Many western media outlets have speculated about the quick collapse of the Syrian regime and its military and security services in their battle against a coalition of opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Operation Deterrence of Aggression succeeded in a mere 12 days in toppling one of the world’s most entrenched and brutal regimes, one that is responsible for the killing, injury, or displacement of millions of Syrians and the destruction of entire cities that dared to revolt against authoritarian oppression. Still, it is important to point out that this last campaign was only an extension of more than 13 years of revolution that saw several stages of weakness and strength and numerous military offensives and negotiation rounds in which local, regional, and international stakeholders participated.
The Opposition Coalition
Several factions coalesced to wage the operation, which was the Syrian opposition’s largest military campaign since 2020. These factions established the Military Operations Department as a unified and central command with one leadership.
Most important is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which was founded by Abu Muhammed al-Joulani in January 2017 after he severed his ties with the al-Qaeda movement in July 2016. In 2018, the United States designated HTS a terrorist organization and prohibited US interactions with it. HTS has been the most disciplined group in the armed opposition and can be credited with organizing the joint operation that culminated in the collapse of the regime.
Another faction is the Syrian National Army (SNA), which is trained and funded by Turkey. It is composed of members of the Free Syrian Army who previously defected to Turkey and were incorporated into the SNA. A third faction is the Ahrar al-Sham Movement which encompasses several Islamist parties. In addition, there are military formations like the National Liberation Front and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, both of which had participated at different times since 2013 in battles against regime forces.
Why Did the Opposition Win So Quickly?
Four main factors played a decisive role in the quick collapse of the Syrian army and the Assad regime.
- The qualitative edge of opposition weapons: Military leaders in HTS said that they began preparing for the battle against regime forces a year before launching their operation. HTS developed its military capabilities with locally produced missiles and drones (called Shaheen) which it used effectively against military and security targets. The drones were able to strike military vehicles and regime personnel from a distance of 30 kilometers and were heavily used in the city of Hama, whose conquest was essential for the success of the entire operation.
- Low morale of regime forces: Regime forces in areas of the operation suffered from low morale and feelings of abandonment by strategic allies such as Russia and Iran-friendly militias that had fought alongside them earlier in the Syrian crisis. This stood in contrast to the resolve, experience, and high combat morale of opposition forces, which hardly encountered any resistance during their assaults on the different strategic points and cities, starting with Aleppo and ending in Damascus. Indeed, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who was among the last to see Assad in Damascus, reported that the Syrian president complained about his army’s unwillingness to fight and the officers’ inability to mount the necessary counter-offensive to regain lost territory or at least to halt the opposition’s advance.
- Changes in the regional and international environments: As a pillar of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance,” the Syrian regime during the long years of civil war depended for its wellbeing and survival on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, and a Shia militia from Pakistan called the Zainabiyoun Brigade. But Hezbollah’s serious weakness after 14 months of war with Israel—especially the last three months during which Israel decimated its leadership—deprived it of the chance to assist the Assad regime militarily. Hezbollah’s inability to deploy fighters in Syria was accompanied by an Iranian decision to withdraw senior military officers who acted as advisors to the Syrian military and rank-and-file members of the IRGC, depriving the regime of allies on the ground who had gained experience in asymmetric warfare against the Syrian opposition.
- Decreased Russian military support: The fourth factor that weakened the regime’s response to the opposition’s campaign was the absence of decisive support from the Russian air force that had been instrumental in defeating opposition forces between 2015 and 2020. Russia’s full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine forced Moscow to withdraw much of its military assets, especially warplanes, from Syria. When the opposition coalition began its assault on Aleppo, Russia had a limited number of military aircraft in Syria which were used to strike opposition positions in Hama, Idlib, and Aleppo, but with no discernible effect on the ground.
To be sure, the catalyst for the opposition’s military operation was certainly domestic, but it benefited handsomely from regional and international changes to effect regime change in Damascus. After more than 13 years of war and displacement, and of dashed hopes for change and failed negotiations, the opposition ultimately succeeded in achieving its dream of overthrowing the Assad family regime, which ruled Syria with an iron fist for 54 years.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Mohammad Bash
