In April 2026, with the help of the United States, Libya’s two parallel governments reached an agreement on a unified national budget for the first time since 2013. The two administrations also participated in military exercises sponsored by the United States African Command (AFRICOM) that were held in Libya for the first time. While these developments may signal cooperation between the rival governments, realities on the ground belie any optimism about imminent reunification. Endemic corruption within each government works to perpetuate the status quo. Well-armed militias run patronage networks that help keep each government in place, while outside powers continue to aid their Libyan clients by way of various military and economic schemes, hindering unification. The United Nations continues to call for a stop to Libyan groups’ weapons smuggling and illicit petroleum exports. Although the United States and Europe may encourage higher Libyan oil production to make up for the shortfall caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, any additional revenues are unlikely to filter down to the Libyan people.
A Country Plagued by Divisions
Libya remains deeply divided. The internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in the capital city of Tripoli, but its authority extends only to the western part of the country. The GNU is led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, who was supposed to be only an interim prime minister until the nationwide elections that were scheduled for December 2021. After those elections were postponed, however, he stayed on as prime minister (the 2021 vote has yet to be rescheduled). His government is supported by various militias based in and around Tripoli.
In eastern Libya, a second government, the House of Representatives (HoR), traces its origins to the June 2014 elections that created that body. Months after the vote, Libya’s supreme court ruled that those elections were unconstitutional and that the HoR must be dissolved, but instead the HoR relocated to Tobruk, near Libya’s border with Egypt, and became the base of the eastern government. The HoR is supported militarily by the so-called Libyan National Army led by self-anointed Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Based in the city of Benghazi, Haftar is the real power in the east. In 2019-2020, Haftar attempted to take over the entire country, but his offensive was stymied by Tripoli-backed forces and by Turkey, which provided this government with advanced military equipment and personnel. Haftar then retreated to his stronghold in Benghazi. Now, his forces control the eastern coast and much of the interior.
The challenges of holding new national elections and creating a unified national government have frustrated the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for many years. On April 22, 2026, UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh stated that the political process was stalled, delaying efforts to reunify the country. She voiced frustration, stating, “Allowing status quo actors to evade their responsibilities will only undermine efforts to preserve Libya’s unity and wealth and delay the path to sustained peace, stability, and development.” Her comments echoed those of past leaders of UNSMIL who resigned after facing similar intransigence.
Some Positive Developments
On April 11, 2026, the two governments approved the first unified state budget since 2013, a potential step toward unifying fractured state institutions and reducing corruption. The High State Council, the legislative body of the GNU, and the HoR agreed on a national budget of 190 billion Libyan dinars, equivalent to about $30 billion. The central bank governor, Naji Issa, stated optimistically that “this is a clear declaration that Libya is capable of overcoming its differences when a unified vision for its future is forged.” Representatives from the two governments said that the unified budget would help ensure a fair distribution of resources and would allocate substantial funds to improve the state-run National Oil Corporation (NOC).
Efforts to agree on a unified budget were assisted by Massad Boulos, Senior Advisor to President Donald Trump for Africa and Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs and the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany. Boulos praised the new budget as not only supporting nationwide development projects in Libya but also as shoring up the NOC to allow it to increase energy production and to generate higher state revenues.
Given the current difficulties of exporting oil and gas from the Gulf because of the Iran war’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration may be looking to Libya to meet part of the worldwide oil shortfall. Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa, estimated at 48 billion barrels, and the country’s oil production has recently increased. Libya reportedly produced 1.43 million barrels per day (b/d) in early April 2026—one million more than it had produced in the previous month, and a ten-year high. Other reports have indicated that Libya plans to substantially increase natural gas exports to Europe by 2030. Currently the country exports very little gas via the Greenstream pipeline that runs from Libya to Sicily, but there are hopes of boosting this with the assistance of foreign companies.
In early April 2026, AFRICOM for the first time sponsored military exercises in Libya, called Flintlock, in partnership with 30 African and European countries. The exercises are designed to improve counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and perhaps also to push back against Russian influence in the region. US Embassy Libya (which is currently based in Tunisia because of security concerns) said that Libya’s hosting of the exercises “highlights the ability of Libyan security institutions from east and west to work together to contribute to and lead regional security cooperation,” and that it was an “important step toward stronger, more unified Libyan military institutions.” During the exercises, Khalifa Haftar’s son Saddam, who serves as deputy commander of his father’s forces, said that the exercises reaffirmed “Libya’s position as a reliable partner in supporting regional and international peace and security.”
Meddling Across Borders and Corruption Continue Unabated
Such upbeat words belie facts on the ground, however. Haftar’s forces and allied militias have reportedly aided the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s brutal civil war by taking over the so-called triangle area where the borders of Sudan, Libya, and Egypt meet. This territorial hold has allowed the RSF to smuggle gold, drugs, and people into Libya, often receiving arms and illicit petroleum exports in return. The RSF has committed numerous human rights abuses, including the execution of thousands of civilians in the town of al-Fasher in the North Darfur province, which makes it difficult to say, as Saddam Haftar claimed, that Libyan security forces are reliably contributing to regional peace and security.
