Sudan’s ‘war of the generals’ between the Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) will complete its second year this April 15 without definite signs of ending. Battle lines have shifted dramatically over the last few months in favor of the SAF, but so far this has not pointed to Burhan’s imminent and complete victory or to Dagalo’s withdrawal from the fight or his final defeat. Indeed, with weapons and other material external support continuing to sustain both camps, and with international and regional attention diverted away from Sudan, the Sudanese civil war appears to remain a feature of East Africa’s geopolitical picture for years to come.
But the SAF’s advance in Khartoum, and Dagalo’s admission that his forces have left the capital, suggest that, at least for now, there is no disputing the fact that the prized central Sudanese state has remained outside the control of the former Janjaweed leader. What matters now is how Burhan—if he so desires, and he should—will use the recaptured apparatus of the state to start to rebuild some of its edifices after two years of internecine fighting with his former stalwart ally. Another serious concern is whether Burhan will decide to rest on his laurels and refrain from ending his former ally’s control of a good chunk of territory in the west and southwest, where Dagalo is ready to establish a rump state and seek outside recognition of it. Indeed, these two concerns, using the state apparatus to rebuild and strengthen its institutions and ending Dagalo’s insurgency, are essential for holding Sudan together as a unified country and for making it a pillar of stability in east Africa.
The War on the Ground
March 2025 was a good month for the Sudanese Army and General Burhan. The SAF finally dislodged the RSF from Khartoum and from most of its twin city Omdurman, in effect securing the eastern part of the country under Burhan’s control. Threats by the RSF’s Dagalo of major military operations against Burhan’s seat of power in Port Sudan and cities north of the capital came to naught as the army tightened its noose on the paramilitary forces in Khartoum and Omdurman. The SAF had already taken Wad Medani and other parts of Al Gezira state earlier this year, scoring a major victory because of the region’s agricultural riches. But whether the Sudanese Army’s victory in the essential central districts of the country would allow Burhan to gain the coveted legitimacy that he has lost with the loss of the capital in the early days of the war, remains to be seen.
At the same time, the RSF still controls parts of southern Kordofan state and most of the western and southwestern Darfur region, except for northern Darfur and its capital, al-Fasher, where the RSF laid siege to the army garrison there. The army had taken North Kordofan state and its capital of el-Obeid in February, clearing the way for its advance toward Darfur. The battle for al-Fasher is pivotal for the army’s control of the west and it could once and for all end the RSF’s attempt at maintaining its grip on what it announced would become a rump state under Dagalo’s leadership, a step that could very well mean the breakup of unified Sudan. In February, the RSF and a group of armed factions signed an agreement in Kenya for the establishment of what they called a “government of peace and unity,” which they claimed would lead a “secular, democratic, and non-centralized state.” It was obvious that news from the front of RSF losses in Khartoum and elsewhere indicated the failure of Dagalo and his paramilitary force to hold on to the capital or to provide the necessary legitimacy to maintain unified and effective rule in the country. Needless to say, three Gulf Arab states—Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—along with Egypt voiced their objection to the declaration, emphasizing Sudan’s peace, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.
Sudan over the last two years has become the scene of an unprecedented humanitarian disaster.
Meanwhile, Sudan over the last two years has become the scene of an unprecedented humanitarian disaster. United Nations officials have announced that the ongoing war has created the “most devastating” aid crisis in the world, with some 30 million people needing assistance in 2025. African Union officials say that hundreds of thousands of children are malnourished as the malnutrition rate increased by 44 percent in 2024. Military operations have since last February halted the distribution of aid to displaced families numbering in the hundreds of thousands in the Zamzam refugee camp in North Darfur state. People fleeing south to South Sudan are finding it yet more difficult to secure food because that country is also in the throes of a humanitarian disaster following armed conflict there.
Combatants in Sudan are also using rape as a weapon of war. UNICEF has reported that from the beginning of 2024 through March 2025, some 220 children have been sexually abused by soldiers, as 20,000 civilians have died in the fighting and some 14 million have been made homeless. Amnesty International recently published a report detailing the issues of sexual violence, rape, gang rape, and sexual slavery that were committed specifically by the RSF all over the areas they controlled before they were driven out. The healthcare system is also on the verge of collapse as health facilities are unable to accommodate those in need of medical care and hospitals lack medicines and food. Reports indicate that both sides have been equally guilty of committing crimes against civilians during their operations, some of which amount to crimes against humanity.
No Sight of the 2019 Revolution
It must be made clear that whoever ultimately wins the current war of the generals and returns triumphantly to Khartoum will not be a guarantee for the restoration of whatever democratic process had been anemically unfolding in the country prior to the conflict. To be sure, Generals Burhan and Dagalo presided over the dismantling of a political agreement between the Sudanese military—that in 2019 had sided with protestors to topple the dictator Omar al- Bashir—and a civilian coalition of democratic forces. That agreement stipulated that a military council would lead the country for a period, followed by civilian leadership in preparation for the establishment of a fully democratic system. But as civilians were about to take over from the military in 2021, General Burhan pulled the rug out from under the whole operation, and declared the process ended. He appointed himself leader of a new governing council, and Dagalo as his deputy, in the process achieving the complete takeover of the country by the military institution.
