The July 13–18, 2025 violence between Druze and Bedouin in Syria’s southern al-Suwayda governorate was followed by a massive wave of tribal mobilization across the country. Thousands of tribal fighters from across the country streamed to this Druze-majority region, motivated by anger at the mistreatment of local Bedouin women, by the reported killing of government forces (including many tribesmen) in the clashes, and by the Israeli airstrikes—ostensibly to defend the Druze—that also killed several tribesmen. While not all the fighters were personally related to the local Bedouin tribes, they share similar cultural codes of tribal honor, solidarity, and collective obligation. Many of them consequently took part in the fighting, forming joint lines with local Bedouin forces against Druze militias.
Although the Syrian government did not officially order this tribal mobilization, it made no effort to halt the tribes from rallying to the south. In his July 19 speech, Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa thanked the tribes for their “heroic and noble stances” in al-Suwayda. He described them as a “shield against internal and external threats” and as an effective tool in preserving the country’s unity and stability. His rhetoric signalled more than simply praise: the al-Sharaa government increasingly is relying on tribes as instruments of coercion, legitimacy, and territorial control.
Arab tribes make up a significant part of the Syrian population and inhabit rural areas, especially in the east, as well as the outskirts of major cities. The Assad regime politically co-opted tribal leaders through patronage networks and parliamentary appointments but did not rely upon them as part of the military and security agencies. Although during the 2011-2024 civil war tribes were often split between supporting the opposition and the regime, tribal loyalties often provided bonds for armed groups on each side. The tribes’ political fragmentation was compounded by their widespread displacement: during the war, many tribespeople relocated inside Syria or left the country while maintaining connections to their tribal networks. In al-Suwayda, some—though not all—of the small tribal population remain connected to their wider families in regions such as Homs and Idlib further north.
The recent al-Suwayda clashes have made clear the rising influence of tribal structures during Syria’s post-Assad transition. The government’s seeming support of the tribal mobilization—alternating between strategic silence (effectively, a refusal to criticize) and selective endorsement—suggests that the state is not merely reacting to the tribes’ joining the violence in al-Suwayda but is positioning itself to benefit from it. Indeed, tribalism is emerging as a central tool for the authorities to assert control and legitimacy, while revitalising tribal identity at the grassroots level.
A New Army Built of Tribes
The new Syrian state, in particular its military and security services, is increasingly shaped by the earlier trajectory of al-Sharaa’s rise to power. In the early years of the civil war, al-Sharaa built the foundation for his first jihadi organization in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, in the eastern governorate of Deir al-Zor, near Iraq. Deir al-Zor became a stronghold for al-Nusra in part due to the presence of cross-border tribal-jihadi networks formed after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The Syrian town of al-Shuhayl, in particular, emerged as an important base of support. Here, the Abu-Kamil clan of the ‘Uqaydat tribe became al-Sharaa’s main backers.
In 2014, when al-Sharaa was forced out of Deir al-Zor by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), many members of the Abu-Kamil tribe accompanied him across Syria to the northwestern governorate of Idlib. Later, as a result of the brutal civil war, tribes in the rural areas of Homs, Hama, and Aleppo governorates undertook a mass migration to the opposition-controlled Idlib. Over time, many members of these displaced tribes joined what would later be known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was led by al-Sharaa and became the de facto governing authority in Idlib.
This fusion of tribal and jihadi elements revealed a certain pragmatism on both sides. While HTS moderated its hardline religious ideology to gain tribal support, the tribes engaged with the group for their own strategic reasons, blending their tribal identities with Islamic ideology. This interconnectedness of Islamic and tribal identities was especially evident in Idlib, where the merger of tribal allegiances with HTS’s goals reflected a negotiation of power, identity, and survival in a changing conflict landscape.
After the Assad regime fell to HTS-led rebel coalition in December 2024, these tribes began to form the backbone of the newly established military and security forces led by al-Sharaa and his former HTS fighters. This development created a complex interrelationship between formal state structures and tribal affiliations. After the July 17, 2025, Israeli airstrikes against Syrian military sites in al-Suwayda killed tribesmen, HTS-supporting tribes immediately understood the attacks as an assault on their kin, catalysing their mobilization toward al-Suwayda. These tribes view the al-Sharaa regime as part of their rise to power and considered the Israeli strikes as a threat to that political revival, prompting them to respond collectively in defence of what they view as their regained stake in the state.
