News of the fall of Damascus on December 8 hit hard in Washington. No one was expecting it. US officials had inklings, but the speed and totality of the rebel takeover of Syria was a shock to both policymakers and foreign policy observers.
Now the United States needs to clean up—not Syria, but the wreckage of its own policy. The Middle East region and its politics seemingly changed overnight, without regard to Washington’s priorities. It will not be easy, especially with major political change coming to the US capital when Donald Trump returns to the White House. Resolve, consistency, vision, and significant amounts of foreign assistance will be required to take advantage of the massive opportunity presented by the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—and to prevent the daunting costs of complacency or failure. Such costs include the return of the so-called Islamic State (IS) or an Afghanistan-style interregnum in Syria involving resurgent terrorist groups, militias competing for power, and warring regional players trying to stake their own claims on the country’s future. Whether Washington will be up to these challenges is a huge question mark, especially with Trump leading a premature transfer of power by posting to social media and meeting with world leaders, as President Joe Biden appears to fade away.
As American Middle East Policy Crumbles
The Biden administration arrived in office with lofty goals for the Middle East. Biden promised to hold Saudi Arabia and Egypt accountable for human rights abuses and pledged vague but consistent support for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Administration advisors also eyed a military and policy withdrawal from the Middle East, a so-called pivot to the Indo-Pacific (a refresh of President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia”) that would refocus American military forces and diplomatic efforts on a vital arena of competition with China.
These priorities wobbled as events unfolded.
Biden soon reverted to Trump’s policy of effecting Arab-Israeli peace through the Abraham Accords, which aim to promote peace among governments based on security and economic ties involving Israel, the Gulf States, and whoever else (such as Morocco and Sudan) could be persuaded to sign on for political and other favors. The Biden team largely ignored the plight of the Palestinians as well as the ongoing war in Syria—as if these conflicts had nothing to do with Middle East peace.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, causing oil and gas prices to spike, Biden was forced to downplay concerns over human rights in order to remain in the good graces of Middle East petro-autocrats. His visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2022 to plead for Saudi cooperation on oil prices (and to rehabilitate rights abuser Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the process) was widely seen as a humiliating climbdown from a principled position.
And then came Gaza. Although the Biden administration hemmed and hawed, wrung its hands over civilian deaths, and intermittently pledged to withhold military aid to Israel, in the end it did precious little to protect Gazans from death and displacement by US-provided weapons. And the war goes on today with full US support, and no end in sight. The administration suddenly rediscovered the two-state solution as a possible means to end the conflict, but faced with adamant Israeli opposition and the Palestinians’ internal divisions, the idea went nowhere. In a sense it did not matter: the administration never bothered to offer details, plans, concepts, or even a special envoy to advance a fully-formed policy.
After years of relative complacency, a reckoning has arrived.
With Israel’s onslaught against Gaza, Hezbollah, and Iran causing a humanitarian disaster in the former and temporarily incapacitating the latter two, Biden’s hope for a legacy-making diplomatic deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as deeper Israeli normalization with other Arab states, appears further away than ever. For Riyadh, the political risks of normalizing relations with Israel have made this deal much harder to achieve, at least in the near-term. And with Iran and Hezbollah weakened, the kingdom probably does not see the urgency of moving forward precipitately, since a major security consideration that would accompany an Israel deal has been diminished.
After years of relative complacency and policies that put the White House well behind the curve of events in the Middle East, a reckoning has arrived. The Biden administration, on its last legs, is confronted with the need to forge a new Syria policy, with a failed approach to Gaza, the shambles of a regional peace deal, and support for human rights firmly in the rear-view mirror. What comes next is very much up in the air.
Biden Administration Reacts, But What Can It Really Do?
Fewer than 24 hours after Assad’s sudden fall, Biden spoke from the White House Rose Garden to deliver the first official American view of the stunning events in Syria. He said that “the fall of the regime is a fundamental act of justice,” noting, “It’s a moment of historic opportunity for the long-suffering people of Syria to build a better future for their proud country.” But he also allowed that “it’s also a moment of risk and uncertainty.” Biden then went so far as to claim Assad’s fall as a victory for US diplomacy, a result of American backing of Israel in its ever-expanding war aims.
