On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a joint military operation against Iran. In response, a coalition of Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) carried out drone and missile strikes against Iraqi Kurdish civilian and military targets, as well as US-linked diplomatic and military facilities in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. These armed groups have also struck US bases and diplomatic facilities in Gulf countries as well as local military and civilian sites in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. US and Israeli airstrikes subsequently targeted IRI facilities as well as those of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia grouping, with which the IRI partially overlaps. Washington has increased pressure on the Iraqi government to restrain the activities of these Iran-aligned groups, while Baghdad has asserted repeatedly that it wishes to avoid involvement in a broader regional war.
This backgrounder examines two actors at the center of this tension: the IRI and the PMF. As the Iraqi government attempts to preserve sovereignty while navigating US demands and Iranian influence, Iraq has emerged as a site of confrontation where state authority, foreign influence, and armed mobilization overlap.
What is the PMF?
The PMF, known in Arabic as al-Hashd al-Shaabi, formed in June 2014 following the so-called Islamic State’s seizure of Mosul and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s fatwa calling on Iraqis to take up arms to defend their country. Many of its constituent factions, however, predate the PMF, tracing their institutional origins to the “Special Groups,” Iranian-supported Shia militias that operated against US and Coalition forces during the US occupation of Iraq following the 2003 invasion. The PMF is today an umbrella organization comprising between 50 and 70 distinct militias.
Although the PMF is predominantly composed of Shia factions, the organization also includes Sunni militias. Within its Shia constituency, three divisions are present: factions aligned with the Iranian Supreme Leader, those aligned with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and others that follow Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
PMF factions continue to maintain their status as independent military formations with their own command structures.
In 2016, the Iraqi parliament recognized the PMF as a legitimate component of Iraqi national security, integrating the organization into the Iraqi armed forces. However, this recognition did not resolve the organization’s ambiguous position as PMF factions continue to maintain their status as independent military formations with their own command structures and ties to Iran outside the formal chain of command.
Successive Iraqi governments have attempted to use legislation to address the role of the militias. In 2025, the Iraqi parliament introduced a draft law aimed at further integrating the PMF into the Iraqi security apparatus and formally subordinating the organization to the prime minister as commander in chief. However, the government withdrew the law following US pressure and internal disputes.
Some PMF factions have also pursued a strategy of political participation. More than 20 PMF factions participated in the 2018 parliamentary elections, with senior officials describing the decision as a deliberate effort to legitimize the organization within Iraqi political life. This political involvement has since deepened, with PMF-affiliated factions constituting a central pillar of the Shia Coordination Framework, which after the November 2025 elections holds 162 seats in Iraq’s 329-seat parliament. Of those, factions directly affiliated with the PMF such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr militia, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s political wing, and Kata’ib Imam Ali account for a significant portion of the seats. This political dynamic has taken on renewed significance following the outbreak of the war on Iran, as some of these same factions are affiliated with the IRI and have struck targets outside the Iraqi government’s authority.
What is the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?
Multiple PMF factions are affiliated with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an umbrella group of Iran-aligned militias including Kata’ib Hezbollah, al-Nujaba Movement, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada that seek to remove US influence from Iraq.
After the onset of the genocide in Gaza in October 2023, the IRI targeted Israeli, Kurdish, and US assets in Israel, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria in solidarity with the people of Palestine and in opposition to the Israeli occupation and indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Gaza. IRI operations included a sustained campaign of attacks against US troops in Iraq as part of their efforts to compel a US withdrawal. This campaign ran alongside diplomatic negotiations between Baghdad and Washington, culminating in a 2024 agreement that formalized the withdrawal of all US-led coalition troops from Iraq by 2026. The IRI re-emerged during the 2026 US-Israel war on Iran, targeting US facilities in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and US posts in Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria in solidarity with Iran while seeking to advance their long-term goal of expelling US forces from Iraqi territory.
In response, the United States undertook intensive strikes on IRI targets. On March 14, 2026, US strikes extended into Baghdad, targeting Kata’ib Hezbollah commanders and the group’s Secretary-General, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi. In response, IRI factions intensified strikes on US targets across Iraq, resulting in repeated attacks on the US Embassy and the Camp Victory Base in Baghdad and in the Kurdistan region. NATO subsequently announced the full withdrawal of all its personnel and most foreign oil companies in Iraq announced the suspension of operations.
Direct confrontation between the IRI and the US has forced a renegotiation of the boundaries among the Iraqi state, its formal armed forces, and the Iran-aligned factions within it.
On April 8, 2026, the IRI announced a unilateral two-week suspension of its operations across Iraq and the region, a decision followed by a wider ceasefire between Iran and the United States and Israel. The announcement underscores the extent to which the IRI’s operational decisions are connected to Iran’s regional posture. It is this dynamic that has placed the Iraqi state under acute political pressure, as the direct confrontation between the IRI and the United States on Iraqi soil has forced a renegotiation of the boundaries among the Iraqi state, its formal armed forces, and the Iran-aligned factions within it operating with and beyond the Iraqi state’s authority.
The PMF and the Iraqi Government
The war on Iran has sharpened tensions inherent in the PMF’s hybrid institutional position in relation to the Iraqi government. On March 19, 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani publicly asserted that his government will not tolerate attacks on the PMF or other branches of the country’s armed forces, framing the organization’s protection as a matter of state sovereignty. This posture sits uneasily alongside sustained US pressure on Baghdad to rein in Iran-aligned factions operating within Iraqi territory.
In March 2026, the contradictions of Iraq’s position were made explicit following the National Security Council’s authorization of the PMF to defend itself against attacks on its positions to protect the force while avoiding direct confrontation with Washington. According to Iraqi militia members and officials, the pressure of the war on Iran has driven Tehran to grant Iranian field commanders greater autonomy over militia operations in Iraq. This decentralization has carried over into Iraq with some Iran-aligned militias now carrying out strikes without awaiting Tehran’s direct approval. These Iraqi factions thus maintain their operational autonomy from Iran.
Al-Sudani has taken steps to curb militia influence, occasionally removing commanders who act outside state authority. Meanwhile, factions of the PMF have asserted their position as acting in alignment with Iran’s regional axis while simultaneously adhering to the structures of the Iraqi state. Al-Nujaba Movement spokesperson Mahdi al-Kaabi himself conveyed this ambiguity, asserting both the group’s solidarity with Iran and its respect for Iraqi law and the constitution. This posture illustrates the continued ambiguity that has come to define the PMF’s institutional position as the war on Iran intensified.
US officials and experts expect Washington to intensify pressure against Iran-aligned militias as these factions have gained greater ability to operate independently amid the war. In mid-April 2026, the United States imposed sanctions on several commanders and senior members across four Iran-aligned Iraqi militia groups. On May 7, 2026, the US Treasury then designated three senior leaders of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq. These moves signal Washington’s strategy of isolating IRI elements from other PMF factions.
Conclusion
The PMF’s pursuit of state integration alongside its retention of operational autonomy, and its factions’ simultaneous claims of Iraqi legitimacy and Iranian alignment, are structural features of Iraq’s post-2014 political order. The PMF is not simply a proxy of Tehran; it has emerged from Iraqi society, has accumulated domestic political legitimacy through electoral participation, and has become embedded in state institutions over the course of a decade. Baghdad now must decide how to define its relationship with an organization that has developed institutional depth, political reach, and military capability to operate beyond a single chain of command. As long as Iran-aligned factions can escalate independently of Tehran and Baghdad, and the PMF’s political wings remain central to government formation, the boundaries of state authority in Iraq will remain undefined.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
