The Saudi-Iranian renormalization deal, signed in Beijing on March 10, 2023, has led to a significant reduction in friction between Riyadh and Tehran. Even as Israel’s war on Gaza rages on and spreads to Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere, the Saudi-Iranian détente has proven resilient. With Riyadh and Tehran determined to look past the unresolved sources of tension between them and support measures aimed at achieving regional de-escalation, both the kingdom and the Islamic Republic see continued improvements in bilateral relations as beneficial to them and to regional security more broadly.
An important dimension of this détente is defense cooperation, which has gained unprecedented momentum this year. On November 10, the kingdom’s top military official, Chief of General Staff Gen. Fayyad al-Ruwaili, visited Tehran for a meeting with his Iranian counterpart, General Mohammad Bagheri. The two addressed bilateral security cooperation, building on meetings held between high-level Saudi and Iranian military delegations in late 2023 and in 2024.
Two weeks earlier, on October 23, the Saudi Arabian and Iranian navies, along with those of other countries, participated in joint drills in the Sea of Oman. Shortly thereafter, it was reported that the commander of Iran’s navy, Admiral Shahram Irani, said that Saudi Arabia requested joint exercises in the Red Sea. On October 19, Iran, Oman, and Russia had carried out naval drills in the northern Indian Ocean, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar among the observers. Dubbed “IMEX 2024,” the purpose of these exercises, according to Iranian media, was to strengthen “collective security in the region, expand multilateral cooperation, and display the goodwill and capabilities to safeguard peace, friendship, and maritime security.”
Military cooperation between these two countries on security issues was practically unthinkable in the 2015-20 period.
Amid Israel’s wars on Gaza and Lebanon, along with the Houthis’ attacks on commercial and merchant vessels off Yemen’s coastline, such exercises, which seek to guarantee protection of maritime routes and trade security, signal major progress in terms of reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran. It is necessary to recognize the extent to which Saudi-Iranian ties have drastically shifted relatively quickly. Military cooperation between these two countries on security issues was practically unthinkable in the 2015-20 period when hostilities plagued bilateral relations. As recently as 2018 Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) famously remarked that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was “worse than Hitler.” In 2017, MBS declared that his country was a “primary target for the Iranian regime,” and asserted that any Saudi-Iranian war would be fought on Iranian soil. Iran’s then-defense minister Hossein Dehghan responded to those remarks by MBS with a warning, declaring, “if the Saudis do anything ignorant, we will leave no area untouched except Mecca and Medina.”
The recent military cooperation highlights not only Riyadh’s commitment to staying out of international alliances and coalitions designed to isolate and pressure Tehran, but also its determination to present itself to Iran as a security partner. In this current era, there are “new rules of engagement” in Iran-Israel hostilities. The “shadow war” between Tehran and Tel Aviv, in which Iranian surrogates in the Arab world and Israel fought each other directly, has since April 2024 given way to direct state-to-state confrontations. As the Islamic Republic feels increasingly threatened by the Washington-Tel Aviv alliance, such defense cooperation with Riyadh brightens the prospects for a more sustainable Saudi-Iranian rapprochement.
The Effectiveness of Iran’s “Neighbors First” Strategy
Saudi-Iranian security cooperation needs to be partly seen within the context of Tehran’s “neighbors first” foreign policy strategy, which aims at removing states in the region from any US-led campaign to squeeze the Islamic Republic. This objective may have been achieved in March 2024 when Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members denied the United States permission to wage military operations against Tehran-aligned groups in the Middle East from bases on their soil. Similarly, the GCC states, including Saudi Arabia, denied Israel access to their airspace when Tel Aviv launched “Operation Days of Repentance” on October 26, 2024, in response to earlier Iranian attacks on Israel. A few weeks before Israel’s October 26 attack, Saudi Arabia even successfully lobbied the Biden administration to pressure Israel into not bombing Iran’s oilfields.
