facilitate a meeting between the warring parties, mobilize humanitarian aid, support a Sudanese-led dialogue, coordinate IGAD efforts with those of the African Union, and consider mobilizing the Authority’s East African Rapid Intervention Force (ISAF).³⁰ This latest step raised reservations and criticism from the army leadership, as it considered it an infringement on Sudan’s sovereignty.³¹ In the same context, the Sudanese government, represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rejected Kenya’s presidency of the Quartet, and saw it as biased in favor of the RSF. The ministry even threatened to withdraw from the organization, saying: “If IGAD does not respond to our request to change the presidency of the committee, the Government of Sudan will reconsider the feasibility of its continuation in the organization that was established by its own initiative.”³²
The outcomes of the second meeting did not differ much from the first in terms of reaching a ceasefire, despite promises of financial contributions and humanitarian intervention.³³ On December 9, 2023, IGAD held its 41st extraordinary summit on Sudan in Djibouti, at which it considered that “the Quartet had ably carried out the task for which it was established,”³⁴ and decided to adopt the committee’s report that was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, and to address settling the war in Sudan collectively through mediation by the General Assembly. During the summit, IGAD committed to “supporting a comprehensive political process, led by civilians, that will determine the nature and structure of Sudanese society and governance, and transition the country to viable civilian democratic rule,” in addition to condemning “unjustified interventions by external governmental and non-governmental actors in the conflict.”³⁵
IGAD’s efforts to stop the war in Sudan began to falter after the formation of the Quartet and the threat of military intervention. The army leadership—which relied in its quest for political legitimacy throughout the transitional period, and to a greater extent after the October 2021 coup, on the issue of “sovereignty that was neglected by civilians”—questioned the neutrality of the mediation. IGAD, as noted in all its statements regarding the settlement of the conflict in Sudan, continues to recommend and adopt its proposed measures in coordination with the African Union, which has suspended Sudan’s membership since the coup of October 25, 2021, as a step to put pressure to reverse the coup. The army leadership stipulated that Sudan’s membership be restored to deal with the proposals pushed through the IGAD mediation supported by the African Union.³⁶

The Reasons for Stumbling

There are many reasons for the failure of the mediation proposed in the Jeddah Platform and the IGAD initiative, of which the following are the most important.

1. Multiple Platforms and Mediation Challenges

The absence of a harmonious regional or international approach to negotiation and the multiplicity of mediations has led to the emergence of two obstacles to effective negotiating solutions. The first was what is known as forum shopping, where the multiplicity of platforms has provided many alternatives for the warring parties to promote their own interests.³⁷ Parties benefit from diversifying the options to choose the most useful platform and manipulate the negotiations by exploiting the contradictions between the different mediators. This also became a means to gain time and evade already made commitments. The second was the competition for platforms from the mediators, which was not limited to the place of negotiation, but included the issues and ultimate goals of the process. The Jeddah Declaration, for example, focused on reaching short-term ceasefire agreements to facilitate the arrival of humanitarian aid, and taking the necessary measures for a permanent cessation of hostilities, without linking any of this to a political process.³⁸
In contrast, IGAD designed a political negotiation process, including a direct meeting between the Army Commander-in-Chief and the RSF Commander, with the involvement of the Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces leadership, which had signed a declaration of principles with the RSF Commander. This multiplicity of platforms, on the one hand, and the diversity of forms of mediation, on the other, led to the dispersal of efforts and the overlapping of roles between the various actors, whether states or organizations. This is sometimes reflected in the lack of effective coordination between mediators which leads to duplication or contradiction of efforts. Conflicts of interest between powers, states, and mediating organizations can weaken the power of persuasion on the parties to the war, which increases the complexity of reaching joint, tangible and sustainable solutions.

2. Weak Political Will on Both Sides to Resolve the Crisis

On December 4, 2023, five days after the suspension of the second Jeddah round, and at the request of the Sudanese army commander, the IGAD held an extraordinary summit. Burhan had conducted a shuttle tour of a group of IGAD countries, including Ethiopia.³⁹ The RSF Commander also toured most of those countries and others. This reflected lessened commitment to the negotiation processes and its outcomes in the two forums. It also was linked to the parties to the conflict and their political adaptation to this war and their will to end it, especially with the developments on the ground since November 2023. The Rapid Support Forces had expanded in the central axis of the country through its control of most of the states of Darfur and the state of Gezira,⁴⁰ and its advance south toward Sennar and Kordofan. On the other hand, the army regained some areas in Khartoum State, such as Omdurman, and recently attracted a group of armed movements, some of whose forces moved to support it in Khartoum and Gezira. The latter is driven by internal contradictions related to their areas of deployment and social bases in Darfur, and their calculations for sharing power in the post-war period, as well as these movements’ fear of the Rapid Support Forces and their hope that the continuation of the war will help dismantle them. It is clear from the actions of the parties in the war that they prefer military options and influence on the ground rather than political solutions.

3. Designing the Negotiation Process

The Sudan Liberation Army Movement pre-empted the proposed Geneva meeting on August 14 in Switzerland with a statement in which it indicated that its negotiations “will lead to nothing in the absence of known parties presently at war.”⁴¹ In fact, this is one of the structural problems that appeared in the design of the Jeddah Platform mediations and the IGAD Initiative, which were limited to the army and the RSF. This dual design, which was limited to these two parties, without including significant forces, such as armed movements, political parties, and civil society, led to a negotiation process that was not inclusive and ignored many important voices and interests. It is clear that failure to involve the parties concerned and affected by the war hinders the process of achieving a comprehensive and lasting consensus. The diverse complexities of the Sudanese context require a comprehensive approach that takes all actors into account.

4. The Absence of the Role of Deterrence and Pressure Exerted by the Mediators

Despite the sanctions announced by the United States on individuals and institutions from both parties,⁴² and others against leaders of the Rapid Support Forces,⁴³ and the United Nations adopting a resolution to investigate human rights violations,⁴⁴ and opening an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur after the El Geneina violations,⁴⁵ the punitive measures were not sufficiently effective in deterring the parties, or motivating their leaders to move forward with the proposed negotiation options.
This indicates the absence of the role of a strong mediator capable of exerting effective pressure and deterrence, which is the role that the United States played in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. This can be attributed to the position of the Sudanese crisis on the list of priorities of international powers, especially the United States, which is currently busy with other wars, such as the Russian-Ukrainian war and the Gaza war since October 2023.

Conclusion

The faltering efforts of mediation to end the war in Sudan appear as a result of the intersection of interests and conflicting agendas between the two parties to the conflict on the one hand, and the regional and international mediators on the other hand. The multiplicity and diversity of mediating platforms has led to a loss of coordination and the dispersion of efforts, hindering the possibility of reaching concrete joint solutions. The design of the negotiation process, which was limited to the army and RSF, without the involvement of other influential forces, resulted in weakening of the entire process. Hence, there is an urgent need for a coherent and strong approach that applies pressure to create the necessary will to achieve peace. In general, it seems that international pressures and sanctions, while important, were not sufficient alone to push the warring parties toward a serious commitment to stopping the fighting. Achieving tangible results on the path to peace in Sudan requires greater coordination and a comprehensive approach that includes all influential actors in the political arena.

This Situation Assessment was first published in Arabic on August 6, 2024, by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.