Turkey’s political landscape has undergone a dramatic shift with the recent arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s most formidable rival. The pressure on Imamoglu has been building for some time, but events accelerated last week. On March 18, 2025, Istanbul University annulled Imamoglu’s undergraduate diploma, citing, according to the Associated Press, “alleged irregularities in his 1990 transfer from a university in Northern Cyprus.” Under Turkish law, presidential candidates are required to hold a university degree, making the annulment a direct barrier to his eligibility to run against Erdoğan in 2028. Just hours later, in the early morning of March 19, a sweeping police operation detained Imamoglu and several close associates on charges of corruption and financing terrorism. This triggered massive protests across major cities that were met with a forceful crackdown. On March 23, Imamoglu and top aides were formally arrested on corruption charges. The move marks a critical turning point for Turkey: but it is the beginning of a new phase of Erdoğan’s authoritarianism in which the last institutional pathways for democratic change—in particular, competitive elections—are being actively dismantled.
Turkey’s Regime Change: From Competitive Authoritarianism to De Facto Autocracy
Turkey has been on an authoritarian trajectory for more than a decade. Imamoglu is far from being the first opposition figure to be imprisoned; Kurdish politicians have long been jailed en masse, and the government has routinely replaced elected leaders of Kurdish municipalities with appointed trustees. The government’s control of the judiciary is widely acknowledged. The systematic detention of dissidents, near-complete government control over the media (just a few opposition outlets remain), the absence of freedom of expression, and the risk of arrest facing anyone who criticizes the government are all established features of Turkey’s political landscape. Turkey ranks dismally low in global indices on rule of law and freedom of expression: in the 2024 Press Freedom Index, it is classified as the 158th worst of 180 countries ranked, while in the World Justice Project’s 2024 Rule of Law Index, it is listed 117th out of 142.
The systematic detention of dissidents and the absence of freedom of expression are features of Turkey’s political landscape.
Yet despite these alarming conditions, one institution had continued to tether Turkey to a semblance of democratic legitimacy: elections. What set Turkey apart from fully authoritarian regimes like Russia was precisely this electoral mechanism—the remaining, albeit narrowing, path for effecting political change through the ballot box. Until now, Turkey had been considered a ‘competitive authoritarian’ system, where despite significant obstacles, the opposition theoretically maintained the possibility of taking power through elections. The opposition’s victories in Istanbul, Ankara, and other major cities in the 2019 and 2024 local elections reinforced this possibility, offering a glimmer of hope for democratic reversal. Turkey’s robust election system, where outright electoral fraud is nearly impossible to execute without being exposed, also supported this argument.
However, Imamoglu’s arrest marks a significant escalation in Turkey’s authoritarian drift, crossing a critical threshold. By arresting his strongest electoral rival, Erdoğan appears intent on eliminating even the theoretical possibility of democratic transition, which fundamentally alters the nature of the system. This move aims to shut the door on power change through elections, making Imamoglu’s arrest a pivotal moment with far-reaching implications for Turkey’s future.
An International Climate Conducive to Repression
While the domestic machinery behind Imamoglu’s arrest had long been in motion, recent international developments created a permissive environment that emboldened Erdoğan to make his boldest authoritarian move yet. Chief among these is the return to power of US President Donald Trump, whose admiration for authoritarian leaders and his tendency to maintain good relations with them has generally emboldened strongman politicians worldwide. In this environment, Erdoğan likely believes that no significant response will come from the United States. The US Department of States’s initial response to the arrests, describing them simply as “internal judicial matters,” confirmed these expectations.
Erdoğan also feels confident in his position with Europe, anticipating minimal pushback from that quarter as well. Europe’s approach to the Middle East is primarily filtered through migration concerns, and Turkey’s growing influence in Syria has increased its leverage over Europe. But the most significant development lies in transatlantic relations. With Trump’s presidency, European confidence in the long-term reliability of US security guarantees has diminished, prompting discussions about strategic autonomy and alternative security architectures. In this evolving context, Turkey—a NATO member with strategic geography and growing military-industrial capacity—has become even more indispensable. The warming relations between the European Union (EU) and Turkey over the past month and Turkey’s potential role in European security have likely led Erdoğan to calculate that Europe will not risk undermining relations with Turkey over democratic concerns.