Saudi Arabia’s quick condemnation of Operation Days of Repentance, deeming it a “serious violation of Iran’s territorial integrity and contradicts established international norms and laws,” was significant. Then, at the November 11 joint Arab League-Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit in Riyadh, MBS stated, “We call on the international community to compel Israel to respect Iran’s sovereignty and not to attack its territory.” He also charged Israel with committing genocide in Gaza. As the Saudi leadership’s rhetoric and language in response to Israel’s conduct since October 7, 2023, demonstrate, the past 14 months of conflict dynamics appear to have brought about some degree of Saudi-Iranian alignment.
The past 14 months of conflict dynamics appear to have brought about some degree of Saudi-Iranian alignment.
With Iran keen to capitalize on the “neighbors first” pillar of its foreign policy, Saudi Arabia’s choice to deepen its military ties with the Islamic Republic gives Tehran more reason to believe its détente with Riyadh is paying off. At the same time, the kingdom’s military cooperation with Iran creates new incentives for Tehran to be more accommodating to Saudi Arabia’s national security interests, especially regarding Iran’s relationships with non-state actors within the “Axis of Resistance” in countries neighboring the kingdom such as Iraq and Yemen.
Although Riyadh continues to view Iran-allied factions in Iraq and the Houthis (also called Ansar Allah) in Yemen as threats, it appears that the Saudi-Iranian détente has, to a significant degree, put the kingdom in a more secure position vis-à-vis these “resistance” forces on its borders. With Iraq’s pro-Iran groups focused on Gaza and Lebanon since October 2023, and the Baghdad government cementing a better defense relationship with Riyadh, these Tehran-backed Iraqi factions are not attacking the kingdom as they were previously. In Yemen, the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have remained in a de facto truce since 2022. Although Iran’s influence over the Houthis has its limits and Ansar Allah has its own interests unrelated to Tehran in ending the war with Saudi Arabia, it is reasonable to conclude that the Saudi-Iranian détente has made the Houthis less likely to resume hostilities toward the kingdom.
Moreover, MBS’s use of such strong language to condemn Israel’s actions against Iran and Gaza only six days after strongly pro-Israel Donald Trump won the election sent a message about Riyadh’s commitment to détente with the Islamic Republic and its firm stance against bringing the kingdom into the Abraham Accords, regardless of who is in the Oval Office. Ultimately, because of the genocide in Gaza, any talk of expanded normalization with Israel has become extremely toxic in the region. Today the political risks for any Arab leader, including MBS, to formalize diplomatic relations with Israel are too high. With domestic and regional constituencies to satisfy, MBS understands that Saudi Arabia’s entry into the Abraham Accords could trigger a crisis, and thus Riyadh has no interest in even considering the normalization path at this stage.
Saudi-Iranian Military Ties in Trump’s Second Administration
With Trump returning to the Oval Office on January 20, 2025, changes in the trajectory of US-Iran relations could have serious implications for GCC states. During his first term, Trump’s administration aggressively confronted Iran with a strategy known as ‘maximum pressure.’ This policy sought to weaken Tehran’s influence in the Middle East by tearing up the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, imposing very stringent sanctions on the country, placing an embargo on Iran’s oil, and threatening Iran militarily while taking hardline positions against Tehran-aligned groups in the region.
There is good reason to expect Trump to subject Iran to ‘maximum pressure 2.0,’ especially since he has picked hawkish and anti-Iran figures such as Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL), and Army National Guard veteran Pete Hegseth to serve high-ranking roles in his second administration. According to people familiar with the presidential transition in Washington, Trump’s foreign policy team intends to restore the maximum pressure policy and to force Iran into bankruptcy so the government can no longer finance its nuclear program or sponsor Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Houthis.
Although Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain enthusiastically supported the first Trump administration assault on the Iran nuclear deal’s legitimacy and imposition of crippling sanctions on Tehran, the second Trump administration will not be able to count on these GCC members to align with another round of maximum pressure on Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE paid a steep price for supporting maximum pressure in 2017-19, including by suffering from Iran-linked acts of sabotage off the UAE’s east coast and attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019. The key lesson learned in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi was that the first Trump administration’s campaign failed to strengthen GCC security, and, in fact, only exposed Gulf Arab countries to Tehran’s wrath.
The second Trump administration will not be able to count on GCC members to align with another round of maximum pressure on Iran.
