Since last November, Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, commonly known as the Houthis, has been attacking commercial and merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea. A response to Israel’s war on Gaza, the group’s maritime attacks have targeted what they claim are vessels traveling to Israeli ports or linked to Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom. All six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]) have grave concerns about the impact of Ansar Allah’s conduct on shipping routes, which are essential for oil and gas shipments upon which Gulf economies rest.
But since the United States and United Kingdom began military operations against the Houthis last January with the aim of “deterring” the maritime attacks, most Gulf Arab monarchies have viewed this western intervention as misguided. Although they have opposed the Houthis’ attacks, leaders in most GCC states see the American-British bombing campaign against Ansar Allah as an unrealistic and dangerous strategy.
GCC States’ Positions
In a wider context, GCC members have lost confidence in the United States’ ability to provide a more balanced leadership in the Middle East. Many Arabian Gulf officials believe that the American-British intervention against Ansar Allah is a disruptive campaign that may leave regional states to pick up the pieces after Washington and London eventually disengage from the area. Arabian Gulf governments increasingly perceive that Washington is ignoring the GCC states’ security concerns regarding the Houthis and Iran—while providing blank checks to Israel.
In December 2023, the United States and several allies formed Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea in the face of Houthi maritime attacks. Bahrain was the only Arab state to join the operation and, other than the Seychelles, the only non-western country to do so. When the American and British militaries commenced their attacks in Yemen in January 2024, Bahrain was again the sole Arab state to provide non-operational support. Bahrain’s fellow GCC members chose not to join the effort or to be officially involved.
Following the announcement of Operation Prosperity Guardian, some GCC states raised concerns about Washington and London’s actions.
In January, following the announcement of Operation Prosperity Guardian, some GCC states raised concerns about Washington and London’s actions. Qatar warned the West against “just focusing on the symptoms” while avoiding the “real” cause—Israel’s war on Gaza. Kuwait expressed its “grave concern and keen interest in the developments in the Red Sea region following the attacks that targeted sites in Yemen.” Oman went further and “condemn[ed] the use of military action by friendly countries” and “denounce[d] the resort to military action by [western] allies while Israel persists in its brutal war without accountability.”
It is not surprising that Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City reacted negatively to the American-British military intervention against the Houthis. Oman never participated in the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis that commenced in 2015; Qatar split from the coalition two years later; and Kuwait played a mostly symbolic role. But Saudi Arabia’s decision to distance itself from the US-UK action is perhaps more remarkable.
Previously the most hawkish GCC state toward the Houthis, in the past Saudi Arabia would have strongly supported western military action against the group. Today, however, the kingdom seeks to avoid warfare with Ansar Allah at nearly any cost. Nor did the UAE support the American-British actions outright, although it did not condemn them, either. On January 12, Abu Dhabi emphasized the importance of maintaining security in Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, striking a rather neutral position.
Gulf Arab officials have generally avoided publicly criticizing Washington and London on this issue. Given the GCC members’ close partnerships with both western capitals, they have probably opted to express concerns privately to avoid any major spats. In May, the UAE and other Arab states began restricting the US military’s ability to carry out operations against Iran-aligned groups in the region, including in Yemen, from military bases on their soil. With decades of close UAE-US military cooperation, this development must be understood as shaped by various factors motivating GCC states to distance themselves from the US and UK-led intervention in Yemen.
Fearing the Houthis
A major factor in such GCC calculations is the threat of Houthi reprisal attacks. When the Riyadh-led military coalition was waging war against the Houthis, from March 2015 until the truce of April 2022, Ansar Allah launched numerous missile and drone attacks against various targets in the kingdom. Such incidents included Houthi strikes on airports in Riyadh and Abha starting in 2017; a Houthi strike on a large oil facility in Saudi Arabia’s southern city of Jizan in July 2020; and a barrage of attacks on liquefied natural gas and water desalination plants and a power station and oil facility in the kingdom in March 2022. Riyadh ultimately decided to negotiate with Ansar Allah over the terms of a Saudi exit from the Yemeni quagmire in no small part due to the impact of such attacks on the kingdom. Saudi Arabia understood that with time the threat from Ansar Allah would only grow more dire. With assistance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Houthis were becoming more sophisticated in their increasingly frequent missile and drone strikes against Saudi Arabia. During the first nine months of 2021, the number of Houthi attacks in the kingdom had doubled from the same period in 2020.
Focused on Vision 2030, which requires a massive level of foreign investment, the Saudi government realized that the kingdom’s seemingly unwinnable war against the Houthis was undermining its ability to achieve its economic development and diversification objectives. In March 2022, for example, Ansar Allah hit a fuel depot in Jeddah with a missile during a Formula One Grand Prix event, reminding Riyadh that sports and entertainment industries that are in line with Vision 2030 require stability and security inside the kingdom.