It is now likely that Burhan, following his acrimonious and serious fallout with Dagalo, will seek to appear as the one to safeguard a new democratic process. In this vein, in February 2025, his foreign ministry declared the intention to begin a democratic process of appointing a transitional government with a civilian prime minister who would preside over discussions with political forces and civil society organizations in preparation for national elections. The ministry called on the international community and the Arab world to support the new plan, which it said “represents a national consensus for restoring peace and stability in the country and satisfying requirements of the democratic transition.” This is almost the same process that the military oversaw in the post-Bashir period and that led to the political agreement aborted by Burhan and Dagalo themselves. This time around, it is hard to see how the Sudanese people would believe that Burhan is indeed interested in pursuing the same process that he derailed four years ago.
A genuine attempt at a workable formula for a democratic transition must start with the premise that the Sudanese Armed Forces have not been a good shepherd of such a transition. Indeed, they are incapable of allowing full-circle deliberations for a democratic transition that they know may very well deprive the military of its longstanding privileges in the Sudanese state. It is thus incumbent upon Sudan’s democratic forces and civil society organizations to present themselves now as the initiators of a democratic transition as General Burhan appears to need a solid civilian base after his bruising fight with Dagalo, which may still take a long time to settle. Indeed, civilian democratic forces may have a good opportunity to exploit Burhan’s tired army to push for necessary political change. But these forces must be unified in their vision for the democratic transition that they desire and must prevent opportunists from throwing their lot behind Burhan’s warmed-up latest plan.
More Than a Regional Wrinkle
There should be no mistake that government writ must be imposed all over the country before General Burhan can claim to fully restore functions to the Sudanese state. His obvious and most important challenge is to finally end the RSF’s insurgency, now moved to the Darfur region. In addition to raw military power and battlefield successes, Burhan will need the assistance and recognition of regional and international actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, despite the latter’s self-imposed isolation from African affairs following President Donald Trump’s decision to slash foreign aid.
Egypt has since the start of the current crisis sided with Burhan as the representative of legitimate authority in Sudan, offering him diplomatic cover. Dagalo’s RSF has recently accused Egypt of participating in the war against them by launching airstrikes that have helped the SAF score victories in Khartoum and elsewhere. Last October, General Dagalo himself accused Egypt of participating in military operations against his forces and of supplying the SAF with drones. Egypt has obviously denied any direct involvement. But there is no denying the fact that Burhan is close to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and is a good ally as their countries face serious geopolitical challenges such as that of Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that they both perceive as a national security threat.
As for Saudi Arabia, it looks like the kingdom has decided to finally throw its weight behind Burhan. Back in 2023, Saudi Arabia led a mediation process between the SAF and the RSF, but that fizzled as each side thought that they could win on the battlefield. But Saudi Arabia’s interest in resolving the dispute sharpened when the RSF declared its intention to form an independent government to rival that led by Burhan. Besides being intent on protecting its economic investments in Sudan, Saudi Arabia is loath to allow conditions that may help the partition of any Arab country, a prospect that was clearly at hand if Dagalo’s scheme of another government for Sudan materialized. In this, the kingdom was in total agreement with Egypt that could not fathom having to deal with a partitioned Sudan.
Saudi Arabia’s and Egypt’s support for Burhan stands in opposition to the UAE’s support of Dagalo.
Saudi Arabia’s and Egypt’s support for General Burhan stands in opposition to what has transpired between the Sudanese government and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE has for years thrown its lot behind General Dagalo, supplying him with weapons and diplomatic support. Abu Dhabi’s backing of Dagalo resembles that which it has given General Khalifa Haftar in Libya and the breakaway Somali federal state of Puntland. Following years of complaints about the UAE’s support for Dagalo, in April 2025 the Sudanese government filed a suit against Abu Dhabi at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing it of complicity in and support for genocide against the people of Darfur. The UAE’s rejection of the accusation was automatic but the damage to its reputation is palpable. Only time will tell how the ICJ may adjudicate the matter.
In the United States, the UAE’s behavior in Sudan and support for the RSF paramilitary forces prompted Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-CA) to propose legislation on March 11, 2025, to prohibit arms sales to Abu Dhabi. A few days earlier, on March 7, the ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) proposed the same sanction because of the UAE’s support for the RSF. It is unlikely that any of this proposed legislation will pass the Republican-controlled Congress, but the mere fact that official quarters in Washington are contemplating cutting off arms supplies to a strategic US partner in the Middle East because of its complicity in the RSF’s atrocities is reason for pause.
Finally, it is obvious that the Sudanese war of the generals has not ended despite clear changes on the ground giving SAF commander General Abdel Fattah Burhan the upper hand against his nemesis General Mohamed Dagalo. Burhan still has his work cut out for him as he must complete the conquest of much of the Darfur region in the west, which Dagalo controls. Any halt in military operations can now allow Dagalo’s RSF to retrench and possibly attempt to establish a rump state in the west, which would likely consecrate the partition of the country. What is required today in addition to achieving the complete conquest of the west is the implementation of a methodical and studied plan for reunifying the country and beginning in earnest another process for a democratic transition away from authoritarian rule.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Facebook/Sudanese Armed Forces
