The surprising fall of the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria on the heel of Hezbollah’s spectacular losses and, with it, the tremendous weakening of Iran’s influence in the country, affords the Lebanese a historic opportunity to decide the fate of their country. Ending Iranian hegemony over Lebanon offers a chance for the emergence of a national and inclusive country with competent leadership able to tackle the country’s multiple crises, from corrupt governance to an unsustainable refugee crisis and a continuing financial meltdown.
After Israel’s destructive campaign, Hezbollah today appears severely debilitated, its leadership in tatters, its Syrian backers gone, and its Iranian patrons on the back foot. Though Hezbollah retains the ability to cause harm, its weakening is a sign of hope for those in Lebanon who would like to see the country take control of its future. But the militant group, which has also lost its supply routes through Syria, must now lay down its arms, as mandated by the November 2024 US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, and become a political party—all while the Lebanese take stock and act in line with the new reality of Hezbollah’s decline.
Hezbollah’s opponents, however, have yet to unite or to agree on a plan of action for the next stage. Such an agreement requires a serious reckoning, not just concerning Lebanon’s leaders’ sectarian impulses, but also what the Lebanese people are prepared to accept from their political bosses. This is the time for an ambitious project of inclusion and dialogue in the context of reconstruction that brings Lebanon’s communities together under a common goal: Lebanon’s survival as a nation-state. Such a project must demand the urgent political and economic reforms needed to move the country forward—and what comes next is up to the Lebanese people. The long-overdue election of a president is a vital first step.
Will the Lebanese Elect a President?
Following the announcement of the ceasefire agreement, Lebanon’s Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri announced that he would convene parliament on January 9 to elect a president, in successive rounds of voting if necessary. To be elected, a presidential candidate must secure two-thirds of parliamentary votes (86 out of 128) in a first round and a majority of votes (65) in the second. Berri’s announcement came after a long hiatus caused by his refusal to hold open electoral sessions. The election of a president has been stymied since former President Michel Aoun concluded his tenure in October 2022 and opposing camps in parliament (the Iran-backed Hezbollah led alliance to which Berri belongs and a pro-US sovereigntist coalition) have been unable to rally around a consensus candidate.
Lebanon’s power-sharing system is prone to gridlock, especially as one bloc within parliament has rarely been strong enough to coalesce and command the majority. Although in the 2022 parliamentary elections the pro-Hezbollah bloc lost its majority, it continued to wield influence by building a coalition that gave it the ability to block decisions, including the election of a president. Until recently, Hezbollah had endorsed Suleiman Frangieh, a Christian Maronite candidate and leader of the Marada movement with ties to the deposed Assad regime, while the opposition to Hezbollah staunchly rejected Frangieh.
The US has redoubled calls for Lebanon to elect a president and move forward with political and economic reforms
Since the ceasefire, the United States has redoubled calls for Lebanon to elect a president and move forward with political and economic reforms, and Hezbollah has announced that it does not oppose the candidacy of Washington’s preferred candidate, Lebanese Armed Forces commander Joseph Aoun. This new momentum toward an election will put to the test whatever remaining influence and power Hezbollah has in the country. Complicating matters, however, are divisions within the opposition camp over the wisdom of engaging with the militant group before it gives up its weapons and transitions to a political party.
Meanwhile, the World Bank has estimated that the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel has caused $8 billion in damage and economic losses to Lebanon, including 100,000 damaged or destroyed homes, mostly in the south where nearly a quarter of buildings have been wrecked. This destruction, which comes on the heels of an economic crisis gripping the country since 2019, may further impede reconstruction. Before the ceasefire announcement, an estimated 1.3 million Lebanese—mainly Shia—had been forced out of many Hezbollah-dominated areas, their livelihoods in tatters. Hundreds of businesses have closed, and shelling has destroyed farms and the agricultural regions. Recovery will take time, especially since today, in contrast to the aftermath of the 2006 war when money from the Gulf states poured in, no one seems to know who will pay for relief and reconstruction. Though Hezbollah has been assessing damages, registering families, promising compensation, and even doling out small amounts as part of a “reconstruction campaign,” it is unclear if it will give any significant funding. And with Iran in no position to finance the full magnitude of reconstruction, Hezbollah is unlikely to regain all of its former popular support among the Shia. Because the group will need the Lebanese state to act decisively, it is no longer able to encourage a continued stalemate or obstruct the formation of a government that can secure outside funding and forge ahead with much-needed reconstruction. This new dynamic increases the likelihood of a political breakthrough and provides any future government with leverage over Hezbollah.
What Is Next for Hezbollah?
Since 2008, Hezbollah’s mantra of “army, people, resistance” governed Lebanon’s defense strategy, legitimizing Hezbollah’s weapons and military operations. The narrative sought to establish that Hezbollah was vital to Lebanon’s defense, based on the need for national resistance to Israel, but also to combat jihadist threats, such as in the eastern town of Arsal in 2017. This formula allowed the group to retain its arms in pursuit of its objectives and paved the way for its entrenchment in Lebanese state institutions. The militia/party, which became the leading provider of welfare and financial services to its Shia base (through structures parallel to those of the state) and developed an extensive media infrastructure, grew to be the dominant domestic power. Gaining seats in parliament gave it official power, enabling it to manipulate alliances and enmity and to pressure state institutions while draining state resources. Most significantly, Hezbollah became the underwriter of a corrupt political establishment that it shielded even from widespread condemnation and public demands for reform and change.
