Commenting on Hezbollah’s retaliation to Israel’s August 25 pre-emptive strike on its positions, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani asserted that “Despite the comprehensive support of states like the United States, Israel could not predict the time and place of a limited and managed response by the resistance. Israel has lost its deterrence power.” The facts, however, suggest a different story. Israel has not only retained much of its deterrence power: Hezbollah’s movements indicate that it grasped the need to avoid actions that might lead to a wider war. Its secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, said as much when he insisted that Hezbollah’s response to Israel’s Sunday assault “completed” the operation to punish Israel for its July 30 assassination of military commander Fouad Shukr. Indeed, Nasrallah added, Hezbollah had deliberately avoided targeting civilian centers in Israel, thus adhering to the logic of controlled escalation.
Kanaani’s own words hinted that Iran embraced this logic. Despite his bravado, his reference to the “limited and managed response” alluded to his country’s concern that the resistance must avoid actions that jeopardize its elemental strategic interests, as well as its regional allies. This does not mean that Iran will indefinitely postpone retaliation for Israel’s August 1 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. But as newly appointed Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi carefully put it, Iran’s response will be “precise and calculated.” In other words, it will not give Israel an excuse for escalation beyond the point of no return. For now, a fragile consensus to limit the conflict endures, enhanced by Iran’s knowledge that US support for Israel could cost Iran dearly if it or Hezbollah launched attacks that killed large numbers of Israeli civilians. Israel’s actions in Gaza, of course, are not constrained by a similar calculation. But when it comes to Lebanon—where a ground war would invite what might be called Mutually Assured Destruction—Iran and Israel are for now standing on the edge of a precipice rather than taking one step forward into the abyss.
Javad Zarif’s Maneuvers
To be clear, that dire moment could emerge as result of miscalculation or just plain bad luck. Indeed, after their April 25 tit-for-tat where Israel and Hezbollah both avoided attacking major civilian targets, Israel’s leaders must surely be wondering whether things might have been different had they not first destroyed some 6,000 Hezbollah projectiles. Strangely enough, Iran’s leaders are probably asking themselves a similar question. One can almost sense a sigh of relief in Tehran, especially from President Masoud Pezeshkian. After all, his election was propelled in part by his promise to his reformist allies and supporters to renew diplomacy with western countries and perhaps even the United States. How he will—or can—deliver given the nearly suffocating embrace he has received from hardliners, and the still bubbling prospects for a wider regional war, is anyone’s guess.
Pezeshkian’s hopes for reviving a wider engagement strategy were dealt a blow after Israel assassinated Haniyeh, who was the honored guest at his inauguration. Indeed, one cannot blame reformists for suspecting that in killing Haniyeh Israel also sought to kill any bid by the new president to push diplomacy. Yet if the timing of the assassination looked suspicious, the domestic deck was stacked from the start. Pezeshkian was elected after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s intervention to reverse the Guardian Council’s decision to disqualify him from running in the first place. And beyond Pezeshkian’s dependence on the Leader’s good will, he faced the strong likelihood that hardliners would move quickly to undermine his new administration.
It is not known whether former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s sudden August 11 resignation as Pezeshkian’s deputy for strategic affairs was prompted by hardliner pressures. If it was however, his equally dramatic announcement on August 27 of his decision to remain in his position could help Pezeshkian deflect such pressures. Indeed, while the precise story behind these two weeks of Zarif’s maneuvering may remain a mystery, they illustrate the multiple forces shaping Iran’s domestic arena, not to mention his uncanny ability to survive and thus throw reformists something of a life raft.
While the precise story behind Zarif’s maneuvering may remain a mystery, they illustrate the multiple forces shaping Iran’s domestic arena.
