On November 7, 2024, the German parliament, the Bundestag, passed a resolution by a vote of 695 to 10, that declared that the security of the State of Israel is the Staatsräson (reason of the state’s existence) of the German nation, and that anti-Semitism in Germany was the result of “immigration from North African and Middle Eastern countries.” It further reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of anti-Semitism, which conflates all criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. The resolution also supported contemporary moves by local governments to force immigrants and asylum seekers in Germany to provide a “written commitment to Israel’s right to existence and to condemn any actions directed against that existence” with their citizenship applications.
Then, on May 26, roughly 6 months after that declaration, and two months after Chancellor Friedrich Merz invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Berlin and promised to sidestep Germany’s obligations to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to arrest him, the Chancellor changed his tune. He said that he found Israel’s actions “no longer comprehensible” while his coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, has openly called for an arms embargo on Israel.
Germany was not alone in this shift. On May 19, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom had released a joint statement stating that “the level of human suffering in Gaza is intolerable” and that if Israel did not stop its offensive and allow outside humanitarian aid into the Strip, they would “take further concrete actions in response.” On May 21, the European Union (EU) voted 17 to 10 to review its association agreement with Israel, with chief diplomat Kaja Kallas demanding that “aid must flow immediately.” Two days later, France and Saudi Arabia agreed to co-chair a conference at the United Nations for the “Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine,” in which the United States warned countries not to participate. Thus, going into June, there was expected to be a review of the EU Association Agreement with Israel, Germany was considering an arms embargo, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France were promising new sanctions if the situation did not improve, and the United Nations was planning an international response. To be sure, expectations were that with mounting international pressure, Israel would surely be forced to heed the criticisms and start to change its conduct.
The exact opposite happened. Israel prevented aid from entering Gaza, failed to halt its offensive there, and used the aid sites run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation as death traps for the starving civilian population. Following this snubbing, with thousands more dead and dying Palestinians and no clear route for international aid organizations to resume operations in Gaza, the EU might be expected to stand by its obligations, to sanction the regime it has said is violating human rights, or at the very least to stop directly aiding it in its war crimes. But this did not happen. When Israel expanded its war by striking Iran, European states quickly stepped in to protect their misbehaving ally, both militarily and diplomatically. Meanwhile, the UN summit on the “Question of Palestine” has been indefinitely postponed. The review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement has been released, but sources within EU member states report that key actors have no appetite to take any real action. Rhetoric from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom returned to the pre-blockade status quo of implicit support, pock-marked with measured calls for ‘diplomatic resolutions.’
Despite this reversal, cracks in support for Israel are again forming. With the first large group of children dying of starvation in Gaza, statements of ‘concern’ have shifted into demands. In the meantime, Israel has repeatedly reneged on its promises of allowing more aid into the Strip and negotiating a ceasefire in good faith.
A Representative Perspective
To those who have more faith in the representative, democratic institutions of the European Union, the immediate explanation for this shift is a large shift in public opinion. A poll conducted by Der Tagesspiegel, a German daily newspaper, found that in the last year the percentage of Germans who would like to see the government distance itself from Israel has increased from 35 to 44 percent, while the proportion of those who would like Germany to grow closer to Israel has grown from 21 to just 23 percent. Meanwhile, a poll from YouGov has found that this trend is fairly consistent across Western Europe, with Israel’s net approval rating ranging from -44 in Germany to -55 in Spain, and only 6 percent of Italians think that Israel has acted proportionately to the Hamas attack of October 7.
These poll results suggest that shifting public opinion may provide a logical explanation for recent changes in EU policy toward Israel. Yet, when this data is viewed through a wider lens, the public opinion argument falls apart. In October of last year, a survey by the Forsa Institute found that 60 percent of Germans supported ending arms sales to Israel—a ban that the government continues to oppose outright. Meanwhile, the aforementioned YouGov poll found that in November 2023, Israel already had a negative net approval rating in every Western European country, though the drop from then is certainly noticeable. While it is true that Western European governments are using a harsher rhetoric to avoid taking concrete action, this change simply cannot reflect majority opinion, as a majority wanted it two years ago.