Domestic Timing
While the international climate has created space for Erdoğan’s crackdown, the timing of Imamoglu’s arrest is rooted in domestic political calculations. This move has been building inside the country for some time. In recent months, the government has targeted several opposition-led district municipalities in Istanbul—dismissing mayors, installing trustees, and launching legal investigations. For the first time, Erdoğan extended the tactic of appointing government trustees, long used against Kurdish municipalities, to the heart of the main opposition strongholds.
Imamoglu himself had already been the target of politically motivated legal proceedings. In the lead-up to the 2023 presidential elections, he faced charges for allegedly insulting members of the judiciary, a case that carried the possibility of both imprisonment and a political ban. Although the case did not ultimately result in his disqualification, it cast enough uncertainty to weaken his candidacy, prompting the opposition to nominate Kemal Kilicdaroglu—a far less popular figure—who went on to lose to Erdoğan.
Now, with Imamoglu almost certain to be the Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate in the next election, the timing of the current move becomes clear. Within the CHP, an internal primary was scheduled for Sunday, March 23, with Imamoglu as the sole candidate. His official nomination would have marked the formal beginning of his presidential campaign. The government appears to have acted preemptively to prevent this moment, annulling his university diploma and launching sweeping arrests just days before the vote.
Despite the government’s attempts to disrupt this primary with restrictions, the CHP proceeded with the vote and officially nominated Imamoglu as its candidate. The primary was initially planned as an internal party process, open only to registered CHP members. Following the detention of Imamoglu, however, the party leadership broadened participation by setting up additional ballot boxes for non-members as well. While the vote was largely symbolic—Imamoglu was the sole candidate—it evolved into a powerful act of public defiance. Millions flocked to the polls to show their support for Imamoglu and to protest the government’s crackdown. In the end, Imamoglu received nearly 15 million votes—roughly a quarter of Turkey’s entire electorate—turning an internal nomination into a striking demonstration of political will.
Beyond the CHP: A Wider Strategy of Repression and Co-optation
While the arrest of Mayor Imamoglu has received the most attention, it is part of a broader strategy by Erdoğan to neutralize the entire spectrum of opposition using both repression and selective co-optation. Over the past few months, this two-pronged strategy has become increasingly visible.
The center-left CHP is the main force of opposition in Turkey, but secular nationalists and the Kurdish political movement are also important elements of the opposition. Umit Ozdag, leader of the far-right nationalist Victory Party and currently the most popular figure among opposition Turkish nationalists, was arrested on January 21. Initially detained for allegedly insulting the president, the charges against Ozdag were later changed to inciting hatred against Syrians. Given the party’s leader-centered structure, Ozdag’s prolonged detention could neutralize the ultra-nationalist opposition. However, despite the lack of a cohesive political organization, ultra-nationalist youth have so far played a prominent role in the recent protests following Imamoglu’s arrest, highlighting their potential as a disruptive force.
Simultaneously, a renewed crackdown on the remnants of Turkey’s liberal opposition has begun through the reopening of cases related to the 2013 Gezi Park protests. This judicial offensive further cripples the already-weakened liberal opposition. It also serves as a warning to the public who may participate in demonstrations against Imamoglu’s arrest: the regime can punish those who participate in such protests, even many years later.
Erdoğan is aiming to either bring the Kurds into the government camp or at least to distance them from the opposition.
Meanwhile, Erdoğan is pursuing a peace process with the Kurdish political movement, aiming to either bring them into the government camp or at least to distance them from the opposition. This timing is particularly significant as Kurds find themselves at the negotiation table with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party during a process that could fundamentally alter the system. The government likely calculated that, to preserve the negotiation process, Kurds would restrain their criticism of the actions against Imamoglu—who is popular among them—and limit their participation in street protests, a strategic consideration in the timing of the move against Imamoglu.