Now, with the loss of a large number of its leaders—most notably Hassan Nasrallah, its charismatic chief with cult-like status among supporters—and Israel’s targeting of key areas of support, along with the devastation of supply routes from Syria, the group’s ability to impose its will has faded. Its new leadership has sought to play down any signs of weakness, however. (The group’s new secretary general, Naim Qassem, declared in his first speech after the ceasefire that Hezbollah had scored a “great victory” against Israel—in stark denial of the reality on the ground.) While questions remain about the group’s capabilities and next moves, its rationale for maintaining weapons has become less and less convincing. And as Lebanon’s public and government absorb the reality of Hezbollah’s defeat, the election of a president can prompt a new, inclusive, and national outlook. For this to happen, Hezbollah’s disarmament, in tandem with Lebanon’s reconstruction, will need to be prioritized.
Implementing the ceasefire agreement, which took effect on November 27, 2024, and ended more than 14 months of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, is now the binding imperative. Under the deal, Lebanese army soldiers should deploy to the south after the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters and the Israeli Army. as they just did by deploying in Naqoura on the border. Strengthening the Lebanese Army so that it can take on its national defense role on its own is a key element in making the deal stick and rendering the “army, people, resistance” dogma obsolete. In that regard, it was reassuring that the army just took over positions in the coastal town of Naqoura following a withdrawal of Israeli forces according to the ceasefire agreement.
Contrary to Hezbollah’s assertions that the ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on which it is based apply only to territory south of the Litani River, the agreement is quite explicit about the disarmament of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has nevertheless signaled its intention of maintaining its military wing. Indeed, Qassem’s first speech emphasized collaboration with the army rather than disarmament, despite the ceasefire’s provisions requiring dismantling non-state military infrastructures. This stance has aggravated tensions inside Lebanon about Hezbollah’s future role in the country (and the repercussions for the Shia community), despite an initial manifestation of solidarity in reaction to Israel’s onslaught and the significant destruction and loss of life it caused. Public resentment against the group and its Shia supporters has virulently re-emerged among a significant portion of Lebanon’s population, especially because of Hezbollah’s role in sheltering a corrupt political class that has, to date, foiled all attempts at reform.
Hezbollah must take stock of recent geopolitical power shifts in the region and recognize the looming challenges.
Though Lebanon’s political trajectory remains unclear, Hezbollah must take stock of recent geopolitical power shifts in the region and recognize the looming challenges. While the group is likely to remain a part of the country’s political life, it needs to adapt to new circumstances in which its margin of operations is more restricted, become invested in rebuilding state institutions, and give up its weapons—or risk inviting more destruction to the country. It needs to accept defeat and reinvent itself within a purely civilian framework, making itself subject to the overall Lebanese demand for a state that acts in the best interest of the majority—something that Hezbollah thought it could obfuscate throughout the past decade but can no longer do so. Here, although disarmament should be non-negotiable, it must be done without imposing defeat on the Shia community as a whole, which Hezbollah purports to represent and defend. This community is devastated and has become a significant burden on the party, which may no longer be able to offer it much.
Lebanon Needs a National Narrative and Leadership
Lebanon’s catalog of woes is long, and the Hezbollah-Israel war has only exacerbated them. The country, whose endemic political dysfunction has been worsened by severe economic and financial crises, now needs to rebuild an infrastructure devastated by conflict, a decimated tourism sector (which was a lucrative lifeline for the country), and a diminished business sector. The country is at a turning point. If Lebanon does not prioritize actions that will serve its immediate humanitarian needs, tackle dangerous divisions, and foster solidarity—especially in the face of the ruin and “collective punishment” suffered by the Shia community—while restoring trust in government, the country’s image as a heterogenous society adept at preserving a veneer of functioning statehood risks being destroyed.
Lebanon’s future thus depends on how it moves in this post-war phase. The journey to recovery will require national unity and a commitment to reform. Indeed, the first step toward a successful “day after” approach is a public national dialogue that progresses beyond the denunciation of the political class and its patrons and delineates the outlines of Lebanon’s future. The country will also need a national defense strategy, with an empowered army at the center that can take complete control of the territory and its borders. Lebanon will not be able to recover and rebuild until the necessary political and economic reforms are put in place under the aegis of the international community. Such reforms will, with associated transparency and accountability provisions, restore local and international confidence in the government, secure international aid, and attract foreign investment.
What Lebanon lacks, however, is a national narrative for its sustainability, away from attachment to failed past models or a triumphalism that dreams of leveraging the wealth or strength of outside powers who often have conflicting interests. The real test faced by the Lebanese people today is whether they can produce a leadership capable of piercing through traditional petty politics and to prioritize Lebanon’s survival. The emergence of such a leadership to help lead this crucial period in Lebanon’s history may be even more important than the election of a new president.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit:Shutterstock/John Grummitt