In his remarks, Biden named three steps that his administration would take to respond to events in Syria: supporting Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel should any threat arise from Syria; protecting the approximately 2,000 US troops reportedly remaining in Syria to combat IS; and engaging all Syrian groups to establish a new political process based on the concept of an inclusive government. Biden acknowledged the primacy of Syrians themselves in this process.
While visiting Jordan a few days later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expanded on the president’s theme. He told reporters that the Syrian transition “should be inclusive, non-sectarian…It’s got to uphold and protect the rights of all Syrians, including minorities, including women.” Blinken also highlighted the importance of protecting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which the United States has backed as an anti-IS force.
The Biden administration seems more focused on claiming credit for the downfall of the Assad regime than on implementing an organized international strategy.
The elements of the Biden administration’s framework are reasonable enough, but belie the serious lack of influence that the United States has at this moment. For one thing, the United States has few means to project power in Syria, with only 2,000 troops on the ground and no diplomatic presence. The United States designated Hay`at Tahrir al-Sham, the major group in Assad’s ouster, as a terrorist group in 2018, and this policy, together with Congress’s continuation of the “Ceasar sanctions,” legally limits the US ability to aid the Syrian government. By contrast, Turkey has assumed enormous influence, especially in Syria’s north. Ankara may be readying a major military incursion alongside its own militia allies there to combat, among others, the US-allied SDF, which Turkey considers an adjunct to the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party. Washington currently has few means to counter such a move.
The administration seems more focused on claiming credit for the downfall of the regime in Syria than on implementing an organized international strategy, which would include effective cooperation with Turkey in the north, expanding contacts with all parties, and mustering financial assistance and political heft to meet the present moment. But few relevant policy ideas have been advanced by the administration.
And How About Trump?
Any serious framework for Syria offered by the outgoing Biden administration will be subject to revision, and probable rejection, by the incoming Trump administration. In the second Trump term, Israel will most likely be given the lead in regional policy, a role that it already assumed over the last 14 months while Biden struggled to keep up. Key leaders in the Gulf will also have the new president’s ear.
Israel is entrenching itself in northern Gaza, forbidding erstwhile inhabitants from returning home. Egypt is terrified that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government may push the remainder of Gazans into northern Sinai. Settler organizations are already talking about re-occupation of northern Gaza, and potentially establishing Israeli settlements in recently occupied areas of Lebanon and Syria. Surging violence in the West Bank by Israeli settler militias, abetted by the Israeli Army, may presage ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, with a major impact on Jordan. And Israel has asserted itself in Syria, mounting a heavy air campaign to destroy its military assets, an indicator of its intention to continue to dictate terms throughout the region. Trump appears likely to assent to much of this.
While the current situation presents opportunities for advancing US policy priorities, depending of course on how they are defined, this will require political will, intent, capability, and money. It is far from clear whether the incoming Trump administration will offer any of these. Trump’s minor forays into Syria policy in his first term included the 2017 bombing of a base associated with the Assad regime’s chemical weapons attacks, and a second attack in 2018 against similar facilities. It also included his putative announcement late that year that US troops would be pulled out of the country, which prompted the resignation of then-secretary of defense James Mattis and then-coordinator of the counter IS coalition Brett McGurk (now Biden’s head of Middle East policy), as well as considerable chaos on the ground. Otherwise, Trump essentially ignored the country, as did his predecessor Obama, who caved on his 2012 pledge to enforce a “red line” on the use of Syrian chemical weapons. Obama’s successor Joe Biden did not involve himself at all. If Trump intends to do more, there is little indication of it so far.
In a social media post the day before Assad fled his country, Trump made clear his lack of interest in intervening. He posted on X that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” Trump’s National Security Advisor-designate Congressman Mike Waltz (R-FL) elaborated in an interview on Fox News that “President Trump was elected with an overwhelming mandate to not get the United States dug into any more Middle Eastern wars.” Waltz said that core US interests in Syria are preventing the return of IS and defending the interests of Israel and US Gulf allies.