So far, the pro-Kurdish DEM Party has condemned his arrest and participated in protests, but prominent figures such as imprisoned former party leader Selahattin Demirtas have remained silent. While not fully mobilized, the Kurdish base is engaged and aligned with the broader opposition.
Imamoglu’s arrest, then, was not only about eliminating a political rival, but also about testing the cohesion of the opposition and exploiting its internal fault lines. This divide-and-conquer strategy reflects Erdoğan’s longstanding approach to consolidating power: isolate the opposition, fracture potential alliances, and selectively punish those who resist. By targeting both Turkish nationalists and Kurdish figures—while simultaneously courting and repressing them—the regime aims to ensure that no united front can emerge to challenge its authority.
What’s Next: Turkey at a Crossroads
Turkey now stands at a critical “make or break” moment. The opposition clearly recognizes that these actions aim to fundamentally change the nature of the political system. The degree of alarm is evidenced by large protests not just in Istanbul but across the country. The government likely did not anticipate such a strong response. The CHP, long criticized for its institutional inertia and reluctance to confront the regime, has found itself compelled by grassroots pressure to lead the current mobilization efforts.
Despite the intensity of the protests, however, the government has shown no signs of backing down, and Imamoglu’s formal arrest underscores this resolve. Moreover, further moves such as trustee appointments to the CHP leadership and legal proceedings against Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavas are on the government’s agenda. Erdoğan appears to have entered a point of no return; releasing Imamoglu now could be seen as a sign of weakness and might embolden resistance.
Yet Erdoğan’s path forward is not without constraints. Perhaps the most critical factor in determining the government’s next steps will be economic indicators. On the morning of Imamoglu’s detention, the Turkish lira lost more than ten percent of its value within just a couple of hours. To halt this decline, the Central Bank burned through $12 billion of reserves in a single day. This pattern continued over the next two days, and the stock market also took a severe hit. At the moment, short-sales are prohibited in the stock market to prevent further volatility and decline.
Erdoğan may aspire to establish a Putin-like regime, but unlike Russia, Turkey lacks the natural resources to finance such a system. Turkey’s economy remains deeply integrated with global markets, and its survival depends on investor confidence and foreign capital inflows. Consequently, the government must consider market reactions when determining its next steps. This is why statements from the EU and the United States could have substantial impact. The current silence is not just passive—it may serve to embolden the government by signaling tacit approval.
Overall, the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu marks more than just a new chapter in Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory—it signifies a rupture. By targeting his most formidable electoral opponent, President Erdoğan appears to be closing off the last remaining avenue for a democratic transition of power in Turkey. This move fundamentally alters the nature of Turkey’s political system, potentially transforming it from a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime to a fully authoritarian one.
The implications extend far beyond Imamoglu, the CHP, or even the 2028 presidential election. What is unfolding is the consolidation of a system in which political power is no longer contestable through democratic means. In such a system, opposition becomes criminalized by default, dissent becomes treason, and elections become performative rituals rather than genuine contests for power.
While Erdoğan retains considerable control, the confluence of political and economic tensions suggests that the costs of recent decisions may be mounting. The scale of public outrage, the mobilization of previously passive political actors, and the economic fallout raise questions about whether Erdoğan may have overreached. Whether the opposition can sustain momentum, build cross-ideological alliances, and endure mounting pressure will be decisive in the weeks ahead. This will require holding together a fragile coalition that includes both hardline Turkish nationalists and pro-Kurdish groups—an alliance that is essential but politically challenging to maintain.
The coming weeks will determine whether Turkey preserves its remaining democratic features or completes its transition to authoritarianism. The stakes could not be higher for Turkish democracy and the broader region.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Sahan Nuhoglu