The UAE has also suffered from Houthi ballistic and cruise missile and drone attacks. On January 17, 2022, Ansar Allah hit targets in Abu Dhabi, which is some 900 miles from Sanaa, killing three Abu Dhabi National Oil Company employees from India and Pakistan. The missiles and drones hit an oil facility and a portion of Abu Dhabi International Airport that was under construction. The strikes were Ansar Allah’s response to the takeover by the UAE-backed Giants Brigade (an ultra-conservative southern militia mostly made up of Salafist tribal fighters) of Houthi-controlled districts in the oil-rich province of Shabwah. Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein al-Ezzi asserted that “the attack on Abu Dhabi falls within our right to defend ourselves.” Later in January 2022, Ansar Allah attempted new rocket attacks against Abu Dhabi and Dubai, but the Emirati and American militaries managed to intercept the missiles.
Tel Aviv is coming to terms with the serious security challenges posed by the Ansar Allah.
Emirati officials understand the importance of maintaining the UAE’s reputation for domestic stability, which is essential for attracting businesses, investment, and tourists. As approximately 90 percent of the country’s residents are foreigners, any (real or perceived) threats to their safety can have serious consequences for the UAE’s economic health. Therefore, assuaging such security concerns is a top priority for Emirati authorities.
This year Saudi and Emirati officials have observed successful Houthi strikes in southern Israel and Tel Aviv using a version of the Samad-3 drone, which had to indirectly travel roughly 1,600 miles to reach its target. This meant that not only Israeli—but also American, British, and Egyptian—air defense systems had failed to detect the drone. As Ansar Allah has gained prominence within the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” for its actions vis-à-vis Israel, Tel Aviv is coming to terms with the serious security challenges posed by the Yemeni group. It is thus easy to understand why officials in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are apprehensive about Ansar Allah’s capabilities and about the Houthi war machine’s threat to Saudi and Emirati national security.
Keeping Détente with Iran on Track
With the UAE having restored full diplomatic ties with Iran in 2022 and with Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with the Islamic Republic the following year, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh both have assessed that keeping dialogue open with Iran serves their countries’ interests. Rather than dealing with Iran in a confrontational and hawkish manner, both GCC members see diplomatic engagement with Tehran as the most realistic way to protect Gulf Arab states from the perceived Iranian threat. The UAE and Saudi Arabia seek to avoid a return to the tensions that plagued the Gulf in 2019. In that year, Iran-linked sabotage and drone and missile attacks on energy infrastructure and vessels in or near their territory highlighted Tehran’s ability to easily disrupt their visions for economic development, which require peace and stability.
Emirati and Saudi officials are aware of Iran’s close relationship with the de facto Sanaa government and of Tehran’s ability to influence the Houthis (although to what degree is debatable). A major concern in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh is that their support for the US-UK military operations against the Houthis could disrupt their fragile détente with Iran. Furthermore, should the détente derail, Tehran has the ‘Houthi card,’ meaning that Iran could encourage Ansar Allah to resume its hostilities toward GCC states that it sees as backing the West and Israel against Iranian interests in the region.
Domestic and Regional Audiences
Public opinion in the Arab world also incentivizes most Gulf Arab states to distance themselves from the American and British military operations against Ansar Allah. Even if all GCC governments oppose the Houthis’ maritime attacks, there is significant sympathy among their citizens for Ansar Allah’s Gulf of Aden and Red Sea operations. In the Arabian Gulf, much of society perceives Houthi actions to be in defense of Gaza.
Therefore, if GCC states were to play supportive roles in Operation Prosperity Guardian or the American-British military intervention in Yemen, they could aggravate state-society tensions. Because the Palestinian issue can quickly mobilize Arab citizens, Gulf Arab leaders are sensitive to how their responses to the Gaza war can impact their legitimacy among their populations, especially as Israeli normalization has become increasingly unpopular in the post-October 7 period. For example, many Bahraini X/Twitter users expressed their opposition to Manama’s role in Operation Prosperity Guardian with a hashtag that said “#Bahrainis Against the Coalition.” Pro-Ansar Allah messages from Oman’s Grand Mufti, who does not speak for the government but has opinions that are popular among many Omanis, also highlight the extent of support for the Houthis among GCC nationals.
Vested Interests in Stability and Conflict Resolution in Yemen
Gulf Arab officials are growing increasingly nervous about the potential for the Gaza war’s expansion to reach the Arabian Gulf and want a Gaza ceasefire implemented as soon as possible. Gulf Arab leaders agree on the need to defuse tensions in Yemen and prevent exacerbation of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea security crises. Saudi Arabia wants to reach a pact with the Houthis whereby Ansar Allah would cease to threaten the GCC states, and the Saudi military could achieve a dignified exit from the Yemeni conflict(s) after years of a disastrous and humiliating campaign.
Ultimately, most GCC states, and some Arab governments farther away, have valid concerns about how American and British military action in Yemen could jeopardize their own security. With Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza approaching its first anniversary and with the Middle East teetering on the brink of a wider regional conflict, the Gulf states will continue to be as neutral as possible toward western efforts to challenge the Houthis in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: US DoD