The most likely course for Trump is to follow Israel’s lead.
Secretary of State-designate Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) has said little about recent developments in Syria. In the past, he had taken a different position, strongly backing Syrian-led regime change in 2017, harshly criticizing Trump’s announcement that he was withdrawing all US troops in 2018, and staking out an alternative policy in early 2019 through the introduction of a Senate bill aimed at keeping US forces in the country. Considering Rubio’s conversion to the Trump worldview, it is unclear whether he still holds these views and is willing to fight for them. But Rubio’s past positions inject a potential element of dissent into the formation of Syria policy. Waltz too had a much different view in 2019, when he criticized Trump’s seat-of-the-pants decision to withdraw US troops as a “strategic mistake” that would create “the conditions for ISIS to return,” a position similar to Rubio’s at the time.
It is unknown whether the president-elect will be influenced by his advisors. But the most likely course for Trump is to follow Israel’s lead. He may also heed what key Gulf allies, primarily major US arms purchasers Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, tell him American interests should be; this will be most effective if they are willing to bring money and ideas to the table. This is no guarantee of a more robust US policy, of course—and Trump may very well surprise—but he may be willing to farm out US policy to eager allies without getting overly involved, “America First” in action.
The Issues for the Next Administration
Trump’s problem, of course, is that Syria cannot be dealt with effectively by a single-minded focus on security, or what certain allies want, and that defending the interests of said allies and preventing the resurgence of IS requires rather more extensive US engagement than Trump seems willing to commit to. Most US regional partners hope and expect that Washington will take the lead in organizing a collective response to post-Assad Syria; yet, apparently anticipating a power vacuum in Damascus, they are already scrambling for influence. Many Arab leaders also may worry that with the fall of the Syrian dictator, they could be next. A weakened Iran may also think in the same terms.
In addition to dealing with the competing interests of various regional parties, the Trump administration will have to work with the United Nations Security Council, whose political and economic process for managing the conflict (based on Resolution 2254 of 2015) will have to be accommodated. Successive US administrations have essentially ignored the UN since the passage of 2254. But with Syria in fresh turmoil, the UN can no longer be ignored, especially by the United States if it is to avoid doing all the heavy lifting itself.
Unless Biden acts before leaving office, Trump will be faced with the decision of whether to end the designation of HTS as a terrorist organization.
Unless Biden acts before leaving office, Trump will also be faced with the decision of whether to end the designation of the lead militant group involved in overthrowing Assad, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and its head—the new presumed leader of Syria—Ahmed al-Sharaa, from the American government’s terrorist register. Failing to do so would prove a big impediment to dealing with the likely rulers of post-Assad Syria, further reducing US influence and limiting Washington to the twin tools of military force and sanctions.
In other words, international diplomacy and cooperation will be crucial going forward, something that does not come naturally to Trump. If the president-elect and his foreign policy team are serious about the priorities they have publicly raised, they will need a more sophisticated, multilateral policy than “DO NOT GET INVOLVED.”
Washington Needs a Holistic Approach
With a presidential transition imminent, US policy on Syria, not to mention the broader Middle East, is in limbo. This is unfortunate and potentially costly, due to both the strategic opportunities and threats posed by the violent transition in Syria and the unsettled regional situation. The stakes are high. The future of Trump’s approach toward the region, which still seems based on Arab-Israeli normalization through the Abraham Accords, could be scrapped or sidelined by the scramble for influence in post-Assad Syria, as well as by the very real possibility of intensified armed conflict in the region. None of these problems is discrete: the outcome in Syria is intimately tied to developments throughout the area. A holistic approach involving all elements of US influence, including foreign aid and military power, will be necessary to secure the stake the United States has in order and positive change. The incoming Trump administration will have to work fast to take full advantage of whatever influence the United States still has.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Mohammad Bash
