For the third time in the young history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a political leader identified with the “Reformist” camp has won the presidency. Masoud Pezeshkian—a member of parliament and former Minister of Health in the 2001-2005 government of President Mohammad Khatami—won nearly 55 percent of the vote in a runoff with veteran hardliner Saeed Jalili. His July 5 victory did not rival the huge majorities that Khatami secured in 1997 and 2001, or the more modest wins that former President Hassan Rouhani secured in 2013 and 2017. And yet given the hardliners’ continuing efforts to ‘cleanse’ the political system, in the wake of President Ebrahim Raisi’s sudden death in a May helicopter crash, it seemed a sure bet that hardliners would prevail in what was an unexpected and unplanned election.
Still, Pezeshkian defied the odds after a campaign that inspired a ten percent increase in turnout after the historically low 39.5 percent rate during the first round in June. While partly due to the failure of the hardliners to unite around a single candidate, Pezeshkian’s candidacy was buoyed by veteran reformists. Led by former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, these activists are now struggling to rekindle an amorphous reformist movement and often divided political elite that seemed completely irrelevant only a few short months ago. Inaugurated on July 30, Pezeshkian knows that his hardline rivals will be eager to clip his wings. Moreover, the now-escalating conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and Israel and Hamas will test his capacity to pull Iran’s regional allies—and perhaps Iran itself—from the brink of what could become a regional war. That test has certainly become far more acute with the July 31 assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in Tehran the day after Pezeshkian was inaugurated in the presence of Haniyeh and other leaders of the ‘axis of resistance.’
Iran’s Complex Politics and the Risks of Hegemony
In the lead up to the election, most Iran observers in the United States predicted a hardline victory. The most emphatic version of this thesis came from right wing think tanks such as the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).The FDD’s CEO Mark Dubowitz held that the election would be “rigged” and “stage-managed by the ‘Supreme Leader’,” while the AEI’s Senior Fellow Danielle Pletka predicted that “Raisi will be replaced by someone just like him.”
Such dire political forecasts display the poverty of imagination when it comes to understanding how Iran’s system works. Iran’s not-so-unique hybrid blend of state-managed elections has often depended on tolerating some arenas of competition in a system that created space for advocates of change but whose boundaries are ultimately enforced by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. It is certainly true that the space for this cat-and-mouse game has shrunk. But even some conservatives who might otherwise be unfriendly to the reformists apparently recognized the logic of reopening the political arena because they saw that the drive by a new generation of hardliners has expanded the chasm between state and society in ways that destabilized the system.
Indeed, concerns about the destabilizing effect of concentrating power in one faction played a role in Pezeshkian’s election. Rather than stigmatize his opponents, he emphasized his religious convictions, the need for consensus across ideological and ethnic divides, his desire to address pressing social and economic challenges in a context of revived—but conditioned—engagement with the West, and last but not least, his commitment to the Supreme Leader.
Iran’s hybrid blend of state-managed elections has often depended on tolerating some arenas of competition.
Highlighting his fidelity to Khamenei was a strategic given. After all, accepting the Leader’s authority is a prerequisite for participating in the system. Moreover, it was also a necessary tactical move because, in point of fact, Khamenei had made Pezeshkian’s candidacy possible by reversing the hardline-dominated Guardian Council’s previous decision to ban him from running. By design, or by default, Khamenei opened the door to a political activist who while devoted to ‘consensus’ among multiple factions is part of the reformist camp.
Of course, it is possible that Khamenei assumed that Jalili would win. But even if he lost, which he did, Khamenei had no reason to fear that Pezeshkian would pose a serious threat to the political system. On the contrary, the president-elect knew from his tenure as a minister in Khatami’s government—and as an MP elected six times—that any head-on bid by reformists to erode the system’s core power institutions—including the ‘Abode of the Leader’—will provoke a hardline backlash. How to deflect or mitigate such a counterattack while serving in an office whose powers are limited is the tricky balancing act that Pezeshkian must now manage. And he must do so in the long shadow of the struggle of two previous presidents, each of whom sought in different ways to open up their systems and societies against rising tides of hardline repression and intolerance.
Pezeshkian and His Reformist Allies at a Time of Opportunity and Danger
Given the unhappy history of reformist activism, it seems an exaggeration to argue that Pezeshkian’s election “signals a major moment in Iran.” As many Iran watchers have argued, Pezeshkian will have little room to make significant policy changes on the home or foreign policy fronts. A US Department of State official has echoed this grim assessment. “As the candidates themselves have said,” he noted, “Iranian policy is set by the supreme leader.”
And yet, given the domestic, regional and global challenges facing Iran’s leaders, Khamenei and Pezeshkian might find some common ground even as each of them also tries to placate their respective supporters. This kind of complex dance will not ‘change the system,’ but it could decrease the regime’s isolation in advance of a struggle over who will succeed Khamenei as Leader—a contest that could very well unfold during Pezeshkian’s presidency.