At this stage, all GCC members seek to avoid any all-out war between Israel and Iran that could engulf the Middle East. Fearing how easily the Iranians could inflict harm on them as a punishment for their perceived role in facilitating any aggression against the Islamic Republic, the GCC states want to approach Iran with dialogue, diplomacy, and de-escalation in order to foster sustainable peace and security in the Gulf—conditions that are necessary for achieving their economic development and diversification goals. In practice, this requires keeping détente with Tehran on track, even if Saudi Arabia and, to varying degrees, other GCC members remain suspicious of the Islamic Republic.
The incoming US administration must take stock of how Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iran has fundamentally changed since Trump’s first term. If Trump brings back maximum pressure while Saudi-Iranian security cooperation continues, his administration’s relationship with Riyadh could face complications due to major Iran-related disagreements. This would be unlike Trump’s first term when the United States and Riyadh were largely on the same page regarding Tehran. There could be far-reaching implications and the United States will likely be challenged to find regional partners other than Israel for any maximum pressure 2.0 drive.
Much of this situation is a result of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states having lost confidence in the United States as a reliable and effective security guarantor. GCC states have assessed that Washington’s Israel-oriented foreign policy is a source of chaos and instability in the Middle East. Gulf Arab monarchies have witnessed the extent to which the Biden administration has given ironclad support to Israel and have not forgotten what they perceive as the lack of adequate support from Washington following the Iranian-backed attacks on the UAE and the kingdom. A deepening of Saudi-Iranian military cooperation after Trump returns to the Oval Office would send a strong message to the United States about Riyadh’s quest to assert greater autonomy from Washington and to pursue increasingly independent approaches to Gulf security. This would continue a trend set in motion during the 2010-11 Arab uprisings, when Riyadh perceived that the Obama administration was supporting anti-status quo movements in the Arab world, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, at the expense of a political order that most GCC regimes saw as critical to their own stability and legitimacy.
The previous two US administrations considered—as Trump’s new administration is also likely to—a Saudi-Israeli diplomatic accord critical to enhancing security in the Middle East. But the past 14 months of Israel’s genocide in Gaza have made the possibility that Riyadh will enter the normalization camp far less likely. Instead, the Gaza war has created conditions which will compel Saudi Arabia to build on its détente with Iran, including through unprecedented defense cooperation.
At the same time, Trump’s unpredictability and lack of any consistent principles guiding his foreign policy suggest the prospect that Trump could approach Iran diplomatically. Since the US election, the Islamic Republic’s leadership made overtures to the president-elect and those on his team to try to entice Trump away from a renewed pressure campaign.
Although officials in Tehran denied it, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations reportedly met close Trump ally Elon Musk in Manhattan on November 11, conveying a message about Tehran’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with the United States and to stop the expansion of the Gaza and Lebanon wars. Four days earlier, Iran’s Vice President for Strategic Affairs and former foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif posted on X that the Islamic Republic was “not [being] swayed by threats, but [also] cognizant of respect.”
It remains to be seen how Trump’s second administration will respond to any Iranian olive branches. Although Trump as a candidate expressed his interest in striking a nuclear deal with Tehran in his second term, there will be many obstacles that make such an agreement difficult to achieve, including opposition from anti-Iran hawks in the US Congress and Iran’s quest for revenge for Trump’s assassination of Major General Qassem Soleimani in early 2020. Trump 2.0 will likely conduct foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic in contradictory ways, influenced by outward hostility and an Israel-centered approach to the region on one side, and a determination to negotiate some deal with Tehran on the other. If the second Trump administration functions similarly to the first one, a high level of dysfunctionality and incoherence will dim the prospects for successful diplomacy, in relation to Iran and across the board.
Nonetheless, should Trump’s second administration engage in diplomacy toward Iran, it would be worth considering how MBS, who has close relationships with Trump and members of his inner circle, and the leaders of other GCC states, notably Oman and Qatar, could play bridging roles between the two sides. Yet, in all likelihood, Saudi Arabia will have to brace for a return of maximum pressure and, with that, new and complicated dynamics in its partnership with the United States—stemming largely from Riyadh’s and Washington’s disagreements about how to approach Tehran.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
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