In his resignation announcement, Zarif insisted that his decision “does not signify regret or disappointment with dear Dr. Pezeshkian,” but “rather, it reflects my doubt about my usefulness in the strategic deputy role.” That usefulness had been underscored by reports that hardliners had already moved to disqualify Zarif from the position of presidential deputy based on a law prohibiting any individuals, their spouses, or children holding dual citizenship from occupying “sensitive” positions in government. That law did not exist when he was previously serving as President Hassan Rouhani’s foreign minister. But its passing on October 2022 gave hardliners ample ammunition to go after Zarif, whose children were born in the United States and thus automatically held US citizenship.
While Zarif denied that his resignation had anything to do with his children’s dual citizenship, it is more likely that his resignation was prompted by his very public unhappiness with the failure of the transition steering committee, which he chaired, to push back against hardliner pressures to influence its proposed slate of nominees for key ministerial positions. He also was disappointed that the vetting process of new ministers may not have been as transparent as was announced. In the end, Zarif was led to opine that “I am not satisfied with the outcome of my work, and I’m ashamed that I could not adequately achieve what I had promised about representation of women, youth, and ethnicities and the expert opinion of the committees.” For this reason, he declared, the time had come for him to return to teaching in the university system and leave politics behind.
Reformists’ reactions to Zarif’s resignation reflected rising frustration and disarray within their already fractured ranks. The new president, one reformist stated, would become “the most hated president” in Iran’s history; another suggested that Pezeshkian should have named a slate of caretaker ministers until others could be found, while Javad Azari Jahromi—who had served as a key adviser to Pezeshkian—warned that criticism of the new ministers amounted to “shooting oneself in the foot.” Still another reform-oriented figure urged that critics of the new president “not set fire to the cabinet” because of unhappiness with a “few” nominees.
It may be that Zarif’s ‘resignation’ was meant to provoke these various protests in ways that might set the stage for his ‘return’ to the side of the new president. Zarif has a talent for this kind of maneuvering, as he displayed in February 2019 when he announced that he was leaving his position as foreign minister, a decision prompted by his apparent exclusion from official meetings with visiting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. After his statement prompted a call from his allies to withdraw his resignation, he did precisely that. Now Zarif may have pulled off a similar tactical move, one that was accompanied by his assertion that he is in fact happy with the makeup of the new cabinet. This effort to put an optimistic spin on what was a setback for him and Pezeshkian could reflect the continuing influence of hardliners. But it could also speak to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s desire to sustain the pro-diplomacy camp rather than allow ultra-hardliners to block a revival of engagement favored by Iran’s new Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
The New Eclectic Cabinet Limits Pezeshkian’s Room for Maneuver
Pezeshkian’s new ministers were approved on August 21 by the 290-member parliament. While experience suggests that some ministers might eventually be challenged, this vote of confidence in the cabinet was partly due to the fact that reformists have little representation in parliament. And yet, the cabinet is not a hardline controlled body. Instead, its ministers come from both hardline and more moderate factions. This mix will suit Supreme Leader Khamenei, whose power derives in part from his ability to arbitrate among competing groups. He can also depend on Pezeshkian to keep peace in the ranks given his own dependence on Khamenei
Not surprisingly, the key security portfolios are dominated by hardliners. Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib has served in that position since 2021. A cleric who studied with Khamenei and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khatib was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2022 for his role in cyber espionage. He has kept his portfolio despite being accused of failing to prevent terrorist bombings in Kerman in January 2024 and infiltration by Israel (as appears to be the case with the assassination of Haniyeh). This suggests that Khatib still retains ample support among his hardline allies. Brigadier-General Eskandar Momeni, the new interior minister, is an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander who presided over the crackdowns on protesters during the last three years. Apparently uncomfortable with a choice that was imposed on the new president, Pezeskhian insists that Momeni is “reform-minded,” which is clearly a stretch. Alireza Kazemi, the new education minister, has familial ties to the security sector, as his brother heads the IRGC Intelligence Organization. Zarif’s resignation was prompted by the selection of all three of these ministers. But he—and the new president—were probably pleased with the nomination of moderates such as Housing and Roads Minister Farzaneh Sadegh—the first woman to be appointed minister in ten years, Oil Minster Mohsen Paknejad, and Economy and Finance Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati. All three are technocrats with considerable experience in their professions.
