In September, Taro Kono, Japan’s former foreign minister and a main contender for president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), announced that if he were to become prime minister, he would consider recognizing Palestine as a state. The LDP has ruled Japan almost uninterrupted since 1955, making the position of party leader practically synonymous with the premiership of the country. Kono becoming the LDP’s leader would have signaled a marked shift in Japanese policy toward Palestine and the Middle East in general.
Ultimately, Kono failed to garner the necessary support, and Shigeru Ishiba emerged as party head and prime minister. Kono’s stance on Palestine was hardly his main platform, and surely not the reason for his defeat—among other factors, he has long lacked support from the LDP’s right wing. His Palestine position was well known, however, and it is significant that a realistic candidate for national leader would support such a policy.
Kono’s Palestine announcement came on the heels of a diplomatic row in August, when Shiro Suzuki, the mayor of Nagasaki, announced that the Israeli ambassador to Japan would not be invited to that city’s annual peace ceremony. Every year, the local governments of Nagasaki and Hiroshima (the two cities to suffer US atomic bombings during the Second World War) hold ceremonies to remember the dead and to call for global peace. Livestreamed on national television, the events feature the laying of wreaths by all foreign ambassadors in Japan.
Mayor Suzuki stated that the decision not to invite Israel’s ambassador was intended to preserve a “peaceful and solemn atmosphere,” but it seemed clear that having the representative of a country found by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to be plausibly committing genocide attend a peace ceremony was not a good look. The move was also in line with the policy of both Nagasaki and Hiroshima since 2022 not to invite Russia or Belarus to the annual commemoration. As countries that threaten international peace and security were not welcome, it stands to reason Israel should be included in that group.
Suzuki was applauded by pro-Palestinian activists in Japan and abroad, but he received a terse letter from the ambassadors of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the other five countries of the G7. The letter stated explicitly that Israel should not be put on a par with Russia and threatened that the ambassadors would boycott the ceremony if the decision was not reversed. Japan’s central government, meanwhile, laid low, stating that the invitations were a local decision. Suzuki stuck to his guns; Israel remained unwelcome, and the G7 ambassadors were no-shows. (Hiroshima, for its part, did invite Israel as usual, a fact perhaps attributable to the right-leaning views of that city’s mayor.)
These two developments—Kono’s proposal to recognize Palestine and the Nagasaki mayor’s disinvitation of the Israeli ambassador—show how the Japanese discourse on Palestine has shifted since October 2023. Over decades, the Japanese position on Palestine has often been muddled as the country has sought to balance competing priorities: the overriding (perceived) prerogative to abide by American wishes, on the one hand, and the country’s desire to be seen as a peace-loving supporter of international law and justice, on the other. These contradictions are inherent in how Japan conducts itself on the world stage. Put another way, if Japan sorts out a coherent position on Palestine—something it may be inching toward—it will have a better idea what sort of country it truly wants to be.
Japan’s Dependence on the United States
For the Japanese political elite, East Asia is the main area for furthering Japanese interests. Japan has always looked at China as its prime strategic, military, economic, political, and even social threat, although Russia and North Korea are also presented as threats. The overall picture is that East Asia is a tough neighborhood, and that Japan (so the argument goes) needs a credible military deterrence.
At the same time, Japan is a strongly pacifist country. Its postwar constitution (prepared for and imposed upon it by the US occupation) renounces the use of force as a means for settling international disputes, and even puts constraints on Japan’s maintaining and deploying military forces. Most Japanese opinion polls show robust support for the pacifist clauses of the constitution and for the peaceful resolution of international disputes through multilateral fora such as the United Nations.
Kono’s proposal to recognize Palestine and the mayor of Nagasaki’s disinvitation of the Israeli ambassador show how the Japanese discourse on Palestine has shifted since October 2023.
Japan could have chosen a route of neutrality, with the country using international diplomacy and multilateralism to advance international peace and security for all. Instead, it threw its lot in with the United States. For decades, many in Japan have tried to push forward remilitarization of the country, but not as an independent actor. Rather, Japan’s goal is to be recognized as a partner—an important but junior one—within the US military alliance.