Their response also revealed an important shift in allegiance. As tribes converged on al-Suwayda, many military and security personnel who are members of tribes shed their uniforms and donned traditional tribal dress—galabias and agals—to join their fellow tribesmen in fighting the Druze. The move highlighted the fluidity of identity in post-Assad Syria as tribal affiliations increasingly intersect with military and security roles.
Tribal Mobilization: The Vanguard of the New State
Tribal mobilization is becoming a powerful tool for the new authorities in Damascus to address internal and external challenges. The mobilization witnessed in al-Suwayda is the second instance since the Assad regime’s fall in which tribal forces rallied to support state efforts in regions where the al-Sharaa government’s security forces lack sufficient presence. The first such mobilization occurred on March 7, 2025, during clashes between government forces and Assad’s supporters along Syria’s coast. While tribes participated in the government’s military operation against Assad loyalists, Syrian state-affiliated media outlets did not frame their involvement as tribal mobilization. By the time of the al-Suwayda mobilization, however, state media clearly identified the involvement of tribes, illustrating the state’s evolving reliance on tribal forces for national security.
The al-Sharaa government’s growing dependence on tribal forces stems from the limited capacity of the new security forces to cover all of Syria. While the Syrian national army is being rebuilt, it lacks the reach and logistical capacity to secure every part of the country, particularly in remote areas like the Syrian coast. This gap has made tribal mobilization a critical tool for the government to extend its influence and respond to unrest when it does not have enough security personnel.
In the case of al-Suwayda, the tribal mobilization also demonstrated that the government supporters could still assert themselves against Druze factions, even after Israeli airstrikes had targeted Damascus and pressured the government to withdraw forces from al-Suwayda.
From Sectarianism to Tribalism: Loyalty and Mobilization
During the rule of Bashar al-Assad (2000-2024), the regime heavily relied on sectarianismMost key security positions were held by members of the minority Alawi sect to which the Assad family belongs. Tribes were largely sidelined from meaningful positions within the security forces, their roles often limited to auxiliary or subordinate functions that reinforced their dependence on the regime. Now, a different pattern is emerging under Syria’s transitional authorities, one that relies much more on tribal affiliations in staffing security institutions. Owing to their close ties to al-Sharaa and HTS, tribes that were displaced to Idlib during the civil war are playing a particularly significant role in the new security institutions. Some tribesmen have been formally integrated into official security structures while others are operating alongside them in an unofficial capacity.
One notable example is the appointment of Hussein Abdullah al-Salama, also known as Abu Musab al-Shuhayl, as the new head of the General Intelligence Directorate. Al-Salama hails from the aforementioned town of al-Shuhayl and is a member of the Abu-Kamil grouping of the ‘Uqaydat tribe that was closely aligned with al-Sharaa and HTS during the civil war. Al-Salama previously held senior roles within HTS. He was appointed not because of his tribal background but because he is a longtime ally of al-Sharaa. His new role, however, is bringing members of his clan and the broader ‘Uqaydat tribe closer to the circles of the government. There is mutual benefit: HTS sees members of the ‘Uqaydat tribe as trusted allies, while members of the ‘Uqaydat tribe view al-Salama’s appointment as a way to gain influence and to have a voice in the new government. Similarly, other tribes displaced to Idlib, such as the Fawaira from Homs, are seeing their members rise through the ranks of Syria’s newly restructured military. This shift signals a broader trend in post-war Syria in which tribal loyalty, rather than sectarian affiliation, is becoming a central pillar of governance—shaping not only military and security leadership, but also the staffing of the civil administration and local councils as well as access to state resources.
The government’s policy of rewarding members of tribal leaders with positions in the new security and political structures created an incentive for tribal participation in the al-Suwayda mobilization. By offering political and security appointments, the authorities have signalled that they will reward loyalty through tangible benefits such as jobs. Such rewards encouraged many tribes to join the mobilization campaign. One notable example is Farhan al-Marsoumi, a formerly pro-Iran figure who, recognizing the shifting dynamics, sent members of his al-Marasima tribe to fight in al-Suwayda. His move was a clear attempt to strengthen his relationship with the new authorities and to solidify his position in Syria’s emerging political system. By demonstrating loyalty to the new order, al-Marsoumi and other tribal leaders are positioning themselves as essential allies of the new government, further embedding tribalism as a powerful tool in the state’s strategy.