Pezeshkian has several assets that could help manage his relations with Khamenei while maintaining credibility with his core supporters. One of these advantages is his personal biography and personality. A heart surgeon and veteran political activist who speaks Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, and English, his service to the Islamic Republic—underscored by his volunteering as a combat medic during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s—has protected him from hardliner reproach. The son of Azeri and Kurdish parents, he has personified minorities’ concerns about social, economic, and even cultural and religious discrimination, especially in the Kurdish community. And while during the campaign he echoed the reformists’ critiques of the repression of the women’s movement—a cause of vital concern to the urban middle class—he did so not by emphasizing ideology, but rather by highlighting his personal integrity and commitment to using skill and “rationality” (as he often puts it) to address the key social and economic issues facing Iranians. A widower whose wife and son were killed during a 1994 car accident, his decision not to remarry but rather to devote his career to the public health service echoes a Shia ideal of self-sacrifice that many Iranians argue has been violated by a corrupt clerical elite.
Indeed, that Pezeshkian is not a cleric and yet has emphasized his personal piety gives him genuine popular appeal. At the same time—and in contrast to former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Hassan Rouhani, all of whom were reformist clerics—because Iran’s president-elect is a lay political activist, Khamenei will not have undue cause to worry that another leader who also wears the clerical robe might command more popular support. In fact, a workable if fragile division of labor between Iran’s only nationally elected lay leader and its ultimate religious figure could stymie the transformation of the presidency into a subservient institutional ally of the Leader. Such a power consolidation dynamic seemed well in train under former President Raisi, a veteran hardliner who was seen as a potential successor to Khamenei. Pezeshkian might now reassert the presidency’s powers, albeit limited, even if in doing so he could also invite dangers in case Khamenei comes to resent the president-elect’s popularity or concludes that Pezeshkian is defying his authority.
Zarif (and Friends) to the Rescue?
Pezeshkian’s bid to manage the intricacies of his relations with Khamenei could be boosted—and yet complicated—by the prominent role that Zarif played during and after the election. It is clear that Zarif viewed Pezeshkian’s candidacy and election not only as an opportunity for him to reenter the political arena, but more importantly, as a chance to widen the space for reformists.
The ambitious project has been underscored by the role that Zarif is playing as chair of the “Strategic Council for the Transition Period.” A body whose main function is to propose names of potential ministers to the president—a task that Zarif insists has been bolstered by the role of various “civil society” organizations—the committee could help shape the policies and ideological orientation of the next government. Of course, this assumes that the hardline-controlled parliament backs Pezeshkian’s nominations. But since their fate will ultimately depend on whether Khamenei backs, or at least does not oppose, these nominations, Zarif and partners will have to find a way to strengthen the reformists without giving their hardline rivals—or the Leader—cause to interfere in the formation of a new government.
Given the political stakes, it is not surprising that the committee’s deliberations have sparked a lively debate among reformists regarding what kind of government should be created. Should it, in the name of national unity, emphasize power sharing between reformists and conservatives and even some hardliners? Or should it be mostly constituted by reformists, some of whom were previously the political targets of hardliners in the parliament, security apparatus, and judiciary? Such calculations also reflect the concerns of the transition council’s reformist-oriented members. Indeed, the presence of Abbas Abdi—who in 2002 was sent to prison after a public opinion poll his organization conducted antagonized the hardliners, former MP Ali Shakouri-Rad—who was threatened by hardliners in 2016, and Mohsen Renani—who has assailed the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic (and recently warned against a government of “national unity”), is striking. These and other activists apparently believe that they should risk provoking the wrath of hardliners one more time if doing so helps to secure a government that reflects Pezeshkian’s domestic and foreign policy priorities.
Pezeshkian Navigates a Turbulent Sea
It is still too early to take the full measure of Pezeshkian’s ability to navigate the turbulent seas of Iranian politics—not to mention the wider region. But both his words and actions underscore how tricky this voyage will be. His decision to name veteran reformist Mohammed Reza Aref as vice president has stirred controversy. A Stanford University-educated 72-year-old politician who served as vice president under Khatami from 2002 to 2005, Aref has strong support from Zarif and other leading reformists, but others have criticized him as weak and ineffective, thus suggesting that he may be too eager to accommodate hardliners.
The appointment of former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as foreign minister points to an effort to have an open foreign policy. He is a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who helped to negotiate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Khamenei has probably backed Pezeshkian’s nomination because Araghchi is a veteran diplomat who is widely viewed as a useful interlocuter with the West and the United States in particular. That Araghchi’s appointment was rescued by the Supreme Leader underscores Pezeshkian’s dependence on Khamenei.