Araghchi to the Rescue?
The same can be said for Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi. An experienced diplomat who has a PhD from Kent University and speaks English fluently, he led the Iran delegation that negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Though Araghchi is an outspoken defender of the Islamic Republic who has reiterated his loyalty to Khamenei, his appointment apparently rattled hardliners who criticized or opposed the deal altogether. Indeed, his elevation to the post of foreign minister suggests that the Supreme Leader believes that having an advocate of diplomacy who is viewed in both European and American policy circles as a pragmatist could benefit Iran at this dangerous moment.
All the same, he will still be constrained by hardline members of the cabinet. Pezeshkian must still choose some 900 undersecretaries, ambassadors, and provincial governors, all of whom will be vetted by a vast security apparatus tied to the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the “Front for Stability of the Islamic Republic,” a faction of super-hardliners who assert that the “era of strategic patience is over.”
Araghchi’s domestic space to advance an enhanced engagement strategy will depend on Khamenei’s backing and on the current precarious situation in the wider Middle East.
Given these constraints, Araghchi’s domestic space to advance an enhanced engagement strategy will depend on Khamenei’s backing and on whether or not the current precarious situation in the wider Middle East goes from bad to terrible. Still, it is striking that thus far, he has continued to reiterate his desire to strengthen diplomacy. As he put it in a recent interview with a Japanese news service, “In my foreign policy address to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, I highlighted the crucial objective of lifting sanctions, particularly unilateral ones, through earnest, focused, and time-bound negotiations while upholding the nation’s fundamental principles.” A former ambassador to Japan, his call for enhancing economic relations with the country speaks to the priority he attaches to, in his words, strengthening Iran’s “energy, oil, and economy section.” As he also suggested, since this will require removing or reducing sanctions, it is possible that Araghchi will push to renew indirect talks with Washington on the now defunct nuclear agreement.
While such a prospect seems inconceivable with the dreaded expectation in Iran (and elsewhere) that former President Donald Trump could win the presidency again, Iranian leaders must now consider that Vice President Kamala Harris might prevail in November. Maintaining Iran’s room for maneuver is a goal that both Khamenei and Araghchi support: it is the latter’s ace in the hole that will help him deflect pressures from super-hardliners. Khamenei himself stated on August 27 that “It is not contradictory to engage the same enemy in some places, there’s no barrier,” a statement that must be good news for Araghchi.
All Eyes on Gaza (and Doha and Cairo)
That room for maneuver could be vastly narrowed if the ongoing effort to sustain controlled escalation between Israel and Hezbollah (and Israel and Iran) collapses. But ultimately, containing these conflicts will depend on one thing: securing a ceasefire in Gaza. Both Iran and Hezbollah have made it clear that the ‘Axis of Resistance’ will continue putting military pressure on Israel so long as talks do not produce an agreement. This is likely to continue since the latest round of negotiations in Doha and Cairo failed. Secretary Blinken’s recent visit to Israel—where he said that the latest round may be the “last opportunity” to halt fighting and free hostages—underscores how desperate the Biden administration is to get a deal that would prevent a regional war.
But the fact of the matter is that neither Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor Hamas’ new leader Yahya Sinwar appear to actually want a deal that requires real compromise. Indeed, Netanyahu insists on continuing the war against Hamas. As for Sinwar, his strategy is simply to survive as Israel is drawn into a deeper quagmire. Learning from the Vietnam War, American leaders know how futile it is to fight an enemy whose absolute resolve is matched by its ruthless ingenuity. But the Biden administration is loath to use US military support to push Netanyahu to compromise. With elections on the very near horizon—and even more so, the prospect of Iranian retaliation for the assassination of Hamas leader Haniyeh—the United States is not about to play that card. Thus, however much he wants to renew diplomacy, Araghchi may find that his path forward will be blocked by forces beyond his control.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: president.ir