A Strategic Message to the SDF
By condoning the tribal mobilization in al-Suwayda, the al-Sharaa government is sending a clear message to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish and Arab factions based in northeast Syria: integrate into the state armed forces or face a similar wave of mobilization against them. Since 2023, the SDF has already been confronting a low-intensity insurgency by members of the ‘Uqaydat tribe. The state is aware of tribal grievances against the SDF and their potential to undermine the SDF’s position. If the SDF refuses to integrate its units into the national armed forces, they may face a tribal uprising that could unravel their control in the northeast.
The al-Sharaa government can now influence thousands of armed tribesmen who could be mobilized against the SDF, giving it powerful leverage. The use of tribal forces in al-Suwayda to further state goals may well presage a future government attempt to regain control over the northeast, which has been governed by Kurdish-led forces as a largely autonomous region since the civil war.
Tribes in Syria: Towards A New Political Order?
As discussed, all indicators suggest that tribalism is emerging as a powerful political force in the new Syria. This process is being driven both by emerging opportunities within the new system that al-Sharaa is creating and by grassroots dynamics within tribal communities themselves. At the government level, there is growing rhetoric that glorifies tribes and tribalism, with little attention paid to the potential risks and long-term consequences of relying on tribal forces for state security. As noted, Syria’s new political leaders have refrained from criticising the tribal mobilization that has taken place twice since the fall of Assad’s regime. Instead, they are praising the loyalty of the tribes and inviting their leaders, including those who were coopted by the state under the Assad regime, to political meetings.
A striking example of this shift occurred recently when the presidential palace hosted the display of a traditional tribal majlis to symbolically honor tribal heritage. This gesture, unprecedented in Syrian political history, not only acknowledges the importance of tribal culture but also reinforces the idea of tribalism as central to the new political order. Such government actions signify a clear attempt by Syria’s new authorities to legitimize and rely on tribal structures, framing tribalism not as a relic of the past, but as an essential force in the country’s future governance.
Tribal mobilization in al-Suwayda has reignited tribal sentiments and revived dormant bonds. Videos of tribal poetry celebrating the tribes’ military actions in the area have gone viral, amassing millions of views on social media. Such expressions of tribal solidarity resonate deeply across Syria. The sense of unity and identity among tribes is being bolstered, as tribal bonds are becoming a more prominent part of social and political life throughout the country.
In a similar pattern to the years following the 1963 Baathist revolution, when peasants and other people from rural areas started flocking to the cities, tribes are now moving to the capital, Damascus, to embrace the new state that they see as their pathway to political empowerment and economic opportunity. Just as the Baath Party relied on the rural population to consolidate its power, today the new authorities are leveraging tribal support to solidify their influence in the capital. This migration is part of a broader trend in which tribes are not only seeking to adapt to the new state order but also trying to shape it through political loyalty and communal solidarity.
Consequences of Syria’s Shift Towards Tribalism
It is not yet clear what the consequences of this trend will be for Syria’s future. The growing integration of tribes into the security and political landscape of the new state could create fragmented loyalties, weakening the national coherence needed for effective governance. As the state continues to empower tribes, their growing autonomy could deepen local and regional divides. As Iraqi sociologist Faleh Abdul Jabar once warned, a state’s reliance on tribes for military purposes could create a ‘Frankenstein-like’ monster, a situation in which tribal dynamics overpower national unity. This is exactly what seems to be happening in Syria: the government is effectively turning to traditional tribal practices such as ‘asabiyya (group loyalty), claims to territory, and revenge (tha’r) to maintain territorial control over the country.
The question remains: will tribalism serve as a unifying force, or will it splinter the country further into competing factions, undermining any hope of national reconciliation? The emerging trend suggests that the emerging role for tribes in Syria may be as much a challenge to national unity as it is a tool for the new regime’s political survival.
Haian Dukhan is Lecturer in Politics & International Relations at Teesside University, United Kingdom. He is the author of State and Tribes in Syria: Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns (Routledge, 2019).
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Fahed saad kiwan
