Following a surprising appointment as Lebanon’s new prime minister, independent jurist, academic, and former diplomat Nawaf Salam, finds himself enmeshed in the petty politics of government formation. Salam now must contend with a tradition of bitter politicking and bartering over cabinet posts to placate all parties and secure parliament’s vote of confidence. Will he assert his prerogatives against political party pressures, or cave to the petty politics of yesterday?
Politics in Lebanon has been based on sectarian power sharing that guarantees representation to all 18 sects, including through an informal arrangement that divides ministerial portfolios by sectarian identity and applies quotas to government posts. This system sustains a weak and patronage-based system through which competing bureaucratic fiefdoms vie for power. Quotas have been treated like entitlements, helping those in control channel state resources to their followers and allies. On top of this has been Hezbollah’s “blocking third’’ in the government that has given the group veto power over cabinet decisions and the ability to topple the government.
Salam, backed by a sweeping 84 of Lebanon’s 128 lawmakers, initially indicated that he would form a non-partisan cabinet that aligns with his convictions. He adopted a forceful tone toward the Shia duo of Hezbollah and Amal who had sought to precondition appointments to the cabinet. He signaled his readiness to tackle Lebanon’s manifold challenges—even the country’s pervasive governance problems and the deeply embedded corruption that treats state resources as sources for income generation in service of narrow sectarian ends. Other pressing needs include the reconstruction of the south, the Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut following Israel’s destructive war against Hezbollah—all against the backdrop of acute social and economic crises.
Now is the time for change and for decision making that overcomes petty machinations and partisan politics. Salam, who may lack cooperation of the political class but has the confidence of the public, needs to break from the past and put the country on a path toward genuine reform and reconciliation that restores national and international trust in Lebanon’s leadership and institutions. This means ending the absurd convention of making the cabinet a mini-parliament. It means instead appointing deputies as ministers to form the cabinet based on the standards upon which Salam has agreed with President Joseph Aoun: competence, non-partisanship, and integrity. It also means not accepting imposition nor exclusion from anyone, foreign or domestic, and putting parliament to the test of approving or rejecting what the Lebanese people want. Only then will much-needed assistance flow to rebuild the devastated regions of the country.
Rescuing Lebanon
On November 27, 2024, a long-awaited though fragile ceasefire was reached between Israel and Hezbollah, ending a 14-month conflict provoked by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel. The 13-point truce called for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy to the South and for the Israeli Army to withdraw from there within 60 days. Both Hezbollah and Israel have since traded accusations of breaking the ceasefire. After Israel failed to remove its troops by the original deadline and faulted Lebanon for allegedly failing to remove Hezbollah from the border areas, the truce was extended until February 18.
The conflict with Israel decimated Hezbollah’s command and control structure, causing disarray among the group’s rank and file, destroyed much of its weapons arsenal, and displaced hundreds of thousands of mostly Shia citizens—Hezbollah’s base—from the south, dealing a crippling blow to the group and its sponsors, Iran and Assad’s Syria before the collapse of the regime. (Former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant alleged in October 2024 that Israel had destroyed 80 percent of Hezbollah’s weapons.) But although it may now be a shadow of its former self, Hezbollah cannot be underestimated. It retains representation in parliament, and some of its fighters remain armed. In recent weeks, weapons that Hezbollah was smuggling into Lebanon were repeatedly seized by Syrian border security, indicating that the group is still active.
Hezbollah cannot be underestimated as it retains representation in parliament and some of its fighters remain armed.
In the next phase of the ceasefire, Lebanon must fully implement the 1989 Ta’if Agreement (which ended the civil war in Lebanon) and UNSC Resolution 1701 (which ended hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006) and on which the 2024 truce is based. This requires disbanding Hezbollah, dismantling its infrastructure, and putting the LAF in exclusive control of weapons in the country. Heretofore, the LAF’s role had been predominantly confined to internal security and it tended to steer clear of confrontations, especially with Hezbollah, to avoid fragmentation of the army along sectarian lines. A US-led plan to bolster the LAF (a significant recipient of US military aid), involving the recruitment, training, and equipping of troops to reinforce its offensive and defensive capabilities, had recently begun. It would enable the LAF to dismantle and confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons freely, secure Lebanon’s borders, and help restore security to the country. Such a plan—which needs to begin quickly but appears to be on hold during President Donald Trump’s 90-day foreign aid freeze—is ambitious and costly. In the meantime, pitting the army against Hezbollah may have devastating repercussions as the movement could still be a daunting opponent despite being diminished. Already, tensions are mounting. Days after the Israel Army killed residents trying to return to their homes in southern villages, inhabitants of the south began redirecting their anger toward the LAF, which they increasingly perceive as being unable to protect them. (Although the LAF has been able to redeploy to some regions of the south, other areas remain inaccessible because of the continued presence of the Israeli Army.)