Japan remains host to 85 American military bases and facilities. The Japanese are exceptionally generous hosts, providing large amounts of funds for the facilities—justified on the questionable basis that they exist to “protect Japan.” While it is true that the United States has a treaty obligation to defend Japan should the country be attacked, it is equally true that is not the sole, or even main, goal of the US bases. Rather, they are incorporated in the overall US global military strategy and are used as launchpads for US operations within and outside East and Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, Japan’s political elite remains wholly devoted to the US military alliance, which the country’s political discourse and mainstream media present as a given and as the only viable way for Japan to survive. Commentators, journalists, and politicians who argue against this fundamental premise are quickly excluded from the mainstream.
Within this context, Japanese policymakers take great pains to align the country’s positions, in particular on foreign policy, with those of the United States. At the same time, Japan has forged a strong international identity as a peace-loving country committed to multilateralism and international law. The demands of these two differing strategic goals have become increasingly difficult to reconcile in recent years.
Palestine and the Middle East
Compared to East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East (including Palestine) is a sideshow for the Japanese elite. The country does not have strong historical, religious, or social ties with the region, and most Japanese have little understanding of, or interest in, Middle Eastern affairs. But Japan relies heavily on energy resources from the Middle East, importing 95 percent of its oil from the region, which necessitates smooth relations with Iran and Arab oil-exporting countries.
Taking this into account, Japan has been content with a backstage role in the Middle East. Japan is a major donor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the Palestinian Authority, and at every juncture stresses its wish for peace and prosperity, respect for international law, and a two-state solution for the question of Palestine. Mindful of the need to distance itself from extreme US positions, Japan has at times voted against American wishes at the United Nations. For example, in 2012, Japan voted to admit Palestine as a non-member observer state in a contentious General Assembly vote.
At the same time, Japan has always taken care not to push things too far. It may sometimes go against US wishes at the United Nations, but its makes efforts to explain its choices in language that it hopes the Americans will understand. For example, on the 2012 Palestine vote, its government stated that “Japan urges both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to exert further efforts to build mutual trust…and to advance direct negotiations in order to realize a two-state solution at the earliest possible time.”
While Japan is the largest bilateral donor to the International Criminal Court, its statements at that forum regarding the pursuit of Israeli atrocities have been less than enthusiastic. Essentially, the Japanese position has been to avoid getting overly involved.
Gaza: The Deal Breaker
Japan started to move in a more overtly pro-Israeli direction under Shinzo Abe’s bullish and nationalistic government, which was in power from 2012 to 2020. A right wing ideologue, Abe was committed to revising the constitution and remilitarizing the country. Abe discarded the consensus-based methods of his predecessors. Though ultimately unsuccessful in constitutional reform, his government rammed through parliament extremely controversial bills allowing Japan’s military more freedom of action—mainly to engage in combat together with US forces—even when Japan was not attacked.
Though never stated explicitly in those terms, Abe understood that strengthening the military alliance with the United States meant stronger relations with other US allies, particularly Israel. Abe abandoned the traditionally quiet approach toward the Middle East and vigorously pursued closer Israeli ties, holding high-profile summits with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and entering into cooperation agreements, including in military areas. Corporate Japan was strongly “encouraged” to build relations with Israeli companies, especially in the technology and military sector. Though Abe resigned in 2020 amidst allegations of corruption and cronyism, his policies toward Israel have been continued. Indeed, it looked like Japan and Israel would become steadfast allies—that is, until October 2023.
The Abe government’s approaches toward Israel were of course subject to criticism from pro-Palestinian organizations in Japan, but such groups were relatively small and had little influence in the mainstream. The bulk of pro-Japanese Palestinian activists (indeed, of the country’s peace-related activists in general) was made up of retired seniors who had been involved in the student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Tactics were generally antiquated, and (rightly or wrongly) groups were looked upon as connected with opposition political parties, or even as left-wing extremist groups.
