Israel has vowed to step up attacks against Hezbollah and Iranian targets with the objective of pushing the Iran-backed militia away from the Israel-Lebanon border. For its part, the Biden administration has made it its goal to prevent war through a combination of military measures and diplomacy. For this mission, the White House tapped Senior Presidential Envoy Amos Hochstein—who in 2022 had helped negotiate a historic maritime demarcation deal between Lebanon and Israel—to negotiate a truce between Hezbollah and Israel. But Hochstein’s third trip to the region since October 7 ended without Israel acquiescing to a pause in fighting in Gaza (Hezbollah’s condition for negotiating) or Hezbollah agreeing to move its forces away from the Israeli border to allow displaced residents to return home (Israel’s key demand). Despite Hochstein’s shuttling, Hezbollah and Israel have continued to exchange strikes as the latter reportedly gears up for a major offensive aimed at neutralizing any future threat posed by the “Party of God.”
But as the United States tries to tamp down hostilities quickly, it is difficult to envisage a durable resolution to the current crisis without addressing Lebanon’s governance vacuum and the entrenchment of Iranian influence. Indeed, Hochstein’s meetings may change little on the ground since Lebanon’s caretaker government has limited powers and even less sway over the main powerbroker in this fight: Hezbollah. And because Israel is determined to deal with Hezbollah, which it now considers an existential threat, the prospect of war has become very real. In the absence of a more comprehensive roadmap for peace and security, including a strategy to diminish Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, only a more forceful US approach to dissuade the parties from deliberate provocation could ward off a potentially catastrophic scenario for Lebanon and the region.
Hochstein’s Difficult Mission
Guiding US-mediated diplomatic efforts is the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which helped end the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. The resolution stipulates that the southern area of Lebanon, between the Litani River and the UN’s Blue Line, should be free of weapons except for those belonging to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, deployed in South Lebanon. The current US proposal is a step-by-step approach to the redeployment of Hezbollah forces away from the border, starting with an 8 to 10-kilometer withdrawal—a distance purportedly equivalent to the reach of Hezbollah’s most effective anti-tank weapons and missiles such as the AT14-Kornet—followed by the positioning of supplementary LAF and UN forces. This would then allow the return of displaced citizens to their homes on both sides of the border.
The current US proposal is a step-by-step approach to the redeployment of Hezbollah forces away from the border, starting with an 8 to 10-kilometer withdrawal…followed by the positioning of supplementary LAF and UN forces.
The deal is believed to involve promises of a potential land border agreement—namely the demarcation of some 13 disputed points along the Lebanese-Israeli border—as well as financial incentives for Lebanon. But trying to get the parties to abide by 1701 through a phased withdrawal overlooks the fact that the resolution stopped working after cross-border skirmishes very early on followed its passage by the UNSC: Israel soon routinely violated Lebanon’s airspace and Hezbollah quietly re-established a military presence in the south. Although Israel today has tentatively accepted the initial US proposition, it has also threatened to drive back Hezbollah in accordance with 1701. Israel says that if Hezbollah is not successfully pushed back through diplomacy, it is prepared for another scenario that involves war.
Hochstein’s mission is proceeding as Israel’s war in Gaza rages on and threatens to spill into Lebanon. The United States has had to reposition itself quickly to limit a wider domino effect in the region. Soon after the October 7 attack the Biden administration dispatched aircraft carriers the USS Gerald R. Ford and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Eastern Mediterranean to be within striking distance of Israel and “deter” hostile actions against Israel or any efforts to widen the war. (The carriers were later swapped with the amphibious assault ship the USS Bataan and accompanying vessels.) Now, some of the US navy’s largest ships are being dispatched as part of a comprehensive aid strategy to increase the flow of aid to Gazans including through the construction of a temporary floating pier off the coast of the Strip.
Iran-backed groups in Syria and Iraq simultaneously seized the moment to conduct a record number of attacks against US facilities and positions, culminating in January in the death of three American soldiers in a drone strike in Jordan. Frictions were also ratcheted up when Yemen’s Houthi rebels began disrupting international shipping routes by targeting maritime traffic in the Red Sea last November. In retaliation, the United States has conducted strikes in Iraq and Syria, as well as in Yemen, while engaging in frantic diplomacy to keep the war confined to Gaza, including trying to dissuade Hezbollah from opening another front against Israel. The United States has prioritized trying to force agreement on a temporary ceasefire while addressing humanitarian needs in Gaza. Hochstein’s mission has been in this vein. But the slew of top Lebanese officials whom Hochstein has met are ineffective and do not call the shots; they are powerless to influence developments.
The United States has prioritized trying to force agreement on a temporary ceasefire while addressing humanitarian needs in Gaza. Hochstein’s mission has been in this vein.
United States Steadfast Support for Israel
From the start of Israel’s offensive against Gaza, the United States has been a key partner in and weapons supplier for Israel’s offensive, staunchly defending its actions and avoiding (at least initially) any punitive measures in response to the civilian death toll, which now exceeds 33,000 Gazans. But confronted with near famine conditions in Gaza, US President Joe Biden recently urged Israel to do more to limit civilian casualties, to allow more aid into the Strip, and to protect humanitarian workers and civilians. The administration also has redoubled its efforts to promote eventual Palestinian statehood and is exploring “day after” scenarios to stop the spiraling violence in Gaza. Having convinced Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to undertake a pre-emptive strike against Hezbollah, Biden has—while concurring on the need to defeat Hamas—pleaded with Israel to avoid war with the party. US concerns about a potential war may have been heightened by a secret Defense Intelligence Agency report stating that Israel with its current resources would be hard-pressed to win a war against Hezbollah.