Both Libyan administrations are engaged in extensive corruption schemes. In the words of one analyst, in western Libya “the appearance of state-building masks a far more predatory ecosystem. Over the past decade, ministries, public agencies, and state-owned enterprises have morphed into personal fiefdoms for factions that operate more like organized crime families than political actors.” In eastern Libya, where most of the country’s oil fields are located, Saddam Haftar has, as that same analyst put it, “refined the art of large-scale fuel smuggling, exploiting Libya’s heavily subsidized fuel system to siphon off billions [of dollars] annually.” Such smuggling schemes deprive the state of hard currency and contribute to a collapsing welfare system. The International Monetary Fund has noted persistently large fiscal deficits, which have put pressure on the exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves, and inflation, exacerbating social tensions. Many Libyan citizens are angry over their living conditions, given that Libya is an oil-rich country with only 7.5 million people but according to 2023 data has a poverty rate of nearly 40 percent.
Human rights groups have castigated both of Libya’s governments. Human Rights Watch, for example, recently noted that “armed groups, smugglers, and state authorities in Libya have subjected migrants, including infants and young children, to arbitrary detention, extortion, forced labor, sexual violence, and other serious abuses.” It also reported widespread arbitrary detention, torture and ill treatment in facilities run by state-affiliated forces and armed groups.
The Damaging Role of Outside Players
External powers, including Egypt, Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are known to have assisted Libya’s rival factions to further their own agendas, with other outside actors such as the European Union (EU) also contributing negatively to the situation.
A March 2026 report by the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on Libya, mandated to monitor weapons embargo violations and other illicit activities involving the North African country, discusses the involvement of foreign actors in illegal schemes that fund Libya’s militias. The UN report confirmed the findings of a 2025 investigation by the Italian publication Il Foglio of an elaborate scheme involving the UAE and a notorious Libyan businessman known as Ahmed Gadalla, who is close to Saddam Haftar. The investigation showed that foreign actors continue to violate the UN embargo on weapons and other military items destined for Libya. It also revealed either lapsed judgment or a cover-up by the EU’s naval mission, Operation IRINI, which was established to monitor the arms embargo.
According to Il Foglio, in July 2025, a container ship that left the UAE port of Jebel Ali was intercepted by frigates associated with IRINI in the Mediterranean Sea near the port of Derna, Libya, after a tip-off from US intelligence. The cargo ship was then escorted to the Greek port of Astakos for inspection. Although the ship officially declared that it was only carrying cosmetics, cigarettes, and electronic equipment, it was actually transporting 240 pickup trucks destined for Libya, 86 of which were armored. Typically used for mounting machine guns, these trucks are the vehicles of choice for Libyan and Sudanese militias. The UN has defined these trucks as military equipment and their shipment is considered a violation of the embargo.
The investigation revealed that the decision to allow the ship to leave for Libya was the result of “secret negotiations” between the EU, Greece, the UAE, and the two Libyan authorities in the east and the west. According to Il Foglio, Greece—worried about the wave of migrants coming from eastern Libya to Crete—sought to avoid offending Haftar and to prevent any retaliation in the form of a new irregular migration surge, decided that allowing the cargo to Libya was the “lesser evil.” Instead of offloading the trucks in Tripoli, the ship docked in Misrata, a port under the control of Dbeibah’s government. Some 209 trucks were offloaded there; the rest were delivered to Benghazi, suggesting that both Libyan governments were involved in the scheme. The March 2026 UN report noted that 26 of the trucks wound up in the hands of a Libyan militia, al-Katiba 55, that run a notorious prison camp for migrants near Tripoli.
No Political Solution in Sight
Libya’s government is likely to remain divided for some time. Each administration benefits from the status quo through corruption schemes, while the militias depend on patronage that they receive from the governments or on revenues from their own rackets. While recent cooperation to agree on a unified budget may be encouraging, the fundamentals of the situation have not changed.
The decision by AFRICOM to host military exercises in Libya and to include military units belonging to each Libyan administration has done nothing to foster unity. Indeed, all it has probably achieved is to make those factions feel important. Rather than trying to forge unity through military posturing, the international community should increase its efforts to stop oil smuggling out of Libya in exchange for arms.
Some moves in that direction are already underway. On April 14, 2026, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution to reinforce international efforts to monitor and prevent illicit oil smuggling from Libya. The resolution reaffirmed that the NOC is the sole entity authorized to market Libya’s oil and called for a prohibition on depositing Libyan oil revenues anywhere but in official accounts.
Yet there appears to be no real mechanism to enforce such a resolution except to target individuals and entities with sanctions—an approach that obviously has not worked well in the past. Only if meaningful punitive measures are applied to those involved in illicit oil sales will there be pressure on the two administrations to hold national elections and to bring about a unified government.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