The Japanese were, and remain, horrified by nonstop video clips of bombed schools, slaughtered civilians, and starving children.
That changed dramatically as Israel launched its genocide in Gaza last October. Like populations everywhere, the Japanese were, and remain, horrified by nonstop video clips of bombed schools, slaughtered civilians, and starving children. In a country where demonstrations have generally not been part of the political culture since the 1970s, a large popular movement supporting Palestine has been born. Though not at the level seen in many western nations, sustained public protests have continued throughout Japan.
Importantly, this new pro-Palestine movement includes large numbers of young people (in particular university students), a population that had long been seen as apolitical, even apathetic. As in other countries, young Japanese activists do not rely on news filtered by mainstream media sources, instead using social media such as TikTok and Instagram to receive and exchange information. They have also borrowed tactics from activist movements in other countries, such as erecting protest tents on university campuses.
The movement is not centrally organized: most Japanese youth have shunned traditional organizations, instead turning to new, more flexible networks. It remains to be seen how the movement will develop in the long term, but it is difficult to deny that at least a significant segment of the public backs its views.
Public Pressure: Impossible to Ignore
Taken by surprise, the government has found itself between a rock and a hard place. Public opinion demands that the government take a more proactive stance toward peace, whereas the United States expects Japan to toe a line supportive of Israel. Public pressure has increasingly been tipping the scales.
In terms of voting patterns in UN fora, Japan’s initial reaction after October 7 was to fall back on its default stance, alignment with US positions. But as Israeli atrocities became impossible to deny and public pressure hard to ignore, Japan changed its stance. Similarly, Japan swiftly joined the Biden administration in suspending funds for UNRWA in February 2024, but resumed support for the organization in April after several European governments took the initiative.
Japan swiftly joined the Biden administration in suspending funds for UNRWA in February 2024, but resumed support for the organization in April after several European governments took the initiative.
There are other indications that public opinion is forcing Japan toward a more pro-Palestinian stance. Immediately after the ICJ decision in late January finding Israel plausibly guilty of genocide, the Japanese foreign minister issued a statement stating that the ICJ order “is legally binding on all parties … and to be observed in good faith.” While calling for the release of Israelis held by Hamas, Japan also “urged Israel to comply with international law, including international humanitarian law,” a veiled suggestion that Japan had concerns in that regard.
Just days later, Itochu, a major Japanese trading firm, cited the ICJ ruling when it announced that it was terminating its agreement with the Israeli military giant Elbit. A household name, Itochu is one of the titans of Japanese industry, and its decision sent shockwaves throughout corporate Japan. Of course, Itochu had “bottom line” considerations: it had been weathering a boycott of its convenience store chain, FamilyMart, in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia due to its Elbit ties. Nevertheless, the decision was remarkable in a country where large companies are generally slow to heed civil society’s concerns.
Though Itochu insists otherwise, it is unlikely that the company would have taken such a politically sensitive decision without at least the tacit approval of the Japanese government. Yet, it also came to light last month that the Ministry of Defense was moving forward with the potential procurement of Israeli drones, despite a public outcry on the issue.
Conclusion
Is Japan slowly moving toward a more principled position on Palestine, one grounded in respect for international law? Although still too early to say definitively, there are indications that public opinion has been pushing the government in that direction. The new Prime Minister Ishiba is known for his focus on security issues in East and Southeast Asia, so an independent stance on the Middle East may once again be low on the priority list. Reliance on the US military alliance will surely remain a key factor for any Japanese government for the near future. But waning American (and increasing Chinese) influence in the Middle East is undeniable—and of course the US November elections could also have unpredictable consequences for Japan’s foreign policy.
Still, it seems likely that the trend in Japan, like in western countries, is clear: the populace is outraged at Israeli violations of international norms, and will not stand for the government aiding and abetting those crimes. The government’s responsiveness to the public may fluctuate slightly in response to specific developments, but, overall, there may be no turning back for Japan’s stance toward Palestine.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Pvince73