Despite Biden’s recent tougher stance with Netanyahu, the United States has not gone as far as conditioning aid or military assistance to Israel, perhaps because the major operations envisaged by Israel against Hezbollah will require a new stock of weapons and ammunition.
Despite Biden’s recent tougher stance with Netanyahu, the United States has not gone as far as conditioning aid or military assistance to Israel, perhaps because the major operations envisaged by Israel against Hezbollah will require a new stock of weapons and ammunition. In a December 12, 2023 address, Biden reaffirmed that although Israel is losing support globally and needs to seriously consider a two-state solution, the United States would not “do a damn thing other than protect Israel in the process,” thereby signaling that the US transfer of weapons to Israel would continue unabated. The administration is giving Israel a free hand with military ordnance. More than once it has bypassed Congress to approve an emergency weapons sale to Israel despite some lawmakers’ outcry against the conduct of Israel’s war against Hamas. And a supplemental aid package—including $14.1 billion for Israel for missile-defense systems and weaponry—is pending in Congress (it still needs to pass the House) that would allow Israel to acquire the precision-guided missiles needed to launch a war against Hezbollah.
How Durable Would a Hezbollah-Israel Truce Be?
Meanwhile, Hezbollah has continued to engage Israel in cross-border attacks. In response to February 26 Israeli air raids deep inside Lebanon against Hezbollah strongholds in the Beqaa Valley, the group launched a barrage of 60 Katyusha-type rockets at Israeli positions in the occupied Golan Heights. There have been scores of strikes since. In addition to the displacement of more than 120,000 Lebanese from the border towns, these daily and increasingly intense tit-for-tat clashes have caused the evacuation of some 100,000 Israeli citizens from the northern towns of their country, and they now form a powerful lobbying force for a hard line with Hezbollah. Israelis increasingly believe that defeating not just Hamas but also Hezbollah will restore their sense of security.
Accordingly, Israel—which experienced a serious crisis of confidence in the October 7 attack—has pledged to drive Hezbollah away from the border by force if necessary. National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi signaled in December that once Hamas is defeated, Israel would no longer tolerate security threats to citizens on the border and would have no choice but to go to war with Hezbollah. Last month, after the failure of ceasefire talks with Hamas in Cairo, Netanyahu announced his intention to expand the offensive to Rafah to achieve “total victory” against Hamas—and then go after Hezbollah. Israel has since slowly expanded the “circle of war” to Beirut and even Baalbek in the Beqaa area, which it has struck repeatedly. It has also dispatched an estimated 100,000 Israeli troops along the northern border and demanded more vociferously that Hezbollah pull back its forces to the UN-mandated ceasefire line on the Litani, some 30 km from the border (a security buffer), in addition to seeking security guarantees against an attack originating from this zone. But the likelihood of Hezbollah agreeing to this is low, even though it has everything to lose from war with Israel. After all, the group derives its legitimacy from resistance operations against Israel’s past occupation of parts of Lebanon, which have reinforced its domestic support among segments of the population.
Iran has clearly benefited from the October 7 Hamas attack. Israeli-Saudi normalization is on hold, and the assault on Gaza has made it harder for Israel’s Arab friends to work with it; given rise to an impassioned anti-US and anti-Israel discourse in the region; and exposed weaknesses in Israel’s military might.
Iran has clearly benefited from the October 7 Hamas attack. Israeli-Saudi normalization is on hold, and the assault on Gaza has made it harder for Israel’s Arab friends to work with it; given rise to an impassioned anti-US and anti-Israel discourse in the region; and exposed weaknesses in Israel’s military might. But it is uncertain how much Iran, like Hezbollah, would gain from further escalation, especially if this leads to war with the United States and to the severe weakening of Iran’s prized asset, Hezbollah. Hezbollah has thus reacted to US diplomacy with mixed messages, refusing negotiations before a ceasefire in Gaza is reached, but also stating it is “open to US diplomacy to avoid a ruinous war.” The group realizes that, while escalation might cause Israel harm, it may not lead to Israel’s defeat but rather to the destruction of Hezbollah’s arsenal and stronghold in Beirut and the south.
Israel has reluctantly acquiesced to efforts to find a diplomatic outcome. But will an 8-to-10-kilometer buffer zone free of armed personnel other than the UN and Lebanese Army—as the United States is proposing—convince displaced Israelis and Lebanese to return to their side of the border? It is increasingly evident that only disarming Hezbollah will satisfy Israel. This underscores the importance of not just reaching a truce but making one last. The more time that passes and the longer that violence endures, the higher the risk of miscalculation and sliding into an uncontrollable war—and the less likely diplomacy is to bear fruit. A fight with Hezbollah would be deadlier and more devastating than war against Hamas because Hezbollah is better armed and trained, and because Iran may activate allied militias and proxies across the region.
Can the United States Prevent War?
While US efforts to quell tensions and avert war are commendable, it is difficult to envision a diplomatic solution to what is effectively a zero-sum game between Hezbollah and Israel. If Hezbollah does not withdraw from the border, which it has little incentive to do, Israel will force it to because this is a “do or die” situation and the United States is firmly on its side. Israel has already upped the ante with an April 2 airstrike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus that reportedly killed seven Iranian officials, including two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders. Considering the existential danger posed to Israel by Hezbollah’s longevity, it is difficult to imagine a situation where, when ready, Israel will not go to war. And when Israel does, it is difficult to imagine that Washington, despite entreaties to avoid escalation, will prevent it.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