The government of Chancellor Merz is still 4 years away from its next election and its coalition holds a solid majority in the Bundestag. The story is similar in Britain and France, fresh off elections last year. The Netherlands, which proposed the EU motion to review its relationship with Israel, had an election in November 2023 and will not have another before 2028. Thus, considering the failings of the public opinion explanation, it becomes necessary to explore alternative interpretations of these shifts.
Focus on the Eastern Front
The United States’ recent overtures toward Russia to secure a negotiated peace in Ukraine have caused European leaders to become increasingly hostile toward American foreign policy and to distinguish themselves from the United States. Gaza is now becoming a part of this shift, with Josep Borell, the former Foreign Minister for the EU, stating on May 9 that the world is “facing the largest ethnic cleansing operation since the end of the Second World War.” Meanwhile, in his victory speech last February, now-Chancellor Merz stated in no uncertain terms that his priority was to “strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we achieve independence from the US” and that “the Americans in this administration do not care much about the fate of Europe.” This more skeptical attitude toward Atlanticism—the longstanding doctrine that the United States and Western Europe should have an integrated foreign policy—likely plays a contributing, if not the dominant, role in this shift.
To European leaders, the war in Ukraine represents a much more immediate threat to their security. Although Israel’s genocide in Gaza is widely unpopular, its war there is not necessarily a strategic concern for Europe. Other than the United Kingdom, which has aided the United States in airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen in order to help keep the Red Sea shipping lanes open, no European militaries have engaged in military action in the region. Indeed, Germany supplies around 30 percent of Israel’s arms imports, but these are not grants but military sales that are extremely beneficial to the German economy. The EU provides development funds and engages in research partnerships with Israel, though this cost is largely offset by the roughly $11 billion trade surplus that the EU runs with Israel year-on-year. Similarly, by diplomatically distancing themselves from Israel, EU countries risk the safety of their UN peacekeepers in the region, of whom there are 3,930 in southern Lebanon and 7 in the occupied Golan Heights. Strategically, the EU has far more to lose by shifting away from Israel than it does by remaining involved; greater distance could potentially endanger its peacekeepers and risk putting a dent into its economy while alienating its closest ally, the United States.
These negative consequences may be balanced by potential gains: the EU may now have an easier time negotiating with Arab partners, finding new allies and export markets for its manufactured and luxury goods. However, these consequences are significant and give some legitimacy to the theory that while geostrategic concerns may have influenced this shift, they could not be the sole factor.
Criminal Liability for Aiding Genocide
The most persuasive theory of the origins of this change lies in the potential international legal repercussions that these EU states, and the EU as a federal body, may suffer if they do not act. The EU is institutionally tied to the International Criminal Court and is mandated through each member state to uphold the Geneva Convention and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). International legal experts have argued, and are now in virtual consensus, that Israel’s actions constitute crimes against humanity, if not genocide, and that states that have supported those actions militarily, diplomatically, or economically could be legally accountable for that support.
Germany and its partners in the EU have refused to call Israel’s actions in Gaza a genocide or even war crimes—with the notable exception of Ireland, which joined South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel in January. But even Ireland, often touted as a pro-Palestinian island in a sea of western support for Israel, sells Israeli bonds to the European market and allows American weapons to be shipped to Israel through its airports. But by calling Israel’s actions genocide and pushing through certain token motions to restrict certain military goods or sanction individual bad actors, as the United Kingdom has been doing for the past month, the EU and other Israeli allies can mount a defense against accusations of complicity.
As time goes on, this charade becomes increasingly difficult to keep up. Senior officials such as the UK’s Foreign Minister David Lammy can argue that Israel is not committing genocide, but evidence of war crimes is irrefutable. As more evidence of continued support for Israel becomes available and public, more people will become disillusioned with this argument of ‘yes, but no.’ While the United States can bury its head in the sand and relish in its immunity from international law, the UK and the EU, not benefiting from the same hegemonic privileges in the Middle East, are forced to concede some areas, leaving the door open to more damning questions.