The appointment of former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as foreign minister points to an effort to have an open foreign policy.
Pezeshkian’s public statements also illustrate the fine line he must walk. His expansive piece in the July 12 edition of the semi-official English daily Tehran Times is a case in point. His pledge to “leverage all authority granted to my office to pursue” a policy based on “dignity, wisdom, and prudence” suggested that he is serious about invoking whatever powers given to him by the constitution, a promise easier to make than to keep given the power of the Leader and his hardline allies. Pezeshkian’s assertion that “neighboring and brotherly nations should not waste their valuable resources” but should instead “aim to create an environment where our resources can be devoted to…the benefit of all,” not only highlighted his repeated calls for a wider engagement policy but also seemed to telegraph his own resistance to a purely ‘resistance strategy,’ a stance that hardliners will not welcome, particularly given the rising tensions between Israel and Iran and the potential for a wider regionl confliguration that could draw in the United States.
Indeed, two issues will provide the ultimate test of this familiar reformist foreign policy view: the new president’s position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (and by association, on Gaza), and his approach to the United States and the issue of reviving talks on the nuclear issue. In his Tehran Times article, Pezeshkian insisted that “Israel remains an apartheid regime” that is “adding ‘genocide’ to a record already marred by occupation.” But he did not repeat the hardline call for the eradication of the Zionist regime. Instead, he emphasized that “my administration will urge our neighboring Arab countries…to prioritize achieving a permanent ceasefire.” His choice of words seemed to indicate that he might revive the classic reformist position that Khatami backed, namely that Iran will accept any solution acceptable to the majority of Palestinians.
And yet his subsequent call for “the dismantling of the Zionist regime” suggested that he had not in fact embraced the vague—yet potentially useful—formula that reformists have long advanced. With the Gaza war still raging and the prospects for a wider Israeli-Hezbollah war growing after the Hezbollah’s alleged lethal rocket attack on the Golan Heights and the Israeli response in Beirut, Pezeshkian will have difficulty arguing for diplomacy while echoing Iran’s maximalist position on the Palestinian-Israeli issue.
As to the JCPOA, Pezeshkian seemed to keep the door open in his Tehran Times piece that may have been written by Zarif himself. “The United States,” Pezeshkian stated, “unlawfully withdrew from the [nuclear] agreement,” and thus “missed a historic opportunity to reduce and manage tensions in the region.” Insisting that “Iran’s defense doctrine does not include nuclear weapons,” he urged the United States to “adjust its policy accordingly.” Despite, or because of, the hardliner’s opposition to concessions that would provide the basis for renewing the JCPOA, Pezeshkian seemed to signal that he would be open to just such a possibility.
At the same time, Pezeshkian will not take any position that could weaken the ample leverage that Iran secured by increasing its enrichment program after Donald Trump withdrew the JCOPA in 2018. Given the tough if perhaps justified line that Araghchi himself adopted during indirect talks that took place during the first year of the Biden administration—and the even harder position that his successor, Hussein Amir-Abdullahian, adopted after Raisi won the presidency—Iran’s new foreign minister and the new president will probably not rush to the negotiating table.
The American Response: Do as Least Harm as Possible
Apart from the ample constraints imposed by Iran’s complex political system, the fate of its reformist presidents has always rested on their efforts to engage with the West and with the United States in particular. The purpose of engagement has not only been to revive the economy by removing or reducing Western economic sanctions. For reformists, one unspoken goal of what Khatami called the “dialogue of civilizations” is to increase their domestic political leverage. This is precisely why hardliners have worked diligently to undermine the reformists. With the Supreme Leader succession contest looming during the next few years, hardliners will be loath to diminish the increased political and economic powers they have secured.
The challenge (or dilemma) for any US administration is how to grapple with the security and geo-strategic threats that Iran could pose in the Middle East and beyond while not inadvertently strengthening the hardliners or weakening the reformists. What the latter have always needed, but ultimately lacked, is the space and, most of all, the time to carefully advance their goals. They may have less of both now given the domestic, regional, and global contexts. However, at the very least, it would be helpful if American leaders would recognize that in Iran, as in many state-controlled autocracies, reformists can sometimes be important players, regardless of their levels of power.
There is no doubt that the assassination of Hamas leader Haniyeh has drastically narrowed President Pezeshkian’s room for maneuver. And yet, Iran has no interest in fostering a process of escalation that could lead to a crippling attack on Hezbollah—or worse, a military conflict with the United States. Eventually, Pezeshkian and his new foreign minister will probably reach out to a new administration. When, and if, they do, this positive effort should be prudently (and perhaps quietly) reciprocated. This will be easier if Vice President Kamala Harris is elected next November, and probably made impossible if Donald Trump wins and then resumes his previously disastrous Iran policies.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: President of Iran