While anti-Hezbollah factions have capitalized on this moment to impose defeat on Hezbollah, many within the Shia community are increasingly fearful of exclusion, in light of the fact that Hezbollah-run welfare and social services previously filled the gap in state services. With many Shia now returning to destroyed homes and villages, narratives of triumphalism could intensify sectarian tensions and fuel the return of a nastier and more virulent Hezbollah. Hezbollah would also like to resume its social welfare activities to fill any void left by government inaction on relief and reconstruction because without Shia support, there cannot be a revitalized Hezbollah.
Consequently, citizens of the south will need the attention of Salam’s new government—not because they were defeated, but because their dire situation needs addressing. Here, a well-implemented reconstruction plan can pave the way for a future for the Shia community not under the thumb of Hezbollah and Iran. But for this to happen, and for foreign assistance to flow, Salam must take decisive actions to demonstrate that the state is functioning. This should start with goodwill gestures toward the implementation of reforms that weaken the power of entrenched elites. Indeed, any new international assistance must impose better enforcement of provisions for reform, including the structural economic and governance reforms mandated by an agreement with the International Monetary Fund in 2022. Such moves will help restore confidence and empower the government to usher the country toward rescue and recovery.
Nawaf Salam and Lebanon’s Recovery
Alongside the spectacular defeat of Hezbollah-backed caretaker prime minister Najib Mikati, who only secured nine votes in parliament, Salam’s election was a further setback for a party that previously held an iron grip on state decision making. For decades, the Iran-backed group in effect controlled and exploited a weak and ineffective state, leveraging its weaknesses even to redirect funds and resources for its own maintenance. For example, Hezbollah controlled key ministries, including the Ministry of Health, through which it directed health care and patronage jobs to its supporters and fighters. Hezbollah also controlled the Ministry of Public Works, enabling it to oversee land use, air traffic, and ports. This role guaranteed that Hezbollah-linked companies would receive large contracts and gave the group access to fresh funds as well as control of the Port of Beirut’s reconstruction after the devastating explosion of August 2020. The militia-cum-party used violence judiciously to maintain its hegemony, to shape politics, to provide cover for a corrupt political establishment, and to suppress opposition.
Now that Iran is weakened and Hezbollah is no longer the country’s main power broker, Gulf countries have suddenly thrown their weight behind President Aoun. However, such support only augurs well for Lebanon if it enables the country to fully implement the ceasefire with Israel and embark on urgent reforms, including restructuring the financial sector to jump start the economy and revive state institutions. This is exactly what President Aoun, who is pushing for a government formation before the February 18 deadline, wants to restore international confidence in the Lebanese state.
Despite Salam’s original intentions of forming a technocratic and “strong” government with the full support of the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia, expectations of power sharing may block his path. The various parties and sects who have impeded long-needed reforms are demanding their share, which will be critical to securing a vote of confidence for the government in parliament. In recent days, Salam’s mission has been complicated by accusations that he assigned the Ministry of Finance, which controls government spending, to the Amal Movement. Salam nominated former member of parliament Yassin Jaber, seen as close to Hezbollah and Amal and to the banking lobby, as minister of finance. The Lebanese Forces Party, headed by Samir Geagea, in turn, is demanding “unified criteria” in cabinet formation while seeking other influential portfolios, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose leadership is technically left to President Aoun to choose. (The party might instead obtain the Ministries of Energy and Telecommunications, potentially sidelining the Free Patriotic Movement, headed by MP Gebran Bassil, which is also looking for a place in the new government.) This process is further complicated because many of Lebanon’s establishment politicians colluded in the country’s financial collapse and stand accused of nepotism and corruption, and are held responsible for thwarting economic and political accountability.
Gulf support only augurs well for Lebanon if it enables the country to embark on urgent reforms to jump start the economy and revive state institutions.
While this all seems ambitious, Lebanon’s new leadership can lay the ground for longer-term change—without giving in to anyone. Though there is talk of government portfolios being nearly all assigned, and of Lebanon inching closer to forming a cabinet, there is still time for Nawaf Salam, with Aoun’s backing, to get his way and set the tone for Lebanon’s next phase. In this context, the weakening of Hezbollah provides a short span of opportunity to recover a viable national formula for broader public engagement on a vision for the future of Lebanon.
Paving the Way for a New Political Identity
The elements are in place today for genuine Lebanese decision-making that overcomes political wrangling and petty politics. For the first time, Lebanon has a chance at independence and reconciliation. And with fresh leadership represented in an independent, non-partisan, cabinet under Salam’s untainted leadership, Lebanon can demand exclusive state control over arms and end its subservience to malign foreign influence. By the same token, it can break the cycle of mismanagement, corruption, and petty politics. This should pave the way for a reassessment within Hezbollah that guides the organization toward a purely political role, turning the page once and for all to become a true Lebanese political party. But crucial reforms are needed to address the country’s severe governance and economic deficits, as well as the current humanitarian crisis ensuing from the recent war with Israel.
Lebanon has the chance today to become a country that belongs to all Lebanese—something that Lebanon’s current elites have, until now, eschewed. Here, political alliances that span divides and build unity will be instrumental in fostering a shared sense of kinship and in fashioning a more inclusive Lebanese political identity.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Facebook/Lebanese Presidency