It Was All A Dream…
If the shift in EU rhetoric toward Israel was indeed a combination of these two factors—declining Atlanticism and concerns about accountability under international law, then why did it not translate into action? The answer for this can be found in Iran. On June 13, Israel launched a surprise attack on the Islamic Republic, assassinating multiple Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers and nuclear scientists, along with a large number of civilians. Within hours, the EU released a statement condemning both sides and blaming Iran for Israel’s attack, arguing that the existence of the former’s nuclear program made the action legitimate. When the United States joined Israel in military action, the EU retreated back into safer ground. While a select few states, such as Ireland and Spain released less fawning statements than their neighbors, acquiescence ruled the day as western nations did their best not to step out of line.
The reason for this 180 degree shift is a simple one, and one that will be undone eventually as the war with Iran loses its urgency and eyes return to the horrors unfolding in Gaza, where at least 870 people were killed over the course of that skirmish, more than those in Iran and Israel combined. For this moment, the costs of maintaining the EU’s alignment with the United States outweighed the potential benefits that deviation toward multi-polarity would bring. For Europe, the war with Iran presented a sterling opportunity to boost demand for military equipment and justify the 5 percent of GDP military expenditure target that NATO has set for much of the continent. Britain, Germany, and France, with their large military-industrial bases, Denmark with its dominance in the logistics sector through Maersk, and the Netherlands, with its unique role in supplying components for Israel’s Iron Dome, all saw large potential benefits from a hawkish position toward Iran. Meanwhile, Ireland and Spain, with their dependencies on imported weapons, oil, lukewarm relations with NATO, and large number of troops stationed in southern Lebanon, had much more to lose from this conflict and much less to gain.
Criminal liability for assisting in Israel’s war crimes seems far less worrying a prospect when there is more of an argument to be made against Iran, a relatively isolated state on the world stage. Following the initial barrage by Israel, Germany’s Foreign Office, ahead of a visit by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul to Saudi Arabia the next day, condemned Iran, saying that it “poses a threat to the entire region.” Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, alongside every other state in the Middle East, condemned Israel’s attack as a violation of international law, showcasing the deepening divide between Germany (and Europe as a whole) and the rest of the world.
But this reset back toward the rhetoric of six months ago will not prevent this divide from deepening, as none of the factors that caused it has been ameliorated. Already, the consensus that seemed firm just a few weeks ago has cracked open wider than before, with Ireland and Spain sharply attacking the EU for not imposing sanctions on Israel, and Ireland moving forward with unilateral sanctions. This division would directly threaten the EU’s professed unified foreign policy. More importantly for the future of the European project, the division has completely shattered a perception of the EU as having a moral high-ground over the rest of the world—and specifically over the United States.
Skepticism in the promise of the EU has already been on the rise over the last decade. But until now Euro-skepticism has almost exclusively been a right-wing phenomenon, which reached its peak in the 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom. Many on the left did become disillusioned with Europe following the Eurocrisis in Greece in the early 2010s (especially in light of the infamous quote from Germany’s delegate that “elections cannot be allowed to change economic policy”). But the vast majority of those on the European left still supported the EU project. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, approval of the EU peaked. But more recently this high tide has now begun to recede. The dual crises of increasing militarization, coming almost three and a half years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and continued European support for Israel seems to reveal a clear contradiction. Much of the left was happy to support Ukraine in its national self-defense against a belligerent invader, but this narrative has not been applied to Gaza. Extremism is on the rise across the western world, and now the EU faces political threats from both sides of this ever more polarized political climate. Going forward, the center cannot hold. The question now is simple: will the EU bend to one pole or the other or will it bring the whole structure down by pushing both away? Indeed, the challenge for the EU in the 2020s and beyond will be to find a successful third way forward.
